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A Radical Right Revival? REVIEW BY LEONARD WEINBERG Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Reno Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. By Pippa Norris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 366 pp., $70.00 cloth (ISBN:0-521-84914-4), $24.99 paper (ISBN:0-521-61385-X). In Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Pippa Norris has provided a significant contribution to the growing literature on the rise of radical right-wing parties in the Western world. Although much of the book is focused on the radical right in Western Europe, she extends her analysis far beyond the French National Front and the other usual suspects to include parties vying for votes in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Russia, Israel, and the United States. One might quibble here and there about her choice of parties. (Identifying Ross Perot’s Reform Party as belonging to the radical right seems a stretch, to say the least.) Nonetheless, the heterogeneity of countries with radical-right parties permits Norris to employ a novel and ambitious research design. One might ask what motivates the recent interest in the rise of right-wing parties? Is this interest a reaction to a realignment of political ideology in these countries, or does it reflect a deep-seated fear of a fascist revival? Much of the current literature on radical right-wing parties, including Radical Right, is premised on the belief that there has been an important and possibly enduring surge in support among voters for these parties over the past decades. Norris, for example, describes the radical Austrian Freedom Party as having solidified its support following a ‘‘critical’’ breakthrough election in 1999 (p. 248). Yet, even though the radical right has enjoyed success in some places (for example, France), it has not flourished else- where (for example, Germany). Nor is it clear just how enduring the successful parties are likely to be. Norris recognizes that the postwar history of the radical right in Europe abounds with examples of skyrocket or ‘‘flash’’ parties (for exam- ple, the French Poujadists in the early 1950s). These parties enjoy a brief surge in support at the polls only to fade into virtual obscurity shortly thereafter. At this point (that is, 2006), it remains unclear whether the Austrian Freedom Party will endure, or simply follow the trajectory of other radical-right skyrockets. Nonethe- less, Norris’ question is relevant from a broader perspective. What does explain the level of electoral support for extremist parties, such as the radical right within contemporary democracies? Norris approaches her discussion from two perspectives. First, she looks at dif- ferences in the ‘‘opportunity structure’’ available to radical-right parties. Second, she explores the widely used concepts of demand and supply to explain their electoral success. In pursuing her analysis, Norris investigates the well-known in- terpretations for radical right success proffered by Hans-Georg Betz (1994), Piero Ignazi (1994), and Herbert Kitschelt (1995). Some of her more significant findings compel our attention. First, Norris investigates the relationship between differences in electoral laws and the performance of radical right partiesFin other words, the opportunity structure. All things being equal, one would expect that radical-right parties would r 2007 International Studies Review. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK. International Studies Review (2007) 9, 113–115

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Page 1: A Radical Right Revival?

A Radical Right Revival?

REVIEW BY LEONARD WEINBERG

Department of Political Science, University of Nevada, Reno

Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. By Pippa Norris. New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005. 366 pp., $70.00 cloth (ISBN:0-521-84914-4), $24.99paper (ISBN:0-521-61385-X).

In Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market, Pippa Norris has provided asignificant contribution to the growing literature on the rise of radical right-wingparties in the Western world. Although much of the book is focused on the radicalright in Western Europe, she extends her analysis far beyond the French NationalFront and the other usual suspects to include parties vying for votes in Australia,Canada, New Zealand, Russia, Israel, and the United States. One might quibblehere and there about her choice of parties. (Identifying Ross Perot’s Reform Partyas belonging to the radical right seems a stretch, to say the least.) Nonetheless, theheterogeneity of countries with radical-right parties permits Norris to employ anovel and ambitious research design.

One might ask what motivates the recent interest in the rise of right-wing parties?Is this interest a reaction to a realignment of political ideology in these countries, ordoes it reflect a deep-seated fear of a fascist revival? Much of the current literatureon radical right-wing parties, including Radical Right, is premised on the belief thatthere has been an important and possibly enduring surge in support among votersfor these parties over the past decades. Norris, for example, describes the radicalAustrian Freedom Party as having solidified its support following a ‘‘critical’’breakthrough election in 1999 (p. 248). Yet, even though the radical right hasenjoyed success in some places (for example, France), it has not flourished else-where (for example, Germany). Nor is it clear just how enduring the successfulparties are likely to be. Norris recognizes that the postwar history of the radicalright in Europe abounds with examples of skyrocket or ‘‘flash’’ parties (for exam-ple, the French Poujadists in the early 1950s). These parties enjoy a brief surge insupport at the polls only to fade into virtual obscurity shortly thereafter. At thispoint (that is, 2006), it remains unclear whether the Austrian Freedom Party willendure, or simply follow the trajectory of other radical-right skyrockets. Nonethe-less, Norris’ question is relevant from a broader perspective. What does explain thelevel of electoral support for extremist parties, such as the radical right withincontemporary democracies?

Norris approaches her discussion from two perspectives. First, she looks at dif-ferences in the ‘‘opportunity structure’’ available to radical-right parties. Second,she explores the widely used concepts of demand and supply to explain theirelectoral success. In pursuing her analysis, Norris investigates the well-known in-terpretations for radical right success proffered by Hans-Georg Betz (1994), PieroIgnazi (1994), and Herbert Kitschelt (1995). Some of her more significant findingscompel our attention.

First, Norris investigates the relationship between differences in electoral lawsand the performance of radical right partiesFin other words, the opportunitystructure. All things being equal, one would expect that radical-right parties would

r 2007 International Studies Review.PublishedbyBlackwellPublishing,350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148,USA,and9600GarsingtonRoad,OxfordOX42DQ,UK.

