A Classicist under Constraint

Justus Lipsius and the Revival of Stoic Determinism in the De Constantia

Peter I. Osorio

Honors Thesis

Margaret Graver, Advisor

Department of Classics

Dartmouth College

May 2012

Verum quid Seneca, quid Epictetus, quibus te inhaerere video, nobis ad salutem conferunt?

-L. Torrentius I. Lipsio (1584 04 05)

Spirat nescio quis calor in Senecae aut Epicteti scriptis, qui ad lectorem quoque pervenit, nec disserere

illi magis de virtute videntur, quam inserere et inculcare.

-I. Lipsius L. Torrentio (1584 05 06)

Table of Contents

Abbreviations 1

Preface 3

Chapter 1: Justus Lipsius and the De Constantia 5

Chapter 2: Senecas De Providentia 27

Chapter 3: Stoic Determinism 41

Chapter 4: Lipsian Determinism 76

Chapter 5: The Physiologia 126

Chapter 6: The De Constantia Reconsidered 150

Summary of Conclusions 182

Appendix: Seneca, Epistulae Morales 65.2-14 184

Bibliography 188

1

Abbreviations

Apul. Pl. Apuleius De platone

August. CD. Augustine De civitate dei

Calc. Tim. Calcidius Timaeus, commentary

Cic. Fat. Cicero De fato

Cic. Fin. Cicero De finibus

Cic. Parad. Cicero Paradoxa Stoicorum

Cic. Phil. Cicero Orationes Phillipicae

De con. Iusti Lipsi De Constantia Libri Duo

Div. Hal. Iusti Lipsi Diva Virgo Hallensis

DL Diogenes Laertius Lives

Ep. ad Belg. Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuriae ad Belgas

Ep. ad Germ Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuria Singularis ad Germanos

Ep. ad Ital. Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuria Singularis ad Italos et

Hispanos

Ep. Misc. Iusti Lipsi Epistolarum Selectarum Centuriae Miscellaneae

Ep. Quaest. Iusti Lipsi Epistolicarum Quaestionum Libri V

Epic. Diss. Epictetus Dissertationes

Eusebius Praep. ev. Eusebius Praeparatio Evangelica

Gel. Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae

ILE Iusti Lipsi Epistolae

Isid. Orig. Isidore Origines

Jerome De vir. ill. Jerome De viris illustribus

Lactantius Div. Inst. Lactantius Divinae Institutiones

LS Long and Sedley 1987

Luc. Lucan Bellum Civile

Man. Iusti Lipsi Manuductionis ad Stoicum Philosophiam Libri Tres

Nem. Nat. Hom Nemesius De hominis natura

Origen Cels. Origen Contra Celsum

Pol. Iusti Lipsi Politicorum sive Civilis Doctrinae Libri Sex

PS Iusti Lipsi Physiologiae Stoicorum Libri Tres

Quint. Inst. Quintilian Institutio Oratoria

Sen. Ben. Seneca De Beneficiis

Sen. Clem. Seneca De Clementia

Sen. Con. Seneca De Constantia Sapientis

Sen. Cons. ad Hel. Seneca De Consolatione ad Helviam

Sen. Ep. Seneca Epistulae Morales

Sen. Nat. Seneca Naturales Quaestiones

Sen. Prov. Seneca De Providentia

Stob. Ecl. Phys. Stobaeus Eclogae Physicae et Ethicae

2

SVF von Armin, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta

Thom. Aq. SCG Thomas Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles

Thom. Aq. ST Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica

Tim. Plato Timaeus

3

Preface

In the summer before my freshman fall, I attended a classics summer program at

Dartmouth. There, I enrolled in Professor Gravers seminar on Marcus Porcius Cato. Incidental

to reading Livys biography of Cato and Lucans Pharsalia, I was introduced to Senecan

philosophy. Over the past four years, I have returned to Seneca and his dialogues, the De

providentia in particular, for his talent to calm and to keep me in appreciation of life. While I

read Seneca for my benefit, I did not consider my faith threatened by a study of Stoicism.

Personal interest of compatibilism between Christianity and Stoicism led to my introduction to

Justus Lipsius, and this thesis is the product of the past year of study. I have made a conscious

effort to separate personal opinion from my examination of Justus Lipsius and the De constantia,

and it is everywhere my intention to present an unbiased and critical evaluation of Lipsian

determinism. I have inevitably come to feel a close kinship with Lipsius, and I am pleased to

contribute to the literature on this imperfect but endearing classicist.

I am immensely grateful to Margaret Graver. Her insights on Stoic philosophy were

necessary to the development of this thesis; her demanding precision of language and reasoning

has corrected my faults; she has improved my Latin and edited my translations; she has given me

an appreciation for the intricacies of Stoic physics; but most importantly, she has kindled in me a

deeper resolution to study classics. I am honored to end my undergraduate studies under the

guidance of Professor Graver, who first introduced me to Stoicism almost four years ago. I thank

Professor Ariane Schwartz for agreeing to act as a reader for this thesis and for her help in the

early phases of this study. Her knowledge of resources for Renaissance texts saved me much

trouble and hassle. I am also grateful to Professor James Murphy of the government department,

for his insights early in the development of this thesis. I especially thank Professor Pramit

4

Chaudhuri. Without his lectures in Epics of Greece and Rome during my freshman fall, I

would not have studied classics further. His subsequent instruction in Senecan drama, Valerius

Flaccus, and neo-Latin tragedy has refined my appreciation for the Latin language. For his

sincere concern for my intellectual and stylistic development, I owe him my regard. I thank my

other professors of the Classics departmentProfessors Stewart, Ulrich, Kretler, Tell, and

Farofor their dedication to teaching. They have made Reed hall an easy place for learning. I

also thank my high school Latin teachers, Mr. Lou Latina, may he rest in peace, and Sister

Lorraine Forester; they prepared me well. I thank my friends, especially Thomas, Andy, Henry

and Kelsey, for their fellowship. Finally, I thank my father, mother, sister and brother. They have

been exceedingly patient as I, perhaps too often, dismissed their calls and emails while writing in

the library. Above all, I thank my parents for their twenty-two years of sacrifice and support that

have allowed me to study classics at DartmouthI love you.

5

Chapter 1: Justus Lipsius and the De Constantia

1.1. Introduction

Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) was a Flemish classicist of the Northern Renaissance. Along

with Erasmus and Hugo Grotius, Justus Lipsius is among the foremost names of Dutch

humanism. He is considered the father of Neostoicism, a philosophical movement in the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that sought to syncretize ancient Stoicism with contemporary

Christianity.1 Guillame Du Vair drew directly from the Stoic ideas Lipsius promoted and made

similar efforts to combine Stoicism with Christian teaching. Du Vairs Philosophie morale des

Stoques (1594) expressed his hope that his audience would derive comfort from a combination

of Stoic doctrine and Christian teaching.2 In a similar fashion, Francisco de Quevedo drew upon

Lipsius Manuductio for the Nombre, origen, inteno, recomendacin y decencia de la doctrina

estoica (1635).3 Others who took direct influence from Lipsius include: Montesquieu, Bishop

Bossuet and Pierry Bayle in France; Francis Bacon and Joseph Hall in England; and Juan de

Vera y Figueroa and Francisco Sanchez in Spain.4 Lipsius work on Stoicism would later inform

the philosophical systems of Spinoza and Descartes, while Leibniz and Locke used Lipsius as a

source for information about Stoic philosophy.5

Lipsius, however, was not the first Renaissance scholar to write on the similarity between

the philosophy of the Stoa and Christianity. The revival of Stoicism in the Renaissance began

with Petrarch (1304-74) and his endorsement of Stoic moral philosophy in De remediis utriusque

fortunae (1366). Nevertheless, Petrarch firmly rejected Stoic doctrines that are in conflict with

1 Papy 2011.

2 This work appeared as preface to his edition of Epictetus Enchiridion. See Kraye 1988, 371-2.

3 Kraye 1988, 372-3.

4 Papy 2011.

5 Kraye 1996, 152; Schrijvers 1986, 279; Papy 2011. J.B. Schneewind also links Lipsius and Du Vair with the

perfectionist ethical theories of Descartes and Leibniz (Cooper 2004, 26). See Schneewind, The Invention of

Autonomy (1998) chapters 9 and 12.

6

Christianitye.g., that suicide is tolerable.6 Petrarch, in his Secretum, and Rabelais (d. 1553),

in his Gargantua, Le Tiers Livre and Le Quart Livre, played with the idea of combining the two

ethical systems of Stoicism and Christianity, yet both always remained firm in their

subordination of philosophy to religion.7 Meanwhile, other writers of the Renaissance purposely

called to mind conflicts between Stoic and Christian moral teachings. Lorenzo Valla (d. 1457)

criticized the Stoic position that virtue was its own reward, and Montaigne (1533-92) regarded

the model of the Stoic sage as not only impractical, but presumptuous as well.8 Salutati remarked

that not even Christ met the Stoics demand for apatheia, and Calvin likewise rejected the Stoic

claim that pity was a vice, arguing that Christ wept for others.9 Among theologians like Valla or

Calvin, who saw rising appreciation for Stoicism as a threat to religion, one figure stands out for

his unconventional relationship with Stoicism. Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525) endorses Stoic

metaphysics in his De fato (which he dared not publish in his lifetime), even though he believed

that doing so was at odds with Catholic teaching.10

In the final book of the work, Pomponazzi

discloses his preference for Stoic determinism and subjects all events to natural and astral laws.

