A model of art perception, evaluation and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience

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New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 80–97

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New Ideas in Psychology

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A model of art perception, evaluation and emotion in transformativeaesthetic experience

Matthew Pelowski*, Fuminori AkibaNagoya University, Graduate School of Information Science, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya 464-8601, Japan

PsycINFO classification:261028202340

Keywords:AestheticsEmotional responsePerceptual developmentCognitive processesCognitive dissonance

* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ81 90 3583 1355; fE-mail address: [email protected] (M. Pelo

0732-118X/$ – see front matter � 2010 Published bdoi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.04.001

a b s t r a c t

While accounts of “aesthetic” experience inspire art study and drive its cognitive goals thecurrent modeling of art perception, based on the analytic tradition emphasizing successfulassimilation of art information, is unable to truly address this phenomenon, leaving uswithout means of accounting for disruption and fundamental changedeither perceptualor self-referentialdas well as epiphany and insight, within the experience of art; and nomeans of addressing ’art’s ability to mark and change lives. To address this, we introducea five-stage model of art-perception, organized around initial disruption and subsequentmeta-cognitive reflection and self-transformation, which allows for this needed discussionof perceptual and conceptual change, and a connection of art-viewing to viewer person-ality. Based on this, we consider belletristic accounts of aesthetic experience, and discussthe inter-relation of emotional, cognitive and appraisal factors that may be important forobjective research.

� 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

For centuries viewers have been struck, moved andchanged by their encounters with art, documentingaccounts of transformation and epiphany throughout art’shistory, which have come to be known collectively as“aesthetic experience.” Proust (1981/1954, p. 48) memori-alized a disruptive “pleasure invading [his] senses” froma tea-soaked Madeleine. Kandinsky recorded being“stopped short” by “an indescribably beautiful picture”dhisown painting, on its sided“pervaded by an inner glow” (inWeiss, 2005, p. 145). In contemporary examples, the un-played piano in the work 4’33 by John Cage, the ‘empty’canvases of Rothko, and Nam Jun Paik’s blank filmstripsroutinely deliver insight and “transcendence” (Belting,2002; Pelowski, 2007). As a viewer recently wrote in a visi-tor’s book afteran experiencewith aRothko (in Elkins, p.11),addinghis comment to a long tradition ofmeetingsbetweenviewer and artwork, “This makes me fall down.”

ax: þ81 52 789 4800.wski).

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Freedberg (1989, p. 60) argues that it is these experi-ences that provide art with its ongoing mystery, anduniversality, throughout human anthropology. People, henotes, are “stirred” by works of art, they “expect to beelevated by them. They have always responded in theseways; they still do.” These reactions can be tracedthroughout diverse mediadfrom painting tomusic, theaterto poetry. They quickly spill beyond the gallery, offeringcompelling connections between the arts and generalconceptions of enlightenment and insight. And, when welook to the specific study of art itself, it is this phenomenonthat sits at the heart of art’s scholarship, inspiringconceptions of what art can do, what art-viewing mightlead to; even, at its best, what art might be.

Despite differences in historical period, terminology andobjects of perception themselves, when writers describeaesthetic experience, as Shusterman (1997; also Fenner,1996) has argued in his review of these accounts, theyshow fundamental agreement, and central emphasis on theimportance of disruption and transformation. Aestheticexperience “breaks in upon us” (Fenner, p. 108), and serves

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M. Pelowski, F. Akiba / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 80–97 81

as a “check of our daily activities” (Ingarden, 1961, p. 300;also Dickie, 1974). It constitutes a state of heightenedawareness (Ferree, 1968), leading to self-confrontation,relieved tension, resolved conflicts (Crittenden, 1968),consummation (Maslow, 1959); enlightenment(Shusterman, 1997) and cognitive development (Dewey,1980; Goodman in Shusterman, 1997; Petts, 2000). It isthis phenomenondwhereby we see something new,question our conceptions and transform our world-viewdthat provides art’s ontological (e.g., Blanchot, 1997/1971; Danto, 1986) and social (Becker, 1982) definition.When considered as a progression of meetings betweenviewer and artist, between expectations and new art-worksdwhat Gadamer (in Roald, 2007, p. 78) has calleda “reciprocal game”dthese experiences drive art’s history(e.g., Dufrenne, 1973). In a recent example, the ur experi-ence for post-modern art, an aesthetic experience had byDanto (1992) in front of Warhol’s Brillo Box fundamentallyaltered and re-defined his, and art’s, entire philosophy. Andit is assumptions about this phenomenon that determineconceptions of how viewers should perceive art, how theyshould be prepared to look at art, and how cognition of artshould be evaluated. Berlyne (1974) argued for novelty,surprise and arousal as the goals of art interaction. “Peopleare looking for challenge in art,” Leder, Belke, Oeberst, andAugustin (2004, p. 2) recently surmised for art apprecia-tion. “Art,” Blanchot (p. 18) concluded, “and by this shouldbe understood the entirety of works and that which makeseach one a work of art,” and therefore aesthetic experience,“is in essence anxiety and movement.”

It is this phenomenon, then, that begs vital questions forpsychology. How does art “break in upon us?” How doviewers come to see something new in art? How do theychange their conceptions, deepen their evaluation andachieve insight and epiphany? Given the historicalevidence for the ability of simple stimuli, often withoutphysical change, to create this outcome (e.g., Freedberg,1989), how does this occur within the act of perceptionitselfdhow do objects become “transformed” (Fenner,1996)? How is cognition within this process tied toemotion and evaluation? And ultimately, as argued byLevi-Strauss (1982, p. 151; also Osborne, 1979) to be thefundamental question, not only for art, but for humaninteractions with their environmentsdhow might theseexperiences of disruption, change and insight be modeled,empirically recorded and identified “in real life?”

However, it is these very questions, and this “aestheticexperience,” that have not been addressed, or more oftenare beyond the scope of consideration, in art’s psycholog-ical study. While inspiring the study of art, aestheticexperience also embodies a longstanding disconnect in theconception and modeling of art perception. When asked todescribe what is important in art, how art might affectusdessentially, how aesthetic experience is manifest inreal lifedwe find this marked agreement amongresearchers highlighting the disruptive and trans-formational nature of the phenomenon. When asked toexplain what aesthetic experience is, and therefore howthis might be achieved, however, art philosophy, andsubsequently art’s psychology, which is largely built uponthe analytic tradition, give a quite different answer.

Focusing almost exclusively on a third factor mentioned inanecdotal accounts, they posit a state of selfless, pleasur-able and harmonious mastery, involving the successfulreception and assimilation of art information, that might beequated to a peak moment of epiphany or insight itself.When considered in isolation however, as has been thepractice since its Kantian inception, this “aesthetic” inexperience tends to preclude the possibility for art to markand transform lives.

As this has come to form the basis for the modeling ofart perception, it has led to a current approach whichpresupposes successful reception and understanding at theexpense of the antecedent, and often negative,movement tomoments of insight, pleasure and conceptual or perceptualtransformation; and we are left without a means ofaccounting for fundamental change within art experience.This, in turn, has led to a flattened conception of theexperience of art itself, often divorced from a viewer’spersonal beliefs and identity, limiting our ability to divideand order perception, as well as to explain and unitecognitive, emotional and evaluative benchmarks. And asFunch (1997, p. 42) has concluded, within his survey of thepresent psychological analysis of art, “if appreciation ofa specific work of art really has an impact on the viewer’slife. it would be difficult, if not impossible, to giveevidence of such influences through empirical studies.”

This paper represents our attempt to re-address thistopic. We first consider the present discussion of aestheticexperience and modeling of art perception, discussing itscurrent limitations, and then introduce an alternativeapproach, basedon thepioneeringworkof JohnDewey,whoargued, rather than success, that a model stressing initialdisruption, based not on analysis of specific information buton the application of the self-image to the perception ofinformation, and disruption-driven meta-cognitive selfreflection and self-change, may introduce this neededelement of change into the modeling of art perception, aswell as explain how aesthetic experience itself is achievedand how it might be recorded. We offer a five-stage modelfor this process, clarifying the steps leading up to trans-formation, and therefore calling for an expansion ofmany ofthe current approaches to aesthetic study.

1. “Aesthetic” success and current limitations in themodeling of art-perception

Before considering our model, it is first necessary toconsider the existing approach to art, noting what isaddressed, and more importantly, what is currently outsideof present discussion. As noted above, while the conceptionof art and aesthetic experience as a disruptive/trans-formative phenomenon represents a long tradition, theactual conception of aesthetic experience, and the subse-quent focus of art study, tends to focus exclusively on themoment of “aesthetic” insight, or peak of harmoniouspleasure and contemplation itself. This can be traced toBaumgarten’s initial founding of the field of aesthetics, anddefinition of “aesthetic experience,” as the “perfection ofsensate cognition” (e.g., Osborne, 1979, p. 136), continuinginto the subsequent Kant (1978/1790) harmony of“aesthetic judgment.” It is this harmonious state that was

M. Pelowski, F. Akiba / New Ideas in Psychology 29 (2011) 80–9782

originally linked to explanations for beauty as well ashedonic valuedas that which is “agreeable” or that whichcan be contemplated free from thoughts of utility (Walton,1993). Often, it is this state that was given as the means ofidentifying works of art, as those objects that allowa viewer to enter, or are intended to be perceived in, thismode of detached pleasure (Fenner, 1996). This thenextends into the analytic tradition (Beardsley, 1969; Eaton,1995; Fenner, 1996) of “aesthetic attention,” a form ofperception in which one moves past worldly disruptions,one’s desires, and negative emotions to a heightened stateof pleasurable scrutiny. And, it is this state, whichShusterman (1997, p. 30) has called aesthetic experience’s“evaluative dimension,” and this pursuit of harmoniousreception of art’s information, that has then come to formthe implicit goal for current psychological models.

