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Metalogicon (2011) XXIV, 1

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A priori Sophisms and Unconscious Inferences in the Philosophical Theory by

Cosmo Guastella.1

Giuseppe Silvestri

1. A priori, natural and artificial sophisms

The theory of natural or a priori sophisms - though these expressions are not perfectly equivalent according to Guastella - and artificial sophisms presents many points of interest both in itself and because we believe it is possible, using some caution, to compare it with the remarkable theory advanced by Pareto, who from the sociological point of view distinguishes between feelings, residues and derivations.

Guastella states or explicitly suggests that his a priori sophisms are clearly inspired by Stuart Mill (A System of Logic), from whom he only borrows the expression but not the whole concept. As concerns the artificial sophisms - and more precisely the relation between the two types of “sophisms”

2 - it is more

1 In this article Guastella’s works will be mentioned as follows:

1) Saggi sulla teoria della Conoscenza: Saggio Primo: Sui limiti e l’oggetto delle conoscenza a priori, Palermo; Sandron, 1897 as LOCP;

2) Saggi sulla Teoria della Conoscenza: Saggio Secondo: Filosofia della Metafisica,(2 volumes plus Appendice), Palermo, Sandron, 1905 as FdM;

31) Le ragioni del Fenomenismo, vol. I, Palermo, Priulla; 1921 as RdF, I; 32) Le ragioni del Fenomenismo, (La cosa in sé), vol. II, ib., 1921 as RdF, II; 33) Le ragioni del Fenomenismo, vol. III, ib., 1923 as RdF, III.

2 We may ask if every sophism is artificial somehow. Guastella would not

agree because if we want to find a synonym, a priori sophisms can be approximately renamed “natural beliefs”, while the artificial ones could be simply called sophisms without any pleonasm. It is interesting to notice that also Pareto suggests that his distinction between residues and derivations


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problematic to find some references, so we will largely attribute them to Guastella himself, who in a way was forced to resort to them in order to systematize some of his key ideas.

The most direct way to explain the difference between the two types of sophisms, also considering the difficulty of this task, could probably be showing how Guastella deals with it, in particular as concerns the a priori (and a posteriori) proofs of God’s existence

3. The arguments advanced to demonstrate the

existence of something are generally artificial sophisms4 because

“they are unable themselves to produce a belief”, although they can convince the one who for “other reasons” is already convinced (FdM, p. 60)

5.

follows in some way an outline version of Stuart Mill’s theory. See V. Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale, Milano, Comunità, 1981 (2a ed. 1923), vol. II, §§ 1410-1412. 3 Notice that in his work Saggio Primo (1897) Guastella tries, through a very

detailed analysis, to deny every form of philosophical intuitionism and divides the propositions in two main clusters: one for the existential propositions (i.e. roughly empirical) and one for those based on similarity (i.e. roughly analytical). It is possible to identify the propositions belonging to the first cluster through the inductive or deductive method (the latter one derives from the first, as Mill suggests). The accusation Peirce flings at the logicians of frequently mixing up induction and abduction can be probably addressed to Guastella as well, because he apparently does not always distinguish between the two, although we cannot overlook that he makes a distinction between logical and extra-logical induction. Actually he attaches to induction more importance than other philosophers, stating that it is also “the sole natural process by which our spirit carries out any proposition, whether it is certain, hypothetical or completely wrong” (FdM, p. 60 – Translation from the Italian edition). If from this extract emerges that induction and abduction are confused, on the other hand we can assert that in Guastella the meaning of “induction” is extended and includes the extra-logical modality, which could partly cover the hypothetical propositions when induction becomes assimilation. 4 In this case the word sophisms is used because there is no communication

between the two clusters in which Guastella divides the propositions, i.e. between an existential proposition and one based on “similarity”. 5 This definition brings inevitably to our minds what Pareto calls derivations.

They are not able to create beliefs but just function as a logical support for those who already have specific residues. A problematic aspect is the


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As concerns the sources of the belief - besides the logical conscious induction which distinguishes logicians, scientists and men endowed with uncommon critical abilities - Guastella identifies another type of “induction” which, using his own words, can be defined as extra-logical (ib., p. 60) and unconscious. It consists in the coercive tendency to compare events and the ideas we form about them to events and ideas we are more familiar with