Nevertheless he considered himself to be a devout Christian. Pomponazzi exemplifies the

principle that religion and philosophy may be diametrically opposed yet still coexist in the mind

of the thinker.11

In general, Stoic moral philosophy is harmonious at many points with Christian ethics.

Early Christian writers were themselves informed by Stoic ethical doctrines (see 1.4). Although

writers like Petrarch had already sought to harmonize Christian ethics with Stoic moral

6 Kraye 2007, 100.

7 Kraye 1988, 368.

8 Kraye 1988, 363, 366-7.

9 Kraye 1988, 368-9. Calvin rejects Stoic ethical doctrines regarding virtue and vice in his preface to his

commentary of Senecas De clementia and in his Intitutio religionis Christianae (III. 7.2, 8.9). 10

Poppi 1988, 656-7. 11

Poppi 1988, 660.

7

philosophy, there was little effort by Lipsius time to make Stoic physics compatible with

Christian natural philosophy. Pomponazzi wrote privately about Stoic physics, but he did not

attempt to harmonize them. What, then, did Lipsius Neostoicism entail: an adaption of Stoic

ethical doctrines that others had already attempted or an incorporation of Stoic physics as well?

In this thesis, I examine how Lipsius revives Stoic thought. I am interested in both the

extent to which Stoicism informs Lipsius philosophy and the manner in which Lipsius presents

Stoicism. I limit my examination to Lipsius seminal Neostoic work, De Constantia Libri Duo

(1584).12

The De constantia was Lipsius first major philosophical work and the only one that is

explicitly devoted to promulgating a philosophical program.13

R.V. Young has called the De

constantia arguably the most significant, influential, and characteristic work of northern

humanism.14

The De constantia is concerned with an ethical problem, and Lipsius employs

determinism to inform his solution. Since determinism is central to the main arguments of the De

constantia, I narrow the focus of my study to the set of topics involving determinism: causation,

providence, fate, chance, moral responsibility, and agency. In particular, I am interested in the

problematic position Lipsius places himself when he speaks on determinism. Namely, I find that

deterministic (and characteristically Stoic) thought is more pervasive than what Lipsius explicitly

states about providence and fate. I conclude my study by considering the factors that likely

caused Lipsius to restrain the presence of Stoic determinism in the De constantia. Lipsius

natural philosophy is now beginning to receive scholarly interest (see Hirai 2011), but no modern

scholarsas far as I am aware have spent significant effort evaluating Lipsius determinism as

presented in the De constantia.

12

The earliest publication of the De constantia was August 2, 1583 (ILE I, 83 08 02), but by convention it is usually

dated to 1584. 13

Lipsius two later treatises on Stoicism are written with the explicit goal of aiding in the study of Senecas prose

works by outlining the philosophical system to which he subscribed. 14

Young 2011, xvii.

8

In the remainder of this chapter, I introduce Justus Lipsius and outline important details

of his life. I then provide a sketch of the De constantia, its constituent parts, and important

arguments. I end this chapter by discussing the important role Seneca plays in Lipsius thought

and the reception of Seneca that Lipsius inherits. Seneca was a well-received writer of Stoic

ethics, and a personal favorite of Lipsius, and so I use Seneca as a starting point for my study. In

chapter two, my intent is to evaluate how well Senecas moral philosophy can explain any Stoic

influence in Lipsius determinism. In his ethical treatise, De providentia, Seneca has much to say

about determinism that would be useful for Lipsius. Therefore, I compare Senecas De

providentia to the De constantia. I find considerable Senecan influence on Lipsius method of

using determinism as a consolation against public evils. Lipsius arguments, however, go beyond

the scope that Seneca covers in his De providentia. Apart from his comforting words to the

reader, Lipsius details a deterministic system of thought that leads to the main arguments of the

De constantia. In order to evaluate whether Lipsius is drawing upon works of Stoic physics in

addition to moral philosophy, I specify in chapter three an account of Stoic determinism that is

accessible and known to Lipsius. In chapter four, I analyze Lipsian determinism as presented in

the De constantia and judge it against the narrative of Stoic determinism outlined in the previous

chapter. I find that Lipsian determinism is largely informed by Stoic sources, although there are

some issues. On several occasions, Lipsius misrepresents Stoicism and threatens the consistency

of his own determinism by making contradictory claims. In chapter five, I more fully consider

these issues by examining Lipsius later treatise on Stoic physics, the Physiologia. I end the

thesis with a consideration of the circumstantial factors that would have caused Lipsius to

disown the presence of Stoic deterministic thought in his treatise.

9

1.2. A Brief Biography

Joost Lips (Latinized as Justus Lipsius) was born in the province of Brabant, Belgium in

1547. Overijse, the village where he was born, lies just outside of Brussels and Leuven. He

studied first with the Jesuits in Cologne and later matriculated at the Catholic university of

Leuven. After compiling three books of textual emendations of Cicero, Propertius, Varro, et al.

in 1566, he went to Rome as secretary to Cardinal Granvelle and stayed for two years in order to

study classical literature.15

After his sojourn in Rome, Lipsius returned to Leuven in 1570 to

continue his education in law. Soon after, Lipsius was driven by the massacres committed under

Duke lvarez of Alba, Spanish general and governor of the Netherlands, to the Viennese court

of Maximillian II and later to the Lutheran university of Jena.16

With his property sacked by

Spanish troops, Lipsius spent two years as chair of History at Jena, before returning to Leuven in

1574.

In 1577, Janus Dousa, a friend from the time of his study at Leuven, invited Lipsius to the

newly founded Calvinist university at Leiden, which lies midway between Rotterdam and

Amsterdam. Around the same time, Don Juan, the new Spanish governor of the Netherlands, was

preparing a campaign to pacify the Low Countries. In anticipation of the oncoming conflict,

Lipsius accepted Dousas invitation and left Leuven in early 1578.17

Lipsius remained in Leiden

for twelve years (1578-1591) where he was chair of History and Latin literature. Due to

controversy over one of his publications, Lipsius left Leiden and returned to Leuven, where he

taught at the Catholic university until his death in 1606.

Lipsius began his scholarly career as a philologist, publishing various works of textual

criticism on such Latin authors as Plautus, Cicero, Tacitus, Livy, Suetonius, both Senecas,

15

His Variae Lectiones Libri Tres were later published at Antwerp in 1569. 16

Gerlo, A. et al. 1978, Introduction. 17

Gerlo, A. et al. 1978, Introduction.

10

Statius, Apuleius, Persius, and others.18

His edition of Tacitus (1574) first secured his reputation

as a scholar of critical excellence. At Leiden, Lipsius published his most popular and influential

works, his De constantia (1584) and Politica (1589). The former is a philosophical work for the

benefit of the individual, while the latter is a treatise on proper governance that relies most

heavily on Tacitus. His other major works are his two treatises on Stoicism, the Manuductio and

the Physiologia (1604), followed by his edition of Senecas prose works (1605). Lipsius also

wrote a textbook of epistolary writing, numerous works on Roman history, and a Menippean

satire on classical scholarship. Finally, there is Lipsius lifetime of letter-writing. There exist

over four thousand letters from or to Lipsius that spread over the course of his entire life,

beginning with his early career and ending ten days before his death.19

Lipsius published about

800 of these letters during his lifetime by groups of hundreds (in so-called centuriae). There

remain over a thousand unpublished letters of Lipsius that still remain unstudied.

Lipsius religious life is a matter of some controversy and uncertainty. Born a Catholic,

Lipsius studied in his youth with the Jesuits in Cologne. In order to hold the chair at Lutheran

Jena, Lipsius made an affirmation of Lutheranism. While at Jena, Lipsius made three speeches

that were particularly critical of the church and the Spanish crown. Lipsius compares the Duke of

Alba to Tiberius, calling him a furiosus tyrannus20

and calls the church the scarlet beast and

the Roman whore in reference to the St. Bartholomews Day Massacre of 1572.21

In his later

years, Lipsius disclaimed authorship of such speeches when polemical works against him began

to appear in 1600.22

Similarly, Lipsius made some affirmation of Calvinism in order to teach at

Leiden, although Dousa never pressed Lipsius regarding his religious allegiance. His return to

18

See, for example, Lipsius Electorum Libri. 19

Gerlo, A. et al. 1978, Introduction. 20

Morford 1991, 130. 21

Morford 1991, 128-9. 22

Morford 1991, 126.

11

Brabant in 1591 required reconciliation with the Jesuits and a re-affirmation of his Catholic faith.

