Jownu/ Of Crimi,1u/ Jusric?. Vol. 12. pp.367-377 (IYM) Pergamon Prw. Printed m U.S.A.

Ol~47-23S’/X4 $3 IHI + .M) Copyright c~ 19X4 Pcrgamon Press Ltd.

A DETERRENCE STUDY OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN ILLINOIS, 1933-1980

SCOTT H. DECKER

Center for Metropolitan Studies Administration of Justice

University of Missouri-St. Louis St. Louis, Missouri 63121

CAROL W. KOHFELD

Center for Metropolitan Studies Department of Political Science University of Missouri-St. Louis

St. Louis, Missouri 63121

ABSTRACT

The study analyzes the effect of executions and the death penalty on homicides in Illinois. A ,forty-eight year time series (1933-1980 inclusive) is used as the basis for this analysis. The first series of results are presented in a graph of executions and homicides by year. A second portion of the analysis compares the mean homicide rates for three time periods-years with executions, years when the death penalty was allowed but no executions were performed, and years in which the death penalty was abolished by the U.S. Supreme Court. No notable differences in homicide rates were observed for these three eras. Finally, a regression analysis was performed which included a lag structure and several relevant controls. The deterrence measure (executions) made no contribution to the variation in homicide rates. Thus, the authors con&de that there is no deterrent effect for the death penalty on homicides in Illinois.

INTRODUCTION responded with new criminal codes, revised penalty structures, and rearranged capital

On March 14. 1952. Harry Williams was trial legislation. Illinois has been no excep- electrocuted at the Cook County Jail. Since tion to this trend. Since Furman (1972) most that time the State of Illinois has not used of the states have attempted to draft legisla- capital punishment. In the face of calls to tion that would pass judicial scrutiny. Illi- “get tough with criminals,” most states have nois followed suit, and since June 21, 1977,

367

368 SCOT-I- H. DECKER and CAROL W. KOHFELD

death penalty procedures have been reinsti- tuted. As a result of this legislation nine inmates are currently on death row. Efforts to increase the severity of punishment for homicide are not isolated phenomena; in- deed, one finds that public opinion. state legislatures. and courts across the nation have all exhibited behaviors that are charac- teristic of this trend.

The debate over the use of capital punish- ment has not been decided, despite its frequent’ invocation as the most severe penalty available to the courts. The argu- ments over the use of executions have focused on three specific areas. First, many commentators have noted that the use of the death penalty presents ethical problems (Bedau, 1969-70; Marshall in Furman v.

Georgia, 1972). Such arguments are based on the “dehumanizing” effects of executions on society and an “evolving standard of

decency” that precludes the use of what is perceived to be primitive or barbaric forms of punishment. But by no means have the abolitionists been the only spokespersons on this issue. Van den Haag (1968), Barzun (1962), and Hook (1969) all argue that the use of executions does not violate moral concerns. Indeed, the basis of each of their arguments for the use of the death penalty is essentially that the fuifure to invoke this penalty is unjust. Using a traditional retri- butionist approach, these commentators argue that those who commit so grievious an offense as homicide have “earned” a requi-

site punishment. A second area of debate regarding the use

of the death penalty has focused on its legal merits. While such concerns are not new, they were crystallized in the Furmun deci- sion (1972). As is widely known, the Su- preme Court held by a 5-4 majority that the method by which the death penalty has been invoked represented “cruel and unusual punishment.” Interestingly the majority was split in its use of the Eighth Amendment in arriving at this decision. Three of the hve votes were cast against the continued use of the death penalty because of procedural reasons. That is, they held the death penalty unconstitutional because of the way in

which it had been imposed. The other two votes in this fragile majority took a more substantive stand and held that the use of the death penalty was not representative of the evolving standards of moral decency in civilized society. These two justices soon found themselves in the minority as the court reversed itself in the Gregg decision (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). In the Gregg

decision the Court ruled on procedural guidelines that had been implied in the Furman decision. This eventually opened the gate to the flood of legislation legitimat- ing the renewed use of the death penalty in criminal proceedings. At every step of the way, these renewed legal opportunities for the use of executions have been challenged in the courts, and as of yet. the issue has not been fully resolved.