Building on this tradition, current models equate art-perception to either an emotional/empathic alignment ofviewer to artist or artwork, as in the psychoanalytic andpsycho-physical conceptions (e.g., documented by Funch,1997; Roald, 2007); or, more recently, a cognitive ques-tion of the assessment of an artwork’s formal or semioticinformation via the matching of perceptual schema to theobject of perception, as in Norman’s (2004) “intuitive”understanding, Berlyne’s (1974) appraisal theory, andrecently Leder et al.’s (2004) “cognitive mastery.” Aestheticperception and aesthetic experience are fit into a framewhereby, it is argued, the more successful an individual isat “grasping the meaning” of an artwork (Leder et al., 2004,p. 178; alsoWalton, 1993), or assimilating oneself to art, themore ease with which they can perceive and the morepleasurable or rewarding the outcome (Mitias,1982).Whenone’s perception and evaluation is sufficiently unified orharmonious, it is then assumed, a viewer may experiencean escape from self-awareness (e.g., Ferree, 1968; Smith,1996). And it is to these ultimate moments of success,typified by Bullough’s “psychical distance” (see Funch,1997), Maslow’s (1959) “peak experience” and recentlyCsikszentmihalyi’s (1990) “flow” stated“a special,detached state of consciousness, in which you are awareonly of the moment, of the activity, and of the sheerenjoyment” (Norman, 2004, p. 125)dthat writers look asthe archetypal explanation of aesthetic experience (e.g.,Leder et al., 2004). In turn, “aesthetic” experiences, withinart-philosophy and psychology, pertaining to bothmundane art perception and transformative accounts,become those situations where, in Leder et al.’s (2004, p.493) words, a viewer can “classify, understand and cogni-tively master [an] artwork successfully; ” and this becomesthe goal and basis for understanding and assessment of art.

While this approach represents essential work on animportant aspect of the experience of artdindeed, itfocuses on one of the most compelling components ofaesthetic experiencedas has long been argued against theanalytic tradition, this exclusive emphasis on informationalmastery introduces numerous limitations when applied tothe “real life” experience of art. Essentially, there is nomeans of accounting for how individuals arrive at theseattunements to their environment within the act ofperception. Rather, following the philosophical focus onassimilation via the minimization of self-awareness and

disruption, this approach presupposes moments of success,requiring, for a viewer to meet their parameters, that he orshe employ an observational strategy or set of pre-expec-tations sufficiently compatible with, or sufficientlymalleable so as to accommodate, a specific artwork. Look-ing back to the qualities of aesthetic experience posited inthe introduction, scholars question how, given correspon-dence between expectations and perception, “aesthetic”mastery can lead to heightened awareness, novel percep-tion (e.g., Carroll, 1986; Dickie in Petts, 2000), newknowledge (Smith, 1996), or enlightenment (McDowell inPetts); or how wemight account for art’s ability to surpriseus or to break in upon us. In fact, with the elimination ofdisruption, it is these very qualities that would also beeliminated in the present approach. As Csikszentmihalyiand Rochenberg-Halton (1981; also Duval & Wicklund,1972; Smith) note, to the extent that viewer action comesto match current models of art perception, culminating inmoments of selfless “aesthetic” harmony, art experienceitself would create no impetus to change one’s analysis orperception because it would create no “checks” in the flowof perception. Instead, “by providing a familiar symboliccontext [it would] reaffirm” existing conceptions andidentity (p. 187).

Even models that do account for re-assessment (e.g.,Goodman in Shusterman, 2006; Leder et al., 2004),different complexities of perception (Parsons, 1987), orthose that explicitly single out disruptive and trans-formative qualities (Lasher, Carroll, & Bever, 1983), focusexclusively on successful assessment of art’s formal infor-mationdoften following Berlyne’s (1974, p. 6) four chan-nels of semantic, expressive, cultural and syntacticanalysisdflattening the perception of art viewing into thiseventual assimilation without a means of consideringfundamental changes in viewer expectations or schemathemselves. By focusing exclusively on informationalassessment, the significance, or “meaning,” of an artworkbecomes implicitly located outside of the viewer, where itcan be received and assessed but is itself “fixed andunchangeable” (Dewey, 1929, p. 23). This leaves no openingfor considering the role that self-identity plays in shapinginformation, or the role that artwork plays in questioningexpectations. Rather, as noted by Müller-Freienfels (inFunch, 1997), personal associations and, often, complete orgenuine examples of artworks themselves (see alsoBerlyne), are often omitted from consideration becausethey represent disturbances in the ability to generalize thereception of information. Instead, both artwork and viewertend to become inert actors in this informational assess-ment process (considered in detail by Dewey, 1951, 1980).Because aesthetic mastery presumes the elimination ofself-reflection, there is also no means of linking aestheticexperience to personal growth or cognitive development(Carver, 1996). Rather these qualities toomust be posited tooccur sometime after, or to have already occurred before,the actual perception of art.

Even if we do look to this selfless harmony as the“aesthetic” experience, distinguishing this state fromcognitive processes (e.g., discussed by Funch, 1997), we arestill leftwith thequestionofwhyaviewer is able to suddenlyfind harmony or epiphany with a previously inert work or


what this consummation occurs in reference to. In order toidentify this state, Dewey (1980) noted, would require thataesthetic epiphany be explained by finding an imaginedthreshold for harmony. More often, this state is specificallylinked to underlying cognitive interactiondDickie (in Petts,2000, p. 64) made this same argument from within theanalytic tradition, noting that when philosophers speak of“detached” aesthetic appraisal, what they in fact appear tomean is “paying attention.” Againwe return to the need fora discussion of change either in artwork or viewer, and thedisruption in perception or experience thatmight drive thischange. This becomesmoreproblematicwhen coupledwithinformation-processing research, discussed below,revealing the fundamental influence that pre-expectationsand self-protectionary filters have on what viewers are orare not initially able to perceive. Writers question whetherselflessness is not really self-protection (Wenzel, 2005), orhow to distinguish between inattentive and attentiveperceptionwithout arbitrarily creating a “correct”meaningfor an artwork (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, 1962/1945). Withoutameans of discussing the overcoming of initial expectationsand perceptual schema, there is the question of whether“aesthetic” success, would not actually signal a “facile” orpremature reaction to art (e.g., Donoghue, 1983), markingwhat Dewey (1980, p. 24) termed “a dead spot in experiencethat ismerelyfilled in.” There arises the question ofwhetheraesthetic experiences themselves can bemeasured (Fenner,1996;Osborne,1979; Shusterman,1997), or can even be saidto exist (Kennick in Beardsley, 1969).

At the same time, when we do look to transformativeexamples, it is the very qualities that are currently elimi-nated from the study of art perception that might giveshape to this phenomenon. According to Tucker (2004),viewer accounts of their experiences and of the significanceof artworks often have little to do with informational orformal assessment, instead focusing expressly on theircognitive and emotional experience surrounding theirinterpretation, its effect on deeply held conceptions andidentity, and fundamental changes in their relation toartworks. The 20th century work allegedly responsible forthe most aesthetic epiphanies (Elkins, 2001) for example,the Rothko Room mentioned above, consists of an octag-onal space and 14 black and purple rectangles that explic-itly reject mimesis, coming to be viewed not as paintingsbut as ‘just paint’. Danto’s aesthetic encounter led him todeclare the “death” of art (1992, p. 8). “If art is impossible,”Fraser (2006, p. 42) recently wrote of an epiphanicencounter with sculpture, composed only of string, strungfloor to ceiling, “then artists are also impossible, and Imyself am impossible.”

Freedberg (1989) has extensively documented thisconsistent, yet “ignored,” “strain of antagonism” betweenself-conception and artwork that underlies profoundencounters (p. 11). Levi-Strauss (e.g., 1982, p. 144) as wellas Gadamer (1984) and Dewey (1951, 1980) have gone sofar as to argue that aesthetic experience/transformation isbest understood, not in terms of what is represented, butvia what is “denied” by a specific artwork. This is reiteratedby Becker (1982, p. 204) for the basic mechanism of art,who argued “to produce unique works of art. artists mustunlearn a little of the conventionally right way of doing

things” Artists, when producing art, and viewers whenperceiving, “must violate standards more or less deeplyinternalized.” Leder et al. (2004) have noted that one of thequalities of much contemporary art that makes it troublingfor both viewer and researcher is the fact that it often doesnot even make use of the old tropes of beauty or mimeticdepiction in questioning standards and ideas. Instead, asnoted by Bourdieu (1984/1979) the post-modern erademands that art be interpreted via its effect on one’sworldview. However, while “ambiguity” is acknowledgedas an important factor in art perception (e.g., Berlyne,1974), it is precisely this negative quality of collativebreakdown and fundamental change in the masteryprocess that violates current models (e.g., Carroll, 1986;McDowell in Petts, 2000). And again, personal relation tostimuli and changes in viewer mode of assessment thatmight explain art’s ability to “die,” or a string to questionone’s existencedand the epiphanic/self-transformativereaction this might createdlie outside informationalconsideration.