6. This process of “induction”-assimilation generates

identification and analysis of the fundamental “other reasons”. In comparison to Pareto’s wide, extensive survey, in which he appeals to the feelings of the homo sociologicus, Guastella’s aim is much more restricted since he focuses on the origin of the feeling of evidence in the homo metaphysicus and on its artificial hiding. It is necessary to add that Guastella, although he is perfectly aware of the difference between the two types of sophisms and he often resorted to it, he does not express this distinction in a sharp, formal way as Pareto does. For this reason some scholars of the Sicilian philosopher - who are not familiar with Pareto’s theories – have not noticed the difference proposed by Guastella. 6 The word “familiar” is one of the most recurrent in Guasella’s work and for

its importance it should be clearly explained or at least precisely defined in its extent, but as far as we know the author does not fully meet this requirements. According to our interpretation, from his writings emerges that “familiar” has to do with something – partly generic – related on the one hand to events and ideas absorbed during childhood that are engraved on the memory and on the other to the general psychological characteristics of the subject that tend to prevail, to give a shape to those “objective” events, in accordance with the principle mentioned also by Freud that the psychological dimension expands outwards modeling and permeating the physical one. From this point of view Guastella’s work presents some undoubted affinity with that by Jean Piaget, with the difference that according to the first the way we think as children still keeps its influence – though in a transfigured way - on us when we are adult. The expression “general psychological characteristics” is also referred to the process of formation of the concepts of the self, of voluntary action and cause from a psychological point of view. We must acknowledge, however, that the so called metaphysicians have shown an unceasing and productive interest in these aspects (see the paragraph dedicated to Piaget for further information). It seems to us that, unfortunately, Guastella uses the term “familiar” alternatively for both the meanings he attaches to it, which are fairly different: sometimes it refers explicitly or implicitly to the passive experience of the adult subject gained during childhood, and in other cases it is related to the active way of thinking, because in a sense it is psychologically congenital (see also footnotes 8 and 9).


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conclusions which are necessarily independent from conscience and seem to be intrinsically evident (i.e. a priori) because, so to say, we are not aware of the inferential mechanism operating behind our conscience. Since these inductions cannot be controlled and only leave their effect, they need to be classified into a new category, that of natural “sophisms”. Guastella compares this class to idola tribus, and in fact they represent the incoercible propensity of the human mind to produce metaphysical theories, which reflect “the constancy in the whole history of thought of certain general types into which these conceptions can be classified”

7 (see RdF, I, p.7 and the opening

pages of FdM). Some examples of the above mentioned sophisms are those which find expression in the animistic tendency and in the tendency to the efficient causality, in the concept of N.O.N.I. (nihil oritur, nihil interit), in the mechanical impulsionism and the philosophical apriorism (notice that Guastella, as Pareto, aims at pursuing constants, universals that appear in various forms and expressions).

The term “sophisms” adopted to define these constants is certainly still affected by the positivist atmosphere. Actually, according to our interpretation, Guastella – although he sometimes surrenders to the prevailing mentality – in his insisting on the natural metaphysics of mankind, he manages to open up – in contrast with Comte’s position - a partially new prospect in which this naturalness is considered a question in itself in terms of instinctive belief and not only as a counterpart of objectivity

8.

7 Translation from the Italian edition.

8 Introducing the modern category of biological a priori, Lorenz deals with the

same question in a fairly different way. Although he adopts a scientific point of view, he points out that a large number of thinkers - not only from the vitalist school - have “a strong, affective reluctance to admit the existence of inanimate life, i.e. life devoid of conscience, and in particular of inanimate animal life”,(K. Lorenz, La scienza naturale dell’uomo, Milano, Mondadori, 1993, p.193), that is they tend to confuse the concept of living being with that of life (v. pp. 191-192). In this case Lorenz seems to agree with Guastella’s global thought (see the paragraph on animism as a biological explanation in FdM and the study on hylozoism). The interpretation of this tendency given by Lorenz,


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Natural sophisms could represent “the elements for an a priori demonstration of the existing

9 and this could be an actual reason

for a belief” (FdM, p. 60. The translation is ours), that is the effective basis of metaphysics

10. To this cluster Guastella pays a

however, does not follow the inductivism of the English School (by which Guastella was inspired) because he asserts that “it derives from certain innate forms of experiencing and thinking and it is difficult to get rid of them even for a subtle mind”. According to Lorenz, there would be “innate receptors” in men that “allow them to immediately understand certain vital manifestations from their conspecifics” without any “rational conclusion based on analogy” (in opposition to what affirmed by the English School). These innate forms of experience, by which we project our psyche onto other living (or non-living) beings, can be interpreted physiologically as unconditioned reflexes (here the inductive process generating conditioned reflexes is missing), while from the psychological point of view they can be considered “highly species-specific, literally anthropomorphic experiences” that include “the great deceit” of “subjective” experiences. Lorenz thinks that there is an overabundance, a sort of excess of these anthropomorphic forms of experience, since in many cases – besides pursuing the aim for which they were phylogenetically elaborated (i.e., we believe, for the intraspecific coexperience and cofeeling) – they also produce a misinterpretation which goes as far as attributing “human psychic qualities to non-human entities and even to objects belonging to the organic nature”. This is clearly a new way of interpreting the anthropomorphic instinct: in addition to the projection and indissociation by Piaget, the concept of biological receptor is introduced. As an anti-apriorist, Guastella would have firmly disagreed on this thesis, even though most of his works – which contain statements and hints that Lorenz would have partly shared – testify that he had clearly foreseen the importance of what Lorenz defines “anthropomorphic receptors”, their bewildering pervading nature and “resistance” even among the exponents of the critical thinking (i.e. philosophers and men of science devoted to philosophy). In dealing with the question exclusively from a psychological point of view, Guastella cannot avoid formulating a theory based on induction (both conscious and unconscious), which Lorenz would have regarded as inadequate and incomplete because it does not consider the biological factor. Quotations from K. Z. Lorenz, La scienza naturale dell’uomo, Milano, Mondadori, 1993. The translation is ours. 9 This demonstration on the one hand is not based on experience, on the other is

