A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict

A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on theRelationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political ConflictAuthor(s): Kurt SchockSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 98-133Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174449 .

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A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict

THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICT

KURT SCHOCK The Ohio State University

Violent political conflict has typically been studied either from an economic discontent or a political opportunity framework. This study proposes a conjunctural model, which hypothesizes that the production of grievances due to economic inequality varies systematically and interacts with political opportunities to generate violent political conflict. Using multiple regression analysis, this cross-national research examines the interaction between economic inequality and political opportunities, and their direct effects on political violence. Findings provide support for the conjunctural model propositions that political opportunity structures moderate the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict. Specifically, the positive effects of income inequality and separatist potential on political violence are enhanced in weak states. The impact of class exploitation on violent political conflict is moderated by regime structure and political institutionalization. Findings suggest that political opportunity structures may operate in different ways for challenges rooted in class as opposed to ethnic inequalities.

The historical process of nation-state formation, consolidation, and rule has typically been met with dissent. Social groups within states have pursued their interests for greater autonomy, different policies or leaders, or alternative forms of political and economic systems. Economic inequality has been considered the major determinant of rebellion by citizens against their state or its policies. Although the relationship between economic inequality and political conflict received great emphasis by scholars, the relationship remains a problem situation-that is, an empirical difficulty for which theory should be a solution (Lichbach 1989). Although most theorists recognize that

AUTHOR'S NOTE: Thanks go to Craig Jenkins, Bob Kaufman, Maciek Slomczynski, Ed Crenshaw, and two referees for insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 40 No. 1, March 1996 98-133 ? 1996 Sage Publications, Inc.

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Schock /A CONJUNCTURAL MODEL 99

there should be a strong positive relationship between economic inequality and political conflict, the relationship remains unclear. Contradictory results have prevailed in empirical investigations: positive relationships, negative relationships, and no relationships have been found. (Excellent reviews of the diverse literature are provided by Zimmermann 1983 and Lichbach 1989.) In addition to the contradictory results, another problem in the study of political conflict is that scholars have tended to focus on one theory, with little regard for opposing theories and often without an awareness of potential areas of integration or the possibility that a broader theory may subsume or connect aspects of various divergent theories to provide a clearer explanation of violent political conflict (Rule 1988).

Two explanations have been prevalent: economic discontent theories (e.g., Gurr 1970; Midlarsky 1988), and political opportunity theories (e.g., Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Jenkins 1985; Tarrow 1989). In their strict versions, the discontent-oriented theories maintain that inequality is the basis of all rebellion and that if economic inequality is high, then violent political conflict will occur. Conversely, the political-oriented theories maintain that economic discontent is not central. They propose that political resources and opportunities determine the extent of violent political conflict within nations.

Despite criticisms of various aspects of the economic discontent theories (Tilly 1978; Aya 1990), the idea that economic inequality is related to a high potential for violent challenges to the state or its policies remains a plausible assumption. Excessive economic inequality and the accompanying injustices produce discontent and clear grievances among groups in a society and are largely regarded as just causes for rebellion (Gurr 1970; Gurr and Duvall 1973; Gurr and Lichbach 1979).

Compared with economic sources of discontent, however, political structures and processes are more proximate to the occurrence of violent political conflict and are also determinants of political violence. This is so because shifts in political processes and structures, which provide opportunities for mobilized dissidents to challenge the state for whatever reasons, are much more common than changes in the system of social stratification and are related to the rise and fall in levels of collective action (Tarrow 1989). The political context is a determinant of political violence in the sense that aspects of the political context, such as semirepressiveness or ineffective rule, provide the rationale, as well as the opportunities, for dissidents to oppose the state or its policies (Muller and Weede 1990; Tarrow 1994). However, a problem with political opportunity theories is that the grievances produced by economic inequality are assumed to be constant (Piven and Cloward 1991).

This study suggests an approach to the problem by proposing a conjunctural model in which the simultaneous combination of economic inequality and political opportunities influnces violent political conflict. Up to this point,



100 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

cross-national studies have been set up in terms of testing one theory without consideration of the other, in terms of competing theories or in terms of eclectic additive models (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Muller and Weede 1990; Weede 1987; Boswell and Dixon 1990, 1993). Relatively little attention has been given to the moderating effect of the political context on the relationship between economic inequality and political violence, that is, how the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict varies in different political contexts has rarely been examined.1

The model proposed in this study, therefore, implies a break from previous cross-national analyses, which have examined only direct effects (Muller 1985; Weede 1987; Muller and Weede 1990; Boswell and Dixon 1993) or direct and indirect effects (Muller and Seligson 1987; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Moaddel 1994) of the determinants of political conflict. There has been no systematic examination of the moderating effect of the political context on the relationship between economic inequality and political conflict.2 A relationship that is moderated differs from a relationship that is mediated. In a moderated relationship, the direct relationship between A and C differs for different levels of B. In a mediated relationship, A influences C indirectly through its influence on B. This study examines a conjunctural model to see whether the influence of economic inequality on political conflict is moderated by the political context. This differs from the testing of a mediation model, in which indirect effects are examined.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICT

Relative deprivation theory, Marxist theories of rebellion, and theories of ethnic conflict have stressed the relationship between economic inequality and political violence. These theories emphasize how various forms of economic inequality produce feelings of discontent and clear grievances. The

1. The main exceptions have been the studies by Gurr and his associates (e.g., Gurr 1968; Gurr and Duvall 1973; Gurr and Lichbach 1979), in which the political context has been viewed as influencing the relationship between relative deprivation and violent political conflict. However, the primary theoretical focus of Gurr and his collaborators was on the relationship between relative deprivation and political violence.

2. Two studies have examined one moderated relationship: Muller and Seligson (1987) found that the effect of income inequality on political violence is greater in semirepressive regimes compared with nonrepressive or extremely repressive regimes, and Muller and Weede (1990) found that there was no interaction between economic growth and semirepressiveness. Sanders (1981) examined the moderating impact of geographical region on the relationship between various socioeconomic determinants and political instability. Geographical region, however, is at best a crude proxy for political culture or type of political system.



Schock/A CONJUNCTURAL MODEL 101

basic assumption of these theories is that violent political conflict within nations is contingent on the extent of economic inequality. The greater the degree of economic inequality, the greater the discontent experienced by individuals and groups. The more intense and widespread the discontent, the more likely that grievances will become clear and will somehow get translated into violent political conflict.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY

Relative deprivation is defined as the perceived gap between people's value expectations and their value capabilities-that is, the discrepancy between what people think they ought to get from society and what they believe they will actually obtain. A prominent source of relative deprivation emphasized in this research is the extent of economic inequality in a society. The central idea is that economic inequality leads to relative deprivation on the part of the less well-off groups and individuals, which is translated into civil violence. Relative deprivation is considered to be the necessary precon- dition for civil strife of any kind (Gurr 1970).