Because of this emphasis on selfless informationalmastery, emotion too tends to be entirely separated fromthe cognitive consideration of art (e.g., Roald, 2007); or,other than pleasure, which is presumed to fit into a one-to-one relationship with assimilation (Berlyne, 1974; Funch,1997), following the original Kantian conception of non-cognitive “aesthetic” pleasure (Pouivet, 2000), omittedaltogether (noted by Eaton & Moore, 2002). However,empirical studies by Russell and Milne (1997) have seri-ously questioned this tie between basic hedonic responseand selfless assessment. Cupchik (1994) has questioned thetie between pleasure and non-discrepant understanding.Here too, Arnheim (1966) as well as Pouivet argue thatdiscussion of cognitive change, within personal relation toan artwork, is necessary in order to create a means of dis-cussing arousal of emotion, including pleasure (see alsoScherer, 1999). And, as might be expected from thediscussion above, when Steele, Spencer, and Lynch (1993;also Ingram, 1990) did explore emotion and trans-formation, outside of art, they argued for a progression ofemotions, specifically including negative affect, whichthemselves may be a necessary antecedent to finalepiphany and pleasure. As is discrepancy however, theseantecedent responsesdanxiety, confusion and self-focusedattentiondare in direct opposition to current conceptionsof aesthetic and epiphanic experience (Csikszentmihalyi,1990; Torrance, 1979).

This same limitation can be traced into the analysis ofart appraisal. Again, while there is specific acknowledge-ment of the importance that arousal and challenge play incoloring art assessment (Berlyne, 1974), there is no meansof considering why, in fact, viewers are aroused, surprisedor pleased by art, and therefore how self-identity andexpectations might shape our assessment of beauty andworth. Ellsworth and Scherer (2003, p. 574) have gone sofar as to note that conscious appraisal often begins when“something in the environment (physical, social, or mental)changes.” However, it is this change that is outside currentdiscussion. Because viewer experience must inevitablyinvolve the resolution of uncertainty through assimilation,there is no means of distinguishing between “agreeable”


art and appraisal reflecting profound encounters (e.g.,Becker, 1982; Harrington, 2004).

Finally, this situation can be traced into the outcomes ofinstitutional/museum programs for art appreciation. Whilechampioning the challenge of art, the current pedagogicalapproach, following the analytic focus on assimilation,attempts to increase selfless mastery by placing viewers incomfortable environments and by giving them contextualinformation (Haanstra, 1996; Tucker, 2004). Yet, while easymastery does lead viewers to feel that they “understand,” ittends to preclude enjoyment of art experience itself (e.g.,noted in empirical study by Leder, Carbon, & Ripsas, 2006).Writers argue that a pedagogical emphasis on informa-tional mastery, in tandem with the goal of the eliminationof discrepancy, may actually diminish the possibility forinsight or self-transformation (Adorno, 1984/1970;Bersson, 1982; Dewey, 1956; Dufrenne, 1973; Tucker,2004) As artworks themselves become increasingly morerefractory, writers argue that this may contribute to anincreasing alienation, and sense among the public that thearts themselves have no connection to their own lives (e.g.,argued by Bersson; Bourdieu, 1984/1979; Tucker, 2004).This might be ascertained, as noted by Eaton (2000), by thedeclining support of the National Endowment for the Arts.

This then leaves us with several key points that a modelof art experience, augmenting existing discussion, needs toaddress. Specifically, there is need for consideration of 1)howmastery or “aesthetic” epiphany/flow is achieved fromwithin experience itself; 2) expanding the conception of artperception beyond informational assessment; 3) incorpo-rating a mechanism for local growth and expectationalmodification that can account for fundamental changes inviewer perception and relationship to art, as well as 4)accounting for the role that viewer self-identity plays in artperception.

In this way, we may provide a means of explaining howwe might “transcend” the process of cognitive or aestheticmastery itself, and may provide the study of art witha frame for the consideration of emotion and changes inappraisal. Essentially, as noted by Tucker (2004, p. 85), thisrequires a “radical change” in the basic conception ofaesthetic experience; from the peak moments of informa-tional assimilation, to an “experience-based” discussion ofa viewer’s relation with art; focusing on the process ofarriving at new insight and transformation.

2. An alternative model of art perception andtransformative aesthetic experience

John Dewey offered the basis for such a discussion.“Instead of denying the importance of conflict in aestheticexperience,” he argued, “I have emphasized its indispens-able function (1951, p. 552).” Dewey (1980) argued that it isdisruption in viewer interaction with art, and subsequentlyviewer response to disruption, which both providesa mechanism for substantial change in the experience ofart, and a means of organizing this experience. Rather thana one-to-one match between artwork and perceptualschema, he posited that art perception and evaluation beorganized around two distinct states: facile “recognition”and meta-cognitive “perception.” Whereas the former

represents the successful matching of pre-expectations toperception through the elimination of discrepancy, assim-ilation of discrepant information into pre-existing schema,or self-protectionary escape, the latter represents a “neworganization” of a viewer’s expectations and schemathemselves. This results from cases in which initial failure,in the application of pre-expectations to perception, forcesa viewer out of informational mastery and induces thismeta-cognitive mode of self-reflection and self-change.When successful, it is this linkedmechanism of discrepancyand self-change, embedded in a viewer’s personal selfimage, that allows us to account for growth, novelty andinsight in art experience, and changes of kind in artworks(Dewey, 1951; also Doll, 1972).

Because this approach is built around the overcoming ofnatural strategies for the reinforcement of the self or self-protection in the experience of discrepancy, it also gives usa means of dividing cognition of environmental stimuli interms of their relation to a specific viewer’s self-identifi-cation. Discussion of art perception becomes, not a discus-sion of specific art information, but a discussion of howviewers transform themselves through engaging with art.Finally, this approach offers a means of reconciling thethree factors noted in the anecdotal description of aestheticexperience, grounding the peak of selfless pleasure andmastery within this cognitive progression, occurring lastand marking the consummation of this process of ante-cedent failure and self-transformation. It is this entireprocess then, wherein a viewer returns to cognitivemastery with a new set of expectations or schema asa direct result of their perception of art, that Dewey arguedshould be considered an “aesthetic experience.” And it isthe implicit focus on disruption, whereby we look forchange before assimilation, that should provide theessential focus for the modeling of art.

The remainder of this paper presents a cognitive modelfor this process, fleshing out this conception of Dewey, andconsidering a large body of existing scholarly work on itsvarious aspects. This model (shown as a cognitive flowdiagram in Fig. 1 and broken into a detailed description ofits stages in Table 1) serves as an extension to the currentconception of cognitive mastery, beginning with 1)a discussion of viewer pre-expectations, self image andperceptual schema, and then considering four phasesinvolving: 2) the initial application of these schema withinthe cognitive mastery process; 3) subsequent attempts atself-protectionary reconciliation or escape given thearousal of discrepancy; 4) transformations of viewerexpectations or schema in meta-cognitive re-assessment,culminating in 5) an “aesthetic” outcome of epiphany,cognitive development and pleasurable harmony. Whilethis discussion is adapted for the specific case of objectsperceived to be “art,” this model readily applies to anyperceptual activity, and, as we discuss below, may offera means of equating multiple forms of transformative/insightful experience.

2.1. Stage 1: pre-expectations and the self-image

First, before perceptual experience, viewers alreadyhold a set of postulates directing behavior, expectations for

Classification

Match self-image to perception?

Yes

No

Confident?

Yes No

All expected info available

Re-classify?

Yes No

Physical escape?

Yes No

Mentally withdraw?

Yes No

Wait for more info

Behavior/ Expectations can be changed? (give up)

No

Yes

Depression

Reassess

SecondaryControl

Self-Image Pre-state

Cognitive Mastery

Schema-change

Recognition

Flow state High

New Schema/Self Image

Aesthetic Phase/ New Cognitive Mastery

Meta-cognitivereassessment

Fig. 1. Cognitive flow model of aesthetic experience.


interacting with the environment, and their likely responseto possible outcomes (e.g., Epstein, 1973). Interaction withstimulidand interactionwith “art”dentails the applicationof some prior, hypothetical postulates to the reality orscrutiny of the environment, and success or failure in

perception, as well as what individuals can perceive orunderstand, are a result of this postulate system. Epsteinnotes the need for self-esteem, for fulfilling needs whileavoiding disapproval and anxiety; as well as strategies fornavigating the environment, understanding and control;

Table 1Major stages and contextual factors in transformative model of aesthetic experience.

Physiological responsea Emotion/affecta Cognitive activityb Self-image involvementb Art evaluationb

1. Pre-encounter Possess hierarchicalself-image/conceptualperceptual schemaregarding art viewing,tie to self

Regard art as eitherself-reinforcing (highself-involvement/highimportance/potency) orself-protectionary (lowself-involvement/importance etc.) task

2. Cognitive mastery Sympathetic arousal: if discrepancyis present: heightened electrodermalresponse/heart rate, decreasedperipheral temperature

Success: pleasure,anticipation, excitement, tensionFailure: anxiety, tension, threat

Semiotic or informational/historical assessment,attempted assimilation intoclassification, assessment ofmotive, evaluation

Structure art perception asself-reinforcing task, utilizecognitive and social filters

Assessment of artist motiveand subsequent meaning.Assimilation of meaning intoclass. Correspondencebetween artwork and artist inevaluation. Assessment ofmeaning based on informational/formal/historical elements. Highunderstanding leads topositive assessment

3. Secondary control Heightened sympathetic arousal Self-awareness, tension, anxiety,need to leave or abort,anger, sadness

Self-focused attention,maintain semiotic/informationalassessment. Art is meaningless

Protect self-involvement and“be goals”: devaluation ofartwork/context, increasedvaluation of self/alternativeactivities

Accusatory evaluation ofart/artist, devaluation ofartwork, art/artist concept orsituational context. Evaluationof art that reduces potency,seriousness. Negativeevaluation as bad or ugly

4. Meta-cognitiveAssessment

Sympathetic and parasympatheticarousal: increased heart rate/electrodermal response, decreasedfinger temperature/respiration

Temporary intensification oftension/anxiety. Acuteself-focused attention.Unsuccessfulschema-change: depression

Meta-cognitive analysis of activity,expectations, acknowledgementand acceptance of failure,examination of motives,schema-change

Modify “be goals” ofhierarchicalself image, resultingself-transformation

5. Schema-change/Aesthetic Outcome

Parasympathetic latencyperiod, tears

Relief, pleasure, happiness,epiphany

New cognitive mastery,reengage perceptual task

Self evaluation as lesspotent

Evaluation of artworkmeaning/artist motive in termsof previous meta-cognitiveexperience/inducedself-reflection. Positiveevaluation of artworkas beautiful, good

a Accumulate throughout experience.b Determined by stage in which experience terminates.