The third of the arguments regarding the effect of the death penalty has focused on its deterrent effect. The results of this research have generally shown that there is little. if any, deterrent effect. Whether contiguous states have been used (Sellin, lY59: Bailey. 1974) or multivariate analyses. (Decker and Kohfeld. 1982) the results have been un- equivocal-there is no deterrent effect. In the few studies that have shown a deterrent effect (Ehrlich. 197.5; Yunker. 1976). imme- diate and damaging criticism has followed. The criticisms by Bowers and Pierce (1975) of Ehrlich’s work, demonstrated several fundamental flaws in his efforts to show the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty. Similarly. Fox‘s (1977) criticism of Yunker devastated any apparent claims to the lat- ter’s work showing a deterrent effect. In- deed. those works which have shown a deterrent effect of the death penalty have been subject to such severe criticisms as to render their conclusions suspect.

METHODOLOGY

Amidst this morass of quantification. there is an approach that addresses these questions. This approach uses states as the unit of analysis. and takes advantage of recent methodological advances in the social

A Deterrence Study of the Death Penalty in Illinois. 1933-1980 369

sciences. What we propose in this context is an analysis that examines the deterrence issue at a statewide level. We use this level of aggregation because this is the level towards which death penalty policy and legislation are directed. While police prac- tices are primarily a local governmental matter, imposition of the death penalty is seen as the proper function of the states. This argument is supported by the observa- tion that state penal laws and the operation of corrections and punishment are relegated primarily to the various states. Thus, it is appropriate that assessments of the effect of the death penalty use individual states as the level of analysis.

When using aggregated data for several states (some which use the death penalty and some which do not), it is difficult to assess specific impact of the death penalty within a particular state. We propose states not as the only correct level of aggregation, but rather as one that is attractive for a variety of reasons. Simply put, the state level is an important one for examining the deterrent effect of executions and death penalty legislation. This does not preclude the existence of a “spillover” effect of executions from one state to another. De- terrence effects clearly need not respect state boundaries. Rather. we propose intra- state analyses because they make sense from a policy standpoint.

There are those though who argue that using aggregates of states is indeed inappro- priate. Their logic is that one could not adequately determine whether or not the death penalty was producing a deterrent effect in one. some. or all of the states used in the analysis. Thus as Bowers and Pierce (1975) have noted, Ehrlich’s analysis, by using aggregated data for all fifty states, may have inferential flaws. The particular criti- cism here is that Ehrlich’s results (which show that for each execution in the United States approximately eight lives are saved) may mean that an execution in North Caro- lina saves a life in Wyoming or even Wiscon- sin. a state that does not have the death penalty. The obvious inferential problems introduced in such analyses are avoided by

the use of a single state. In addition to this reason, the use of a single state as the level of analysis allows for an analysis that more effectively controls for the effect of extrane- ous variables that may have an impact on the homicide rate that is independent of that of executions. In any case, using a single state represents a useful level of aggregation in addressing the deterrence issue. particularly regarding the deterrent effect of executions and capital punishment.

Recent social science analyses of the effect of the death penalty have pointed to the need to include a variety of socio-demo- graphic characteristics in the studies. The inclusion of these variables has been based on their theoretical relevance to the expla- nation of homicide. The recognition of extralegal factors related to variations in homicide has produced better specified models used to study the deterrence issue. In particular these include such variables as, proportion of the population that is male and between the ages of 15 and 29, proportion of the population that is non- white, and measures of the economic well- being of the community, all of which have a demonstrated relationship with homicide rates. These multivariate analyses allow a more specific determination of which vari- ables explain homicide rates. Indeed, many researchers that have included such vari- ables have found that their predictive power in explaining variation in homicide rates is far greater than that obtained using execu- tions (Bailey, 1978; Decker and Kohfeld, 1982). These findings suggest that murder rates are affected more by structural changes in society than by some specific efforts of society to control such crimes. Pogue (1983) examined the same deterrence issue as Ehrlich (1973) and obtained con- trary results. He noted that Ehrlich had used only a limited number of social and demographic variables in his analysis. When Pogue used the same variables as Ehrlich, his results were the same. That is, a deterrent effect existed. But when addi- tional, theoretically relevant socio-demo- graphic controls were added to the regres- sions, different results were observed. For