In addition to the factors that produce relative deprivation, Gurr (1970) also identified factors that are likely to channel civil strife into political violence. These include normative justifications, such as cultural traits that legitimize the use of violence, and utilitarian justifications, which are essen- tially rationally based justifications of the utility of violence in achieving one's goals. Gurr also takes into consideration aspects of the political context that translate relative deprivation into political violence, such as the balance of coercion between dissidents and the state. However, the primary focus of relative deprivation theory has been on the economic and political conditions that produce discontent, whereas the influence of the political context as a moderating or primary determinant of conflict has been secondary and undertheorized.

A large body of cross-national research has been undertaken based on the assumption that income inequality produces relative deprivation, which in turn leads to political violence. Some have found positive relationships between income inequality and political violence (Park 1986; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Boswell and Dixon 1990, 1993). Others have found no relationship between income inequality and political violence (Hardy 1979; Weede 1981, 1987). Overall, although it is assumed that there should be a strong positive relationship between income

inequality and violent political conflict, the results have been weak and, at best, inconsistent. Thus an uncomfortable ambiguity prevails with regard to the relationship between income inequality and political violence.




MARXIST THEORY OF REBELLION

From a Marxist perspective, class struggle is viewed as the historical driving force behind social change, political conflict, and revolutions. In capitalist societies, structural contradictions lead to the economic exploitation of laborers, which in turn promotes class struggle between workers and capitalists. Marx ([1887] 1967) defined economic exploitation as the expro- priation of surplus value by capitalists from workers. Surplus value is the total value of a product minus the costs of production. One way for competing capitalists to attain higher profits is to lower the costs of production by increasing the rate of exploitation of the laborers-that is, by decreasing the wages and benefits received by workers. According to Marx's theory of rebellion, the greater the extent of economic exploitation, the more likely that the working class will experience discontent, or what Marx referred to as immiseration. The greater the immiseration, the more likely that the state or its policies will be violently challenged by impoverished workers, and the more likely that a revolution will occur.

Although the primary emphasis of the Marxist theory of rebellion is on the economic bases of discontent and grievances, the theory also takes into consideration organizational and ideological factors that facilitate class struggle. Marx ([1887] 1967) maintained that the process of capitalist economic development creates a proletariat class that must work for wages. Industri- alization concentrates the proletariat into cities and facilitates communica- tion, solidarity, the organization of dissident groups, and class consciousness, all of which promote class struggle and violent political conflict. However, the organizational and ideological factors are secondary to the economic sources of discontent and grievances in Marx's theory of rebellion.

Marx's ([1887] 1967) theory of rebellion has not been historically accurate, as revolutions in the 20th century have occurred in less developed rather than in the most economically developed societies as anticipated by the theory. Economic exploitation and class polarization in developed nations have been abated in part due to the implementation of socialist welfare programs and macroeconomic stabilization policies. However, Marx's theory is still relevant at the global level, as there should be a relationship between economic exploitation and violent political conflict. That is, in countries with higher levels of worker exploitation, the impoverished labor force should experience higher levels of discontent and have clear grievances. These, in turn, should increase the potential for political conflict regardless of a country's level of development or avowed political ideology.

Despite the importance of Marx's ([1887] 1967) theory of class struggle and revolution, very little attention has been given to class exploitation in cross-national studies of violent political conflict. The exception is Boswell




and Dixon's (1993) analysis. They found that the rate of class exploitation in the industrial sector, along with the size of the industrial workforce, promotes violent rebellion.

ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AND CONFLICT

Ethnic mobilization and conflict, which are largely a response to economic and political discrimination, frequently polarize societies much more than class-based divisions as expected by the Marxist theory of rebellion. In fact, both Marxist and functionalist theories assume that economic modernization will be characterized by the assimilation of minority groups into the dominant culture and the eventual disappearance of ethnic conflict. In contrast, neo- Marxist and other economic-based theories of ethnic conflict assume that modernization and its impact on inequality have played an important role in the development of ethnic-based challenges. The major source of political cleavages in most societies is segmental rather than functional (Oberschall 1973). As a consequence, cultural identity is often a more accurate predictor of political behavior than class identity.

Neo-Marxist and economic-based theories of group subordination, such as world-system, internal colonialism, and split labor-market theories, maintain that uneven development creates conditions that are conducive to the emergence of a cultural division of labor (O'Sullivan See and Wilson 1989). They recognize that racial, ethnic, and sexual divisions can be used by capitalists to increase profits, divide the working class, and prevent solidarity. For example, according to the theory of internal colonialism, the uneven process of capitalist development creates core and peripheral areas within nations. The core groups attempt to institutionalize the existing stratification system by creating a cultural division of labor, whereby occupations with

higher statuses tend to be reserved for the members of the dominant culture, whereas members of minority cultures tend to occupy positions at the lower end of the stratification hierarchy. The aggregate economic differences between the core and the periphery are directly related to the culturally based differences (Hechter 1975).

Cultural divisions of labor promote a distinctive cultural identity in the periphery. The greater the level of economic discrimination, the more likely that the distinctive identity promotes group solidarity and political mobilization (Hechter 1975). Moreover, the more intense and widespread the economic discrimination, the greater the discontent and grievances, and the more likely that ethnic-based movements will arise to challenge the institutionalized system of economic inequality. Cross-national research has found that separatist potential and the extent of political and economic discrimination are related to mass political violence (e.g., Muller and Seligson 1987; Muller and




Weede 1990; Ellina and Moore 1990; Boswell and Dixon 1990, 1993; Gurr 1993a, 1993b; Moaddel 1994).

Like Marxist class-based theories of rebellion, theories of ethnic mobilization and conflict have been found deficient in the explanation of violent political conflict due to their neglect of the political context of collective action. Recently, however, the deficiencies in ethnic conflict theories have begun to be addressed by giving greater emphasis to the political context (e.g., Nielsen 1986; Jalali and Lipset 1992-93; Gurr 1993a, 1993b). This recent trend mirrors the process that occurred 20 years ago with regard to relative deprivation studies, as they also attempted to confront their deficiencies by giving more emphasis to the political context. The political context of violent political conflict is the primary focus of political opportunity theories, which are discussed below.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES AND VIOLENT POLITICAL CONFLICT

Political opportunity theories focus on the political context in which political participation takes place. These theories emphasize the relationship between political structures, the distribution of political power, and collective action (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Jenkins 1985; Jenkins and Schock 1992; Tarrow 1989, 1994; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995). A basic assumption of these theories is that the sources of discontent that lead to violent political conflict are inherent in all societies and that the occurrence of political violence is a function of the political opportunities and constraints of the immediate political environment, rather than variations in levels of economic inequality or the intensity of economic discontent. Important aspects of the political environment that have been identified to constrain or facilitate violent political conflict include the coerciveness of governments and the extent of institutionalized political structures.

The coercive behavior of governments should influence violent political conflict. Government sanctions against dissidents should increase the level of violent political conflict, because coercive actions taken by governments to suppress dissident protest tend to instigate violent confrontations. Political opportunity theorists suggest that coercive responses by political authorities to illegal but nonviolent collective action lead to an escalation of protest from nonviolence to violence (e.g., Tilly 1969, 1978). In cross-national research, a positive relation has been found between government sanctions and political violence (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Muller and Seligson 1987).