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Fig. 2. The hierarchical self-image (adapted from Carver, 1996).


and the need to be a part of society and to act in a non-deviant manner. Individuals also hold a set of “funda-mental” meanings regarding themselves, other persons,objects or behaviors (Lawler & Thye, 1999, p. 228)di.e.,who am I; what, in the case of meetings with artworks, is“art,” and how does “art” relate to me. Together, thesepostulates constitute an individual’s “ideal self-image”(Carver, 1996), and the specific hierarchical arrangement ofpostulates within the self-image, as in Fig. 2, drives indi-vidual behavior.

At the highest level of importance are what Carver(1996) termed “Be goals,” a collection of ideal traits andconcepts such as ‘be creative’ that the individual aspires to.Be goals are pursued and reinforced through actions,controlled by “do goals”de.g., understand artdwhich arethen subdivided into specific tasksdclassify, find meaning,etc. The higher the level of control utilized for a task, themore relevance to the ideal self and the greater thepotential threat to the self-image should a discrepancyarise; while low level goals that directly link to high levelconcepts are difficult to change without modifying thehigher concept. Lawler and Thye (1999, p. 228) note,“individuals seek consistency between fundamentalmeanings (i.e., that which they believe to be true), andtransient meanings (i.e., that which they experience ata givenmoment).” Individuals avoid discrepant situations ifpossible, actively work to escape from situations that posea threat to the self-image, and are more likely to attend toinformation that fits their hypothetical model and rein-forces their existing self-image (Swann & Read, 1981).Taylor and Brown (1988, p. 201) also note the presence of “aseries of social and cognitive filters [that] make informationdisproportionately positive” while “negative informationthat escapes these filters is represented in as unthreateninga manner as possible.”

In the specific case of art, while individuals for whom artperception is tied to higher order self-relevant conceptsmay have specific goals for art encounters, in most casesart-viewing expectations are structured toward generalself-reinforcement and control (Leder et al., 2004):knowledge acquisition and “stimulation”; involvement ormembership with a respected element of culture,

distinguishing oneself from ‘others’ who are not members;and enjoyment (Goulding, 2000; Hendon, Costa, &Rosenberg, 1989; Jansen-Verbeke & van Rekom, 1996).These are accompanied by specific cultural expect-ationsdthe prohibition against touching art, or againstimproper actions in the museum (e.g., Goffman, 1974). It isimportant to note here that, although much previous studyof art experience has noted pre-expectations in artperception (reviewed by Leder et al., 2004), this has onlyfocused on “aesthetic preferences,” past knowledge aboutart, level of past exposure, and cultural expectations(Berlyne, 1974). It is this deeper tie between stimuli andself, as well as expectations for the self in the perception ofstimuli, which forms the basis of this model, that has nottypically been included.

2.2. Stage 2: cognitive mastery and introduction ofdiscrepancy

Upon encountering a stimulus in the environment,individuals make an initial identification or classification,based upon their pre-expectations and conceptual image inwhat Leder et al. (2004) recently called the process of“cognitive mastery”. Because they have extensively docu-mented this, we will only refer to specific elementsimportant to this model. Once a classification is made,given an “art” situation, viewers make an attributionalinference regarding the basic motive or purpose behind theobject (Gilbert, McNulty, Giuliano, & Benson, 1992).Humans are preconditioned to employ this perceivedmotive in order to assess an artwork’s meaning (Bloom &Markson, 1998; From, 1971/1953; Gelman & Ebeling,1998; Parsons, 1987), which is then used to structureinteraction, evaluation and re-evaluation. However, again,motive is not specifically necessary when considering thismechanism itselfdone could just as well substitute theframing question, ‘why is this here?’ (e.g., From; Norman,2004). Once classification and mode of evaluation are set,the viewer attempts to locate and combine all informationin order to form one coherentmeaning, matching the initialclassification/motive, and then may attempt to formulatean appropriate evaluative or physical response.


According to Leder et al. (2004), mastery is a circularprocess, reflecting Gadamer’s (discussed in Parsons, 1987)notion of the accumulation and understanding of parts interms of a projected sense of the hypothetical whole, andrevising the latter in the light of an investigation of theparts. This assumes a temporal nature. “There [is]a successive cyclic interpretation check after each newpiece of syntactic structure is built” (Ferreira, Christianson,& Hollingworth, 2001, p. 14). Importantly for this discus-sion, this cyclicality within the cognitive mastery stageimplies that, barring perfect receptivity, there will alwaysbe discrepanciesdinformation that does not fit the presentclassification or motive; elements that do not readilycombine. Conceptually speaking, any novel element, to theextent that it is perceived, is prima facie a ‘discrepancy’.Discrepancies may also arise between perceived informa-tion and its relevance to the self or to other importantconcepts, or between one’s actions or response and one’sexpectations for action etc. In each case, as noted byFestinger (1957), discrepancy involves two cognitions, oneinvolving one’s hypothetical model, the other involvingactual behavior or perception.

Typically, in the case of informational discrepancy,resolution is possible from within the cognitive masteryprocessdeither through ignoring the discrepancy orthrough assimilation into a classification (Festinger, 1957).If individuals are confident that a discrepancy can beovercome, or will soon be explained, they will wait andattempt to take in more information in order to achieveclarification (Goethals & Cooper, 1975). In art situations,Bloom and Markson (1998) note that viewers afforda certain leeway to an artist. Parsons (1987, p. 74) adds, “thethought of the artist’s intentions allows us to believe that [awork] has a subjective meaning even when we cannotgrasp what it is,” encouraging viewers to persist whenotherwise they might be tempted to move on. As arguedabove, researchers typically view this process of mutualreinforcement and assimilation itself as the archetypalconception of art-evaluation (e.g., reviewed historically byBerlyne, 1974, p. 9; Haworth in Mitias, 1982). Gadamerconcludes that it has as its goal the “achieving of a unity ofsense: an interpretation of the whole (in Parsons, p. 81).”And Leder et al. (2004, p. 493) add, “it is this entire processthat we call an aesthetic experience.” Particular masterymay even induce pleasurable flow-type states(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).

However as this occurs from within the process ofinformational evaluation itself, it is essentially an act ofcircularity, requiring a viewer to expand his/her classifica-tion or break off perception rather than modify pre-expectations to accept a discrepant element. Viewers mayof course be bemused by art, pleasantly stimulated, or finda work beautifuldaccounting for a great majority of artinteractionsdhowever, if we restrict our analysis of artperception to only this stage, it is essentially an act of whatRothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) call “changing theworld,” so that current ideals and expectations might bepreserved. In fact, successful assimilation reinforces theexisting self-schema (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). While itbecomes suspect to the criticisms laid out above, typifiedby the conundrum Ingarden (1961) made explicit by

noting, given information that is discrepantdor fromanother perspective, perception that is ‘imper-fect’dassimilation requires that we ignore some informa-tion that might disrupt our experience. Frazier and Clifton(1998) note that the cognitive mastery process followsthe “Minimal Revisions Principle” maintaining as much ofthe initial classification as possible. Viewers spend moretime attending to the earliest information in an encounter(Morgan & Schwalbe, 1990). In situations of contradictoryinitial and subsequent information, initial information isgivenmore value; and viewers often fail to correct an initialclassification given new evidence (Gilbert et al., 1992;Greenwald, 1980). The longer that a subject has success-fully employed an initial classification before discrepancy,the less likely they are to change (Ferreira et al., 2001); andas adults, viewers become progressively less able toabandon existing schema and classifications whenperceiving novel objects (Gutheil, Bloom, Valderrama, &Freedman, 2004). When this process of assimilation isconnected to the selective pre-filtering of informationmentioned above, Dewey’s notion of the differencebetween recognition and perception becomes pertinent. Inorder to accommodate new information that does not fitone’s present self-image, viewers must work against thisgradient of self-protection that would diminish or dismissthe novel in perception; and following the argument laidout by Becker (1982) above, it might be said thatmuch art isspecifically designed to accomplish this.

2.3. Stage 3: secondary control and escape

When discrepancy cannot be assimilated or ignored,while it appears that no subsequent informationwill resolvethe discrepancy and an individual is confident that theyhave not made a mistake, we move to the next phase ofinteraction. Steele et al. (1993) note that at this pointdiscrepancies appear as such to the individual, self-protec-tion, as opposed to self-reinforcement, begins to play anovert role, andelements suchas tensionandanxietybecomeprevalent. This also entails a switch from “lower order andoften unconscious” perception to a “higher order processinvolving conscious assessment” and greater cognitiveinvolvement.

