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A Subsumption Theory ofMeaningful Verbal Learning andRetentionDavid P. Ausubel aa Bureau of Educational Research , University of Illinois ,USAPublished online: 06 Jul 2010.
To cite this article: David P. Ausubel (1962) A Subsumption Theory of MeaningfulVerbal Learning and Retention, The Journal of General Psychology, 66:2, 213-224, DOI:10.1080/00221309.1962.9711837
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1962.9711837
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The lourrial of Gcnrrcii Pryrhofogy , 1962, 66, 213-22+.
A SUHSUXlPTION T H E O R Y OF il lEANlNGFUL VERBAL L E A R N I N G A N D R E T E N T I O N *
Bureau of Educational Rcsrnrch, Universiiy of Illinois
DAVID P. AUSUBEL
A. IXTRODUCTION In a previous paper ( 3 ) , the writer distinguished between “reception”
and “discovery” learning on the basis of whether the content of the learning task (i.e., what is to be learned) is presented to or independently dis- covered by the learner. In verbal reception learning, presented material is merely “internalized,” i.e., made available (functionally reproducible) for future use. It was also maintained that reception learning is meaningful provided that the learner adopts a set to relate the material to cognitive structure,’ and that the material itself is logically, i.e., non-arbitrarily, relatable thereto. In other words, pupils do not independently have to discover concepts or generalizations before they can understand or use them meaningfully. Direct empirical and nonverbal contact with the data on which verbal constructs are based is only necessary for meaningfulness prior to junior high school age (8).
T h e aim of the present paper is to present a comprehensive theory of cognitive organization and of long-term learning and retention of large bodies of meaningful, verbally presented material. I n the absence of such a theory, inappropriate explanatory principles have been uncritically ex- trapolated from experimental findings on nonverbal or on short-term, frag- mentary, and rote verbal learning. As a result, not only have advances in the efficient programming of verbal classroom learning been impeded, but teachers have also been encouraged to perceive meaningful verbal materials as rote in character and to persist in the use of rote teaching methods.
T h e scope of this theory is limited to the nature and conditions of meaning- ful, verbal reception learning and forgetting. Hence it deals only with problems of cognitive organization and interaction, i.e., with ( u ) systematic changes in the availability and identifiability of presented ideational materials as they interact with and are incorporated into existing cognitive structure,
Received in the Editorial Office on July 21, 1960. 1 By “cognitive structure” is simply meant a given individual’s organization of
knowledge.
213
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214 JOURN.41. OF G E S E R . 4 L PSYCHOLOGY
and ( I ) variables increasing or decreasing the incorporability of these materials as well as their subsequent availability. It does not include less complex kinds of learning such as classical or instrumental conditioning, discrimination learning, and perceptual o r motor skills learning, or such other forms of cognitive activity as nonverbal, rote or discovery (e.g., concept formation, thinking) learning. I n the writer’s opinion, entirely different rxplanatory principles are required to account for these latter tvpes of learning. Also, although their importance is in no sense discounted, no attention is paid to motivational, emotional, and attitudinal factors in learning ; to incentive and Interpersonal conditions ; to ego-involvement and personality variables ; or to individual differences in cognitive capacity and orientation to learning. Cognitive and noncognitive factors undoubtedly influence the learning process concomitantly, and probably interact in various ways; but for research purposes either set of factors can be systematically varied while the other is held constant.
13. RESEARCH APPROACHES TO L’ERBAL RECEPTION LEARNING ’The principles governing the nature and conditions of meaningful, verbal
reception learning can only be discovered through an applied or engineering type of research that actually takes into account the distinctive attributes of this phenomenon as it occurs in the classroom ( 1 ). W e cannot merely extrapolate general “basic science” laws derived from the laboratory study of qualitatively different and vastly more simple ,instances of learning ( 1 ). Contrary to Spence’s contention (10, pp. 57-88), however, the greater complexity and number of determining variables involved in meaningful verbal learning does not rule out the possibility of discovering precise quantitative laws with wide generality from one educational situation to another. I t simply means that such research demands experimental in- genuity and sophisticated use of modern techniques of research design.