His unexpected decision to leave Leiden led Protestant colleagues such as Joesph Scaliger and

Isaac Causabon to defame and criticize him even up until his death.23

When he was encouraged

to remember his Stoic consolations on his death-bed, it is said that Lipsius rejected them and

made a final re-affirmation of his faith, saying, those things are vain...this [pointing to the

crucifix] is true constancy.24

On Lispius allegiances and personal beliefs, Morford concludes:

[The] man still eludes us. His inconstancy in religion, the histrionics of his death (at least as

described by his Catholic friends), and the editing, suppression, and amplification of his

correspondence and published work indicate a character whose instinct for self-preservation

was stronger than adherence to the high Stoic principles of his best writing or to one faith at

the price of martyrdom.25

1.3. The De Constantia Libri Duo

The primary text I use for the De constantia is the first (1584) edition. Lipsius released

several more editions during his lifetime, with the second edition published just a year after the

first. Lipsius made no dramatic changes in these later editions, but I do consider these changes in

chapter six. The De constantia was translated into all major European languages shortly after its

initial publication, including English in 1594 by John Stradling.26

R.V. Young has aided my

study greatly with his 2011 translation with notes, which is the only modern English edition that

does not rely on Stradlings translation. I use Young (2011) for my translation of the De

23

Morford 1991, 132. 24

illa sunt vana... haec est vera patientia. The account is from Joannes Woverius, Lipsius pupil and executor (Iusti

Lipsi Opera omnia 1: 185). See Morford 1991, 133n148. 25

Morford 1991, 133. 26

Young 2011, xxviii.

12

constantia unless otherwise noted.27

The text I use is from the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in

Munich, which has been digitized by Google.28

For the setting of his treatise, Lipsius fictionalizes his 1571 journey to Vienna. In the first

chapter of book one, Lipsius says that as he was fleeing the disturbances of his native land

(patriae meae turbas), he stopped by Lige to visit some friends, the most important of whom

was Charles Languis. Like Lipsius, Languis (ca. 1521-1573) was himself a noted philologist who

published editions of Ciceros philosophical works and Plautus comedies.29

Within the De

constantia, Languis takes the role of the philosophical teacher in dialogue with the young

Lipsius, the pupil.30

Through the voice of Languis, Lipsius introduces the philosophical aim of

the work:

Itaque non patria fugienda, Lipsi: sed Adfectus sunt: et firmandus ita formandusque hic

animus, ut quies nobis in turbis sit et pax inter media arma.31

And so you must not flee your country, Lipsius, but your emotions. The mind must be so

strengthened and shaped that quiet may be yours amidst tumults and peace amid warfare.

Languis will advance a series of four arguments for the purpose of treating the young Lipsius

present mental infirmity. The De constantia is, above all, a work of ethical discourse between the

philosopher and his student.

Before Languis sets out his four arguments in support of constancy (constantia), he

explains to the young Lipsius why the mind becomes afflicted and why constantia is required to

treat it. Languis explains that the afflicted mind is depressed by itself, not by external wars or

27

Young uses a 1605 edition as the basis for his text and translation, with only a few places where my 1584 text

conflicts. I also deviate from Young at times when I wish to be particularly precise in translating certain

philosophical terms and concepts. 28

The URL is

. 29

Young 2011, 17n2. 30

To distinguish between Lipsius the author and Lipsius the character, I will refer to the former simply as Lipsius

and the latter as Lipsius the pupil or the young Lipsius (Lipsius would have been around 25 when his

fictionalized conversation with Languis took place). 31

De con. 1.1.

13

suffering, and thus constantia, defined as an upright and unmoved vigor of the mind that is

neither uplifted nor cast down by outward or chance occurrences,32

is the means by which the

mind can free itself from anxiety and turmoil. The mind that is plagued by opinion, defined as

false judgment (iudicium...fallax), is overtaken by volatile emotions, while the mind that is

fortified through right reason, defined as correct judgment regarding human and divine affairs

(de rebus humanis divinisque...verum iudicium), is always in a stable, tranquil state.33

Languis

thus expounds a theory of the mind in which the interplay between reason and opinion explains

emotive states.

After introducing his theory of the psyche, Lipsius explores how the unhealthy mind

judges things as either good or evil. Because the unhealthy mind is guided by opinion, it makes

false judgments regarding external objects as either beneficial or harmful. External objects are

falsely considered good or evil because they are not in us but around us, and strictly speaking

they neither help nor harm the inner man, that is, the mind.34

Among false goods are wealth,

commendations, power, and health; among false evils are poverty, disgrace, weakness, illness

and death. Lipsius further dissects these false evils into private (privata mala) and public evils

(publica mala). Since the pupil Lipsius is fleeing from Spanish troops, Lipsius focuses on public

evils, which include war, plague, famine, tyranny and massacres. Lipsius says that because

public evils afflict us en masse, and not individually, we are more likely to succumb to sorrow

when faced by them.

Due to the shared experience of adversity, we are more likely to grieve over public evils

even though they are falsely regarded as harmful. In 1.7-12, Lipsius describes three states of

32

De con. 1.4: [Constantiam hic appello,] rectum et immotum animi robur, non elati externis aut fortuitis non

depressi. 33

De con. 1.4. 34

De con. 1.7: [Utraque sic appello,] quae non in nobis, sed circa nos, quaeque interiorem hunc hominem, id est

animum, proprie non iuvant aut laedunt.

14

mind (adfecti) that inhibit resistance to public evils. They are: deception (simulatio), nationalism

(pietas), and pity (miseratio). Due to deception, we are able to mask our self-interest as concern

for others. He uses the following example: if there was war in the Indies no one would care, but

if in the Low Countries, everyone weeps and wails. To the pupils reply that the Indies is not his

native country, Languis replies, Fool. Are they not also men of the same stock and seed as

you?35

This leads Lipsius to the second of these mental states, pietas. Lipsius acknowledges that

piety is a virtue when it is defined as the lawful and owed honor and love for God and parents

(legitimum debitumque honorem et amorem in Deum ac parentes), but people often twist this

into an excessive love for country. Love for country does not come from nature, but arises out of

human custom and convention for the protection of property and the safety it provides.36

Lipsius

accepts that we owe respect, service, and sometimes our lives to our country, but no one should

grieve for a contrived institution.37

Lipsius distinguishes the third adfectus, pity (miseratio), from

mercy (misericordia). Lipsius defines pity as the vice of despondency at the sight of anothers

evil (vitium...ad speciem alieni mali collabentis) while mercy is an inclination of the mind

towards relieving anothers suffering (inclinationem animi ad alienam...luctum sublevandum).38

If one sees another in need, the virtuous response is aid, not wallowing in sorrow. These three

states of mind are obstacles to the recognition that public evils are not harmful and inhibit the

cultivation of constancy.

With the three passions out of the way, Lipsius spends the remained of the treatise on

four arguments for why public evils are not worth grieving over. The first argument (1.13-14) is

35

De con. 1.9: Stulte. An non et illi homines, eadem stirpe tecum et satu? 36

De con. 1.11: A natura enim esse vis: reversa autam est a more quodam et instituto (You wish to maintain that

[the origin of countries] comes from nature, but the truth of the matter is, it comes from custom and education). 37

De con. 1.11: Quam si iure amari a civibus vis; fatebor. Defendi; agnoscam. Mortem pro ea suscipi; permittam.

Non illud, ut etiam doleat quis, iaceat, lamentetur (If you wish that [country] be loved by its citizens as a matter of

right, I admit it; that they should defend it, I acknowledge; that they should die for it, I allow it. I do not concede that

anyone should grieve for it, lie prostrate, or bewail it). Translation altered. 38

De con. 1.12.

15

that all events are directed by Gods providence, and thus there is no cause for anxiety. In fact, to

complain or weep over them is irreverent to God, who makes provision for all natural and human

affairs. The second argument (1.15-22) is that public evils are necessary in two ways and, again,

are not worth worrying about. First, public evils are necessary in that countries inevitably end at

some point in ruin and destruction; nations and civilizations are as prone to destruction as the

mortals who comprise them. Since we necessarily die, the institutions of men also necessarily

die. Second, public evils are necessary by fate. Lipsius is careful to distinguish his theory of fate

from others, most notably from that of the Stoics. In a similar way to the first argument, Lipsius

argues that all events are fated by God and thus there is no reason to lament suffering. Lipsius

also clarifies that fate does not limit Gods freedom, nor does it interfere with our own wills.

This concludes book one, and book two begins with a discussion about the proper use of

gardens: they are meant to be places for serious reflection, not places of vanity or sloth. Lipsius

then makes an exhortation to virtue and encourages young men to incorporate philosophy into

their studies. After this brief interlude on gardens and wisdom, Lipsius sets out his third

argument (2.6-17): that public evils are actually beneficial because they come from God. Even if

they are brought about by evil men, adversities have four useful purposes. First, adversity

strengthens good men and makes then an example for others (2.8). Second, adversity corrects

those who on the way to virtue (2.9). Vice thrives easily in prosperity and lack of want, and so

adversity humbles us and keeps our faults from growing. Third, adversity is a useful punishment

for those who have sinned (2.10). Fourth, public evils serve purposes that are beyond human

comprehension (2.11). Lipsius hesitates to guess what these could be: they prevent

overpopulation or contribute to later human development. To the objection that the innocent are

often unjustly punished by God, Lipsius responds that humans are in no place to question Gods

16

justice (2.12). Further, not only are we all guilty of some fault, but it is also incorrect to presume

that anyone except God can judge who is more innocent or more deserving of punishment

(2.1539

).