Interaction becomes a balancing act between elementsinvolving the self-image. According to Folkman, Lazarus,Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, and Gruen (1986, p. 1000), thesubject has “appraised [the] encounter as having to beaccepted,” yet acceptance would impact the self negatively.In order to escape discrepancy, the individual must alterone of the two cognitions so that the relative impact on theself is lessoned (Bem, 1967; Festinger, 1957). Viewers areleft with a choice between the importance of maintaininga sense of control and mastery and the relative importanceof the object, task or contextual elements. Becausecontextual factors are not typically important to the self-image, while motor control and action expectations doimpact comparatively higher “do goals” regarding efficacyand ability, viewers discard or diminish the environment.In so doing they preserve the integrity of their own, failed,interaction. However this does not lead to a confrontationof the self that might result in a true resolution. This phase


represents what Rothbaum et al. (1982) call “secondarycontrol,” the attempt to covertly change the conditions ofthe environment so that a discrepancy can ultimately beassimilated or ignored.

First, viewers attempt re-classification. In the case ofman-made stimuli, From (1971/1953; Norman, 2004) notesthat this often utilizes the existence of motive, taking anaccusatory tonedthe artwork is a bad or meaninglessexample, i.e., the artist made a mistake, and therefore thereis no need for interpretation. A viewer may also misat-tribute discrepancy to an uncontrollable external sour-cednatural phenomena, divine intervention, “aninsurmountable task, chance, or a powerful other”(Rothbaum et al., 1982, p. 8)dthereby absolving him/herself from culpability. From (p. 122) concludes that it isonly in rare cases that the viewer is not able to adequatelyassign blame to an external source and fully escape fromthe proceeding involvement. It is only in cases where “weparticipate in such a manner that our personal status isaffected,” where negative reclassification “is of importanceto our self-esteem.” Failing re-classification, viewersattempt escape. Physically, they may leave the situation,block out dissonant stimuli, or undertake action shiftingattention away from the dissonant cognitiondclap, fidget,talk to one’s neighbor (Rothbaum et al.). Individuals nextattempt to escape mentally (e.g., Steele et al., 1993). Roth-baum et al. (p. 10) label this act “cognitive withdrawal,”which can be accomplished by raising the relative impor-tance of the individual’s ideal-selfdfocusing on otherpositive self qualities not impacted by the discrepancy (e.g.,Hill & Martin, 1997)dor lowering the importance of thediscrepant eventdi.e., “it’s only art” (From). Theseoutcomes result in Dewey’s (1980, p. 52) second form of“recognition,” “perception arrested at the point where itwill serve some other purpose”dthe self is protected at theexpense of the artwork.

2.4. Stage 4: meta-cognitive re-assessment

When assimilation and subsequent escape mechanismsare unsuccessful or are bypassed, however, and viewersbecome trapped in an intractable situation where theabortive alteration of either discrepant cognition is notpossibledone can neither escape from perception norchange its repercussionsdviewers may instead enter intoa period of active experiential and expectational re-assessment. This event is often accompanied, or preceded,by acute self-focused attention (Steele et al., 1993), whichappears to serve as a catalyst for inducing an outcome indiscrepant encounters. While self-focused attention forcessubjects who anticipate doing poorly to abort (Ingram,1990; Steenbarger & Aderman, 1979), through reclassifica-tion and escape, it induces individuals who cannot abort torevisit and revise their expectations (Duval & Wicklund,1972; Greenwald, 1980; Steenbarger & Aderman, 1979).Self-focus leads to the feeling of “increased submissive-ness” and “individuation,” causes the individual to “focusattention on personal limitations and to increase perceiveduncontrollability” (Rothbaum et al., 1982, p. 23), increasesnegative affect and anxiety (Mor & Winquist, 2002); andinduces expectational re-assessment (Ingram, 1990).

Efran and Spangler (1979; also Miceli & Castalfranchi,2003) note that this movement is often aided by anexternal “trigger”da formal climax (discussed in Frey &Langseth, 1985; Sloboda, 1991), a mirror, camera, audi-ence, or the sound of ones own voice (Rothbaum et al.,1982); even a painting ‘watching you’ (Duval & Wicklund,1972)dthat consummates an irresolvable conflict orinduces this self-awareness. Dissonant events may alsoslowly wear a viewer down over a length of time.Rothbaum et al. (1982, p.28) note, “when the obstacle andthe resulting failure are salient and of lengthy duration.individuals’ resources are depleted and they are forced togive up.”

It is viewers in this position that we can attach toa discussion of transformation. In order to resolve thisposition, viewers must reframe their own involvementwith the problem situation, seeking, what Torrance (1979,p. 182) has called a “second-order change” whereby they“look outside” the problem to “the system” itself. Thisoccurs through viewers switching to a meta-cognitiveapproach to their interpretation: acknowledging discrep-ancy, revisiting their previous expectations or perceptual/conceptual schema, and eventually discarding or changingthese schema or “do goals” themselvesdoften, essentially“giving up” their attempt at direct control (Miceli &Castalfranchi, 2003). Thereby viewers alter their ownhierarchical self-image, achieving a relative “self-trans-formation” (Rothbaum et al., 1982).

2.5. Stage 5: aesthetic outcome and new mastery

It is this schema change or self-transformation that wecan then reunite to the current conception of aestheticexperience. As noted by Duval and Wicklund (1972) thischange allows a viewer to reset their interaction and re-engage with a stimuli, employing a new set of schema thatmay then allow renewed/deepened cognitive mastery (e.g.,Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason 1996), and the ability to attend toor understand previously discrepant elements (Dewey inPetts, 2000). This successful completion of schema changeis also explicitly tied in the literature to epiphanic emotionsassociated with aesthetic experience da feeling of“cathartic” release, epiphany, enlightenment, harmony,pleasure and, often, tears (Efran & Spangler, 1979; Frijda,1988; Labott & Martin, 1988; Miceli & Castalfranchi, 2003;Vingerhoets, Van Geleuken, Van Tilburg, & Van Heck,1997). It is also within the latency period followingschema-change that viewers may return to a harmonious/selfless contemplation of these new elements or thephysical qualities of a stimuli that allowed for theirpreceding experience (e.g., Dewey,1980). And therefore it isthis outcome, brought about through previous discrepancyand schema-change, that Dewey (1950, p. 56) termed the“aesthetic phase” of experience.

3. Art-perception and aesthetic experiencereconsidered via disruption and transformation

Returning to the psychological/philosophical discussionof art, it is this progression through disruption, to meta-cognitive reflection, acceptance and self-change, rather


than assimilation or escape, that introduces a vital elementof distinction in art experience. Adorno (1984/1970, p. 25)put this best when he argued that aesthetic experience,or enlightenment through art involves “the individualeffect[ing] his identificationwith art not by assimilating thework of art to himself,” as would occur in the initialcognitive mastery and secondary control stages, “but byassimilating himself to the work.” By introducing a meansof breaking from the mastery process, through the intro-duction of meta-cognitive assessment and schema-change,and then re-engaging in final mastery/assimilation witha new set of schema/expectations, we introduce a means ofexplaining the transcendental quality of artdreflectinga relative adjustment in a viewer’s self-image or relation-ship to the worlddas well as a means of connecting theexisting conception of mastery to insight, novelty andpersonal growth.

This then also offers ameans of explaining the arousal of“aesthetic” harmony, pleasure and emotion itself. Whilethis model may end with mastery and aesthetic emotions,these responses are explicitly connected to this antecedentcognitive progression of discrepancy, overcoming self-protectionary strategies and achieving self-transformation.In this way, this final “aesthetic phase,” of experience, isgiven grounding and purpose. Rather than being champ-ioned for its own intrinsic value or the pleasure it entails,these emotions become “signs. that point to a cognitive orpsychological reorganization” (Efran & Spangler, p. 68), oras noted by Bohart (1980, p. 199), “sign[s] that one isallowing oneself to actively experience and perceive.” Inturn, as Dewey argued, it is as much this antecedentdisruption, as well as subsequent self-reflection, as it is finalharmony and pleasure, that should be regarded as an“aesthetic experience” and should be considered whenexamining the perception of art. However, it is theseantecedent stages that are typically overlooked.

When we return to literary examples, however, we cantrace this process. Danto’s account of transformationthrough viewing Warhol’s Brillo Box, for example, detailsa discrepancy between his pre-expectations and percep-tion, self-reflection and self-change. He recalls that he,a philosopher interested in the ontological meaning of art,was confronted with an artwork designed as an exact copyof a commercial shipping container for soap, leaving him(1992, p. 3) “struck by the question of how it was possible”for the Brillo Box to be a work of art. He recalled that thisplaced him in the intractable position noted in this model,where either the work was not art, which, because it wasplaced in an art gallery, called into question the very exis-tence of art itself; or it was art, but, because it was designedto not be beautiful or meaningful, was un-interpretable.This in turn challenged his previous philosophical basis forinterpreting art (his “do goals”), and therefore his self-identity as a philosopher. His aesthetic experience camewhen he realized that it was his own expectations for theinterpretability of art itself that were incorrect, and thatthis in fact was the intention of the artist; leading toepiphany and the famous “death” of artworks, as he hadknown them.

Also recalled that many of his colleagues did not make itpast the “secondary control” stage when confronted by this

discrepancy, choosing instead to protect their own self-identities. “The [gallery] director. felt absolutely betrayedby the Brillo Box. She hated them. she was livid at theopening.” “People laughed. An artist friend of mine wroteSHIT across the guest book.” They “were clearly not readyfor [an artwork] which put no premium whatever on theromantic. imperatives that defined painting.”