Experimental psychologists can hardly be criticized, however, i f laboratory studies of short-term, fragmentary and rote learning have had little ap- plicability to the classroom. Like all pure research efforts in the basic sciences, these studies were only designed to yield general laws of behavior as ends in themselves, quite apart from any practical utility. T h e blame, if any is to be assigned, must certainly lie with educational psychologists who in general have failed to conduct the necessary applied research, and have been content with extrapolating the findings of their experimental colleagues.
Extrapolation, of course, offers several very attractive methodological
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DAVID P. AUSWBEL 215
advantages in verbal learning experiments. First, by using nonsense syllables with equivalent Glaze values it is possible to work with additive units of equal difficulty. Second, by using relatively meaningless learning tasks it is possible to eliminate, for the most part, the indeterminable influence of meaningful antecedent experience, which naturally varies from one individual to another. But it is precisely this interaction of new Iearning tasks with existing cognitive structure that is the distinctive feature of meaningful learning. Hence, one cannot have one’s cake and eat it too. If one chooses the particular kind of methodological rigor associated with the use of rote materials, one must also be satisfied with only applving the findings from such experiments to rote learning situations.
Unfortunately, however, the rote learning of lists of nonsense syllables and arbitrarily paired adjectives is representative of few defensible learning tasks in modern classrooms. It is also difficult to find supportive evidence for Underwood’s assertion that “much of our educational effort is devoted to making relativeIy meaningIess verbal units meaningful” ( 1 1, p. 1 I 1 ) . Brute memorization of representational equivalents (e.g., lists of vocabulary in foreign language study, the values of various constants in mathematics and science) tends to form a very small portion of the curriculum, especially beyond the elementary school years, once children have mastered the basic letter and number symbols. Meaningful learning of verbally presented materials constitutes the principal means of augmenting the learner’s store of knowledge, both within and outside the classroom. Hence, no research program purporting to advance this objective can avoid coming to gI.l’ps with the fundamental variables involved in meaningful learning.
C. PROCESS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ROTE AND MEANINGFUL RECEPTION LEARNING
Plausible reasons exist for believing that rotely and meaningfully learned materials are organized much differently in consciousness and hence conform to quite different principles of learning and forgetting. First, meaningfully learned materials have been related to existing concepts in cognitive structure in ways making possible the understanding of various kinds of significant (e.g., derivative, descriptive, supportive) relationships (3). Most new ideational materials that pupils encounter in a school setting are relatable to a previously learned background of meaningful ideas and information. I n fact, the curriculum is deliberately organized in this fashion to provide for the untraumatic introduction of new facts and concepts. Rotely learned materials, on the other hand, are discrete and isolated entities which have
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2 16 J O U R N A L OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY
not been related to established concepts in the learner's cognitive structure (3) . (Depending on their logical relatability to a particular learner's cognitive structure, they may or may not be potentially meaningful to begin with.) Second, because they are not anchored to existing ideational systems, rotely learned materials (unless greatly overlearned or endowed with unusual vividness) are much more vulnerable to forgetting, i.e., have a much shorter retention span.
T h e above differences between rote and meaningful learning categories have important implications for the underlying kinds of learning and retention processes involved in each category. Rotely learned materials are essentially isolated from cognitive structure, and hence are primarly in- fluenced by the interfering effects of sinzilur rote materials learned im- nrediaicly before or after the learning task. T h u s it is not unreasonable to explain the learning and retention of discrete rote units in such stimulus- response terms as intra- and inter-task similarity, response competition, and stimulus o r response generalization. T h e learning and retention of meaning- fu l materials, however, are primarily influenced by the attributes of relevant subsuming concepts in cognitive structure with which they interact. Com- pared to this extended interaction with established ideational components, concurrent interfering effects have relatively little influence and explanatory value ( 5 , 6) .
D. THE SUBSUMPTION PROCESS I N LEARNING AND FORGETTING ( 5 , 6 ) T h e model of cognitive organization proposed for the learning and re-
tention of meaningful materials assumes the existence of a cognitive structure that is hierarchically organized in ternis of highly inclusive conceptual traces2 under which a re subsumed traces of less inclusive sub-concepts as well as traces of specific informational data. T h e major organizational principle, in other words, is that of progressive differentiation of trace systems of a given sphere of knowledge from regions of greater to lesser inclusiveness, each linked to the next higher step in the hierarchy through a process of subsumption. It is incorrect, however, to conceive of this mode of organization as deductive in nature. T h e inductive-deductive issue is only relevant in considering the method of acquiring or presenting generaliza- tions and supportive data, and the sequential procedure adopted in problem-
2 T h e term, "trace" is used here simply a3 a hypothetical construct to account for the continuing representation of, past experience in the nervous system and in present cognitive structure. No assumptions are made regarding the neuro- physiological basis of the trace or regarding psychophysiological correlations.