the source of the belief. 10

This is a fundamental passage and needs to be explained. Firstly, we should ask what originates the actual reasons of a belief. Do they derive from the conventions of the child’s way of thinking, from a priori pre-understandings


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particular attention since, as he suggests, he is interested above all in the identification of the actual, natural reasons generating a belief, which have to be distinguished from the artificial reasons. In comparison to other forms of metaphysics, the theological philosophy presents a positive point that probably justifies its preceding some others (though Guastella does not believe in a three-stage law). If we examine the process of formation of the theological philosophy in the light of conscience, we notice that it shares some features with logical induction

11 (though not

conclusive).

(though resulting from partly wrong or extreme interpretations of events of the experience) or rather from both of them? More precisely, from the psychological characteristics of thinking or from theories induced by a distorted experience? Are these reasons subjective or inductive somehow? An answer can be probably found in the first chapter of RdF, I (I sofismi a priori), where Guastella faces the question accurately. The theory according to which we tend to assimilate an event to those that seem to be more familiar has a double meaning: from the one hand we are inclined to compare phenomena to others that appear more usual, form the other we tend to assimilate our ideas (or representations) to those we are more familiar with (RdF, I, p. 19. The translation is ours). The beliefs resulting from the first tendency could be more properly defined as a priori sophisms and unconscious inferences, while those “coming from the second one come from them” (ib.). (beliefs) 11

This remark could suggest one of the reasons for the particular interest and detailed analysis Guastella grants to animism and, more in general, to theological philosophy. This gives the opportunity to draw a parallel with E. B. Tylor’s reiterated statements about the natural philosophy of primitive peoples, which in his opinion is not as irrational as it may appear but has rational grounds, since it is based on natural psychology. Guastella read Tylor’s work in order to find out the contents of this spontaneous psychology. If we think it is possible to easily demolish Tylor’s animist theory, we are overlooking this component, which is probably the most important. In his work in fact he asserts that “does primitive animism account for the facts of nature, that it has held its place into the higher levels of education. Though classic and mediaeval philosophy modified it much, and modern philosophy has handled it yet more unsparingly, it has so far retained the traces of its original character, that heirlooms of primitive ages may be claimed in the existing psychology of the civilized world.” (E. B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, Andover-Harvard Theological Library, Cambridge, Mass., Volume I, p. 429). We consider this key passage a


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As regards the proofs of God’s existence12

, there are two main natural (inductive) sophisms that in Guastella’s opinion produce the belief: the final causes and the primal cause, especially in its ancient form

13. The first one, of greater

importance, has the appearance of resorting to experience since the proposition from which it derives – i.e. that something is the result of an intelligence if there is coordination between means and purposes – is based on the experienced “analogy between certain creations of nature and the products of human art” (FdM, p. 61. The translation is ours). This idea recalls the artificialism proposed by Léon Brunschwicg and then largely used by Piaget for the case of the child. Though less important, the argument of the primal cause has been diffusely adopted a long time ago and was considered by Kant as consistent with human reason as the first one. The intuition or analogy on which it is based is typical of volitional philosophy and consists in “tracing the origin of a movement back to the will” (FdM, p. 63. The translation is ours), since it has to do with a profound conviction that depends on our habits of taking voluntary (or apparently voluntary) decisions that produce auto-movement (see footnote 5). This latter form of natural cause - which could be also defined as inductive, but this adjective sounds ambiguous – is overlapped or followed by an artificial sophism (an a priori reasoning) that should “demonstrate” the necessity of the primal cause. Actually, the underlying source of the belief is not an a priori reasoning, as the philosophers who developed this theory would suggest, but a natural argument. In the light of this, Guastella seems to distinguish himself by his originality.

Of the two forms of argument related to the primal cause - one widespread among the ancients that considers God as the First sort of manifesto of Guastella’s project pursued in FdM, which follows Tylor’s theories. 12

In this case the distinction between a priori and a posteriori arguments should be replaced with a more general division, i.e. between artificial and natural (or a priori) sophisms. 13

See also RdF, I, 258.