The epiphanic response to the works of Rothko followsa similar progression. According to Nodelman (1997, p.333), the paintings, monumental black and purple colorfields representative of mid-twentieth century abstractexpressionism, are “cunningly designed to incite” theattempt at direct mimetic interpretationdbegging viewersto find a message or meaning from the artistd“while at thesame time rendering it untenable.” Elkins (2001, p. 11)continues, viewers are forced into a turning point, “themoment when they have seen everything they can, andthey sense its time to look away.” It is viewers who do notflee at this point who are likely to have a moving experi-ence. This in turn comes to fit into this model’s descriptionof meta-cognitive reflection. “Frustrated and thrown backto yourself,” Nodelman (p. 330) argues, “you become thecenter of the room. You think about your conduct, yourbody.” The art “forces disturbing questions about thenature of the self and its relation to the world.” One realizesthat the real is only “a system of signs constructedcontinuously by and for the viewer” (p. 342). And this self-confrontation and meta-cognitive assessment induces anexpectational change in the viewer, who “may emerge ona new plateau” of understanding where “the experientialstructure of the installation [itself] is transformed.” “Rothkomakes a “transcendental promise,” Dutoit and Bersani (inElkins, p. 16) conclude, “but he breaks it and gives usourselves.”

It is by considering this tie to self-image, and the meta-cognitive nature of viewer assessment in the schema-change process, that we can account for these fundamentalchanges in a viewer’s relation to stimuli; and explain the“negative” quality of aesthetic transformation. The re-assessment process may often explicitly take on a negativetone, deeply tied to the defeat of a viewer’s personalexpectationsd“what did I expect?”; “what am I doing?”However, in all cases, schema-change requires a viewer to“give up” a previous, personally important, expectation ordesire for action (Miceli & Castalfranchi, 2003). Theresulting transformation, in turn, creates a fundamentalchange in the viewer’s relation to the stimuli; a switch frompositive informational analysis, or direct attempt to controltheir situation, to essentially an aniconic assessment oftheir own, “failed,” participation with art. This in turnreunites the outcome of art perception to the specificqualities of an artwork itself, which, by questioning vitalelements of a viewer’s self-image, creates the opportunityfor this self-reflection; and, when a viewer is able to ach-ieve self adjustment, may be evaluated expressly for itsability to provide this enlightenment. Much like Rothkoabove, Belting (2002, p. 391) notes of the epiphanicresponse to the empty films of Nam Jun Paik and the silentpiano of John Cage, the artists “devised zones of silence aszones of freedom where the audience was expected tobecome creative in the face of nothing.”


This however, should not be thought of as a recentdevelopment, or a new kind of interaction, but rather canbe traced throughout art experiences. Rollins (2004, p. 182)notes that this response is fundamental to paintings thatare often tied to conceptions of beauty and mimesis. Heoffered as an example Monet’s painting Springtime throughthe branches, arguing that it represented leaves so that it isimpossible to combine them together in order to resolvetheir depth, leading to a forced, and eventually pleasurable,re-assessment of the “way the visual system ordinarilyworks.” This can also occur via discrepancy between whatis mimetically depicted in art and its relevance to a viewer.Magherini (1989; also Elkins, 2001) has documentednumerous intense responses to pre-modern works,involving for example a discrepant relation betweena “repressed” gay male viewer, a troublingly titular Rubenspainting of a young man, and transformative confrontationof the viewer’s self-expectations. As she concluded, while“different people have strong reactions to the same worksof art,” response ultimately comes down to “the [viewer’s]history and personal experience” (in Elkins, p. 47), and self-adjustments therein.

In his empirical studies of music, Sloboda (1991, p. 120)notes this same mechanism, arguing that emotional oraesthetic responses are linked to “creation and violation ofexpectancy. within musical structures.” In opera, Poizat(1992/1986) notes that aesthetic emotions occur whenviewers “dimly sense that the singer is trying to freethemselves from the prison of words. at the point whena voice has almostmade it, but gives out” (in Elkins, 2001, p.146) forcing a viewer to give up their prior expectation.Burch-Brown (1983, p. 122) argues that transformational orepiphanic experience from reading poetry results froma “metaphoric process” that alters one’s expectations insuch a way as to engage and change their “whole self.”

This process can also be traced in accounts that corre-spond directly to the classical conception of aestheticexperience. Cases of extremely resonant stim-ulidexperiences beauty or harmony (e.g., documented byElkins, 2001)dor “sublime,” overwhelming naturalphenomena, when considered in the broadened viewpointof this model, are often marked by discrepancy betweenone’s expectations for understanding the significance ofwhat they have perceived and their actual response. Elkins(p. 20) argues that, while the examples above are “painfullyvacant,” these cases are “overfull”. Miceli and Castalfranchi(2003, p. 260) add, viewers experience a “sense of contrastbetween one’s experience. and one’s perceived ‘small-ness’, ordinariness, and imperfection. together with one’shelpless need to comprehend and express the wholeexperience.” “Viewers see more [,or experience more,] thanthey expect” (Elkins, p. 20). And, again, it is self-awareness,acceptance, and final forfeiture of one’s expectations forcontrol that leads to pleasure and epiphany. As Frijda (1988,p. 351) concludes, these instances result from meta-cognitive “awareness of [one’s] state of action readiness”and, ultimately, “some change” in one’s expectations forthis state. Koestler (in Frey & Langseth, 1985, p. 92) adds;these experiences too are always “self-transcending.”

Viewers may also be presented with a powerful stim-ulus in a situation, such as a museum, where an overt

action is socially discouraged (e.g., Lutz, 1999; Vingerhoetset al., 1997). Art history recounts these responses indicativeof “secondary control”: the desire to clap or yell (Elkins,2001), the need to “do something with itdto run throughit, or eat it, or tear it apart (Beckley & Shapiro, 2001, p.360).” The inability to do so, because of social constraints, isdeeply dissonant, and giving up this need or accepting theimpossibility of a correct response leads to intense emotion(Elkins, 2001; Goffman, 1974; Magherini, 1989). In thesecases, the particular discrepant cognitions in the model forarriving at an “aesthetic phase” concern not the evaluationof the artwork itself, but the evaluation of one’s responsewhile perceiving the artwork. However the progressionfrom primary to secondary control to acceptance remainsfundamentally the same.

While each account, and the specific combination ofevents that conspire to create transformation and thespecific relevance of this outcome to a viewer are of coursedifferent in each case, this model gives us a means ofconsidering these elements via this underlying progres-sion, and a key elementdthis self or schema changedthatunites them. This allows us to expand this model beyondart, providing a basic mechanism for self-transformationsin the relation to environmental stimuli, without need fora definition of “artworks”. This also draws together bothman-made and natural stimulidi.e., those with an absenceor presence of perceived underlying intentionalitydas wellas objects not intended to be art. Again, as was discussedabove, objects that are perceived as “artworks” certainlyinvite a set of pre-expectations that play an important rolein information processing, and may determine the specificmeans of escape in secondary control, however, the basicmechanism of self-change itself remains the same. As notedabove, great deal of 20th century art, notably the Brillo Box,created disruption and reflection in viewers by presentingobjects not intended to look like “art.” More recently,exhibitions, such as the 1998 Guggenheim exhibition ofHarley Davidson motorcycles, created disruption andreflection through the appropriation, into the “art” context,of objects expressly not intended to be art. And with post-modernism and performance art, “artists” have moved pasteven this trope, using design to question elements of lifehaving nothing to do with “art” at all. We would argue, it isthis procession, regardless of the specific stimuli, thatwriters implicitly refer to when speaking of ”challenge” ofart. And it is art’s ability to act, in whatever form, as animpetus of this process, again, that is given as the historicalbasis and definition of art itself (Becker, 1982).

In turn, Dewey (1929, 1956) explicitly argued fora fundamental equivalence between artworks and educa-tional materials, and for basic equivalence between thisconception of “aesthetic experience” and everyday acts ofgrowth and insight. And this model can be readily con-nected to numerous such conceptions. Gadamer (1984, p.317), writing of knowledge acquisition, much like Dewey,noted two types of experience: an initial facile interactionwith the environment that “fit[s] in with our expectationand confirm[s] it,” and “real” experience “[whereby] wegain through it better knowledge, not only of itself, but ofwhat we thought we knew before.” This is reiterated byHeidegger in his notion of “destructive hermeneutics,”


requiring for the discovery of something new, that the“traditional interpretive instrument breaks down” and anindividual be forced to evaluate their schema for “being inthe world” (Spanos, 1993, p. 55). Torrance (1979), in hisreview of insight and “aha moments” in education, notesthis same process of antecedent disruption and decon-struction of initial schema and ideas leading to meta-cognitive reflection and acquisition of new knowledge.

This model can also be connected to conceptions oftransformative experience in religion or spiritual contexts.Notably, James (1958) description of religious experiencenoted“to get to it, a critical point must usually be passed,a corner turned within one. Something must give way,”explicitly linking this progression to negative emotions,a “change in terms of the old self” and a final feeling of“conversion” (pp. 169–175). This “negative” nature of reli-gious transformation is reiterated by Kierkegaard (inSpanos, 1993). Stoudenmire (1971, p. 254) adds that theinitial contradiction of one’s religious beliefs elicits“significantly more emotion” than expectational affirma-tion. And the phenomenon of “satori” or enlightenment inZen Buddhism explicitly follows this failure-basedprogression. Suzuki (1950, p. 87; also Torrance, 1979) notesthat “a psychological impasse” and a “highly wrought-upstate of consciousness” are “the necessary antecedent ofsatori.” Sogen Hori (2000) adds that Zen masters, playingthe role of artist, and using the religious context ofBuddhism as their medium, violate the basic rules ofinteraction, creating a discrepancy between students’expectations and their perception, inducing reassessment,schema-change and epiphany.