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DAVID P. A U S U R E L 217
solving. Irrespective of how they are acquired in the first place (inductively or deductively), new materials are incorporated into total cognitive organiza- tion in accordance with the same principle of progressive differentiation.
T h u s , as new material enters the cognitive field, i t interacts with and is appropriately subsumed under a relevant and more inclusive conceptual system. T h e very fact that i t is subsumable (relatable to stable elements in cognitive s t ructure) accounts for its meaningfulness and makes possible the perception of insightful relationships. If it were not subsumable, it would constitute rote material and form discrete and isolated traces.
T h e initial effects of subsumption, therefore, may be described as facilitation of both learning and retention. Only orienting, relational, and cataloguing operations are involved a t first. These preliminary opera- tions are obviously essential for meaningful learning and retention, since the incorporation of new material into existing cognitive structure necessarily presupposes consistency with the prevailing principle of organization. Fur - thermore, subsumption of the traces of the learning task by an established ideational system provides anchorage for the new material, and thus con- stitutes the most orderly, efficient and stable way of retaining it for future availability. Hence, for a variable period of time, the recently catalogued sub-concepts and informational data can be dissociated from their subsuming concepts and are reproducible as individually identifiable entities.
Although the stability of meaningful material is initially enhanced by anchorage t o relevant conceptual foci in the learner’s cognitive structure, such material is gradually subjected to the erosive influence of the concep- tualizing trend in cognitive organization. Because it is more econornical and less burdensome to retain a single inclusive concept than to remember a large number of more specific items, the import of the latter tends to be incorporated by the generalized meaning of the former. W h e n this second or obliterative stage of subsumption begins, the specific items become pro- grxssively less dissociable as entities in their own right until they a re no longer available and are said to be forgotten.
T h i s process of memorial reduction to the least common denominator cap- able of representing cumulative prior experience is very similar to the reduction process characterizing concept formation. A single abstract con- cept is more manipulable for cognitive purposes than the dozen diverse in- stances from which its commonality is abstracted ; and similarly, the memorial residue of ideational experience is also mote functional for future learning and problem-solving occasions when stripped of its tangential modifiers, particularized connotations, and less clear and discriminable im-
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plications. Hence, barring repetition or some othcr special reason [e.g.. primacy, uniqueness, enhanced discriminability, o r the availability of a specially relevant and stable subsumer (see below)] for the perpetuation of dissociability, specific items of meaningful experience that are supportive of o r correlative to a n established conceptual entity tend gradually to under- go obliterative subsumption.
E. LEARNING VERSUS FORGETTISC In reception (as contrasted to discovery) learning, the distinctivv at-
tribute of both learning and forgetting is a change i n the availability or future reproducibility of the learning material ( 3 ) . Learning represents ;in
increment in availability (i.e., the situation prevailing after initial exposure to or repetition of the mater ia l ) , whereas forgetting represents a decrenient in availability (i.e. the situat,ion prevailing after a single exposure of between two exposures of the material). Retention, therefore, is largely a later temporal phase and diminished aspect of the same phenomenon o r functional capacity ( the availability of internalized material) involved in learning itself. Later availability is obviously a function of initial availability. I n the absence of intervening practice, therefore, delayed retention cannot pos- sibly surpass immediate retention. T h e common phenomenon of reminiscence reflects either the operation of a drive state temporarily lowering thresholds of availability a t a later testing of retention (2), or the subsequent release (disinhibition) of transitory inhibitory conditions (e.g., repression ; initial confusion after presentation of new material) operative immediately ai ter learning.