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Cause and the other that sees God as the creator of movement and matter – only the first can be regarded as a “natural argument” according to Guastella, while the second one – since usually an explanation consists in converting the unknown into the known - is “unnatural” and artificial, because it explains through the “unknown” of creation

14. In other words, natural arguments to

demonstrate God’s existence “correspond – from a different point of view – to the two functions of the divinity and serve as explanatory principles for certain phenomena” (FdM, p. 64. The translation is ours). What Guastella considers unusual and needing an explanation is that the authors of this theory choose to substitute the two inductive “proofs” they could theoretically use with a priori arguments, i.e. artificial sophisms. There may be two reasons for this (unconscious) substitution:

1. the influence of the well-established, aprioristic metaphysics that accepts exclusively the mathematical or metaphysical truth and therefore refuses the probability of God’s existence;

2. the process of disanthropomorphization (cf. Spencer). Guastella speaks of “disphenomenisation”, a process that in time affected the principles of theological philosophy and leaded to the modern idea of the perfect, creating being.

As Pareto suggests, this peculiarity could depend on the fact that residues (i.e. a priori or natural sophisms)

15 are unconscious, while

artificial sophisms provide a logical, conscious foundation for the 14

This reasoning brings Guastella to state explicitly that the two inductive “proofs” are “the sole rational basis of theological philosophy” (FdM, p. 73. The translation is ours), confirming Tylor’s deep influence (be it direct or indirect) on his positions. What is problematic is that Tylor defines “reasonable” some primitive beliefs. Guastella interprets the concept of reasonableness as inductive (or more precisely abductive) naturalness. 15

Notice that the adjective “a priori” means “natural”, “spontaneous”, “unintentional” when put before the term “sophism”, while it acquires the meaning of “artificial” and “false” when it precedes “argument”. A superficial reading of Guastella’s work could easily lead to misunderstandings and compromise its interpretation.


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previous ones. It is important to observe that Guastella seems to perceive – or at least he does not exclude, as we deduce from what stated at point 1. and from Guastella’s idea that metaphysical apriorism derives from an a priori sophism – that artificial sophisms, with their persisting and pervading nature, are based on a residue

16 as well. More precisely, this residue consists in a

process of logicization, in the instinct for making something logical, which in Guastella’s words may be defined as instinct for apriority (in the sense of logical foundation). As Pareto suggests, this instinct reflects man’s natural need for logic (the process mentioned at point 2. can be seen as a particular case deriving from the tendency explained at point 1.).

The parallel with Pareto is justified by the fact that all of Guastella’s works are dedicated to the search for the natural sophisms and their distinction from the artificial ones in spite of the appearances. The ontological argument

Guastella asserts that this argument does not proof but just postulates the existence of a supreme being. If related to God as in Descartes’ interpretation, the ontological argument results obviously inconclusive to those who do not accept any form of theism or are not persuaded jet

17. Differently from what we may

expect, in this case as in many others “the choice of certain arguments depends in fact on the suggestions produced by the principles of theological philosophy” (FdM, p. 65. The translation is ours) - i.e. theological residues - and not on their demonstrative power. This happens because the arguments “meet in a more obvious way at the point of view of the system” (i.b.). 16

This residue emerges with all its relevance and strength in the branch of metaphysics, which Guastella calls aprioristic philosophy. 17

As Guastella suggests, only a strong belief can explain why so many distinguished thinkers relied on this argument. This is also a theme proposed by Pareto: strong “feelings” in these philosophers prevent them from detecting any logical vice.


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Theological, of which they are actually a consequence and not a presupposition

18.

2.1 A priori sophisms and unconscious inferences

When we mistake a connection (or an incompatibility) between two or more ideas for objective, we generate propositions that appear to be intrinsically evident - though this may be deceptive – and, in the sense proposed by Stuart Mill, we create a priori sophisms (also called simple inspections). Guastella admits having borrowed the term from Mill, but he was also inspired by Bacon’s Novum Organum as well as by Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetics and Transcendental Dialectic. Actually, he specifies that there is a differentia specifica in comparison to the English philosopher, that is Guastella considers these propositions as the result of inferences, i.e. as the product of “a process quite similar to reasoning” (RdF, I, p. 10. The translation is ours), although the inferences are subconscious and lie outside the sphere of conscience. Moreover, he states clearly that he attaches no obscure or contradictory meaning to the term “unconscious”, since these propositions (the a priori sophisms) are conclusions of premises that are “actually” not recognized by the conscience. These premises are indeed produced by past experiences of a certain type as well as by the way of thinking influenced by those experiences, which later “operate without our knowing”

19 and protected from

rational criticism (at least until a given level). It is interesting to notice that unconscious inferences do not all result in “deceptive” propositions that are not able to bear criticism, and in fact our belief in the principle of causality, for example, is the result of an

18

This position is particularly interesting and, for some aspects, can be compared to Pareto’s ideas on residues and derivations. The derivations, which in the creator’s mind are the origin of the belief, are actually not causes but effects of that belief, that was generated for other reasons (non-logical or extra-logical). 19

Translation form the Italian edition.