370 SCOTT H. DECKER and CAROL W. KOHFELD

Pogue. there was no evidence of a deterrent effect for crime control variables.

In addition to the advantages of using a single state and the inclusion of socio-eco- nomic variables, the use of time-series analysis has increased the methodological sophistication and validity of deterrence studies. The use of time-series data is a relatively recent addition in social science study. Such analytic techniques allow re- se.archers to examine the effect of a social policy or innovation over time, rather than in a static analysis. By using a time series. we are able to examine the effect of the death penalty not only in years in which executions occur, but in subsequent years as well. Because the effect of a social policy or action may not be observed immediately, this is a valuable addition to the analysis. Thus a lag structure for the deterrent effect of homicides can be hypothesized and sub- sequently tested.

An additional positive feature of the time-series design in this particular context are the periods of differential use of the death penalty in the last fifty years. The three different uses that have characterized the history of the death penalty in Illinois in the last fifty years are: (1) years in which the death penalty has been in force and execu- tions have occurred; (2) years in which the death penalty has been in force and there have been no executions; and (3) years in which there has been no death penalty in force. This provides what social scientists refer to as a “natural experiment.”

This unique partitioning of time facilitates deterrence analyses for several reasons. Illinois is a state that has used the death penalty frequently enough to examine the effect of executions on homicides. The deterrence argument argues not only for the effect of executions, but that the mere threut of the death penalty is perceived by some to be its most potent effect. It is difficult to separate out the effects of the threat of the penalty from its use, particularly in states like Georgia or Texas which have used the penalty most frequently. But because Illi- nois has executed persons on a moderate level (by comparison). there are several

years in which no executions took place. but the penalty was still on the books. and. therefore. theoretically could exert a deter- rent effect. It is argued, though. that execu- tions. a more graphic indicator of the penalty, are more likely to produce a deterrent effect than the existence of the threat without its fulfillment. In addition. we are able to compare these eras of l!Se and threat with another time period of interest to the deterrence hypothesis. The third time frame is the years in which neither execu- tions nor threat could be observed due to the legal prohibition of the death penalty by the Supreme Court. Thus threat and use years can be compared to abolition years. The comparison of homicide rates from these three time periods allows a more accurate specification of the impact of both executions and their threat on rates of homicide. If the deterrence hypothesis is correct, lower rates of homicide should be observed during the threat and use eras than the abolition years. This feature of the study is made possible by the use of a single state.

The state of Illinois has executed X5 persons since 1930, in what is referred to as the. “modern era” of the death penalty in America: The state is somewhat unique in that executions have taken place at more than one location. The penal institutions at Joliet and Menard, as well as Cook County Jail have been the three sites of executions in the state. The designation of location has been made on the basis of the geographical home of the offender. Of the three. Joliet has executed the fewest (10). while Menard has executed 18 and the Cook County Jail has been the scene of 57 electrocutions. As is the case with most states, the peak activity occurred in the 1930s: 1931 and 1935 were the peak years with 10 executions each.

FINDINGS

Three specific findings are discussed re- garding the deterrent effect of the death pe- nalty on homicides in Illinois. First. a plot of homicide rates and executions for the entire 48 year time series is examined. This allows

A Deterrence Study of the Death Penalty in Illinois. 1933-1980 371

us to more accurately see and analyze the his- torical rate of change in the patterns of both variables. and to detect patterns as well.