The remainder of the treatise (2.17-26) comprises the fourth and final argument: that the

ongoing turmoil of the Low Countries is a trifle compared to countless sufferings of human

history. Lipsius uses the exempla of Roman, Greek and Jewish history, in addition to the more

recent miseries imposed on the native populations of the Americas. After Languis finishes his

arguments and makes one last exhortation for the young Lipsius to grow in virtue, they promptly

rise and head out in the midday sun for lunch.40

The pupil Lipsius leaves with Languis in a

joyous mood, crying out I have escaped evil and found the good.41

Some of Lipsius statements may be shocking or unsavory to modern readers (e.g., that

everyone deserves punishment or that wars may be ordained by God to reduce overpopulation),

but Lipsius does not make these claims callously. When recalling European domination of the

Americas, Languis says:

Ostende etiam te paullum tu, Peruana, tu Mexicana ora. Heu mira miseramque faciem!

immensus ille tractus et vere alter Orbis, vastus attritusque apparet, non aliter quam si

caelesti quodam igne deflagrisset. Mens et lingua mihi cadit, Lipsi, dum haec memoro: et

video nostra omnia prae istis non aliud quam paleatum cassa esse, ut Comicus ait, aut

gurguliunculos minutos.42

Show yourself also for a while, Peruvian land, and you, the Mexican. Alas, what an

amazing and miserable aspect! That immense expanse, truly another world, appears

desolate and wiped out, not otherwise than if it had been consumed by some fire from

heaven. Mind and tongue fail me, Lipsius, as I recall these things; and I see all our

troubles beside them as nothing but clouds of chaff, as the Comic poet says, or tiny little

weevils.

39

In editions after 1584, Lipsius separated chapter 2.14 into two chapters, increasing the total number of chapters in

book two from 26 to 27. The convention I use is that of the first edition, so that 2.15 refers to 2.16 in later editions. 40

De con. 2.26. 41

De con. 2.26: Effugi malum, repperi bonum. Young (2011, 205n161) notes that Lipsius is quoting from

Demosthenes (On the Crown 313). 42

De con. 2.21. Translation altered. The Comicus refers to Plautus, Rudens, 1325 (Young 2011, 187n119).

17

When Lipsius justifies why bad things happen to good people, he admits that he is not speaking

from a position of authority.43

Although Lipsius is aware that his explanations are not always

palatable, he tries to make sense of calamity according to his understanding of the universe.

Setting aside judgment of Lipsius justification of public evils, his humanism can still interest

todays students of classics. Lipsius believed that Greek and Latin literature was valuable not

only to the academic, but to the general reader. With the De constantia, he calls upon his

classical learning to address the pressing issues of rebellion and war that afflicted the Low

Countries. If nothing else, this humanist program makes the De constantia deserving of our

attention.

1.4. The Role of Seneca

Now that we have an outline of the contents of the De constantia, I introduce a Stoic

writer who is foundational to my study. Some information about Seneca the Younger is

necessary to contextualize Lipsius own appreciation for the man. Senecas prose philosophy

was the most important vehicle for the transmission of Stoic ideas through the medieval period

and into the Renaissance. Due to his ubiquitous presence and reputation as a proto-Christian by

the sixteenth century, Seneca was a natural source of attraction to Lipsius and other humanists of

the age. In chapter two, I pay careful attention to Lipsius use or disuse of Seneca because from

this we can learn something about Stoicisms place in the De constantia. Namely, we may learn

how deeply Lipsius draws from Stoic sources: does he draw only from Senecas moral

philosophy, or does he incorporate a richer collection of Stoic texts?

43

When prodded for the reasons for divine punishments, Lipsius first says, tutissime dicam, me nescire (the safest

thing for me to say is, I dont know) (De con. 2.12).

18

Even in his own day, Lucius Annaeus Seneca (4 BCE 65 CE) was a man of incredible

influence. Born to the famous statesman and rhetorician of the same name, Seneca the Younger

was a Roman senator, playwright, and Stoic philosopher. Senecas literary oeuvre encompasses

Latin tragedy, Menippean satire, and philosophy. His extant philosophical works include 124

moral epistles, a collection of essays on various ethical topics, and an idiosyncratic work on

natural science. His Epistulae morales were written to his friend Lucilius and function as

vehicles for Senecas ethics rather than strictly personal correspondence. Twelve treatises on

moral subjects survive, though approximately twenty more have not.44

The surviving treatises

are: Ad Helviam de Consolatione, Ad Marciam de Consolatione, Ad Polybium de Consolatione,

De Beata Vita, De Brevitate Vitae, De Constantia Sapientis, De Ira, De Otio, De Providentia, De

Tranquillitate Animi, De Beneficiis, and De Clementia. The first three are consolatory letters

written to parents, including Senecas own mother, regarding their children. The remaining nine

treatises cover a range of philosophical topics falling within the realm of ethics, though De

Providentia tangentially covers some metaphysics. Finally, the Naturales Quaestiones seeks to

rationally explain a range of natural phenomena and includes epistemology and theology. On the

content of Senecas philosophical corpus, Brad Inwood has cautioned against expecting to find a

unified philosophical program.45

Rather, Seneca engages with Stoicism in a particularistic

manner as he reflects on issues that interest him most. While Senecas philosophy is unique in its

sensitivity to first-hand experience and his attention to the proficiens, he is conservative in

relation to the earlier Athenian Stoa.46

Nevertheless, Seneca is a serious philosophical presence

in the Western tradition, worth the time and energy demanded.47

44

Colish 1985, 15. 45

Inwood 2005, 2. 46

Inwood 2005, 352. 47

Inwood 2005, 5.

19

Christian apologists and Fathers of the early Church received Seneca well despite a tepid

reputation inherited from Quintilian. The Roman rhetorician came out strongly against Senecas

style, calling it corrupt and exceedingly dangerous for the style it promotes.48

Even worse,

Quintilian characterized Senecas philosophy as parum diligens (lacking thoughtfulness).49

However, as Stoic ethics would largely become assimilated into the Christian tradition, Christian

writers unsurprisingly lauded Senecas prose for its moral emphasis.50

Lactantius (4th

century)

credits Seneca as omnium Stoicorum acutissimus (the keenest of all Stoics) and we even have

fragments from three lost works of Seneca that Lactantius quoted.51

Tertullian (born c.160)

famously wrote that Seneca was saepe noster (frequently ours)52

and while Augustine (354-

430) charges him with hypocrisy, he does admit there is some truth in Senecas writing.53

Jerome

(c. 347-420) includes Seneca in his catalogue of illustrious men.54

In fact, Jerome writes:

I would not have placed him in my catalogue of the holy, had I not been moved by those

letters of Paul to Seneca and of Seneca to Paul, which many have read. In these, when he

was the teacher of Nero and the most powerful man of that time, he says that he wishes to

occupy the position among his own that Paul occupies with the Christians. Two years

before Peter and Paul were crowned with martyrdom, he was killed by Nero.55

This excerpt contains the earliest recorded mention of the Paul-Seneca correspondence, which

Jerome unquestioningly accepts as genuine. The Paul-Seneca correspondence was often included

with the Epistulae Morales from the early Middle Ages, and Jeromes biography served as an

48

Quint. Inst. 10.1.29: sed in eloquendo [sententiae] corrupta pleraque, atque eo perniciosissima quod abundant

dulcibus vitiis. 49

Quint. Inst. 10.1.29: In philosophia parum diligens, egregarius tamen vitiorum insectatur fuit. 50

Long 2003, 8. Long views this as detrimental to a later revival of Stoicism as true Stoic doctrines would become

indistinguishable from their Christian counterparts. 51

Lactantius Div. Inst. 2.8.23. The three lost works are: the Exhortationes, De immatura morte, and Moralis

philosophiae libri. We also have quotes from other lost works; Jerome quotes from De matrimonio, Augustine from

the De superstitione. Cassiodorus quotes from De forma mundi (Reynolds 1983, 358). 52

Tertullian De anima 20. 53

August. CD. 6.10: [verum] adfuit enim scribenti, viventi defuit. 54

Jerome De vir. ill. 12 55

I use Kers (2009, 182-3) translation here.

20

introduction in editions of Seneca from at least the 11th

century.56

Jeromes Vita Senecae,

however, does not mention Neros motivewhich we know to be his alleged involvement in the

Pisonian conspiracyfor ordering the death of Seneca. With the rediscovery of Tacitus Annals

not occurring until 1370, medieval scholars filled in the gaps of missing information by likening

Senecas suicide to Christian martyrdom.57

At first, the rediscovery of Tacitus did little to prevent a Christianization of Seneca. In

1374, Boccaccio uses the newly found Tacitean account to argue that Seneca not only received a

baptism of the spirit, but that Seneca baptized himself at the time of his death by consecrating

water to Jove the Liberator, whom Boccaccio argues is to be understood as Jesus Christ.58

It was

not until the 16th

century that Erasmus properly secularized Seneca. Erasmus admired Seneca,

calling him the one ancient writer who deserves to be read by Christians.59

Still, his 1525 edition

of Seneca definitively proves the Paul-Seneca correspondence a forgery and clarifies the

biography of Seneca against those who were virtually embracing him as orthodox.60

Due in part to his reputation as a proto-Christian, Senecas prose works enjoyed a healthy

transmission from the early Middle Ages to the Italian Renaissance. Most of the main units that

comprise the manuscript tradition follow a general pattern of brief appearance in the 9th

through

11th

centuries followed by a great resurgence in 12th

and 13th

centuries.61

In the 12th

century,

Senecan texts begin to be joined together into a corpus, and most of his major works are bound

under a single cover beginning in the 14th

century.62

Of course other factors beside his content

56

Reynolds 1983, 360. Also, Ker 2009, 188. 57

Ker 2009, 187. One 9th

century pseudo-Senecan manuscript fabricates the story that Seneca objected to Neros

Great Fire of 64CE. Senecas death is then compared to the contemporaneous deaths of Peter and Paul. 58

Ker 2009, 201-2. This account is found in Boccaccios Commento Di Dante (c. 1374) as a response to Dantes

placing of Seneca in Limbo. 59

Kraye 2001/2002, 31. 60

Ker 2009, 210. 61

Reynolds 1983, 359. 62

Reynolds 1983, 360.