This then suggests a potential universal nature to theseaccounts, able to explain the equivalence of small acts ofinsight and “big” aesthetic experiences. Essentially, asCarver (1996; also Festinger,1957) has argued, regardless ofwhat the specific stimuli and means of arousing discrep-ancy are, the more fundamental an affected schema orconcept is to the core self-image, the greater the magnitudeof potential dissonance, the greater the difficulty in over-coming self protection, and therefore the greater the finaltransformation of the hierarchical self; and the moreprofound the experience.

We might even connect this process to shocking eventssuch as war, natural disaster or the World Trade Centertragedy.1 Virilio and Lotringer (2002) note that, while formany, overwhelming violence and its aftermath constitutea simply horrifying experience, for some, these events,what Virilio (p. 147) called “negative historical monu-ments,” act, just as artworks, as a “rite of passage,”becoming “the means by which you connect creatively tothe world” or “touch base with reality” itself (p. 9). This is ofcourse not to champion the transformative potential ofdisaster, but to equate it, as one more potential stimuli, inthis basic mechanism of disruption and change.

This reiterates one more important note about thismodel’s discussion, connecting back to the educational

1 These examples were raised in the peer review of this paper.However, the specific interpretation of these examples is that of theauthors.

discussion in the introduction. Following the typicalconception of the arts as affording detached moments ofcontemplation, we are lead to assume that the role that artmight play in human existence is as a form of “rehearsal,”with the consequences of interaction somehow removedfrom a viewer’s real life. It is assumed that “aesthetic”interaction fits into this cognitive mastery process whereviewers test their conceptions and seek challenge, beingcareful not to go too far so as to find themselves in anintractable position. And the idea of “aesthetic” evaluation,as detached analysis of an object’s informational qualities,itself informs this conception. This paper, however, arguesjust the opposite. Truly detached “aesthetic” contempla-tion, as noted above, would signal a self-defense/rein-forcement mechanism, allowing a viewer to escapepersonal involvement with their environmentdleading tothe discomfort of many writers when this conception ofaesthetics is extrapolated to the ‘aestheticization’ of warand tragedy (e.g., Arendt, 1958). This, however, exemplifiesthe basic disconnect with the current approach to art,where despite the effort of artworks to force intractabledisruption, it is this process that is dissuaded by the focuson physical/mimetic evaluation. Jagodzinski (1981, p. 29)makes this explicit when he laments; “by fiat, new artforms are critical and reflective of existence” [demanding]“please don’t relax and have an aesthetic experience.”

However, what this paper calls for is an entirelydifferent conception of aesthetic experience, equated tocognitive schema-change rather than a particular mannerof perception, because such labels become meaningless asthey shade into other psychological/contextual disciplines.In turn, this expressly requires a viewer/artwork to over-come the human instinct of escape or assimilation throughsurface evaluation or self-withdrawal and instead enter anintractable position whereby one might use their owndisruptive encounter as a means of self-reflection andtransformation, and therefore come to believe or seesomething new, as well as feel pleasure, epiphany andharmony.

Finally, while there are examples of art experience thatdo seem to break suddenly upon viewers (seeCsikszentmihalyi, 1990), their distinction from the aboveaccounts highlights this important cognitive distinction.Without this process of disruption, reflection and meta-cognitive change, in which a viewer is able to process theirexperience and make it a part of their life, these events donot contain a cognitive resolution, they do not changefuture behaviordsave for possibly motivating a viewer totry again to duplicate the feeling. They do not includea component of self-modification and leave the viewerwithout any understanding of the significance of thepreceding event (e.g., Carver, 1996; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990;Smith, 1996). These accounts often appear to be the resultof the application of a classification that is so broad, orflawed, so as to allow for wonderment and contemplation;and examples from the arts often suggest that the viewerentered the experience in an already altered state of fatigueor dreams, returning to question of facile assimilation.Often they share a sense of lost opportunity. Kandinskylamented that he tried to recreate his impression and “onlyhalf succeeded” (Weiss, 2005, p. 145). Proust (1981/1954, p.


48) diminished his madeleine experience, summing up theproblems with “isolated, detached” moments of success,“with no suggestion of origin”d“Whence did it come?What did it mean? How could I seize and apprehend it?”

4. Factors for empirical study: interrelation betweenemotion, appraisal and viewer experience through thestages of aesthetic experience

Whether talking of peak accounts or the basic mecha-nism of change in art perception, this then leaves one finalquestion for this paperdthe empirical study of this process.As noted above, if we focus only on the peak conclusion ofepiphany or assimilation of art information, we are left withnomeans of assessing art experience other than pleasure orformal assessment. And as Osborne (1979) notes, there isprobably then no individual measure that could determinethe occurrence of an “aesthetic” experience.

However, if we approach art perception not as a distinctmoment of assessment, but rather, following the discussionof this paper, as a progression of stages whereby the viewermatches and adjusts their self-schema against an artwork,we can connect a great deal of existing work on the variousstages discussed herein. By using this model as a frame, andintroducing this process of self-change, we can thenintroduce a means of considering the interrelation ofemotion, appraisal, understanding and viewer self-conception through each stage of this model. By consid-ering the elements most likely to arise throughout anexperience culminating in this schema-change (detailed inTable 1), we can then propose a means of identifying thisoutcome and making a distinction from facile acts ofassimilation or abortive secondary control. While it iscertainly true that schema-change itself may occur overa long period of time, involving multiple stimuli, because ofthe distinct nature of most meetings with art, we can arguethat this full progression might be looked for in a specificencounter.

5. Art evaluation and assessment of meaning

This model posits three general outcomes to art view-ingdinitial self-reinforcing mastery, abortive self-protec-tionary escape in secondary control, and final “aesthetic”meta-cognitive schema-change. When looking at theevaluation of art and the assessment of meaning, wewouldexpect to track an evolution in viewer understandingthrough these stages within a distinct art encounter:beginning with 1) direct evaluation of art in the cognitivemastery stage, involving appraisals of the formal elementsof an artwork such as those qualities noted by Berlyne(1974)dits semiotic or conceptual meaning, its historicalor cultural significance, as well as syntactic and expressivequalities transmitted via the art form. Given discrepancythat cannot be assimilated, this should then be followed by2) a period of meaninglessness and loss of understanding ofartist motive in the secondary control stage; concludingwith 3) a fundamental shift in assessment from the infor-mational plane to a meta-cognitive mode of “experiential”interpretation. In the case of plastic arts, viewers mayrevise their analysis of the artwork’s significance, deciding

that that the artist’s intention for the artwork, rather thantransmitting signs, may have been the creation of theviewer’s preceding experience itself. For example, Danto(1992), when assessing the meaning of the Brillo Boxsurmised that what it was “about” was its ability to ques-tion his attempt to answer that very question. Thedescriptions of Rollins (2004) and Fraser (2006) above offersimilar examples. It is this personalized, experience-basedinterpretation of art that Dewey (1980) and Tucker (2004)argue constitutes the goal of a deepened art experience.And it is this form of interpretation that Bourdieu (1984/1979) claims is expressly demanded by post-modern andmuch contemporary art.

This progression might be assessed by having viewerskeep a log of their interactions with an artwork, or askingviewers to walk a researcher through their interaction afterthe fact, as in the work by Roald (2007), looking for thesechanges. Alternatively, Pelowski (2007) has asked viewersto describe the “meaning” of an artwork, as well as the“artist’s motive,” after a viewing experience, assessing theiranswer via these three stages. We are essentially thencalling for an analysis of art perception, if at all possible, ina “natural” setting, in which a viewer is allowed to interact,without intrusion, with a completework of art. From (1971/1953), and Bloom and Markson (1998), on the other hand,have explored this isolated progression in the laboratory,presenting viewers with an artwork or stimuli and thenpurposefully introduced a discrepancy, typically by callinginto question the existence of artist motive or a work’sclassification as a meaningful object, tracking viewerresponse through these stages.

It is also important to note that this final experientialassessment proposed as the end-state of a transformativeoutcome should not be confused with what Leder et al.(2004) have described as self-related interpretation, refer-ring to a form of art assessment often equated with facileunderstanding. While the latter involves assessment offormal qualities in relation to existing schema that a viewermay holddi.e., “that character looks like my cousin”dtheexperiential interpretation reflects the viewer’s own artexperience itself and the role the artwork plays in thisexperience.

6. Appraisal and self-conception

When looking to appraisal of art, again, much usefulwork has been done which might be applied to thisdiscussion; specifically, the work of Berlyne (1974), Vitz(reviewed in Funch, 1997), or approaches considered byScherer (1999), which consider a multivariate analysis ofappraisal terms. As these authors note, following the initialwork of Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1961), who alsoapplied this analysis to art, appraisal typically can bedivided into the three factors of an evaluative or hedonicresponse, as well as evaluations of potency and activity.While much work has gone toward the consideration of,predominantly hedonic, factors in aesthetic experi-encedspecifically the tie between complexity or challengeposed by art and hedonic value/beauty, relation betweenunderstanding and positive or negative hedonic evaluation,and the agreeable “collative” application of art to one’s self


in the assimilation process (e.g., Berlyne)dthere has notbeen consideration of the underlying role that self-image,and threats to this self, play in determining viewerresponse to, and assessment of, art (e.g., Scherer). Nor hasthere been a consideration of assessment following majorchanges in viewer relationship to artworks.