Second, mean homicide rates during the periods of differential use of the death pe- nalty are compared. This allows assessment of the independent effects on murder rates of use of the death penalty, threat but no use of the death penalty, and abolition of the death penalty. As part of this analysis homicide rates are combined for the four years prior and subsequent to the United States Su- preme Court’s holding that the death penalty was unconstitutional. This is a comparison of mean homicide rates for the years in which the death penalty was a legal possibility to those in which it was not. By using years that are closer in proximity, several characteiis- tics of a natural experiment are approxi- mated, and the results provide specific impli- cations for the important policy question of death penalty deterrence.

Third, results of correlational and several time-series regressions are presented. The correlational analysis focuses on the rela- tionships between executions, homicide rates, and socio-economic variables. This provides direct assessment of the issue of spuriousness. and the determination of whether or not the relationships between executions and homicides are stronger than those between socio-economic variables and executions. Results of a multivariate time- series analysis that examines the simulta- neous influence of several socio-economic and execution variables on the homicide rate over a period of time are also pre- sented. Different measures of execution use (e.g., lagging the execution variable one and two years as well as examining its immediate impact) and several socio-economic vari- ables are included to determine their collec- tive and separate impact on the homicide rate. This approach recognizes that several variables influence homicide rates, permits a relative consideration of those effects, and assesses the impact over time. rather than in a static analysis.

The plots of executions and homicide rates are presented in Figure 1. Several conclusions are readily evident. First, Illi-

nois is consistent with most of the other 50 states in terms of its use of the death penalty. Nationwide, the most frequent use of the death penalty occurred during the first ten years of the “modern era” of executions (1930 to the present). The homi- cide rates for Illinois are also similar in pattern to those for the nation during this time period. In general. most of the states exhibited a high rate of homicides through- out the 1930s and into the early 1940s. This was followed by a gradual and slight decline. After this decline-roughly corresponding with the years of World War II-the rate began to increase rather dramatically until the late 1970s when it levelled off.

We have designated three eras of execu- tion use: the first in which the use of executions was at its peak (1933-1946). a second in which executions showed a declin-

ing pattern (1946-1963), and a third in which there were no’ executions (1963- 1980). The data can also be bisected at 1954 which provides more meaningful findings. It is obvious that until 1954 no apparent pattern in the relationship between the rate of change in the two variables can be discerned. While the executions show an almost annual rise and decline, the rate of homicides seems impervious to these changes. But following 1954, when the use of executions drops to zero for only the fourth time in the last 25 years, the homicide rate begins a precipitous increase. It is clear from these data that this increase in homi- cide rates does not have its origins prior to the decrease in executions. The suggestion is that something other than the legal threat is affecting fluctuations in the rate of homi- cide. The most obvious candidates are socio-economic and demographic variables. This notion is examined more closely in the tables to follow.

We now turn our attention to Tables 1 and 2. In the first of these tables we look at the mean homicide rate for each of the three periods of differential use of the death penalty. The first of these periods is labeled Use because it reflects the mean murder rate for years in which executions occurred. The second period of time is referred to as

372 SCOTT H. DECKER and CAROL W. KOHFELD

X

A Deterrence Study of the Death Penalty in Illinois. 1933-1980 373

TABLE 1

A COMPARBON OF MEAN HOMICIDE RATES FOR ILLINOIS 1933-1980 FOR USE. THREAT

AND ABOLITION YEARS

Time Period N

1. Use 20 2. Threat 23 3. Abolition 5

Mean S

5.21 1.34 7.03 2.11 10.38 1.07

TABLE 2

A COMPARISON OF MEANS FOR ABOLITION

AND ADJACENT THREAT YEARS FOR ILLINOIS

Time Period N Mean S

1. Abolition 5 10.38 1.07 (1972-1976)

2. Adjacent Years 8 9.63 .90 (1968-1971, 1977-1980)

Threat years, because while the death pe- nalty was a legally available alternative during these years, it was not imposed. Finally, a period of years designated as Abolition years, represents the period of time between the Furman decision in 1972 and 1977 when the death penalty was reinstated by the State of Illinois.