21

aided his reception. As already mentioned, Seneca wrote in a pithy, sententious style

characteristic of silver Latin, and this style lends itself well to quotations and excerpting. In the

early Middle Ages, florilegia (gathering of flowers, compilations of quotations) contain

abundant extracts from (sometimes pseudo-)Seneca. Florilegium Gallicum, Proverbia Senecae,

Senecae Monita, and the Liber de moribus are just a few of those that contain quotes attributed to

Seneca. Collections of short maxims by Seneca also became popular in the 16th

century.63

These

compendia allowed publishers to censor Senecas philosophy so that only the most palatable

sayings are published.64

Imitating Senecan style and content, forgeries and pseudo-Senecan

works also abound, including the aforementioned Proverbia Senecae and Liber de moribus. The

most cited plagiarist, however, was Martin Braga of the 6th

century who wrote De ira, Formula

vitae honestae, and De quattuor virtutibus cardinalibus.65

Finally, remember that Seneca is the

sole ancient Stoic philosopher who wrote in Latin. Translations of Greek sources such as

Epictetus remained lacking until the 15th

century.66

For a Medieval Latin reader, Seneca and

Cicero were the primary source for information about Stoicism.67

As a philologist Lipsius himself contributed to the study of Senecan texts. In his

Electorum Libri (1582) Lipsius first made the conclusive distinction between the Elder and the

Younger Seneca, and Lipsius worked with Andreas Schott to publish the Declamationes (1603)

under the heading of the correct Seneca. Most importantly, Lipsius published a new edition of

Senecas prose works (1605) that greatly aided in the establishment of an authoritative text. He

63

Kraye 2001/2002, 37-8. 64

Incidentally, Seneca himself condemned reading a Stoic author in this manner. While in his Epistulae Seneca

initially provides Lucilius with short maxims drawn usually from Epicurus beginning with Ep. 4, Seneca later stops

the practice. In Ep. 33.2, he states that the writings of his Stoic forebears have an interwoven logical structure that is

not suited to excerption. Even more, Seneca views snatching at flowerets (Ep. 33.7) to be shameful for one trying

to make real moral progress. I thank Margaret Graver for introducing me to this point. See Graver (forthcoming). 65

Colish 1985, 16. 66

Verbeke 1983, 7. 67

Verbeke 1983, 7.

22

claimed to have been the first to establish the correct punctuation and division of words and

phrases, and his profound knowledge of Senecas style and vocabulary allowed him to be

extraordinarily accurate in his corrections (Morford 1991, 173).

Like others before him, Lipsius greatly admired Seneca. In a 1585 letter written to

Laevinus Torrentius, friend and vicar general of the archbishop of Lige, Lipsius writes A kind

of fervor lies in the writings of Seneca or Epictetus, which also comes upon the reader, and they

do not seem so much to discuss virtue as to sow and cultivate it within him.68

And in his

dedication to Pope Paul V of his edition of Seneca, Lipsius calls him the most praiseworthy

writer among all the ancients (laudatissimum inter omnes veteres scriptorem) and nearly

Christian (paene Christianus).69

Lipsius admiration, however, extended beyond respect for the

moralizing quality of his philosophy. In the introduction to his edition of Seneca, Lipsius defends

the philosopher against the judgment of Quintilian. Whereas Quintilian saw Senecas style as

antithetical to proper Roman rhetoric, Lipsius counters that:

Proprium aliquod et suum genus habuit: ut solent ista vel cum aetatibus mutari, vel

pro ingenio atque animo cuiusque formari. Quis Ciceronem Gracco aut Catoni

similem dicat, aut velit?

He [Seneca] had his own particular and characteristic style: as such things habitually

change with the passing ages or are shaped in accordance with the intellect and spirit

of each. Who would say that Cicero is like Gracchus or Cato? And who would want

him to be?

Lipsius also aimed to reverse the earlier judgment of humanists like Erasmus who approved of

the moral content of his writing, but whonot unlike Quintiliancriticized his writing as flat.70

68

ILE, II, 84 05 06 (no. 342): Spirat nescio quis calor in Senecae aut Epicteti scriptis, qui ad lectorem quoque

pervenit: nec disserere illi magis de virtute videntur, quam inserere et inculare. 69

Opera Omnia Senecae, Epistola Dedicatoria: En Annaeum Senecam, laudatissimum inter omnes veteres

scriptorem et virtutis studio paene Christianum (ita nostri censuerunt), emendatum varie et illustratam damus et

deponimus ad sacros tuos pedes (Behold, I give and place at your holy feet Annaeus Seneca, the most praiseworthy

writer among all the ancients and often Christian (so our writers have judged) in the study of virtue, variously

emended and illustrated). Also see Papy 2004, 50. 70

Kraye 1999, 458.

23

Regarding Senecas sententiousness, Lipsius regards it as complementary to moral instruction

and to Stoicism in particular:

neque abnuo, crebras et minutas istas sententias intervenire. Sed pondera etiam

rerum frangere?hoc nego, in istis quidem philosophicis libris, qui exstant. Augent

magis, et intendunt. Stoicorum hoc proprium fuit, non gladiis, sed pugiunculis, rem

gerere: et brevi et accincto sermone esse.71

Nor do I deny that those frequent, short sentences crop up. But that they break the

balance of things? I deny this, certainly in those philosophical works which are

extant. Rather they enrich and direct. This was characteristic of the Stoics, to carry

out war not with swords but with little knives: and to be of concise and well-girdled

speech.

Senecan brevity and pith is characteristic of Lipsius own writing, filled with forceful, terse

sentences.72

For example, Lipsius describes those infected by the Dutch tulip craze as follows:

Hi sunt, quorum litterae in Thraciam, Graeciam, Indiam discurrunt: idque seminis exigui

aut bulbuli caussa. Hi, quibus aegrius sit florem aliquem novum mori, quam veterem

amicum.73

These are the men whose letters run to and fro into Thrace, Greece, and India, and that

for the sake of a few seeds or bulbs. These are the men for whom it would be more

distressing should some new flower die, than an old friend.

Here we see Lipsius abbreviating his already compact sentences and ending with a quick punch-

line that stabs at his targets dehumanizing behavior. Note the contrast between the new bulbs

and the old friend; the tulip craze distracts priorities from the long-standing to the fickle. Finally,

Lipsius objects to Quintilians criticism of Seneca as a philosopher lacking critical power, and

instead makes an attack on Quintilians own perspicacity:

At culpat etiam Fabius, ut in Philosophia parum diligentem. Quid hoc est? aut de

qua parte loqui eum putem?...Sed Fabii mentem ego hanc arbitror, non inquisisse

nimis aut penetrasse in interiora Philosophiae; externa hac populari, et velut

medicante, contentum. 71

For characterization of Stoic rhetoric as small and sharp-pointed, see Cic. Fin. 4.7: Pungunt quasi aculeis

interrogatiunculis angustis; also Cic. Parad., Prooemium 2: sed minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis quod

proposuit efficit. 72

Lipsius Senecan style would later influence a group of rationalistic thinkers of the late 16th

century, including

Montaigne, du Vair, Richelieu, Montesquieu, Fancis Bacon, Joseph Hall, etc. (Saunders 1955, 15-16). 73

De con. 2.3.

24

But Fabius [i.e., Marcus Fabius Quintilian] still censures that there is little insight in

his philosophy. What is this? And about what part should I think him to speak of? ...

But I judge that this is the mind of Fabius, that he has not inquired enough or

penetrated into the innermost of philosophy; that he was content with the outer,

popular, and, as it were, medicating part of this philosophy.

Lipsius clearly had a high opinion of both Senecas stylistic and philosophical contributions, and

was willing to make a forceful attack on perhaps the most respected authority on Latin rhetoric.