Democratic political structures should be related to violent forms of political participation in a curvilinear pattern. In open regimes, there should




not be much violent political conflict, because most groups can effectively pursue their interests through peaceful channels of political participation. Because peaceful strategies of participation are effective, more costly violent strategies are not typically used. In closed regimes, there should be low levels of mass political violence, because the repressiveness of the regime inhibits protest against the state or its policies. The costs of any sort of collective action, whether peaceful or violent, tend to outweigh the possible benefits, thus inhibiting protest against the state or its policies. Violent political conflict should be the most common in regimes that are partially democratic, or semirepressive. These regimes are not so repressive as to inhibit collective action but are not open enough to provide effective peaceful channels of political participation. Cross-national research has confirmed an inverted U-shaped relationship between regime repressiveness and mass political violence, with higher levels of political violence in semirepressive regimes (Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Weede 1987; Muller and Weede 1990; Boswell and Dixon 1990, 1993).

Political opportunity theories have been criticized because there is a tendency to treat economic discontent as ubiquitous and as a constant. That is, there is a tendency to ignore ethnic and class divisions independent of the

political processes that might promote violent political conflict. Moreover, some political opportunity formulations suffer from the problem of indeter- minacy; that is, certain objective conditions, such as structural opportunity, do not necessarily promote collective dissidence (Piven and Cloward 1991). These problems are addressed by the conjunctural model of political opportunities, which is discussed below.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES: A CONJUNCTURAL MODEL

To develop a more general theory of political conflict, one must emphasize the political context in combination with economic inequality. All forms of discontent that are translated into collective action confront a political context that may influence the form and level of political conflict to a much greater extent than the type or level of discontent. This study proposes a conjunctural model of political conflict in which economic inequality is directly related to violent political conflict as expected by theories of economic discontent and in which political structures and processes are directly related to violent political conflict as expected by political opportunity theories. Moreover, as

implied in some political opportunity formulations but not explicitly tested cross-nationally, political opportunity structures should moderate the relationship between economic inequality and political violence. That is, the




Economic Inequality

Violent Political Conflict

Political Opportunity Structures

Figure 1: Conjunctural Model of the Relationship between Economic Inequality, Political Opportunities, and Violent Political Conflict

effect of economic inequality on violent political conflict should be enhanced or constrained by political opportunities.

The conjunctural version of political opportunity theory proposed in this study differs from other political opportunity models, such as McAdam's (1982) political process model and the political mediation model of Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan (1992). McAdam's political process model emphasizes the expansion of political opportunities over time, which creates cognitive liberation and hence grievances. The political mediation model of Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan stipulates that the political environment mediates the relationship between collective action and its outcomes. However, it does not consider how grievances may be channeled into different forms of political conflict, such as nonviolent or violent protest. The conjunctural model proposed in this study differs because it stresses the combination of economic inequality and existing political structures, and maintains that the political context moderates the relationship between economic inequality and political violence. The general model is depicted in Figure 1.3

Regime repressiveness is a major component of the political opportunity structure that should constrain or facilitate the translation of discontent derived from economic inequality into violent political conflict. Economic discontent should be most readily translated into political violence in countries with semirepressive regime structures. In countries with open regime

3. Many studies have found only indirect effects of world-system and dependence indicators on political violence (e.g., Boswell and Dixon 1990). However, Moaddel (1994) found that export dependence is directly related to political instability, of which political deaths were an indicator. In contrast to Moaddel's study, this study focuses on the interaction between inequality and the political context, and assumes that international economic relations influence levels of inequality. The question of how international economic relations directly influence political violence in addition to influencing levels of inequality (and political opportunity structures as well) is left open for further study.




structures, inequality-induced discontent should be channeled into conventional forms of political participation. In countries with closed regime structures, inequality-induced discontent should be channeled into defiant actions that may not be overtly collective, such as everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985). However, in countries with semirepressive regime structures, there is a contradiction between the apparent ability to organize and participate in institutional politics, and the ineffectiveness of institutional participation. Ineffective participation through institutional channels is referred to as pseudo-participation (Green 1984). Dissidents mobilized in response to worker exploitation, income inequality, or ethnic discrimination, when faced with the choice between ineffective pseudo-participation and potentially effective unruly forms of participation, are likely to turn to nonroutine protest, which in such contexts is likely to turn violent because of the response of the government.

State strength is another major component of the political opportunity structure that should either constrain or facilitate the translation of discontent derived from economic inequality into violent political conflict. In addition, state strength directly influences the form that political participation assumes within countries. Regardless of the extent of democracy, if the state is effective in maintaining order and delivering goods and services to its citizens, then it is unlikely that the state or its policies will be violently challenged. Moreover, societies in which the state controls virtually all of the power and resources should have inherently low potentials for mass political conflict. Conversely, if the state is weak, personalistic, ineffective at chan- nelling political participation, or nonresponsive to the needs of its citizens, then it is more likely that its legitimacy will be questioned and more likely that violent challenges to the state or its policies will develop and be sustained. Thus weak states should enhance the translation of discontent derived from economic inequality into violent collective action.

Although state strength is often used by political scientists and political sociologists, a problem with the concept is that its meaning is multifaceted and somewhat nebulous. In this study, the concept will be used in two ways: as political institutionalization and as military sovereignty.

Political institutionalization should influence the form that political participation assumes. Huntington (1968) defined political institutionalization as strong and stable political institutions, characterized by adaptability, coherence, and autonomy. Huntington's basic thesis is that high levels of political institutionalization lead to peaceful forms of political participation, whereas the process of developing strong political institutions is characterized by violent political participation. The process of modernization creates a gap between political mobilization and the capacity of traditional political institutions to meet the new demands of political participation and




incorporation. The gap produces violent political conflict. In addition to the gap between mobilization and institutionalization, the level of political institutionalization should also influence the form that political conflict assumes. States characterized by a high degree of political institutionalization should be able to channel the activities of aggrieved dissidents into institutionalized forms of political behavior, thus lessening the occurrence of political violence.

Drawing on Huntington's (1968) thesis, Sanders's (1981) cross-national analysis found that the escalation of peaceful protests into violent challenges was much more common in Third World regions (Middle East, Far East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America) than in more developed regions (North America, and Western and Eastern Europe). Evidently, coherent and autonomous political institutions, which characterize the democratic systems of North America and Western Europe and the communist systems of Eastern Europe, were able to channel political protest into institutionalized forms of political participation. In contrast, in countries with lower levels of political institutionalization, a process of escalation occurred whereby peaceful protests, rather than being channeled into conventional political participation, developed into violent political conflict. Similarly, Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) maintain that the degree of political institutionalization plays a prominent role in the development of rebellious conflict. Aspects of political institutionalization, such as the degree of state penetration, incorporation, and bureaucratization, determine whether or not revolutionary movements will develop. Rebellious conflict is most likely in exclusionary, bureaucratically weak regimes, especially where there are territories within the country not fully penetrated and controlled by the state. Revolutionary movements are most successful when they incorporate social groups excluded by the incum- bent regime's political institutions and provide statelike collective goods.

Thus states with high levels of political institutionalization and regulation should be more adept at channeling discontent derived from economic exploitation, income inequality, or ethnic discrimination into controlled forms of political participation. Alternatively, in states with a low level of political institutionalization and regulation, discontent derived from economic exploitation, income inequality, or ethnic discrimination is more likely to be acted on by dissidents in nonroutine, including violent, ways.