T h e relationship between meaningful learning and forgetting is even closer than that already indicated for reception learning generally. Meaning- ful retention is not only a later attenuated manifestation of the same availa- bility function established during learning, but is also a later temporal phase of the same interactional process underlying this availability. During the learning phase, new ideational material forms an ,interactional product wi th a subsuming focus in cognitive structure, and depending on various factors (see below), has a given degree of dissociability therefrom. Continued interaction results in a gradual decrease in the d,issociability of the new material (i.e., in forgetting) until the interactional product is reduced to a least common denominator capable of representing the entire complex, namely, to the subsuming concept itself. T h e same cognitive factors3
3 Such motivational variables as drive, reinforcement a n d intention may influence learning without influencing retention (+).
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DAVID P. AUSUEEL 219
determining the original degree of dissociability at the time of learning (initial interaction) also determine the rate a t which dissociability is subsequently lost during retention (later interaction). In rote learning, on the other hand, cognitive interaction, by definition, does not take place. Hence, rote learning represents an increment in availability involving one discrete cognitive process and set of variables, and rote forgetting represents a loss in this availability due to interference from another discrete process (and group of variables) set in motion shortly before or after learning.
F. PRINCIPAL VARIABLES INFLUBNClNG MEANINGFUL VERBAL LEARNING‘
One important variable affecting the incorporability and longevity of new meaningful material is the availability in cognitive structure of relevant subsuming concepts at an appropriately proximate level of inclusiveness to provide optimal anchorage. If appropriately relevant and proximate sub- sumers are not present, the learner tends to utilize the most relevant and proximate ones that are available. But since the latter subsumers do not provide optimal anchorage, and since it is highly unlikely that the most relevant and proximate subsuming concepts are typically available to learners in most learning situations, it would seem desirable to introduce the ap- propriate subsumers and make them part of cognitive structure prior to the actual presentation of the learning task. T h e introduced subsumers would thus constitute efficient advance “organizers” or anchoring foci for the recep- tion of new material.
A second important factor presumably affecting the retention of a meaning- ful learning task is the extent to which it is discriminable from the established conceptual systems that subsume it. A reasonable assumption here, borne out by preliminary investigation ( 6 ) , would be that if the distinguishing features of the new learning material were not originally salient and clearly discriminable from stable subsuming foci, they could be adequately rep- resented by the latter for memorial purposes, and would not persist as dissociable entities identifiable in their own right. In other words, only discriminable categorical variants of more inclusive concepts would have long-term retention value. T h e discriminability of new materials could be enhanced by repetition or by explicitly pointing out similarities and dif- ferences between them and their presumed subsumers in cognitive structure.
Lastly, the longevity of new meaningful. material in memory has been
4 Two preliminary studies ( 5 , 6 ) concerned with some of these variables have already been reported. More definitive investigation is currently in progress as part of a long-term research program in meaningful verbal learning.
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shown to be a function of the stability and clarity of its subsumers ( 6 ) . Ambiguous and unstable suhsumers not only provide weak anchorage for related new materials, hut also cannot easily be discriminated from them. Factors probably influrncing the clarity and stability of subsuming concepts include repetition, their relative age, the use of exemplars, and multi-con- textual exposure.
G. SUBSUMPTION THEORY VERSUS CONNECTIONISM
Connectionism has little difficulty in explaining rote verbal learning and forgetting. T h e learning of discrete verbal units isolated from cognitive structure can be conceived of quite plausibly in terms of habit s t rength; and forgetting can be similarly conceptualized in stimulus-response terms as reflective of interference with established habit strength through such mechanisms as response competition and stimulus or response generalization. Hence, the principal variable in rote forgetting is exposure to materials similar to but not identical with the learning task, shortly before (proactive inhibition) or after (retroactive inhibition) the learning session. W h e n learning material is meaningful (ii.e., interacts with subsuming concepts in cognitive s t ructure) , however, it seems more credible to define learning and forgetting in terms of the dissociability of the material from its subsumers a t successive stages ,in the interactional process. I n relation to this theoretical frame of reference, the major variables affecting retention are the availability of appropriate subsuming concepts in cognitive structure, the stability and clarity of these concepts, and the discriminability of the learning material from its subsumers.