Before we can look to Lipsius De constantia in detail for Senecan influence, we must

first verify that Lipsius was familiar with Seneca when writing his treatise. During his three years

in Rome from 1568 to 1570 as secretary to Cardinal Granvelle, the young Lipsius gained the

friendship of the French scholar Marc-Antoine Muret. It was under the guidance of Muret that

Lipsius was formally introduced to Seneca, and their discussions about Seneca would later

become a source of contention between the two.74

It appears the first mention Lipsius makes of

Seneca is in a letter addressed to Gerhard Falkenberg from August 1575.75

Lipsius lists Socrates,

Seneca, Helvidius Priscus and Thrasea Paetus as exemplars of constancy in the face of tyranny.76

It is interesting that Lipsius only mentions Seneca within a catalogue of notable sapientes, and it

would appear that Lipsius particular appreciation for Seneca has not yet blossomed. A year

later, in 1576, Muret writes to Lipsius accusing him of plagiarizing his emendations to Seneca

which they discussed during their time in Rome.77

Muret is referring to two of Lipsius lectures

74

Morford 1991, 157. Kraye 1988, 371. 75

Falkenberg was a Protestant, secretary to Thomas Rehdinger, to whom Lipsius devoted Antiquae Lectiones late in

1574. Falkenberg had indirectly criticized Lipsius return to the Spanish Netherlands (Morford 1991, 152). 76

ILE, I, 75 08 01 (Ep. Misc. 1.4): Quis servus est, perire modo qui non timet?Hoc enim firmum adversus externa

omnia telum, non timere propter quod timentur. Sic Socrates adfectus, qui Athenas non deservit, insessas non uno

sed triginta tyrannis; sic Seneca, qui sub Nerone, imo cum Nerone vixit; sic Helvidius, sic Thrasea, et magna illa

sapientum manus (Who is a slave who does not fear to die? For this weapon is firm against all external affairs, to

not fear them on account of that they are feared. Thus Socrates possessed it, who did not desert Athens, occupied not

by a single but by thirty tyrants; so did Seneca, who lived under, nay, rather with Nero; Thus Helvidius and Thrasea

and that great band of wise men). 77

ILE, I, 76 09 05 (no. 74): Et negas te a me quidquam accepisse praeter unum aut alterum locum, in quibus etiam

vis facta a te mentionem mei (And you deny that you have taken anything from me besides one or another point, in

which also you wish that my mention came about from you ).

25

in which he recommended 29 emendations to Senecas prose works.78

After Christophe Plantin,

a mutual friend and Lipsius publisher, reunited the two scholars in 1579, Lipsius writes to Muret

to preserve their failing friendship:

Electorum librum iam nunc vulgavi. paro Saturnalium sermonum, et De vita ac scriptis

Annaei Senecae. quem nec invitus ad te miserim, quasi vadem amicitiae coeuntis et

sanescentis.79

I have already published Electorum Librum. I am preparing Saturnalium sermonum [a

book on gladiators] and a work on the life and writings of Annaeus Seneca which I may

have sent to you not begrudgingly, but in earnest of a friendship that is coming together

and beginning to recover.

Lipsius never published the work on Senecas life and writings, but it appears as one of the many

introductory portions of his 1605 edition of Seneca.

Within the next few years, evidence for Lipsius appreciation for Seneca and Stoicism

becomes more substantial. In a letter written on New Years Eve 1580 to Janus Lernutius, a

fellow Belgian humanist, Lipsius says he is digging deeply into Stoic philosophy and reading

Seneca, Epictetus and Arrian.80

A year later Lipsius writes a charming letter in which we learn

that he has recommended Seneca to Alexander Ratlo, and Lipsius is glad to hear that his friend

enjoys the Stoics as much as he. He writes:

Senecam nostrum tibi placere ex animo gaudeo. Scio non alios e priscis magis consentire

cum Christiana pietate, quam eos qui e Stoica domo. In quo numero etiam Arrianus est,

qui digessit Graece dissertationes Epicteti, mihi valde probatas. Quaere, moneo, et

lege.81

I rejoice from my heart that our Seneca is pleasing to you. I know of none among the

great ancients that agree more with Christian piety than those of the Stoic school. And in

whose number is also Arrian, who distributed in Greek the Discourses of Epictetus,

which are very much in agreement to me. Look for and, I urge you, read them.

78

Morford 1991, 157. 79

Ep. Misc. 1.53. 80

ILE, I, 80 12 31 (Ep. ad Belg. 2.1): nec medicina ulla nisi a litteris: non istis amoenioribus sed ab illis

robustoribus. Philosophiam dico, in quam me penetro: et quidem Stoicam (Reading is my only comfortnot those

more pleasant works, but stronger medicine. Philosophy, I meanStoic Philosophyinto which I am digging

deeply). I use Morfords (1991, 158) translation. 81

ILE, I, 82 01 23 R (Ep. misc. 1.33).

26

Six months later, Lipsius writes to Andreas Schott, a friend from his time at university, that I

approve that you are preparing to publish Seneca the Elder, but the wisdom in the Younger

uniquely pleases me.82

In the ensuing years, Lipsius began writing his De Constantia, with the

first copy sent to the Treasurer and Advocate of Antwerp on October 15, 1583 before it was

formally published in 1584.83

Prior to writing the De Constantia, then, Lipsius was both familiar

with Senecan manuscripts as well as personally vested in the philosophical content of Senecas

prose.

82

ILE, I, 82 07 07 (Ep. misc. 1.45): Senecam patrem quod paras, approbo. Unice me sapientia in filio delectat. 83

ILE, I, 83 10 15 P (Ep. misc. 1.59). See Morford 1991, 103.

27

Chapter 2: Senecas De Providentia

Works like the De constantia that betrayed a Stoic ethical influence were quite

uncontroversial in 16th

century Europe. In the case of the De constantia, the influence of

Senecas De providentia stands out. In this chapter I will show that the De providentiaand by

extension Stoic ethicsis essential to Lipsius concerns with determinism. Nevertheless, it is

also an insufficient model to satisfactorily explain determinism in the De constantia. The result

of this analysis is a preliminary indication of the degree to which Lipsius revives Stoicism. While

the De providentia provides some glimpses into Stoic physics, it is wholly a work of ethics.

Since I find that the De providentia is insufficient for explaining the full breadth of Lipsius

concerns with determinism, I may continue my investigation as to whether Lipsisus metaphysics

features a revival of Stoic causal determinism. I clarify that I do not seek to merely show that

Lipsius draws upon the De providentia; that much is obvious from Lipsius own excerpting from

the work. Rather, I seek to reveal to what extent the De providentia is a guide for the De

Constantia.

The De providentia is an incomplete essay in six sections that seeks to answer this

question posed by Lucilius: why, if the world is governed by providence, it is still the case that

good men suffer from many misfortunes?84

The crux of the De providentia is to resolve the

apparent problem of human suffering despite a provident and beneficent God. Specifically,

Seneca is concerned about the perceived inappropriateness of hardship and discomfort in the

lives of good men. In addition, Seneca assumes that God is provident when he frames the

question; he does not set out to prove that providence does preside over all of us and that God

84

Sen. Prov. 1.1: [Quaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ita,] si providentia mundus agetur, multa bonis viris mala acciderent.

I refer to John Davies (2007) translation unless otherwise noted.

28

concerns himself with us.85

At the beginning of the next section, Seneca states his central thesis:

nothing bad can happen to a good man: opposites do not mix.86

Clarifying this proposition,

Seneca notes the difference between experiencing hardships and judging them to be evil:

ita adversarum impetus rerum viri fortis non vertit animum: manet in statu et quidquid

evenit in suum colorem trahit; est enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc dico, non

sentit illa, sed vincit87

so adversitys onslaughts are powerless to affect the spirit of a brave man: it remains

unshaken and makes all events assume its own color; for it is stronger than all external

forces. I do not mean that he is insensible to those forces but that he conquers them...

Seneca later repeats this sentiment:

Pro ipsis ergo bonis uiris est ferre quae non sunt mala nisi male sustinenti...88

Accordingly it is expedient even for good men to endure with a patient mind things

that are bad only to the one who bears them badly...

Good men do not feel harmed by misfortune because they perceive that external objects are not

truly evil, defined as that which is unconditionally harmful. Seneca next explains that adversity is

properly judged to be training for virtuous living. After using Cato the Younger as an exemplum

of a good man unaffected by misfortune, Seneca outlines the rest of his treatise as follows: first,

that adversity benefits the individual and the human race; second, that good men are eager for

adversity; third, that good men are fated to face adversity; finally, that one should not pity a good

man for he is never wretched.89

Seneca finishes the remainder of the third section with the

analogy of adversity as medicine or surgery, followed by the exempla of Mucius Scaevola,

Fabricius Luscinus, Rutilius Rufus, Atilius Regulus, Socrates, and, for the second time, Cato.

Surely we dont count these men as miserable, Seneca argues, and they were beset with

85

Sen. Prov. 1.1: [Hoc commodius in contextu operis redderetur,] cum praeesse universis providentiam probaremus

et interesse nobis deum. 86

Sen. Prov. 2.1: Nihil accidere bono viro mali potest: non miscentur contraria. 87

Sen. Prov. 2.1-2. 88

Sen. Prov. 4.16. 89

Sen. Prov. 3.1.

29

adversity. In the next section, he says that not only are the good left unharmed by misfortune, but

that those with good fortune will experience unhappiness eventually.90

That good men

experience adversity is also educational to the rest of humanity as they teach us what is truly

good and evil.91

Consolation also lies in the understanding that God directs all things according

to his will.92

After succinctly clarifying what truly harmssin and crimethe treatise abruptly

ends with an argument in favor of suicide should life become unbearable.93

The central argument of the De providentia, that adversity is beneficial as a form of

mental training, reappears in Languis third argument for achieving constantia:

Utilia enim sunt, haec quae patimur Publica mala: et cum interno nostro fructu

commodisque coniuncta. Mala autem? imo Bona verius, si remoto hoc Opinionum velo,

oculos ad Ortum eorum referes et ad Finem.94

For they are useful, these public evils that we suffer, joined with our fruit and profit. Yet

are they evils? They are rather more truly goods, if, having removed this veil of opinion,

you will take a look at their origin and end.