Another aspect of state strength-military sovereignty-should also influence political participation within nations. Military sovereignty is defined as the structural capacity of a nation to resist the intrusion of foreign militaries in its own internal affairs. States that have low levels of sovereignty and are subject to external pressure and control tend to be viewed as illegitimate by their own citizens, and they should be more prone to violent challenges on the part of dissident organizations. Sometimes, a leader of a state may ask a




foreign power to intervene in its domestic affairs. However, this is still indicative of a lack of legitimacy. Cross-national research has shown that a lack of military sovereignty is directly related to mass political violence within nations (Muller and Weede 1990). A lack of military sovereignty should also promote the translation of challenges rooted in economic exploitation, income inequality, or cultural divisions of labor into violent political conflict. States that are not strong enough to prevent other states from

interfering in their rule should also have a greater inability in inhibiting violent challenges from aggrieved dissidents within their borders.

HYPOTHESES

From the previous theoretical sections, the following hypotheses are derived:

Economic discontent theories:

Hypothesis 1: Economic inequality is positively related to violent political conflict. Hypothesis 1.1: Class exploitation is positively related to violent political conflict. Hypothesis 1.2: Income inequality is positively related to violent political conflict. Hypothesis 1.3: Separatist potential is positively related to violent political

conflict.

Political opportunity theories:

Hypothesis 2: Government sanctions are positively related to violent political conflict.

Hypothesis 3: Semirepressive regime structure is positively related to violent political conflict.

Hypothesis 4: State strength is negatively related to violent political conflict. Hypothesis 4.1: Political institutionalization is negatively related to violent politi-

cal conflict. Hypothesis 4.2: Military sovereignty is negatively related to violent political

conflict.

Conjunctural model:

Hypothesis 5: Economic inequality interacts with the political opportunity structure to influence violent political conflict. The positive effect of economic inequality on violent political conflict is enhanced in semirepressive regimes and in weak states.

Hypothesis 5.1: The positive effect of class exploitation on violent political conflict is enhanced in semirepressive regimes.

Hypothesis 5.2: The positive effect of class exploitation on violent political conflict is enhanced in countries with low levels of political institutionalization.




Hypothesis 5.3: The positive effect of class exploitation on violent political conflict is enhanced in countries with low levels of military sovereignty.

Hypothesis 5.4: The positive effect of income inequality on violent political conflict is enhanced in semirepressive regimes.

Hypothesis 5.5: The positive effect of income inequality on violent political conflict is enhanced in countries with low levels of political institutionalization.

Hypothesis 5.6: The positive effect of income inequality on violent political conflict is enhanced in countries with low levels of military sovereignty.

Hypothesis 5.7: The positive effect of separatist potential on violent political conflict is enhanced in semirepressive regimes.

Hypothesis 5.8: The positive effect of separatist potential on violent political conflict is enhanced in countries with low levels of political institutionalization.

Hypothesis 5.9: The positive effect of separatist potential on violent political conflict is enhanced in countries with low levels of military sovereignty.

METHODOLOGY

The hypotheses are tested using a quantitative cross-national lagged panel design with a sample of the global population of independent countries for which data is available. Although the underlying assumptions of quantitative and qualitative research are the same (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), there are obvious advantages and disadvantages with any methodology. In this case, a cross-national analysis cannot provide the depth that would emerge from a detailed case study of political conflict in a particular country. However, case studies, while rich in detail and history, may be less conducive to making causal inferences because of the limited size of their samples. Case studies typically focus on a particular time and place in which political conflict occurs, without comparison to times and places that lack political conflict.

An advantage of cross-national research is that a large number of countries that have experienced varying levels of political conflict are examined. The examination of a large number of nations permits one to reveal general patterns that might not be revealed in the examination of one or a few cases. Moreover, cross-national studies are probabilistic rather than deterministic and permit the analysis of interaction effects and multiple causes (Lieberson 1991). Thus cross-national research is conducive to determining whether or not probabilistic theoretical propositions can be supported.

The variables are listed in Appendix A. Appendix B provides descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix. When possible, the independent variables are measured at the same time period as the dependent variable, because it is assumed that the economic sources of discontent and grievances, and the political opportunity structures have a contemporaneous impact on political




violence. When contemporaneous time points for the independent variables are not available, midpoints or earlier time points are used.

This analysis builds on the models developed by Muller (1985), Muller and Seligson (1987), Muller and Weede (1990), Weede (1987), and Boswell and Dixon (1990, 1993), which examined political violence in the period between 1973 and 1977. Altogether, these studies identified five aspects related to economic inequality that directly influence political violence (income inequality, potential separatism, worker exploitation, economic development, and economic growth) and three aspects of the political environment that directly influence political violence (semirepressive regimes, government sanctions, and military interventions). All of these variables as well as the theoretically relevant measure of political institutionalization are incorporated into the conjunctural model. A significant departure from previous studies is made by examining how the relationship between economic inequality and political violence is moderated by political opportunity structures.

MEASUREMENT

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable-violent political conflict-is measured by the total deaths from nonroutine political participation events, such as protest demonstrations, political strikes, riots, armed attacks, and assassinations (Taylor and Jodice 1983). Because of the newsworthiness of political deaths, this is considered to be a reliable indicator of violent political conflict (Weede 1981; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987). White (1993) found that for Northern Ireland, the statistical analyses of political deaths collected from the New York limes Index (the main source for the World Handbook data; Taylor and Jodice 1983) corresponded with the results of the statistical analyses performed on a data set with complete coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict, suggesting that the measure is reliable.

One criticism of the measure is that it significantly underreports the number of deaths in some nations (Brockett 1992). However, as argued by Dixon, Muller, and Seligson (1993), the underreporting of the number of deaths is most likely in countries that experience large-scale insurgency and civil war. One way to address this problem is to establish a ceiling point at some value representing a moderately high but not excessive level of political violence. Because the underreported cases exceed this threshold, the biases of underreporting are averted. Following the convention of previous studies




(Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Muller and Weede 1990; Boswell and Dixon 1990, 1993), a ceiling of 50 deaths per million is used in this study.

Another criticism of the measure is that it includes political deaths inflicted by both challengers and the state. However, as pointed out by Muller and Weede (1990), it is assumed that the total number of political deaths is a multiple of the number of challenger victims and that the two are highly correlated. Given this assumption, the measure can be considered a valid indicator of violent rebellion.

Boswell and Dixon (1990, 1993) used a constricted version of the political deaths measure, which excludes deaths in which groups other than the state or insurgents are targets. However, I assume that political protest actions in which other groups are the target are ultimately protests against the state or its policies. Conflict between ethnic groups, for example, is usually in response to state policies that favor one group over another. Therefore, the use of all political deaths seems justified. In principle, I agree with the idea that disaggregated death counts should be used (Boswell and Dixon 1990, 1993; White 1993). With the World Handbook data (Taylor and Jodice 1983), however, it seems justifiable to assume that many political deaths in which the target is other groups are deaths resulting from intergroup conflicts, which I assume to be ultimately in response to policies of the state.