I = 1.18 df= II

nor sign$cant

The results seem unequivocal. The lowest rate of homicides was obtained for the years in which the death penalty was used. The mean rate of murder for this period of time (some 20 years) was 5.2, almost two murders per 10.000 citizens fewer than during threat years, and approximately half the rate for the abolition years. These results suggest support for the deterrence hypothesis discussed earlier. Clearly, the lowest murder rates were for the era in which the most direct effect (executions) of a deterrence policy was in operation. The

second lowest rates were for the threat years. This indicates that the penalty itself appears to have an independent deterrent effect and provides support for the general deterrence argument about the function of criminal law. This analysis may be some- what distorted because of the gross disparity of social and economic conditions across the periods in which the use, threat, and aboli- tion years occur. As was suggested in the observations of the plot, socio-economic and demographic fluctuations may be co- mingled with legal threat variables in such a way as to make a spurious relationship appear to be valid.

In order to avoid comparing 1930 homi- cide rates to those in the early to mid-70s (and thus consider socio-economic variables as equal), an additional analysis of mean homicide rates is examined. In this analysis, presented in Table 2, mean homicide rates for the four years prior to and after the legal hiatus in .the use of the death penalty in Illinois, are compared with the homicide rate during the abolition years. The differ- ence of means test was used to determine whether or not the null hypothesis (that there is no significant difference between the means of the two periods) is presented. While the abolition years have a slightly higher homicide rate than the adjacent years (10.38 to 9.63). the difference is not statisti- cally significant. That is, the null hypothesis (that there is no significant difference be- tween the two eras) cannot be rejected. Thus. these results indicate that the death penalty does not have the deterrent effect presumed by its proponents in spite of the marginally higher rate of homicides during the abolition era. This test provides more convincing evidence than the previous one (Table l), because it uses more comparable years in which the influence of socio-eco- nomic variables, an important consideration in such analyses, is controlled more effec- tively. This consideration gains importance as we consider a better specified statistical model which allows an assessment of the relative contributions of executions and socio-economic characteristics in the expla- nation of homicide rates.

374 SCO-IT H. DECKER and CAROL W. KOHFELD

The simple correlational relationships be- tween homicide rates. executions, and so- cio-economic variables are presented in Table 3. Executions and executions lagged one and two years are each related nega- tively to the murder and non-negligent manslaughter rate (-0.26, -0.34, and -0.27). This relationship is in the hypothe- sized direction for a deterrent effect but significant at the 0.05 level only for the one year lag of executions. On the surface it appears that there is some support for imposing the death penalty to deter homi- cides and that this impact continues across time. However, examination of the relation- ships between the homicide rates and other socio-economic and demographic variables suggests that many of these relationships are stronger than that found for executions. Measures of state urbanization, unemploy- ment, proportion of the population that is male between ages of 15 and 29, and proportion of the population nonwhite and male between the ages of 15 and 29 are included here. All of these variables have been shown in previous research to have theoretical and empirical relevance to the issues of homicide rates and the death penalty. As shown in Table 3 all of the above are positively and, except for unem- ployment, significantly related to homicide rates. This measure of unemployment is probably not useful because it is dominated by the totals for white males. A more useful measure of unemployment would be for the group most involved with homicides-males between the ages of 15 and 29. A measure of economic impact on this group should better explain the relationship between change in economic -hardship and change in murder rates. The simple correlational relationships show some support for the hypothesis that executions have a deterrent effect, but the relationship between homicide rates and socio-economic and demographic variables is stronger. The multivariate regression analysis used to assess the relative impacts when all are included in the same analysis is discussed in the next section.