The inapplicability of connectionist principles of proactive and retroactive interference to meaningful verbal materials becomes evident when w e use such materials in experimental studies of retention. For example, explicit study of a long passage about Christianity, immediately before or after the learning of a comparable passage about Buddhism, does not significantl!. impair the ,immediate or delayed Buddhism retention scores of college students in comparison with those of matched control subjects not exposed to the Christianity material (5 , 6 ) . T h e short-term interference of similar elements, so crucial in rote forgetting, becomes relatively insignificant when meaningful materials are anchored to established subsuming concepts and pro- gressively interact with them to the point of obliterative subsumption. Under these conditions the discriminability of the Buddhism material, and the clarity of the learner’s knowledge of Christianity are the significant determining variables ( 6 ) . T h e same studies also showed that retroactive exposurc to
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DAVID P. AUSUBEL 22 1
material with the same ideational import as the learning passage, but differing in specific content, sequence, and mode of presentation, not only has no inhibitory effect on retention, but is just as facilitating as repetition of the learning passage ( 5 ) . Meaningful (unlike rote) verbal materials obviously have a general substantive content that is transferable or independent of specific verbatim form and sequence.
H. SUBSUMPTION VERSUS GESTALT THEORY Subsumption and Gestalt5 theories have two points in common which set
them apart from connectionism. Both conceive of forgetting, in whole or part, as an assimilative rather than as an interference process, and both em- ploy the concept of “trace” instead of such constructs as “habit strength” and “response tendency.” These resemblances, however, are more terminologi- cal than substantive. T h e Gestalt concept of “replacement” merely describes assimilation as an end-result of cognitive activity without ex- plaining how or why it occurs. Subsumption theory also only uses the term “trace” to refer to the continuing representation of past experience in the nervous system and in cognitlve structure; the Gestalt assumptions regarding isomorphism and intra-tract- dynamics are not accepted. Stripped of these latter connotations, it is felt that such terms as “trace” and “availability” describe more appropriately the memorial residue of ideas and information than such far-fetched behavioristic terms as “response tendency” and “habit strength.”
Subsumption theory also differs from Gestalt theory in the following additional ways: ( u ) I t a t t ~ b u t e s all forgetting to trace interaction, and denies that autonomous disintegration of traces occurs as a result of the resolution of perceptually derived intra-trace tensions. Asymmetrical figures, for example, would sometimes be remembered as more symmetrical than originally perceived, not because of any autonomous changes within the traces, but because they were subsumed by and eventually reduced to a memorial residue of familiar geometrical concepts in cognitive structure. ( b ) I t conceives of assimilation (loss of identifiability or decreased dissocia- bility of newly learned materials) as a progressive phenomenon rather than as an all-or-none type of replacement in which reproducibility is lost com- pleteIy and instantaneously. An ideational element and its subsuming con- cept interact and set up an equilibrium process defining the dissociability of the former from the latter at any given point in time. T h e direction of this
5 Based on Chapter 10 in Koffka ( 9 ) .
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222 . IOURNAl. OF GENER.4L PSYCHOLOGY
equilibrium then gradually shifts to the undissociable form of the inter- actional product which is its natural end-point. ( c ) Thus , assimilation is not conceived of as s.imple replacement of one trace by another, but as the outcome of a conceptualizing trend in memorial reduction. As a result of this trend, a highly inclusive and established trace system comes to represent the import of less generalized traces, the identifiability of which is correspondingly obliterated. ( d ) A meaningful ideational element is believed to be as- similated by a more inclusive trace system, not because of similarity between them per se, but because it is not sufficirntly discriminable from the latter. Hence its import can be adequately represented by the generality of the more inclusive system. Similaxity, of course, helps determine which of a number of potential subsuming concepts in cognitive structure actually plays the subsuming role, and is also one of the determinants of discriminability. A high degree of similarity can facilitate initial anchorage without leading rapidly to obliterative subsumption, provided that differences are also clearly and explicitly perceptible. ( e ) Forgetting is regarded as a continua- tion of the same interactional process established a t the moment of learning. According to Gestalt assimilation theory, a trace is first established in unattached form at the time of learning, and then interacts with and is later replaced by another similar and separately established trace.