Five-year intervals are used, because the number of deaths due to political violence is a volatile process influenced by short-term changes in the political environment. The measure is standardized, dividing the total death counts in each nation by its population size at the midyear of each interval. Stan- dardization is theoretically justified, because political violence is assumed to be an indicator of the extent of violent mass political conflict, which is indicated by the frequency of deaths in proportion to the population.

CONTROL VARIABLES

The influence of economic inequality on political violence will be examined net of the effects of economic development and growth, which are used as controls.4 The level of economic development is measured by energy consumption per capita (Taylor and Jodice 1983). Economic growth is measured by the change in gross national product per capita (Taylor and

4. A number of theoretical perspectives have suggested that in addition to economic inequality, economic development and growth also influence political violence. Mass society theory assumes that rapid economic growth breaks down ties between people and creates a susceptibility for political radicalism and violence (Olson 1963). Relative deprivation theory assumes that countries at low levels of development are characterized by social immobility and other forms of social strain factors that promote discontent and violent political conflict (Gurr 1970). Moreover, relative deprivation theorists assumed that countries experiencing economic growth should have less violent political conflict, because economic growth lowers levels of deprivation and discontent (Hibbs 1973). Theories of systemic frustration have emphasized the




Jodice 1983). Economic inequality within nations should be influenced over time by levels of economic development and rates of economic growth; however, these relationships will not be examined in this study.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Following Boswell and Dixon (1993), a measure of the class exploitation rate of industrial workers is used. This concept, which corresponds to Marx's ([1887] 1967) conception of the rate of surplus value, is measured using the ratio of the total value added in the manufacturing sector to wages and salaries in the manufacturing sector as reported in the World Tables (World Bank 1989, 1990). This measure is multiplied by the percentage of the labor force in industry in order to tap the extent of worker exploitation within countries. Income inequality is measured by the share of the income going to the top 20% of the population (Moaddel 1994). Separatist potential is measured by an ordinal scale of four categories indicating the circumstances under which a social group that advocates greater autonomy for its group or region originally came to be part of the state in which it is currently a member. The underlying dimension of the scale is whether consensus or coercion was used to incorporate the group and region into the existing state (Taylor and Jodice 1983). This measure is multiplied by the percentage of the population that belongs to the autonomy-seeking group in order to tap the extent of separatist potential within countries.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Government coercion is measured by the sum of the number of negative sanctions imposed by the government in response to dissident activity perceived as representing a security problem at the national level. Negative sanctions include general restrictions on political behavior, such as censor- ship, curfews, the declaration of martial law, and the mobilization of the military, and actions against specific individuals or groups, such as the removal of government officials because of their political beliefs, the banning relationship between rapid socioeconomic change and political violence (Feierabend, Feiera- bend, and Nesvold 1969). Marxist theories of rebellion suggest that economic declines and market crises should facilitate mass political conflict (Boswell and Dixon 1993).

Despite these theoretical claims, it is likely that economic development and growth are important determinants of levels of economic inequality within nations, which, in turn, promote discontent and grievances, which may get translated into political conflict. Although levels of economic development and rates of economic growth should influence levels of economic inequality, these relationships will not be examined in this study, because the focus here is on the relationship between various forms of economic inequality and political violence, with the political context moderating the relationship. Economic development and growth will be used as controls. In an expanded model, one would want to examine how economic development and economic growth, as well as international economic relations, influence levels of economic inequality (and political opportunity structures) within nations.



114 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

of specific political organizations, and the arrest, exile, or deportation of individuals for engaging in dissident activity against the state (Taylor and Jodice 1983).

Semirepressiveness is measured by the degree of democracy of a nation's political structures, based on scores from Gastil's indexes of civil rights and political liberties (Taylor and Jodice 1983). A dummy variable is used (1 = semirepressive regime, 0 = open or closed regime) (Muller and Seligson 1987; Muller and Weede 1990).

The political institutionalization aspect of state strength is measured by Gurr's (1990) indicator of the regulation of political participation. The indicator is a 5-point ordinal scale measuring the extent to which there are binding rules on the expression of political preferences. The military sovereignty aspect of state strength is measured by the number of overt foreign military interventions experienced by a nation (Tilemma 1989). Tilemma (1989) defined military interventions very broadly: any sort of incursion of one state into the territory of another state is considered to be an intervention. Military interventions may be used as a control for political deaths because of international conflict. Given Tilemma's broad definition of military interventions, this indicator taps into the concept of military sovereignty as well.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The procedure for the analysis is to develop a baseline model for explaining violent conflict using the economic inequality and the political opportunity indicators. Then, the hypothesized conjunctural effects between economic inequality and political opportunity structures will be tested by adding the interaction terms to the baseline model on a one-at-a-time basis. The effects of the interaction terms must be examined individually because of the limited number of degrees of freedom in the models. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation techniques are used.5

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Table 1 presents the results of multiple regression analyses in which the baseline model is constructed. In Equation 1.1, violent political conflict is

5. Wang (1993) argued that the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach may yield incorrect estimations when applied to event-count data, such as political deaths. He suggested that maximum likelihood techniques, such as exponential Poisson regression, should be applied to such data. However, Dixon, Muller, and Seligson (1993) maintained that the OLS is appropriate for the study of political deaths. They replicated earlier cross-national studies of violent political conflict and found that the use of OLS and exponential Poisson regression produced similar results.




TABLE 1

Regression of Political Violence on Measures of Economic Inequality and Political Opportunity, 1973-1977

Independent Variable Equation 1.1 Equation 1.2 Equation 1.3 Equation 1.4

Lagged political violence b .306* .309** .206** .224** t 2.1 2.4 1.7 1.9

P .301 .301 .201 .218 Economic development

b .036 .028 .075 .054 t 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4

P .039 .031 .085 .062 Economic growth

b -.149* -.146** -.178** -170** t -2.1 -2.2 -3.1 -3.0

P3 -.247 -.250 -.304 -.291 Class exploitation

b 1.157* 1.235* .842* .879* t 1.7 2.2 1.6 1.8

P .234 .283 .193 .201 Income inequality

b .036* .037* .028 .029* t 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.7 3P .256 .260 .195 .207

Separatist potential b -.012 t -0.2

P -.021 Government sanctions

b .261** .231** t 2.6 2.4

P .310 .275

Semirepressiveness b .609* .710** t 1.9 2.4

P .255 .297 Political institutionalization

b -.191 t -0.9

P -.119 Military interventions

b .025 t 0.1

P .008 Constant -2.646 -2.827 -2.074 -2.890 R2 .308 .316 .512 .503 Adjusted R2 .222 .255 .427 .439 Standard error 1.066 1.040 0.912 0.902 Number of cases 55 62 62 62

*p < .05, one-tailed. **p < .01, one-tailed.




regressed on the measures of economic inequality, controlling for the effects of lagged political violence, economic development, and economic growth. In Equation 1.2, separatist potential is dropped from the model because it is not directly related to the political violence net of the other measures. In Equation 1.3, the measures of political opportunity are added to the model. In Equation 1.4, political institutionalization and military interventions are removed from the model because of their insignificance. Equation 1.4 provides the baseline model to which the interaction terms are added. This equation indicates that income inequality and economic exploitation are positively related to political violence, as expected by the theories of economic discontent. Semirepressiveness and government sanctions are positively related to political violence as expected by political opportunity theories.6

Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide the results of the regressions with the interaction effects added to the baseline model.7 For Tables 2, 3, and 4, only the interaction terms that have been added to the baseline model developed in Equation 1.4 will be discussed.8 In Table 2, the moderated relationship between working-class exploitation and political violence is examined. Two of the three interaction terms are significant; however, one of the significant interaction terms does not support the proposed conjunctural model. Equa- tion 2.1 indicates that class exploitation has a stronger impact on political violence in semirepressive regimes compared with open or closed regimes, as expected by the conjunctural model. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2, which shows that class exploitation has a positive effect on political violence and that the positive effect is enhanced in semirepressive regimes. Equation 2.2 indicates that class exploitation has a stronger impact on political violence at higher levels of political institutionalization. In fact, as depicted in Figure 3,

6. A squared government-sanctions term was also added to the model to test the proposition that government sanctions are related to political violence in an inverted U-shaped relationship. No support was found for the curvilinear relationship.

7. An outlier analysis was performed on the baseline model based on extreme scores on the Cook's D and the standardized residuals. One case, Nicaragua, was found to have a Cook's D of .10 or greater and a standardized residual greater than 2.0. The deletion of the case resulted in only one change in the results reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4, in which the interaction terms were added to the baseline model. In Equation 2.1, the t ratio of the interaction term declined in significance below the critical t value. In the other equations, the interaction terms were unaffected. Because there is no theoretical justification for excluding Nicaragua, it is left in the analyses reported in Tables 2, 3, and 4.

8. A virtue of the conjunctural model is that it can treat political opportunity structures or economic inequality as the context for the other. That is, the effects of economic inequality on political violence can be interpreted in terms of different levels of political opportunities, and the effects of political opportunities on political violence can be interpreted in terms of different levels of economic inequality. In this study, the focus is on the effects of economic inequality on political violence interpreted in terms of different levels of political opportunities. The interaction terms will be interpreted as suggested by the model illustrated in Figure 1. Additionally, one could interpret the effects of political opportunities on political violence in terms of different levels of economic inequality-a topic for future studies.




TABLE 2

Regression of Political Violence on Measures of Economic Inequality, Political Opportunity, and Class Exploitation Interaction Terms, 1973-1977

Independent Variable Equation 2.1 Equation 2.2 Equation 2.3

Lagged political violence b .227* .189* .230* t 2.0 1.7 2.0 b .221 .185 .224

Economic development b .062 .091 .079 t 0.5 0.7 0.6 b .071 .104 .090

Economic growth b -.186** -.172* -.152** t -3.3 -3.1 -2.5 b -.319 -.295 -.260

Class exploitation b .199 -6.610* 1.120* t 0.3 -2.0 1.9 b .046 -1.514 .257

Income inequality b .028* .020 .026 t 1.6 1.1 1.4 b .201 .142 .181

Government sanctions b .264** .220* .215* t 2.7 2.2 2.2 b .314 .261 .255

Semirepressiveness b -1.434 .714** .768** t -1.0 2.3 2.4 b -.600 .299 .321

Political institutionalization b -3.174** t -2.3 b -1.996

Military interventions b 1.829 t 1.0 b .605

Class Exploitation x

Semirepressiveness b 1.372* t 1.6 b .926

Class Exploitation x Political Institutionalization b 1.835* t 2.2 b 2.561

(continued)




TABLE 2

Continued


Class Exploitation x

Military Interventions b -1.270 t -1.0 P -.578 Constant -1.883 10.390 -3.314 R2 .525 .554 .513 Adjusted R2 .453 .477 .428 Standard error .890 .872 .911 Number of cases 62 62 62


the effect of class exploitation on political violence is negative at lower levels of political institutionalization and positive at higher levels of political institutionalization. This relationship does not support the proposed conjunctural model, nor does it provide full support of the strict versions of economic discontent theories, as they would expect that political institutionalization would not influence the relationship between class exploitation and violent political conflict. Equation 2.3 indicates that the relationship between class exploitation and political violence is not moderated by military interventions.

In Table 3, the moderated relationship between income inequality and political violence is examined. Equation 3.1 indicates that the relationship between income inequality and political violence is not moderated by regime repressiveness. Equation 3.2 indicates that income inequality has a stronger impact on political violence at lower levels of political institutionalization, as expected by the conjunctural model. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 4, which shows that income inequality has a strong positive relation to political violence at lower levels of political institutionalization and a negligible relationship with political violence at high levels of political institutionalization. Equation 3.3 indicates that income inequality has a stronger effect on political violence at higher levels of military interventions, as expected by the conjunctural model. This relationship is depicted in Figure 5, which shows that income inequality is positively related to political violence, and this positive relationship is enhanced in contexts in which the military sovereignty of a country has been compromised. Thus two of the three interaction relationships between income inequality and political opportunity structures are significant and work as proposed by the conjunctural model.




TABLE 3

Regression of Political Violence on Measures of Economic Inequality, Political Opportunity, and Income Inequality Interaction Terms, 1973-1977


Lagged political violence b .236* .195* .272** t 2.0 1.7 2.3

p .230 .190 .265 Economic development

b .027 -.010 .042 t 0.2 -0.1 0.3

P .031 -.011 0.48 Economic growth

b -.165** -.164** -.154** t -2.9 -2.9 -2.7

P -.282 -.281 -.264 Class exploitation

b .844* 1.033* 1.020* t 1.7 2.1 1.9

P .193 .237 .234 Income inequality

b .012 .223** .012 t 0.5 2.5 0.6

P .082 1.578 .082 Government sanctions

b .235** .273** .254** t 2.5 2.8 2.7

P .279 .325 .302

Semirepressiveness b -1.322 .611* .835** t -0.8 2.0 2.7

P -.553 .256 .349 Political institutionalization

b 2.193* t 2.0

P 1.379 Military interventions

b -4.340* t -1.9

P -1.435 Income Inequality x

Semirepressiveness b .039 t 1.2

P .900 Income Inequality x Political Institutionalization b -.046* t -2.2

P -1.563

(continued)




TABLE 3

Continued


Income Inequality x

Military Interventions b .081* t 1.8

P 1.490 Constant -1.834 -12.027 -2.371 R2 .517 .553 .534 Adjusted R2 .444 .475 .453 Standard error .898 .872 .891 Number of cases 62 62 62


To test hypotheses 5.7 to 5.9 and to see whether the proposed conjunctural model applies to a larger sample, the interaction terms involving separatist potential are examined. In Table 4, separatist potential replaces the class exploitation and income inequality measures, yielding a sample size of 80. Two of the three interaction terms are significant, both supporting the conjunctural model. Equation 4.1 indicates that the relationship between separatist potential and political violence is not moderated by regime repressiveness. Equation 4.2 indicates that separatist potential has a stronger impact on political violence at lower levels of political institutionalization, as expected by the proposed model. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows that separatist potential has a positive impact on political violence at low levels of political institutionalization and a negligible and slightly negative effect on political violence at high levels of political institutionalization. Equation 4.3 indicates that separatist potential has an enhanced impact on political violence at higher levels of military interventions, as expected by the conjunctural model. This relationship is depicted in Figure 7, which indicates that the effect of separatist potential on political violence is negative in the context of no military interventions and positive in the context of military interventions.