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unconscious inference determined by experiences that operate so to say “from a certain distance” (ib., p. 11. The translation is ours). If the principle of causality has a solid inductive basis – at least for an empirist-phenomenalist like Guastella – other propositions, of no less importance, would only have the appearance of (experimental) evidence, that is they would belong to the category of intrinsic evidence because - having a strong subjective basis - they would lack an objective foundation. Guastella clearly believes in the validity and clearness of this distinction, which should allow us to tell truth from mistake (or illusion), although his distinction should be more moderate since no belief in itself can be considered either well-grounded or definitely deceptive – irrespective of the amount of experimental confirmations and confutations. The real problematic element is the subjective basis: according to his education and his denying the existence of purely a priori propositions – though this position has been partly refused by modern biology – Guastella is inclined to believe that the subjective basis depends (directly or indirectly) on the person’s past experiences, and in particular on those gained during childhood. The subject, however, could interpret these experiences in an unconscious way (i.e. not scientifically) and expand them also to cases that are different from the cases that determined the experience itself. The cause of this phenomenon is a sort of compulsion to repeat that arises in the mind “shocked” by a recurrent experience, i.e. the tendency to resort to experience whenever there are actual or presumed signs of similarity with the cases from which that experience originated.

Guastella asserts that these inferences can be considered as associations of contiguous nature, though his position is undoubtedly questionable. Since we make use of our reason without realizing it, inferences are also marked by a latent argumentative feature as well as by the “principle of similarity” (ib., p. 12. The translation is ours), which – being related to the process of assimilation - is not to be considered “real” nor scientific but rather forced, imposed, shaped on experiences that are more familiar to us. If we try to analyze the belief resulting from this process and regarded as obvious, “we would not be able


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to justify it properly” (ib., p. 13. The translation is ours), because the reasons of our belief are not real nor experimental, but of different nature. The apparent evidence of these propositions is proved by the fact that we accept them spontaneously and do not feel the need to analyze them. According to our interpretation, Guastella borrows the term and partly the concept of unconscious inference from Wilhelm Wundt - who is actually quoted in his work (ib., p. 14) - and from Hermann von Helmholtz - who is not quoted, but it is well-known that Wundt was inspired by the great physician and physicist. As far as we can deduce, Guastella read the main works of the two authors in the French version. The non-conscious inference plays a fundamental role in Guastella’s project, which – as Vailati acutely observed (see the review to Saggio Secondo in Scritti, Firenze-Lipsia, Seeber-Barth, 1911, pp. 649-651) – aims to reduce the history of metaphysics to the analysis of a limited series of tendencies of thought, considering the various philosophical systems just as different versions of these tendencies and deducing the costants from the unconscious processes that generate “the natural or a priori sophistry of our spirit” (ib., p. 15). In order to demonstrate the effectiveness and topicality of Guastella’s positions, it is interesting to notice how close they are to those that Raymond Boudon – in his brilliant interpretation - ascribes to Simmel. According to the French sociologist, the discordance between “the objectively conjectural nature of the propositions produced by induction and our trust on them is not explained properly, both in Peirce’s and in Popper’s theories, while Simmel proposes a simple explanation. In his interpretation, it is due to the fact that every argument contains implicit propositions that the subject perceives in a metaconscious way“

20. This position seems to confirm that induction is also “the

source of all sorts of misbelief” (ib., the translation is ours) – notice that in Guastella’s thought the induction is essential for both the hypothetical and false propositions. Moreover, the 20

R. Boudon, L’arte di persuadere se stessi, Milano, Rusconi, 1993, p. 119. All the quotations from this work are translations from the Italian text. The pages also refers to the Italian edition.


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“general hypotheses” that link the empirical propositions to the conclusion are of “large validity”, i.e. they “apply very different types of contents” (ib., p. 121. The translation is ours), and these a priori propositions are used “in an unconscious (metaconscious) way, since – because of their validity and intrinsic generality – they are easily judged auto-evident when they are actually inappropriate” (ib., the translation is ours). In conclusion, an apriorism can be inappropriate on certain circumstances, although it has an extremely wide validity and has been naturally inspired by those circumstances” (ib., the translation is ours).

2.2 Voluntary and involuntary actions

Guastella, starting from a different point – the analysis of various theories (i.e. those proposed by Comte, Tylor, Reid, Maine de Biran et al.