International Studies Review (2007) 9, 113–115

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do better when it is relatively easy for small parties to gain access to the ballot andwhen votes are counted on the basis of proportional representation. Countries inwhich the laws make it difficult to achieve a place on the ballot or in which electionrequires a plurality of the vote should, in theory, limit the electoral success ofextremist parties: the radical right and the radical left. This expectation turns outnot to be true. In particular, Norris finds that the level of voter support for theseparties is unrelated to whether votes are counted on the basis of the first-past-the-post criterion or some version of proportional representation. What does matter isthe number of seats that the radical-right parties win. Where proportional repre-sentation is used and a place on the ballot is easy to obtain, radical-right partiesachieve a larger presence in parliament than in countries where a plurality formulais used or laws make ballot access harder. But the plurality electoral formula doesnot inhibit voters from casting their ballots for the radical rightFif that is theirpreference.

Second, Norris considers the social bases of support for radical-right parties.Who votes for them? Here she looks at several competing hypotheses. Is supportbased on a ‘‘crisis of modernity’’? In other words, are right-wing parties supportedby Lipset’s (1960:131–176) classic petit bourgeoisie: the small businessmen, familyfarmers, small shopkeepers, self-employed craftsmen, and professionals who arebeing squeezed by the forces of modern enterprise and big bureaucracy? Or, incontrast to this classic view of the roots of fascism, does support for the radical righttap a new social cleavage based largely on the lower strata of society? In otherwords, in postindustrial societies, will the radical right be supported dispropor-tionately by a ‘‘residual underclass of low-skill workers, who face shrinking lifechances, poorer opportunities for full-time employment . . . reduced state benefitsand growing conditions of social inequality’’ (p. 132)? Lacking time series data,Norris’ assessment of the evidence at her disposal is complex, but her answer toboth these questions is essentially ‘‘yes.’’ In short, the contemporary radical rightgarners greater support proportionately from those at the bottom of the economicscale and from the lower-middle classFwhich corresponds to the radicalism of themiddle that Lipset analyzed so many years ago.

Norris’ next question is why? Why are such people attracted to radical-rightparties? The obvious answer is that radical-right voters are attracted by the parties’opposition to immigration and multiculturalism. They support these parties’ xeno-phobic appeals to ‘‘real’’ Austrians, Frenchmen, Norwegians, Dutchmen, and so on.Norris finds this widely held view to be true in a subjective sense, but not in astructural one. Countries experiencing high levels of immigration and the rapidgrowth of minority populations are no more or less likely to have strong radical-right parties than countries in which these trends do not prevail. Perception iseverything. Radical-right voters tend to be angry about the presence of immigrantsand minority populations no matter what the pace of immigration or the size of theminority population is.

At this point, Norris turns her attention from the demand side of the equation tothe supply side. In particular, she looks at the roles that radical-right parties andpolitical party systems play in stimulating popular support. First and foremost, shepays attention to ‘‘ideological space’’ and party competition. She tests HerbertKitschelt’s well known and Downsian-based thesis that, when the major parties ofthe center-right and center-left converge, the electoral space available for the rad-ical right expands. Norris finds this thesis not to be true. In general, she reports,radical-right parties do not perform better at the polls when the major parties in thesystem display a centripetal drive toward the center of the ideological spectrum.

Leadership, however, does appear to make a difference. Radical-right partiesthat manage to achieve an electoral breakthroughFas in Austria, France, andItalyFhave been led by figuresFJorg Haider, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and UmbertoBossi, respectivelyFto whom the term ‘‘charismatic’’ has often been applied. The

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problem with charismatic leadership is, of course, the long term. When such rad-ical-right leaders as Pauline Hanson (ex-head of One Nation in Australia) andMogens Gilstrup (deceased leader of the Danish Progress Party) depart the scene,their parties commonly experience a decline at the polls. The radical-right partiesable to sustain their popularity over time are the ones that develop organizationsthat are capable of maintaining the momentum set in motion by their charismaticleaders.

Finally, Norris considers the status of particular kinds of elections in promotingincreases in support for the radical right. Are dealigning elections, for example,crucial in stimulating such support? Her answer is ‘‘not necessarily.’’ Partisan de-alignment and widespread voter dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties canfacilitate a spurt in support for the radical-right. However, these developments arenot sufficient to sustain support over time. Although her reasoning has an elementof circularity, Norris asserts that critical elections based upon major changes in theeconomy and society are crucial in making radical-right parties serious actors innational political life.

Readers interested in the politics of contemporary right-wing radicalism will haverealized by now that Radical Right considers and seeks to weigh most of the con-tending hypotheses proposed by students of the subject. What is missing fromNorris’ analysis, a quibble perhaps, is any effort to assess the role of violence in thepolitics of right-wing radicalism. Radical right-wing politicians commonly cite theviolence, or alleged violence, of minority populations in appealing to voters forsupport, seeking a return to ‘‘law and order.’’ At the same time, radical right-winggroupsFusually the youth organizations of the radical-right parties them-selvesFare not uncommonly the perpetrators of violent attacks on members ofminority populations. It would be interesting to know what role violence plays incausing a popular backlash that radical-right parties can exploit.

Despite this gap, Radical Right is an important book. It should be required read-ing for all those interested in the contemporary radical right.

References

BETZ, HANS-GEORG. (1994) Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York: St. Martin’s Press.IGNAZI, PIERO. (1994) L’estrema Destra in Europa. Bologna: Il Mulino.KITSCHELT, HERBERT. (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan

Press.LIPSET, SEYMOUR MARTIN. (1960) Political Man. Garden City: Doubleday and Company.

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