Table 5 provides a summary of the six significant interaction terms, five of which support the proposed conjunctural model. Altogether, five of the nine hypotheses originally proposed by the conjunctural model receive support. One significant interaction term, in which the effect of economic exploitation on political violence is enhanced at higher levels of political institutionalization, contradicts the conjunctural model, yet does not lend full support to economic discontent theories either.




TABLE 4

Regression of Political Violence on Measures of Economic Inequality, Political Opportunity, and Separatist Potential Interaction Terms, 1973-1977


Lagged political violence b t

Economic development b t

Economic growth b t

Separatist potential b t

Government sanctions b t

Semirepressiveness b t

Political institutionalization b t

Military interventions b t

Separatist Potential x

Semirepressiveness b t

P Separatist Potential x Political Institutionalizatic b t

P

.389** .408** 3.6 3.6

.382 .400

-.154 -.131 -1.3 -1.0 -.169 -.143

-.103* -.083* -2.1 -1.7

-.198 -.161

.051 .652 0.5 1.5

.080 1.024

.255** .250** 2.6 2.5

.259 .255

.565 .302 1.5 0.9 .214 .114

.116 0.4

.065

-.779 -1.5

-.242

-.169 -1.4 -.210

-.163* -1.6 -1.059

(continued)

.433** 4.2

.425

-.088 -0.7 -.097

-.093* -2.0

-.180

-.117* -1.7

-.183

.266** 2.8

.271

.424 1.5 .160

)n




TABLE 4

Continued


Separatist Potential x

Military Interventions b .424** t 2.7

P .492

Constant 1.228 0.594 0.770 R2 .440 .448 .490

Adjusted R2 .386 .386 .433 Standard error 1.038 1.038 0.998 Number of cases 80 80 80


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Regime Repressiveness

Figure 2: Effect of Class Exploitation on Political Violence Moderated by Regime Repressiveness (from Equation 2.1)

Fiue2:EfcofCasEpottoonPltclVoecMoeaebyRgm Rersaees(ro qain21

DISCUSSION

The conjunctural model proposed in this study suggests that political opportunity structures should constrain or facilitate the translation of economic inequality into violent political conflict. The model provides a broader specification of the political opportunity structure than has previously been considered in cross-national analyses. Regime repressiveness has typically been examined in previous studies; however, state strength has received less attention in cross-national studies of political violence. Although regime repression directly affects political violence, it also moderates the relation-




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Figure 4: Effect of ncome nequalityton Political Violence Moderated by Politica Institutionalization (from Equation 3.3)

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Figure 4: Effect of Income Inequality on Political Violence Moderated by Political Institutionalization (from Equation 3.3)

ship between economic inequality and violent political conflict. Various aspects of state strength were found to moderate the relationship between economic inequality and violent political conflict as well.

An important question that the conjunctural model addresses is, Why does the relationship between economic inequality and political violence vary? These findings suggest that the ambiguity of past findings may be due to the neglect of the moderating impact of the political context, which impedes or




0

Military Interventions

Figure 5: Effect of Income Inequality on Political Violence Moderated by Military Interventions (from Equation 3.3)

4 5


Figure 6: Effect of Separatist Potential on Political Violence Moderated by Political Institutionalization (from Equation 4.2)

impels the translation of various forms of economic inequality into political violence. Generally, economic inequality tends to promote violent political conflict; however, the extent to which it promotes violence is enhanced or constrained by the political opportunity structure.

As suggested by these findings, when aggrieved dissidents confront semirepressive political structures or weak states, it is more likely that discontent and grievances produced by economic inequality will be translated into political violence. A semirepressive political context is conducive to the

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Figure 7: Effect of Separatist Potential on Political Violence Moderated by Military Interventions (from Equation 4.3)

translation of discontent into violence, because effective peaceful strategies are closed to dissidents but the state is not so repressive as to inhibit all collective action. In semirepressive regimes, the opportunities to organize and mobilize are present, but effective forms of routine political participation are blocked. Given the alternative between ineffective pseudo-participation and potentially effective violent protest, the latter is selected (Green 1984; Muller and Seligson 1987). This study suggests that dissident groups experiencing extreme economic exploitation are more likely to challenge the state violently in contexts of semirepressiveness, compared with open or closed political contexts.

State strength is also an important aspect of the political context facilitat- ing or constraining the translation of structured economic inequalities into political violence (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989). One aspect of state strength- political institutionalization-channels dissent into institutionalized forms of participation. This analysis suggests that income inequality and separatist potential have a greater influence on political violence in contexts in which politics is less regulated. Dissidents are more likely to act on their discontent in political contexts in which the regime does not have developed institutionalized forms of political participation. In such contexts, protest is likely to escalate into violence (Huntington 1968; Sanders 1981). Alternatively, in contexts in which political institutionalization is high, dissent deriving from income inequality and separatist potential tends to be channeled into institutional forms of political participation.




TABLE 5

Summary of Significant Interaction Effects Between Economic Inequality and Political Opportunity Structures

Measure Political Relation of of Economic Opportunity Significant Inequality Moderator Variable Interaction Term Theory Supported

Class exploitation Semirepressiveness Positive Conjuctural model Class exploitation Political institutionalization Positive Income inequality Political institutionalization Negative Conjuctural model Separatist potential Political institutionalization Negative Conjuctural model Separatist potential Military interventions Positive Conjuctural model

NOTE: See Tables 2, 3, and 4 for regression equations. Significance = p < .05, one-tailed.

TABLE 6

Correlations of Measures of Economic Inequality with Sectoral Inequality and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization

Sectoral Inequality Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization

Class exploitation -.499 (n = 89) -.374 (n = 94) Income inequality .594 (n = 69) .222 (n = 71) Separatist potential .339 (n = 72) .642 (n = 83) NOTE: Correlations are calculated using pairwise deletion. See Table 1 for operationalizations of class exploitation, income inequality, and separatist potential. Sectoral inequality is operationalized as the Gini coefficient based on the product per worker across the agricultural, industrial, and service sectors of an economy in 1970 (Taylor and Jodice 1983). Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is operationalized as the extent to which a country is fractionalized in terms of different language-based groups, c. 1970 (Taylor and Jodice 1983).

Another aspect of state strength-military sovereignty-also had a moderating impact on the relationship between economic inequality and political violence. This study suggests that income inequality and separatist potential have a greater impact on political violence in contexts in which the state's sovereignty has been compromised by a foreign state. Dissidents acting on discontent derived from income inequality or separatist potential are more likely to challenge the state when the state's sovereignty is challenged by a foreign state. As suggested by Skocpol (1979), the ability of states to maintain domestic political stability is partly shaped by the competition between states in the international system.