The use of time-series multiple regression has increaSed substantially in the last de-

cade. Jt is a statistical technique that is particularly suited to this analysis. The task at hand is to determine-over time-what the relative effect of several variables is on the dependent variable. homicide rates. By using this technique we can specify more accurately whether executions or socio-eco- nomic and demographic variables are re- sponsible for change in homicide rates. Two separate considerations of the deterrence question are presented. In Table 4 results of regressing homicides rates on several inde- pendent variables, including executions. all measured in the same year are displayed. Table 5 displays the results of a similar analysis except that executions are included as a lagged term. i.e., measured at time t + 1. There are two ways of looking at the effect of executions. The first argues that the deterrent effect of executions can only be observed shortly after an execution. This school holds that executions have an impact for a relatively immediate period of time. an effect which diminishes rather quickly. Another perspective suggests that the deter- rent effect of executions is tlof felt most strongly in the period immediately after an execution, but rather, after some period of time has passed. Evidence for this was observed earlier in the correlational analy- sis. Thus, in Table 5 the results of the regression analysis using executions lagged by one year are presented. In each of the tables the variable time is included to detrend the analysis. Including time in the regressions serves the purpose of removing the time trend and allowing a more accurate assessment of the influence of the other variables on homicide rates. Each of the regressions includes the same socio-eco- nomic and demographic variables.

Table 3 presents the regression results in which executions are considered to exert a deterrent effect in the year in which they occur. Only time and the proportion of non-white males 15 to 29 years of age were significantly and positively related to homi- cide rates. The coefficient for the execution variable was slightly negative which is in the hypothesized direction for a deterrent effect but was not significant. A similar conclusion

TAB

LE

3

CO

RR

EL

AT

ION

S .F

OR

ILL

INO

IS D

EA

TH

PE

NA

LT

Y A

NA

LY

SIS

1.

Mur

der

and

Non

-Neg

ligen

t M

ansl

augh

ter

Rat

e 2.

E

xecu

tions

3.

E

xecu

tions

L

agge

d 1

Yea

r 4.

E

xecu

tions

L

agge

d 2

Yea

rs

5.

Urb

aniz

atio

n 6.

U

nem

ploy

men

t R

ate

7.

Prop

ortio

n of

Non

-Whi

te

Mal

es

15-2

9 8.

M

ales

15

-29

-0.2

6 -0

.34”

-0

.27

0.61

” 0.

27

0.82

h o.

ggh

0.63

h 0.

57h

-o.7

5h

0.12

-0

.62h

-0

.35”

0.63

h -0

.73h

-0

.03

-0.6

4h

-0.3

4”

-0.7

0 -0

.16

-0.6

3 -0

.34

0.00

01

0.90

h 0.

65h

0.40

; 0.

35

a Si

gnifi

cant

at

0.

05

h Si

gnifi

cant

at

O

.OO

OI

376 SCOTT H. DECKER and CAROL W. KOHFELD

TABLE 4

RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODELS USING MURDER AND NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER

RATES AS THE CRITERION VARIABLES (ILLINOIS, lY33-1980)

Independent Variables Unstandardized

Regression Coefficients Standard

Error R’

1. Unemployment Rate -0.04 0.19 0.92 2. Non-White Males

15-29 2.04” 0.57 3. Proportion of

Urbanization 24.44 41.94 4. Executions -0.03 0.39 5. Time -1.03h 0.38

” Significant at the 0.005 level h Significant at the 0.05 level

TABLE 5

RESULTS OF REGRESSION MODEL USING MURDER AND NON-NEGLIGENT MANSLAUGHTER RATES AS THE CRITERION VARIABLE WITH EXECUTIONS LAGGED ONE YEAR (ILLINOIS. 1933-

1980)

Independent Variables Unstandardized

Regression Coefficients Standard

Error R’