The publica mala of Lipsius are harmful only due to a false judgment of the mind. Although I do

not consider in depth Lipsius use of Stoic psychic theory in this thesis, Lipsius is evidently

familiar with the idea that external objects are not in reality good or evil. A few lines later,

Lipsius illustrates how adversity can be beneficial by means of a medical analogy similar to

Senecas: these hardships are like medications: severe to the sense, healthful in substance

and outcome.95

While we immediately see a parallel structure to Seneca, the third argument for

constancy considers the role of adversity more systematically than the De providentia. Whereas

90

Sen. Prov. 4.7: Erratis enim si quem iudicatis exceptum... quisquis uidetur dimissus esse dilatus est (You are

wrong if you think anyone has been exempted from ill... Whoever seems to have been set free from this has only

been granted a delay). 91

Sen. Prov. 5.1. 92

Sen. Prov. 5.6-8. 93

Sen. Prov. 6. 94

De con. 2.6. 95

De con. 2.6: velut medicamenta sunt: sensu tristia, re salubria et eventu. Cf. Sen. Prov. 3.1: miraberis quosdam

ferro et igne curare.

30

Lucilius only laments good men suffering misfortune, Lipsius holistically considers adversity in

relation to the good, the bad, and those in between. De con. 2.6-7 introduces the thesis that

adversity is beneficial and begins by considering its source (i.e., God). The next chapter

introduces three purposes for adversity: it exercises the good (2.8), corrects the imperfect

proficiens (2.9), and punishes the wicked (2.10). Lipsius conjectures a fourth purpose in 2.11:

that publica mala protect the world against overpopulation and enable future human

development. Lipsius the pupil raises objections in 2.12 that Languis addresses in the four

subsequent chapters. First, wicked men never go unpunished; rather punishment is delayed or

internalized (2.13-14). Second, no one is innocent and all deserve some degree of punishment

(2.16). Finally, punishments are sometimes transferred to ones descendants, but only in the form

of external misfortune and not internal guilt or fault (2.17).

Senecas De providentia plays the most important role in De const. 2.8 where Lipsius

explains adversity as it concerns good men. Lipsius fills nearly the entire chapter with Senecan

analogies, ideas, and a quotation that is directly lifted from the De providentia. Languis begins to

explain adversity as exercise with the simile like a gymnasium where God trains His own to

endurance and virtue.96

Within this gymnasium we see athletes exercised by harsh routines

(Athletas per multa aspera exerceri videmus), and these training athletes first appeared before

our eyes (Athletas videmus) in Seneca.97

Taking Seneca further, Lipsius makes God a harsher

exercitor (trainer) of wise men, requiring suffering that extends beyond sweat; he requires

blood. Compare:

Seneca: Itaque cum uideris bonos uiros acceptosque dis laborare sudare...98

And so, when you see good men of whom the gods approve toiling and

sweating...

96

De con. 2.8: velut gymnasium est, in quo deus suos ad robur instituit et virtutem. 97

De con. 2.8; cf. Sen. Prov. 2.3 98

Sen. Prov. 1.6.

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Lipsius: Laboris patientiaeque exactor, non ad sudorem tantum, sed ad cruorem.99

He demands exertion and endurance of us not only until we sweat but until we

bleed.

Immediately after the gymnasium, Lipsius transitions to a parental metaphor that appears twice

in the De providentia.100

Unlike mothers who excessively pamper their children to their own

detriment, God loves us truly and severely (De con. 2.8: vere nos diligit et severe) and rears with

severity, just as harsh fathers do (Sen. Prov. 1.5: sicut severi patres, durius educat). Next,

Lipsius argues that afflictions are necessary for becoming a mature individual:

Si nautam te esse velis, per tempestates doceare; si militem, per pericula; si vere virum;

cur recusas adflictiones? non enim alia ad robur via.101

If you wish to be a sailor, you may be instructed by storms; if a soldier, by dangers. If

you wish truly to be a man, why do you object to afflictions? There is no other way to

strength.

In this passage Lipsius borrows both philosophical content and literary device from Seneca.

First, there is the Stoic idea that a healthy mind is the necessary element to virtuous living and,

99

De con. 2.8 100

Sen. Prov. 1.5: immo etiam necessitudo et similitudo, quoniam quidem bonus tempore tantum a deo differt,

discipulus eius aemulatorque et uera progenies, quam parens ille magnificus, uirtutum non lenis exactor, sicut

seueri patres, durius educat (No, rather it is a bond of relationship and similarity, since undoubtedly a good man

differs from God only in the sphere of time; he is Gods pupil and imitator, his true offspring whom that illustrious

parent, no gentle trainer in virtue, rears with severity, as strict fathers do). Sen. Prov. 2.5: Non uides quanto aliter

patres, aliter matres indulgeant? illi excitari iubent liberos ad studia obeunda mature, feriatis quoque diebus non

patiuntur esse otiosos, et sudorem illis et interdum lacrimas excutiunt; at matres fouere in sinu, continere in umbra

uolunt, numquam contristari, numquam flere, numquam laborare. 6. Patrium deus habet aduersus bonos uiros

animum et illos fortiter amat (Do you not see how differently fathers and mothers show their love? The father

orders his children to be roused early to pursue their studies, not allowing them to be idle even on a holiday, and

wrings from them sweat and sometimes tears; but the mother wants to cherish them in her embrace and keep them

out of the suns glare, and wishes them never to know sadness, never to shed tears, never to toil. It is a fathers heart

that God shows to good men; he loves them in a manly way). Cf. De con. 2.8: Molliter eum habere suos censes?

Deliciis fovere aut luxu? non facit. Matres sunt, quae plerumque specie dulcium corrumpunt, et enervant liberos:

patres, qui tristium specie servant. Pater autem ille nobis est: ideoque vere nos diligit et severe (Do you think that

he should treat his own more gently and fondle them with delights and excess? He doesnt do that. Mothers are

generally the ones who corrupt their children with the semblance of living-kindness and enfeeble them. It is fathers

who preserve them with the appearance of sternness. God is our Father, however, and so He loves us truly and

severely). 101

De con. 2.8. Another sailor analogy that carries an equivalent meaning is made later in this paragraph: Vela

gubernatori ventus semper a puppi impleat: artem nusquam explicabit (Let the wind always fill the sails for the

helmsman from the sternhe will never develop his skill).

32

further, that adversity makes the mind healthy. In Prov. 4, Seneca mentions twice that the part of

the body that is in constant use is the strongest and encourages the reader to continually endure

adversity for the sake of strengthening his mind.102

As we find in Lipsius, Seneca couples this

idea with comparisons to sailors and soldiers: gubernatorem in tempestate, in acie militem

intellegas (you would come to know a ships pilot in a storm and a soldier in the line of battle)

and sunt nauticis corpora ferendo mari duraad excutienda tela militares lacerti valent (the

bodies of mariners are tough from the buffeting of the sea the muscles of soldiers enable them

to hurl the javelin).103

Lipsius, following Seneca, then juxtaposes the athletes, sailors and

soldiers against those with good fortune:

Seneca: Languent per inertiam saginata nec labore tantum sed motu et ipso sui onere

deficiunt.Non fert ullum ictum inlaesa felicitas.104

Bodies that have become fat grow sluggish through lack of use, and not effort

alone but even movement and their very own weight cause them to fail. Prosperity

that is undiminished cannot withstand a single blow.

Lipsius: Videsne languida illa et umbratica corpora, quae rarus sol vidit, ventus non

strinxit, aura tristior non libavit? tales mollium istorum et perpetim felicium

animi sunt, quos deiiciet et resoluet minima adversantis Fortunae aura.105

Dont you see those languid pallid bodies that the sun has rarely seen, the wind

has not grazed, and a harsher gale has not touched? Such are the minds of these

flabby, perpetually lucky types, whom the least gust of adverse Fortune reduces to

dejection and dismay.

Those with weak characters but good fortune are so unaccustomed to adversity that they feel

harmed at the slightest discomfort. Finally, Lipsius ends the paragraph with another analogy for

the good man drawn from the De providentia: ut arbores ventis agitatae, altius radices agunt:

102

Sen. Prov. 4.12: saepius adierimus, fortiores erimus: solidissima corporis pars est quam frequens usus agitauit

(the more often we engage in it, the stronger our hearts will be: the sturdiest part of the body is the one that is kept

in constant use); Prov. 4.13: id in quoque solidissimum est quod exercuit (in each case the part of the body

exercised is the strongest). 103

Sen. Prov. 4.5,13. 104

Sen. Prov. 2.6. 105

De con. 2.8.

33

sic boni in virtute magis comprehendunt (as trees buffeted by the wind put down deeper roots,

even so the good lay hold of virtue more firmly). Compare this with Senecas: non est arbor

solida nec fortis nisi in quam frequens uentus incursat; ipsa enim uexatione constringitur et

radices certius figit (No tree is sturdy or firm-rooted without enduring many an assault from the

wind; for the battering itself makes it tighten its grip and fix its roots more securely).106

As a

whole, this single paragraph reiterates an impressive amount of Senecas material. As for style,

every sentence is concise, colorful, and forceful; it is entirely Senecan.