Subsumption theory also has elements in common with Bartlett’s views ( 7 ) of cognitive functioning generally and of remembering in particular. His concept of schema as an organizing attitude or affect resulting from the abstraction and articulation of past experience-although somewhat vague with respect to both nature and mode of operation-is structurally and functionally more closely related to “subsuming foci” than to the Gestalt concept of “trace” ; but, probably because his learning tasks were concerned with narrative events rather than with the substance of impersonal ideas, attitudinal and affective attributes of schemata play a more important determinative role than cognitive variables in his theories of perception and memory. I n accounting for the discrepancy between presented and re- membered content, Rartlett emphasizes both the influence of idiosyncratic schemata on original perception of the material, and a process of “imaginative reconstruction” at the time of recall as a result of which particular content is selected and invented in accordance with the nature and demands of the current situation (7 , p. 213). Subsumption theory, on the other hand, attributes most of the change between presentation and recall to an inter- vening interactional process in cognitive structure. Thus , although the individual in remembering undoubtedly selects from what is available in
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DAVID 1’. AUSUREI. 223
memory, and also adds some new material suitable for the occasion, he is actually reproducing, for the most part, materials that have undergone memorial reduction rather than reconstructing the residue of original per- cep ti on.
I. SUhlMARY A X D CONCLUSIONS
IIeaningfully and rotely learned materials are learned and retained in qualitatively different ways because meaningful learning tasks are, by defi- nition, relatable and anchorable t o relevant and more inclusive concepts in cognitive structurc. Hence, it is postulated that the learning and retention of meaningfully presented materials a re primarily influenced by the attributes of these latter concepts with which they interact and by the nature of the interactional process. Rotely Iearned materials, on the other hand, are isolated f rom cognitive structure and are primarily influenced by the inter- fering effects of similar rote materials.
As meaningful new material enters the cognitive field, it interacts with and is appropriately subsumed under a relevant and more inclusive conceptual system. T h i s initial anchoring process facilitates retention. Gradually, however, because of the conceptualizing trend in cognitive organization, the import of the new material becomes incorporated by the more generalized meaning of its subsumer, and is no longer dissociable from it. It ceases being available as an individually identitiable entity in its own right, and is said to be “forgottrii.” Forgetting is thus a continuation or later temporal phase of the S U ~ P intcractional process underlying the avnilability cstablished during learning.
According to this theory, the principal variables influencing the incor- porability and longevity of meaningful material a re ( a ) the availability in cognitive structure of relevant subsuming concepts at a n appropriate level of inclusiveness; ( b ) the stahility and clarity of these concepts; and (c ) their discriminability from the learning task. Research on the effect of these vari- ables on classroom lcarnirig has obvious pedagogic implications and is urgently needed. Extrapolation of findings from studics of rote learning has not only held back the improvement of verbal instruction, but has also encouraged teachers to present meaningful material5 in rote fashion.
REFEREXES 1. ~ ~ J S I J B E I . , D. P. The nature of educational research. Educ. Theor., 1953, 3,
314-320. 2. - . 3. - . In defense of verbal learning. Edur. Thcor., 1961, 11, 15-25.
Introduction to a threshold concept of primary drives. J . Gen. P l y - c ~ o I . , 1956, b6, 209-229. D
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4. i ~ U S W B E L , D. l’., SCHIwoST, S. H., Sr CWKIER, L. T h e influence of intention on the retention of school materials. J . Edur. Psychol., 1957, 48, 87-92.
5 . ~ZUSUBEI. , D. P., ROBBINS, L. C., S: BLAKE, E., J R . Retroactive inhibition and facilitation in the learning of school materials. J. Edur. Psyrltol., 1957, 48, 334-343.
6. AUSUBEL, D. P., Sr BLAKE, E., JR. Proactive inhibition in the forgetting of meaningful school material. J. Educ. RES., 1958, 62, 145-119.
7. BARTLETT, F. C. Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psycholog!. Cambridge: Cambridge IJniversity Press, 1932. Pp. 317.
8. INHELDER, B:iRBEL, & PIAGET, J. T h e Growth of Logical Thinking from Child- hood to Adolescence. New York: Basic Books, 1958. Pp. 356.
9. KOFFKA, K. Principles of Gestalt Psychology. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935. Pp. 720.
10. SPENCE, K. W. T h e relation of learning theory to the technology of education. Harvard Edur. Rev. , 1959, 29, 84-95.
11. UNDERWOOD, B. J. Verbal learning in the educative processes. HaratirJ Edirc.. Rev. , 1959, 29, 107-117.
Bureau of Educational Research University of Illinois 1007% S . Wright Street Champaign, Ill inois
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