Whenwe return to the three stages proposed for viewerinteraction moving to schema-change, it is this role ofself-protection, self-reinforcement, and final self-trans-formation that might give further shape to many assess-ments of art appraisal. Evaluation ending in initial cognitivemastery, according to Garfinkel (1967) and Goffman (1974),should likely reveal appraisals that aid in ignoring orassimilating discrepancy, thereby aiding self-reinforce-ment, diminishing the potential threat to the individual byreducing art’s potential meaningfulness and importance(also Rothbaum et al., 1982). We might expect these low-ered measures in baseline evaluation of the general cate-gory of “art”. When experience ends in the secondarycontrol stage, on the other hand, we would expect self-protectionary strategies to play an important role inappraisal. This might be revealed through an analysis ofterms corresponding to potency or activity. Carroll (1959, p.113) notes that these factors of appraisal suggesta measurement of the amount of adjustment that “must bemade” to a stimulus. Berlyne (1974) too has noted theability of these regions to measure “collative uncertainty”or tension between pre-expectations and perception in artassessment. We would expect a correlation betweensecondary control and negative evaluations in these scales,reducing the “need” for evaluation from an individual andtherefore reducing the threat art plays to the self. Viewersmay also evaluate the artist in equally negative terms,reflecting the accusatory or dismissive tone noted above byFrom (1971/1953). Matched pre and post testing may alsoshow a re-evaluation of general categories of art and artistreflecting this lowered importance and potency. In addi-tion, Becker (1974, p. 773; also Harrington, 2004), adds, an“attack” on the self, “becomes an attack on the aestheticrelated to it,” and for viewers who end with escape, weexpect a negative hedonic evaluation of the artwork as“distasteful,” “ugly” and bad. Finally, with schema-change,the work may be again evaluated positively, as evaluationmoves from self-protectionary impotence and lack of seri-ousness to evaluations revealing heightened potency(Becker, 1982), affecting both specific artwork and re-evaluation of the general category of art. In this way, asnoted by Bourdieu (1984/1979) this final schema-changewith a specific artwork may also create a deepened rela-tionship between viewer and the category of art itself.

This of course, leaves many questions for future study,such as the relation that this model proposes betweenimpotence of artworks, negative hedonic assessment andthreat to the self, or potency and positive assessment ofbeauty and worth given “aesthetic” outcome. This alsoraises the question of possible differences between initialassessments of beauty or hedonic evaluation and thatfollowing a schema-change. While it is generally assumedthat initial assimilation or understanding of art results inreward/relief and therefore positive assessment (e.g.,Berlyne, 1974), recent studies by Russell and Milne (1997),

as well as Cupchik (1994), have questioned this assump-tion, suggesting that initial difficulty may instead lead toa deepened hedonic response. This in turn may be tied tothis epiphanic/schema-change progression proposedherein, suggesting that the final stage in this model mayresult in a more profound hedonic appraisal. By tyingappraisal to the other factors of evaluation and emotion, wemight shed light on this distinction. These proposedchanges in viewer evaluation of artist and “art,”which mayrepresent either self-protection or self-transformation, alsocall for future exploration.

Miceli and Castalfranchi (2003) also argue that thisprogression from secondary control to schema-changeshould manifest in re-evaluation of a viewer’s own self-image, revealing, in the case of the transformation positedin this model, increased personal impotence as a vieweracknowledges discrepancy and gives up attempts atcontrol. This might be assessed by issuing matched pre-and post-tests evaluating a viewer self-image followingOsgood et al. (1961). Bem (1967) notes that changes in selfappraisal using multivariate analysis may prove a readyindicator of this cognitive self transformation.

7. Emotion, physiological response and experientialfactors

Finally, a review of literature on the major cognitiveelements of this modeldcognitive dissonance studies,secondary control and schema changedalso offers a meansof ordering and incorporating numerous emotions andphysiognomic responses, as well as specific experientialfactors, to this discussion.

Discrepancy in the cognitive mastery stage shouldcorrespond physiologically to sympathetic arousal of theautonomic nervous system (Frey & Langseth, 1985; Gross,Fredrickson, & Levenson, 1994). Whereas successful assim-ilation of discrepancy results in a “positive” feeling of“anticipation or excitement,” unsuccessful assimilationresults in confusion, anxiety and tension (Epstein, 1973), aswell as loss, failure and threat (Efran & Spangler, 1979).Movement to secondary control results in heightenedtension, anxiety and professed desire to leave or abort aninteraction (Steele et al., 1993). Viewers may note elementstied to self-awarenessdawarenessof others, feelingofbeingwatched, awareness of one’s bodyand actions. And for thosewho do not escape, but continue on to the meta-cognitivere-assessment, we should find a switch from outward“subjective awareness” to inward “self-awareness” (Duval &Wicklund, 1972), and specific awareness of “triggering”elements, marking a distinction between these stages.

Schema-change itself, then, appears to temporarilyintensify the preceding tension and emotion (e.g., Miceli &Castalfranchi, 2003). The moment of schema changeappears to result in both sympathetic and parasympatheticresponse. Gross et al. (1994, p. 466) conclude, “it may beprecisely this coordinated activation of parasympatheticand sympathetic [response] that makes [it] such a potentphysiological state.” This is accompanied bymeta-cognitiveanalysis of the previous activity, analysis of one’s motives,changing one’s mind; and reported epiphany. As the indi-vidual moves past the height of schema change into


a period of latency, parasympathetic response is expected,as is reported relief, happiness and pleasure (Efran &Spangler, 1979; Labott & Martin, 1988; Miceli &Castalfranchi, 2003). This outcome may also be accompa-nied by tears, which, according to Frey and Langseth (1985),represent a physical indicator of schematic change. Martinand Labott (1991) also note a correlation between this finalaesthetic emotion/tears and superior recall of thepreceding experience. Physiological factors might bemeasured by galvanic skin response, following Ram-achandran and Hirstein (in Leder et al., 2004). In turn,emotional/experiential factors might be assessed by ques-tionnaire or through interviews (e.g., Pelowski, 2007;Roald, 2007).

8. Specific combination of factors in empirical studyof aesthetic experience

When we consider the above elements in combination(Table 1), following the underlying progression to schema-change discussed herein, we can begin to organize art-experience based upon the combination of factors reported.Viewer experiences of emotion and experiential factorsshould reflect their historical movement through eachsubsequent stage of this model, while art appraisal, self-evaluation and understanding should show a correlationwith the stage at which experience ends. When looking tothe transformative outcome, we can argue that thoseviewers who do achieve schema-change should report thisentire progression of experiential terms, including: anxiety,tension and confusion from failed cognitive mastery, self-awareness and meta-cognitive re-assessment, as well ashappiness, relief, tears and epiphany, which may serve asa centralmarker of transformation. Viewersmayalso reportspecific changes, reflecting lowered personal potency, intheir own self-image, and increased importance andpotency in art. Epiphany and schema-change should be tiedto a movement from direct informational evaluation to anexperiential evaluation of art, as well as final assessments ofbeauty and quality. As argued above, this makes an explicittie between emotion and cognitive appraisal/evaluation,and a natural progression to emotions themselves. In addi-tion, following Steele et al. (1993), the antecedent emotionsof anxiety, confusion, as well as self-focused attention,become important elements of both an art encounter andfinal, often selfless, aesthetic epiphany. Cupchik andGebotys (1988) too have suggested the importance ofdiscrepancy and the overcoming of disruption as a vitalcomponent of insight and mastery of art. However, thismodel provides a frame for understanding this process.Whenwe talk of a unique art encounter, Arnheim (1966) hasgiven the rough estimate of 10 min necessary for thiscomplete progression.

On the other hand, viewers who show discrepancy,anxiety and confusion but lack this full progression, shouldshow negative appraisals, reflecting the influence of abor-tive self-protection. They should remain on the informa-tional plane of assessment, or evaluate art as meaningless.In addition they should not report self-focused attention orepiphanic emotions, and should show no self-trans-formation. While those who lack discrepancy, although

their experience may include pleasure and “mastery,” tooshould lack important factors in this full pro-gressiondspecifically, self-focus and expectational change.Just as this cognitive progression underlying this progres-sion is argued to be universal, so too should be theseappraisals and emotions in each stage. As Ellsworth andScherer (2003, p. 584) have argued, the relationshipbetween these factors, considering their tie to self-protection,“is culturally general, perhaps even universal.”

9. General conclusion

This paper argued for an alternate approach to thetraditional conception of aesthetic experience, and thecurrent modeling of art perception. Instead of initialassimilation of viewer to artwork, and an exclusive analysisof art’s formal information, we argued that amodel focusedon discrepancy, and subsequent processes of overcomingdiscrepancy through meta-cognitive analysis and expecta-tional or schema change may allow us to account for thosedisruptive and transformative aesthetic experiences in art’shistory. In addition, we argue that this basic mechanism forschema change itself should not be thought of as mysticalor once in a lifetime event, although when it involvesfundamental aspects of the self it certainly can be, butrather may be an everyday occurrence. This in turn calls formuch future work considering the aspects raised by thismodel.

Essentially, this calls for a broadening of what weconsider to constitute an aesthetic experience itself, andwhat researchers include in their study of art perception. Itmay be that what is considered to constitute cognitivemastery in the present conception is actual deepenedmastery following this model proposed herein, wherea viewer, in a single encounter with art, both leaves themastery process due to failure, and returns with a newmeans of addressing, and new relationship to, the artworkitself. This in turn calls for a renewed focus on the rela-tionship between viewer and artwork. By dealing with thiscombination in terms of viewer processes for self-protec-tion rather than the specific meaning of art, this model mayprovide a means of generalizing and discussing thisphenomenon. Ultimately, the most fruitful question maybecome, what environmental and psychological combina-tions allow viewers to move beyond assimilation/escape tothis aesthetic outcome, and how can this be enhanced?

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A model of art perception, evaluation and emotion in transformative aesthetic experience