Why is the relationship between working-class exploitation and political violence enhanced by semirepressive regime structure but not by weak states? Why are the relationships between income inequality and political violence and separatist potential and political violence enhanced by weak states but




not by semirepressive regime structures? To answer these questions, it is necessary to examine how challenges derived from class exploitation may differ from challenges derived from income inequality or separatist potential. Table 6 provides a correlation matrix suggesting that there are differences between the various forms of economic inequality. Class exploitation is negatively related to both sectoral inequality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization, whereas income inequality and separatist potential are positively related to sectoral inequality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. Sectoral inequality occurs when there are large disparities between the productive capacity per worker across the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors of the economy. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization measures the extent to which a country is divided along ethnic and linguistic lines. Both sectoral inequality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization are characteristic of the operation, or the potential operation, of a cultural division of labor in which sharp inequalities exist along racial or ethnic lines. This suggests that both income inequality and separatist potential are more likely to be rooted in cultural divisions of labor to a greater degree than class exploitation and, therefore, more indicative of ethnic-based challenges.

Weak states should be most susceptible to challenges that are ethnic based, especially when the leaders of the state are members of a different ethnic group than the aggrieved dissidents. The combination of weak, illegitimate states and cultural divisions of labor, with their institutionalized discrimination, provides a potent formula for violent political conflict (Gurr 1993a, 1993b). The correlation matrix in Table 6 suggests that proletariat-based challenges are less likely to have an ethnic component compared with challenges rooted in income inequality or separatist potential. The strength or legitimacy of the state is less of an issue in promoting working-class struggles than the opportunities provided by the regime structure.

This study suggests that low levels of state strength are conducive to the translation of ethnic-based discontent into violent political conflict, whereas urban, worker-based challenges are more likely to be translated into violent political conflict in the context of semirepressive regimes and high levels of political institutionalization. But why does working-class exploitation have a negative effect on political violence at low levels of political institutionalization and a positive effect on political violence at higher levels of political institutionalization, a finding unexpected by the conjunctural model? One answer might be that the process of political institutionalization or incorporation leads to rebellion when there are deprived ethnic-based groups that are being incorporated into the political sphere, as suggested by Huntington (1968) and Gurr (1993a, 1993b). In contrast, in an urban context, the contradiction between political institutionalization and economic exploitation experienced by workers may promote higher levels of deprivation or




unattained expectations and thus violent political conflict. This explanation is somewhat akin to relative deprivation and rising expectation explanations (Gurr 1970; Davies 1962) that emphasize discrepancies between expectations (which, in this case, are raised because of the high level of political institutionalization) and objective conditions (which are, in the case of high levels of economic exploitation, dismal). This type of relationship might be better examined in a dynamic analysis.

Other dynamic changes in the political opportunity structure over time should have consequences for violent political conflict as well. For example, the current wave of democratization has important implications for political participation within nations. Governments would be well advised to address extreme inequalities as they move toward more democratic political structures. In the short run, openings in the political system not simultaneously met with programs for the redistribution of wealth are likely to lead to civil violence. In the long run, democracies are unable to survive if severe inequalities are not addressed (Huntington 1968; Sorensen 1993). Moreover, weak states that are attempting to expand their efforts to control resources, political activity, and socioeconomic activity are likely to provoke violent protest. The expansion of state strength is especially susceptible to violent resistance if there are specific minority groups whose interests are adversely affected by such efforts (Gurr 1993a, 1993b).

In sum, this study shows that political opportunity structures moderate the relationship between economic inequality and political violence. Thus structured inequalities are important for explaining violent political conflict, but they must be considered in combination with the political context. Finally, this study indicates that the translation of grievances rooted in different types of structured inequality into challenges may be influenced by different political opportunity structures. This suggests that not all political opportunity structures operate in the same way on various forms of economically derived discontent. Future research must specify more completely how different political opportunities influence challenges rooted in different types of economic inequality.




APPENDIX A Operationalization of Variables, Time Points, and Sources

Time Point Operationalization

Dependent Variable Political violence 1973-1977 Sum of total political deaths divided by the

midyear population (Taylor and Jodice 1983) Lagged political violence 1968-1972 Sum of total political deaths divided by the

midyear population (Taylor and Jodice 1983) Control variables

Economic development 1975 Energy consumption per capita in coal

equivalents (Taylor and Jodice 1983) Economic growth 1965-1975 Rate of economic growth in gross national

product per capita (Taylor and Jodice 1983) Economic inequality independent variables

Income inequality c. 1975 Share of income going to the richest 20% of the population (Moaddel 1994)

Class exploitation 1973-1977 Mean score across five-year periods (1 - earnings as a % of value added) / (earnings as a % of value added) (World Bank 1989)

Separatist potential 1975 Intensity of separatist potential multiplied by the proportion of separatist potential (Taylor and Jodice 1983)

Political opportunity independent variables Government sanctions 1973-1977 Sum of the number of sanctions imposed by

the government against dissident activity (Taylor and Jodice 1983)

Semirepressiveness 1973-1977 Mean score across five-year periods of the civil rights and political liberties indexes, transformed into a dummy variable. 1 = semi-repressive (2.5 to 5.5), 0 = open and closed (below 2.5 and above 5.5) (Taylor and Jodice 1983)

Political 1973-1977 Mean score over a five-year period on the institutionalization index of political institutionalization

(Gurr 1990) Military interventions 1973-1977 The number of external military interventions,

broadly defined (Tilemma 1989)

NOTE: Variables with skewed distributions are logarithmically transformed.




APPENDIX B Correlation Matrix and Descriptive Statistics

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

1 1.000 2 .571 1.000 3 -.255 -.374 1.000 4 -.252 -.224 .300 1.000 5 .167 .126 -.545 .065 1.000 6 .133 .081 .568 .120 -.149 1.000 7 .241 .369 -.397 -.016 .088 -.351 1.000 8 .421 .201 .204 .022 -.250 .336 .149 1.000 9 .223 .219 -.143 .054 .398 .055 .027 .253 1.000

10 .255 .174 -.266 -.131 .184 -.238 .363 -.014 -.029 1.000 11 -.265 -.424 .428 .074 -.383 .032 -.204 .079 -.284 -.169 1.000

Variable n M SD Minimum Maximum

1. Logged political deaths, 139 1.12 1.38 0.00 3.93 1973-1977

2. Logged lagged political 139 1.24 1.42 0.00 3.93 deaths, 1968-1972

3. Logged economic 132 6.29 1.76 2.20 9.69 development, 1975

4. Economic growth, 1965-1975 133 2.51 3.30 -15.80 13.30 5. Income inequality, c. 1975 72 51.22 8.78 36.80 72.60 6. Logged class exploitation, 96 1.49 0.33 0.75 2.19

1973-1977 7. Logged separatist potential, 1975 84 1.81 2.09 0.00 5.93 8. Logged government sanctions, 139 2.28 1.45 0.00 6.35

1973-1977 9. Semirepressiveness, 1973-1977 136 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00

10. Military interventions, 1973-1977 139 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 11. Political institutionalization, 129 4.06 0.70 2.00 5.00

1973-1977

NOTE: Correlations are computed using pairwise deletions.

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Documents

A Conjunctural Model of Political Conflict: The Impact of Political Opportunities on the Relationship between Economic Inequality and Violent Political Conflict