A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LINSTONE RICHARD FERINGER

Western Washington University

Professor Linstone’s (1983) opening and closing remarks deal with issues that repre- sent fundamental philosophical differences between us. I do not reject his views outright, but see them as having utility only in the context of a more comprehensive paradigm for social science analysis. Other objections he raises are not to what was said, but rather what was omitted. Had more space been available, he would have seen that we agree on those issues. I would like to briefly return the favor and comment further on what he omitted in his review, and thereby suggest another important issue that should be debated in the future. First, I pause and express my gratitude to the editor for making space for this debate. There are always issues to be clarified in journal articles, clarifications which would improve our dialogue; we should see more of this.

I am puzzled as to the evidence by which Professor Linstone makes the charge of gloom and doom, and his comments here cannot logically be attributed to statements I made. Where have I prophesied? I suggest, rather, that there are some basic breakdowns in society, that these are danger signs and we had better look to our analytical methodologies or we will keep going downhill. Looking at the world today, can we rest easily thinking about our approaches to problems? Human societies are always in crises, Hocking said, “in a race between education (knowledge) and catastrophe.” Our views of the world are never complete enough and, thus, prescriptions for action are fallible and methods fail. Initially new solutions, usually forged to treat some prominent problem of an era, tu rn us away from the precipice for a time. But these eventually break down when the environment changes, a new situation arises and does not submit to old perceptions and methodologies. The pulse of history is, therefore, an alternation between usually long periods of struggle broken by short periods of peace and prosperity. It is the challenge of every civilization to perceive these breakdowns and attempt to correct them as soon as possible. History is strewn with evidence of mistaken judgments dug from an- cient stream beds, or of living societies whose vitality has gone dormant. Was I not merely raising storm signals?

Professor Linstone’s second objection is just. In the process of attempting the greatest possible brevity, clarity may be sacrificed. There was no intention to suggest any problems are solved, finally, and his brief clear explanation is difficult to improve on.

Point 3 is true, as well; however, there was neither space for a detailed analysis of how society functions, nor was such a point ignored completely. I suggested in at least two instances that determining such issues as “greatest possible” as well as what is significant would engender debate, always, and thus inferred a dynamic. A quotation from Carl Schurz characterizes society as a bustling hive of interaction (see Feringer, 1982). Also, the quotation from Mumford illustrates a consideration for the dynamic dimension of community.

Professor Linstone’s points 4, 5 and 6 represent the crux of our deep philosophical differences, which I believe are these. Science, seen as a methodology for ascertaining the order in the universe, puts into our hands, when it is successful, the means to manipulate our environment. One can look at this two ways in terms of prediction: what is most likely to happen under given conditions and, prescriptively, what we want to make happen. The two factors are by no means entirely separate, of course. He rightfully suggests the pitfalls of social prediction, but avoids the other point that was my main

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focus. I assume we must constantly strive to create the world we want to inhabit regardless of the difficulties. The alternative to this would be to drift. Furthermore, I presume that our vision of the world must include more than how technology can provide us with electric toothbrushes and television spectaculars. The thought is repugnant to me that we might be able to feed ten billion people, given the trouble we now have managing our bureaucracies. Every major social problem (i.e., pollution, war, poverty, crime, etc.) is directly traceable to overpopulation. That we might be able to create the conditions by which to live together in peace could happen in the future but, given our present state of knowledge and inclinations, the quality of life for those poeple would no doubt be ap- palling.

It is a common penchant of academics to assume that objectivity is the prime criterion of science. This is true, of course, for the verification of evidence which includes measurement. But I believe it is not possible to be objective about the problems we choose to study, nor is it possible in ascertaining the meaning of knowledge. I believe, therefore, the gap that divides Professor Linstone and myself is just on this point. He comes across as the scientist evaluating predictability and I am interested in the prior question, “What do we want to happen?”, as the basis for not only action but evaluation.

This leads me finally to the question that Professor Linstone did not raise, and perhaps should have. The intent of my essay was to raise the question as to the validity of the knowledge our research produces. My logic was simply that the only forum for es- tablishing validity is in the community, in terms of the consequences of use. Because all action brings about some consequences, unless we have some notion as to what we want to happen, it is not possible to establish significance. Knowledge, after all, only takes on meaning when put to use.

That Professor Linstone fails to mention at any time the central question I attempt to deal with, I believe reflects a philosophical point of view that significantly differs from my own. What I consider to be a major problem he either doesn’t see, or ignores com- pletely. I am thus not interested in forecasting except to select the course of action that is most likely to take a step toward a better community. My topology is intended to provide some means of measuring just that, i.e., have we moved the community in the right direc- tion? It seems to me, therefore, that it helps one keep in touch with the real world, where solving problems in the abstract with no reference for establishing significance of action, keeps one from having to deal with reality. Our differences are at least as old as those between Parmenedes and Hericlitus. The fact that the future will always be uncertain does not need to detract from the necessity for science, nor that we should hold back from risking action to improve the community.

REFERENCES LINSTONE, H. A.

FERINGER, R.

Comments on Feringer’s “The idea of a future.” Journal ofCommunify Psychology, 1983, 11 , 71-78.

The idea of a future. Journal of Community Psychology, 1982, 10, 265-274.