21) and the illustration of the history of

philosophy and metaphysics – manages to trace an history of theories

22 and divides them in two main clusters (that disguise

themselves and return in different forms), followed by other secondary groups that adapt to the changed cultural and scientific atmosphere and show their substance, often through a complex logical-rhetorical system. One of the most impressive analogies between Guastella’s and Pareto’s work is represented by the same deep interest and extensive analysis

23 they dedicated to the

conscious and especially unconscious role played by the intimate perception of the voluntary action in generating a large number of philosophical, sociological and parascientific theories. In the light of this it may be said that Guastella, studying volitional philosophy, has carried out – for the benefit of philosophy and philosophers, especially the metaphysicians - the action of unmasking the non-logical and the extra-logical, which can be

21

Although he does not resort to the sharp, general schematization proposed by Pareto in residues and derivations . 22

We find that its real potential is still to be shown. 23

Tough with different means and from distant cultural positions.


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compared to Pareto’s achievement on the sociological field. Guastella, as Pareto does, devoted himself to investigate the transformation process

24 of the non-logical into logical, i.e. the

process by which we unconsciously try to convert non-logical actions into logical

25 (consciously target-oriented, teleological). In

this way, the solitary philosopher from Palermo - with such a breadth of thought that is in no way inferior to Pareto’s - puts in the centre of his interest (though not exclusively) the voluntary, target-oriented action, and especially its function of unconsciously plagiarize instinctive (or generally involuntary and afinalistic) actions, with the aim of showing the influence that this mould has had and probably still has on various theories in history.

One may ask, going beyond Pareto’s position, why are we inclined to consider non-logical actions as logical. As the Italian sociologist states, before a logical action is performed, in the mind of the executor there is a rational connection

26 between means and

aims; this means we actually move in a teleological direction, since there is agreement between subjective and objective purposes. This changes completely in the case of non-logical actions, which are performed without a prearranged purpose, additional or different from the actual intentions of the executor (a particular category is that of the “instinctual” actions of third class, which have an objective aim, but lack the subjective one). If the subject is still convinced that the action is voluntary, although an external observer would exclude this possibility, this means that the person is driven to consider what he does or achieves under a teleological light. Going slightly beyond the concept of residue (behavioral constant), we may say that - according to Guastella – on the subject acts a psychomorphism, i.e. a psychological mechanism that is hiddenly present also in philosophic-metaphysical theories, as well as in child’s and 24

This same process is the result of a residue. 25

See also the classification of actions proposed by Pareto in his Trattato di sociologia generale. 26

This connection appears rational also to the scientific observer.


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primitive peoples’ theories, and consists in the anthropomorphic tendency to compare every kind of action – even non-voluntary – to the voluntary and conscious ones, since most of the actions are (or pretend to be) directed towards a goal. This happens because the subject is more familiar with voluntary actions, which– according to Maine de Biran – are a clear expression of the person’s power to form the ego. For their ability of escaping the control of the subject, non-voluntary actions upset and weaken the sphere of initiatives and efforts that gradually constitute the ego (see also footnote 13), therefore they suffer the subject’s unconscious tendency to expel, isolate and refuse them since they are perceived as harmful for its integrity.

3. Atomic and mechanistic theory

Starting from his particular ideas, Guastella takes ideally part to the debate of the late 19th century on the atomic-corpuscular theory. His position is undoubtedly original and is the clear result of his theory on a priori sophisms, i.e. – as we said before - on instinctive beliefs. The pre-comprehension is that behind the atomic theory there is the concept of N.O.N.I.. According to Guastella – and as proved by the historical analysis that includes the pre-Socratic “physicists”, the Indians, Giordano Bruno and especially Bernardino Telesio – the concept of N.O.N.I. demonstrates that being subject to this a priori sophism (immutability of the substance) implies “being forced to go round the concepts of mechanism when it is impossible to reach them”

27

(Appendice, p. 86. The translation is ours)28

, on account of the natural intelligibility they give to the principle. Even monist philosophers, who use the metaphor of the unrolling hank of cloth, of the huge turtle spreading out and drawing back his limbs and so on, reveal that the experiences from which their ideas developed are in part similar to those that generate the mechanistic theory. 27

Translation from the Italian text. 28

For the concept of mechanism see notes on pp. LXXXVI-VII as well as note 1 on p. CXXXIII and ff.. See also the following passage.


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These experiences show us “the persistence of things in their properties and the movement like the only change as the most familiar phenomena” (ib., the translation is ours). Guastella believes that the mechanistic theory, just for its being clear, schematic and intelligible, was able to come back into vogue at the beginning of modern science, when Descartes and Galileo gave more strength to conceptual rigor. Furthermore, of the two possible theories of matter – the one based on continuity and homogeneity and the other on discontinuity and corpuscularity - Guastella finds that only the second one has the necessary requirements for representativeness, while the first theory suffers a defect of representation, i.e. the difficulty in imagining forms that move within an indistinct, perfectly homogeneous whole

29. As

other thinkers have pointed out - though coming to different conclusions – like the theory based on continuity, also the second one was originally “an a priori speculation”, generated by spontaneous tendencies of the spirit and not a logical induction deriving from facts”