1. Unemployment Rate -0.04 0.19 0.92 2. Non-White Males 2.04” 0.57 3. Proportion of

Urbanization 24.44 41 .94h 4. Executions (t-l) -0.03 0.40 5. Time -1.03h 0.38

.’ Significant at the 0.005 level h Signtficant at the 0.05 level

can be drawn from the results in Table 5, ables on the homicide rates. When other when executions are lagged one year. Again variables are included in such analyses, the the variables that are significant in this results are unequivocal in their lack of equation are time and the proportion of the support for the deterrence argument as population that are non-white males age 1.5 applied to the use of the death penalty. In to 29 years. Once more the coefficient on fact. the relationship between executions the execution variable is related in the and homicides, which is in the hypothesized hypothesized direction but fails to reach direction in the simple correlational analy- statistical significance. The results of these sis. is not significant in either regression regression analyses are consistent with those case. whether it is lagged or not. This of earlier studies that have considered the suggests rather clearly that the variation in joint impact of executions and other vari- homicide rates is not accounted for by the

A Deterrence Study of the Death Penalty in Illinois, 1933-1080 377

measure of deterrence, executions. Rather, socio-economic and demographic character- istics tell us much more about the variations in the dependent variable. Thus, those who wish to more clearly understand the factors which affect homicide would do well to concentrate on causal variables other than those which reflect the pattern of executions in Illinois. These results are consistent with those found in earlier single-state analyses by Bailey (1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1979~).

CONCLUSION

In this analysis we presented data for the State of Illinois to assess the effect of executions on homicide rates. The only cases in which there was any support for a deterrent effect were those which provide the weakest evidence. The over-time plots of executions and homicides were rather inconclusive. The difference of means tests produced mixed evidence: the consideration of the entire time series (1933-1980) showed a deterrent effect, while the consid- eration of the more recent and contiguous years did not. Some support for the deter- rent analysis can be found in the correlation analysis. But these results were not sup- ported by the regression analyses. Here, despite two considerations of the effect of executions. no deterrent effect was ob- served. That is to say, the influence of executions on homicide rates was minimal and not significant compared to socio-eco- nomic and demographic variables. It is clear that the majority of the variation in homi- cide rates is explained by measures other than deterrence indicators. The results of this study can be succinctly summarized in terms of their effect on future public policy. Use of the death penalty in Illinois has little empirical support as a deterrent measure.

NOTE

’ Depending on which estimate is used. there arc between 9(K) and 1200 persons currently on death row.

REFERENCES

Bailey, W.C. (1974). Murder and the death penalty. J. of Crim. Law. and Criminal. 6X3):416-423.

- (1978). An analysis of the deterrent effect of the death penalty in North Carolina. Nonh Curolina Cenrral Law J. 29-52.

Barzun. J. (1962). In favor of capital punishment. The American Scholar 31(2):181-191.

Bedau. H.A. (1969-70). The death penalty as a deterrent: Argument and evidence. Ethics, X0:205- 217.

Bowers. W.J., and Pierce, G. (1975). The illusion of deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich’s research on capital punishment. The Yale Law J. 85(2): 187-208.

Decker. S.H.. and Kohfeld. C.W. (1982). The death penalty in Missouri. Center for Metropolitan Studies working paper #2. University of Missouri-St. Louis.

Ehrlich. I. (1973). Participation in illegitimate activi- ties: A theoretical and empirical investigation. J. of Pal. Econ. 81.(3):521-565.

- (1975). The deterrent effect of capital pun- ishment: A question of life and death. Am Ecou. Rev. 65~397.

Fox. J.A. (1977). The identification and estimation of deterrence: An evaluation of Yunker’s model. J. of Behav. Econ. 21225-242.

Furman v. Georgia (1972). 408 US 238.

Gregg v. Georgia (1976)

Hook, S. (1961). The death sentence. The New Leader 44:18-20.

Pogue. T. (1983). The crime prevention effects of arrests and imprisonment: Evidence from multiple cross-section analyses. National Institute of Justice Report.

Sellin. T. (1959). The Death Penafry. Philadelphia: The American Law Institute.

Van den Haag. E. (1969). On deterrence and the death penalty. The J. of Crim. Law, Crimino[.. and Police Sci. 60(1):141-147.

Yunker, J.A. (1976). Is the death penalty a deter- rent to homicide? Some time series evidence. J. of Behav. Econ. 1:45-81.