The remainder of chapter 2.8 contains a few other hints to the De providentia. Lipsius

compares God to a general who only chooses the best men to join his ranks, and he uses a

quotation attributed to Demetrius that Seneca provides in Prov. 3.8: Nihil mihi videtur infelicius

eo, cui nihil evenit adversi (Nothing seems more unhappy to me than someone who has never

experienced adversity).107

The chapter ends with a rephrasing of Senecas argument that good

men suffer misfortune in order to help the rest of humanity know what is truly good. Lipsius

does not identify true evils as in Seneca and instead emphasizes a characterization of good men

as beacons of virtue.108

Lipsius characterizes the good man as a light in the dark world (lumen in

tenebroso mundo) and that torch (ista face).

106

Sen. Prov. 4.16. 107

De con. 2.8: Non enim parcit Imperator noster talibus, sed diffidit; nec indulget, sed abiicit et contemnit.

Expungit, inquam, eos e legionum suarum numeris, ut ignavos quosdam et imbelles (For our Commander does not

spare such men [who have not endured], but suspects them; he does not indulge them, but degrades and dismisses

them. He removes them, I say, from the tally of his legions, as malingerers and cowards). Cf. Sen. Prov. 4.8: Quare

deus optimum quemque aut mala ualetudine aut luctu aut aliis incommodis adficit? quia in castris quoque

periculosa fortissimis imperantur (Why does God afflict the best men with bad health, or grief, or other

misfortunes? Because in the army the bravest men are ordered to carry out dangerous missions). 108

Sen. Prov. 5.1: Adice nunc quod pro omnibus est optimum quemque, ut ita dicam, militare et edere operas. Hoc

est propositum deo quod sapienti uiro, ostendere haec quae uulgus adpetit, quae reformidat, nec bona esse nec

mala; apparebit autem bona esse, si illa non nisi bonis uiris tribuerit, et mala esse, si tantum malis inrogauerit

(Take into account the further fact that it is to everyones benefit that all the best men become soldiers, so to speak,

and do service. Gods purpose, and the wise mans, too, is to show that what ordinary men desire, and what they

fear, are not either goods or evils; but it will appear that there are goods, if these are granted only to good men, and

that there are evils, if these penalize only bad men).

34

Other components of Languis third argument for constancy show indebtedness to the De

providentia as well. While Seneca is only interested in adversity affecting good men, the De

providentia contributes to Lipsius dialogue regarding the other two groups of individuals: the

venially sinful (2.9) and the genuinely wicked (2.10). For those experiencing temporary

difficulty in exercising virtue, adversity serves as a means of correction. For the sake of moral

improvement, God may harm our bodies, our fields, our wealth, and all external things but

does not affect our integral selves.109

This distinctly Stoic separation between our proper selves

and our external goods appears in Prov. 5, but it is by no means unique to the work or Seneca.

Finally, Seneca assures Lucilius in Prov. 4.7 that the wicked, while now happy with good

fortune, will eventually experience misfortune:

Erratis enim si quem iudicatis exceptum: ueniet ad illum diu felicem sua portio;

quisquis uidetur dimissus esse dilatus est.

You are wrong if you think anyone has been exempted from ill; the man who has known

happiness for many a year will receive his share some day; whoever seems to have been

set free from this has only been granted a delay.

Lipsius shares this sentiment in chapters 2.13-14. First, Lipsius restates the general proposition

that ones share of unhappiness, or punishment, has only been postponed:

Malos, ais, divina ultio male praeterit. Itane praeterit? imo, ut ego sentio, differtAtqui

idem facit magnus ille deus, cui cum poenam improbi omnes debeant, ab istis eam statim

exigit, in aliis differt, sed cum faenore solvendam.110

Divine vengeance, you say, badly misses the bad. But does it miss them? Rather, I

imagine, it delayssince all the wicked owe Him a penalty, He demands it from some

immediately, for others He delays, but it must be paid with interest.

Lipsius separates himself from Seneca and Stoicism, however, by stressing divine retribution.

Whereas Seneca only mentions some share (portio) of unhappiness that necessarily accompanies

men of weak character, Lipsius introduces divine vengeance (divino ultio) and punishment

109

De con. 2.9: sed corpus, agros, opes, et omnia externa. 110

De con. 2.14.

35

(poenam). Lipsius enumerates three possible forms of punishment: external misfortunes of the

body, internal sufferings of the mind, and posthumous torment. While wicked men may

sometimes have good fortune, they will always experience the mental suffering and everlasting

punishment after death.111

Although Lipsius and Seneca both acknowledge the harm felt by

wicked men resulting from imperfect rationality, Stoicism does not posit that souls retain any

individuating qualitieslet alone are capable of sufferingafter death.

Until now, I have examined the De providentia as contributing to Lipsius third

argument: public evils are beneficial. Accordingly, this discussion has largely focused on the De

providentia as an ethical discourse on the proper attitude one should adopt towards misfortunes

like war, poverty, and sickness. It is undeniable that the De providentia serves as a guide for

Lipsius on this topic. He takes over the ethical axiology that underpins Senecas De providentia

to conclude that public evils are not actually evil; rather, good men have the mental clarity to

properly value external objects as indifferent. It is not the misfortune that causes unhappiness,

but the imperfectly rational mind that falsely believes itself harmed. As a result, good men are

able to exercise virtue amidst the threat of bodily pain. In fact, adversity actually makes it easier

for the good man to be virtuous. This argument resolves the complaint of Lucilius in De

providentia, but Lipsius expands upon this reasoning to include how public evils benefit all

individuals, not just the wise men. Still, this all occurs only in the second book of De constantia

and three further arguments remain. In the first and second arguments, Lipsius deals with the

metaphysical issues of providence, necessity and fate.112

In Lipsius letter to Lernutius (dated

December 31, 1580), he says he is penetrating (penetro) into Stoicism. Recall that Lipsius also

111

De con. 2.14: Et est quidem plerumque, ut eae omnes iusto quodam dei iudicio in impios convenient: certe

quidem priores duae semper (And for the most part it is the case that all these by some just judgment of God

converge upon the wickedassuredly the first two always). 112

The fourth argument is essentially a catalogue of historical wars and does not contain much philosophical matter.

36

makes the charge against Quintilian that he has not penetrated into the innermost of Philosophy

(non penetrasse in interiora Philosophiae) in his Opera Omnia Senecae (1605). Does such a

deeper knowledge of Stoicisma knowledge that extends beyond ethical thoughtfind a

presence in the De constantia?

As its title suggests, providence lies at the core of the De providentia. However, Seneca

himself says in Prov. 1.1 that he will not set out to systematically explain providence or prove it

exists:

Quaesisti a me, Lucili, quid ita, si prouidentia mundus ageretur, multa bonis uiris mala

acciderent. Hoc commodius in contextu operis redderetur, cum praeesse uniuersis

prouidentiam probaremus et interesse nobis deum.

You have asked me Lucilius, why, if the world is governed by providence, it is still the

case that good men suffer from many misfortunes. This question would receive a more

fitting answer in a coherent work that set out to prove that providence does preside over

us all and that God concerns himself with us.

Seneca limits himself in this treatise to the reconciliation between providence and adversity.

Through this reconciliation, Lucilius and the reader may improve themselves by responding

properly to adversity. Seneca tells us immediately that the physics fundamental to Lucilius

question will be left out. Nevertheless, we should proceed cautiously and consider the De

providentia as a possible vehicle for Stoic physics before we search for other works that may

have influenced Lipsius. Despite Senecas warning that he will not prove providence, there are

traces of Stoic determinism in parts one and five of the De providentia that demand attention.

In the opening segments of the De providentia, Seneca briefly introduces an important

principle of Stoic physics before settling into the main argument of the work. While Seneca is

sure Lucilius already knows all this (Supervacuum est in praesentia ostendere), he sets out a

37

critical property of the Stoic cosmos: it is regulated by some rational and non-random power.113

Providing clarification, Seneca explains that there exist fixed laws that provide the stars and

planets with orderly, predictable movement.114

Further, it is evident that this system is not

characteristic of matter that moves randomly (non esse materiae errantis hunc ordinem).115

The

term materiae errantis refers to Epicurean randomness of atoms; Seneca means that the observed

patterns of the universe are not characteristic of randomly moving bodies. Further:

nec quae temere coierunt tanta arte pendere ut terrarum grauissimum pondus sedeat

inmotum et circa se properantis caeli fugam spectet, ut infusa uallibus maria molliant

terras nec ullum incrementum fluminum sentiant, ut ex minimis seminibus nascantur

ingentia.116

[It is superfluous to show] that such combinations as do result from chance are not

dependent on the great artistry that makes the earth with all its mighty weight remain

stationary, observing the swift passage of the heavens as they whirl around it, that makes

the seas, flooding the valleys, soften the land, and feel no increase from the rivers, and

makes enormous growths arise from the smallest seeds.

Seneca makes reference again to a designing principle (arte) that is responsible for the physical

laws that govern the earth. This design codes the seminal principles in all living things, guiding

their biological functions and growth. Natural events like thunderstorms, volcanoes, and

earthquakes are all likewise determined according to this design.117

This designs influence

extends to phenomena which are taken to be miraculous because the setting in which w