30 (ib., p. 88; italic is ours). Until the 17th

century, the atomic theory proposed by Gassendi, Boyle et al. – being substantially a natural, a priori view - did not diverged from the similar positions of the ancients. Only at the beginning of the 19th century - thanks to Dalton (1803) and his discovery of the laws of the fixed and multiple portions - it found an experimental basis, particularly in the chemical field, which can be considered the kingdom of variability and mutation because of the nature of the phenomena it studies. In the chemical field, in fact, Dalton’s “theorems” aimed at reducing “to a simple conjunction and separation of elements what the simple observation immediately reproduces as a conversion of more substances into a new, single substance” (ib., 92. The translation is ours). It is no wonder, then,

29

Guastella states explicitly that, though he does not have the right skills, it would be interesting to verify if the preference given to the atomic theory is due - at least in part - to its representative character. 30

Translation from the Italian edition.


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that Guastella considers a limit31

what actually seems to be a positive aspect in the atomic theory (i.e. its natural ability of explaining facts), because it hides a component that disturbs the experimentalist and derives from its ancient purpose of converting unfamiliar events such as the changing (even radical) of certain phenomena (i.e. the conversions between substances) into something much more familiar

32, such as the phenomenon “that

we see in every moment, of elements that, though remaining unvaried, change mutually their position” (ib., p. 93. The translation is ours). This is essentially what the atomic theory is for him, although we may find it quite limitative in comparison to its contemporary evolution

33, because it does not take into account

the bonds and energies of atoms. It is true that Guastella mentions this aspect, but unfortunately he drops it when he asserts that the authors of this doctrine assume the presence – inside the molecule or atom - of a “special force of cohesion whose existence has never been observed in the world of the experience” (ib., p. 97. The translation is ours). In confirmation of his theory, Guastella points out that a chemist feels the need of explaining an astonishing phenomenon such as the regularity of weight relationship, which can be obtained in a laboratory, because it does not belongs to his familiar experiences. Furthermore, following Mill’s position, he advances the hypothesis that this could be an extreme case

34. Other elements of criticism that

31

This view reminds us of Popper’s position on the meaning and value of hypothesis that seem to be able to explain everything. 32

Notice that one of the main aspects of the metaphysical explanation, which Guastella considers primarily psychological, is the ability of tracing the unfamiliar back to the familiar, or to what is psychologically usual. The scientific explanation, on the contrary, leaves the “familiar” out of consideration and focuses on more general aspects. 33

This is true also in comparison to the atomic theory of that time. 34

Guastella was constantly interested in the dialectic between scientific and metaphysical explanation and tried to identify this second type in various theories. We are aware that there is no sharp distinction but only a gradual transition between the two aspects. This remarks are particularly interesting


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Guastella addresses to the atomic theory, i.e. its resorting to unreal, hypothetical causes, are undoubtedly more “conventional” and cannot be used to highlight his position.

Guastella’s conclusion is fortunately careful and - although he rises relevant objections and underlines that this hypothesis (because of its conformity to the instinctive tendencies of the spirit) can lead to an overestimation of the experimental evidences that support it - it cannot be easily put aside for the complexity of the questions and proofs it implies

35.

The mechanistic theory

Also in this case, Guastella examines the proofs for and against, analyzing the question as he does with the atomic theory. In 1903 this doctrine became exceptionally popular in the field of physics and after Darwin its success began to expand to biology as well

36, so it acquired more supporters than other theories. Is this

the reason for its popularity or the fact that it expresses a natural tendency of thought (a residue) that leads – as in the case of the atoms – to think compulsorily that they change position mutually, while the “bricks” remain unvaried? This tendency derives from the concept of N.O.N.I. and its logical consequence, i.e. “the impossibility that a whole has completely different properties in comparison to the reunited properties of the elements outside the whole” (ib., p. 123. The translation is ours). It is interesting to notice that - differently from the case of the atomic theory - here Guastella points out the axiomatic character in the statements of many mechanists about their research programs, as well as their because they allow us to understand that the subject does not want an explanation for everything, but only for unfamiliar phenomena. This implies that the question about what is unusual comes exclusively from an intuitive basis, i.e. from what is familiar. 35

Guastella admits that he is not able to control these questions and proofs. 36

Although many men of science such as Bernard, Du Bois-Reymond et al. were skeptical.


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fideistic tendency (without proving it) to believe that the only possible explanation is mechanistic and that “the laws of mechanics are the only real laws, because they dominate with their logical necessity” (ib., the translation is ours)

37. What is worthy of

remark and proves Guastella’s acumen is his ability of unmasking theories that other men of science perceived as experimental - revealing at the same time their (at least partial) aprioristic nature – and this before the revolution of the quantum and relativistic theories. This ability is the result of a global attitude that allows him to interpret the “necessary”, evident, a priori propositions just as propositions provided with an extraordinary (and sometimes irresistible) psychological influence on the subject usually without an objective counterpart. From this element derives Guastella’s mistrust of doctrines such as mechanism, atomism, animism – although he does not underestimate them – that present all the requisites of evidence and necessity (an aspect that would probably explain the “mystery” of their ancient and “natural” origin

38).

The concept of N.O.N.I. as a common root

39

After an extensive illustration of Guastella’s position on

animism and materialism (the mechanistic and atomic theories), it

37

B. Varisco, in his Scienza ed opinioni (1903), illustrated this a priori mechanism. Reading his work offers the opportunity of demonstrating Guastella’s greater epistemological (or gnoseological) perspicacity in comparison to the philosopher from Montichiari, as well as the fairness of the judges’ decision when the two scholars competed on the occasion of the Concorso di Palermo to obtain philosophy university teacher’s position. 38

Notice that Guastella identifies in the empiricists an inclination (non-logical, according to Pareto) towards the mechanistic theory. This may signify that also these philosophers can be subject to pre-comprehensions (see Appendice, p. CXXX, footnote 1). 39

Here the root, the “logical” argument by Parmenides represents an attempt of arrangement and argumentative enucleation of an unconscious principle, the N.O.N.I., which was already used by the Ionics.


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is now the time to identify the general principle that generated these partially divergent conceptions

40. Actually the spiritualist

and materialist doctrines are thought to come from the unconscious pre-comprehension “that things cannot change in their nature” (ib., p. CXXXI. The translation is ours). As concerns the first doctrine - from the principle and from the fact that there is no conscience in material elements – we can infer the existence of an element which differs from matter, i.e. the spirit, the soul – of which the conscience is “immutable property”. On the contrary, from that principle and from the conscience manifestation in an organic whole, the followers of the second doctrine infer that it should not be “essentially separated from the properties of the constituent elements” (ib., the translation is ours). In the light of this, we can say that – starting from an equal intuitive, subconscious ground - the two schools of thought use different auxiliary principles to explain their inferences.

- The spiritualist rely on the pre-comprehension that the conscience belongs exclusively to the living body, and this leads them to isolate a new substance, since they consider the essential difference in an aprioristic way.

- The materialists base themselves on the “observation” that in an organic whole there are properties that seems to be different from the typical properties of what is material –

40

Among the pre-Socratic philosophers, the followers of the N.O.N.I. shared the “axiom“ that implies “the impossibility that the essence of a whole is different from the essence of the elements by which it is composed and in will be ended” (Appendice, p. LXXII.). They were therefore in contrast with other thinkers, such as Plato and Aristotle, who resorted to the doctrine of the formal and essential causes and refused that axiom, asserting implicitly that “beings have qualities that are not the result nor the amount of the qualities of the element that form them” (ib., p. LXXI). This position, in spite of the suspected apriorism or anthropomorphism, in Guastella’s opinion is or should be also considered as the result of “a simple observation” (ib.) and not as a mere pre-comprehension. On the other hand the axiom proposed by the physicists appears to be an hypothesis “not less meta-empirical in its origin” (ib., LXXII) than the theological theories by Plato and Aristotle, since it is the result of natural sophism. All the quotations are translations from the Italian edition.


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and this aspect would actually lead them to think that this is an apparent difference.

So the first group starts from the concept of N.O.N.I. and the idea of an essential difference to reach a new, different substance-principle, while the second group starts from the observation of a difference to reach an apparent difference. That is, on the one side there is a statement of difference that generates a new principle, and on the other there is a refusal of the essential difference of material phenomena in opposition to those of life

41.

Guastella seems to refuse both hypothesis (which would be justified in their naturalness) in favor of a third one “that does not presumes” but “only notices that the same piece of matter has essentially different properties in different conditions” (ib., CXXXIII. The translation is ours)

42. So to say, the mistake made

by the exponents of the two conceptions consists in their spontaneous abductions, which have a pure psychological value. In fact, they do not start from the verification of the “fact” before analyzing the appearing or disappearing of properties in different conditions, so that these beliefs are typically “conservative” and “hostile to any kind of novelty”, though they are justified by the unconscious tendency to constantly discover – in our experience – a large number of objects and aggregates with have a nearly stable structure in comparison to the relatively small number having a variable structure.

41

In both cases, if it was a deductive conclusion, the opposition would not be possible. It is possible just because there are abductions (i.e. hypothetical inferences) in both cases. 42

This passage represents a scientific conception in contrast with two apriorisms but is unfortunately not further explained, so it is open to different interpretations. One of these aims to the elimination of the joke of N.O.N.I. and admits the need of new properties in the matter. Another interpretation, following Spencer (see also footnote 40), supposes that an aggregate has essentially different properties from the properties of its components. In this case the different conditions are the different forms of aggregation, but there could be many other way of considering this position, since the expression “in different conditions” is quite obscure.

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