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  • CHAPTER 1: STATUTES

    A. IN GENERALLAWS, GENERALLY

    Law in its jural and generic sense refers to the whole body or system of law, in its jural and concrete sense, it means a rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the stateIt includes: statutes, presidential decrees, executive orders, other presidential issuances, rulings of the Supreme Court construing the law, rules and regulations, and ordinances

    STATES, GENERALLYA statute is an act of the legislature as an organized

    body, expressed in the form, and passed according to the procedure, required to constitute it as part of the law of the land. Includes those passed by the: Phil. Commission, Phil. Legislature, Batasang Pambansa, Congress of the Phil.

    Private Statutes, applies only to a specific person/subject

    Public Statutes, affects the public at large:1. General law- applies to the whole state upon all the

    people or all of a class (People v. Palma)2. Special law- relates to particular persons or things of

    a class or to a particular community, individual or thing

    3. Local law operation is confined to a specific place or locality e.g. municipal ordinance

    PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY STATUTESPermanent- operation is not limited in duration but continues until repealedTemporary- duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the statute itself, ceases upon the happening of an event

    OTHER CLASSES OF STATUTESApplication: prospective, retroactiveOperation: declaratory, curative, mandatory, directory, substantive, remedial, penalForms: affirmative, negative

    MANNER OF REFERRING TO STATUTESPhil. Commission/Phil. Legislature (1901-1935) Public

    ActCommonwealth (1936-1946) Commonwealth ActsCongress of the Phil. (1946-1972 and 1987 onwards)

    Republic ActsBatasang Pambansa (1973-1986) Batas Pambansa

    B. ENACTMENT OF STATUTESLEGISLATIVE POWER, GENERALLY

    Leg. Power is the power to make, alter and repeal laws. The sangguniang barangay, sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang panlalawigan have also legislative powers within their jurisdiction, to enact ordinances.

    Ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state (Primicias v. Municipality of Urdaneta).

    An admin./exec. Officer, in the exercise of a duly delegated power, can likewise issue rules and regulations to implement a specific law, and such rules and regulations have the force and effect of law.

    CONGRESS LEGISLATIVE POWERThe essential feature of the legislative function is the

    determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. The legislative power is plenary.

    PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS, GENERALLYApart from the basic constitutional requirements,

    congress provides in detail, embodied in the Rules of both Houses of Congress, the procedure by which a bill may be enacted into law.

    PASSAGE OF A BILLThe Secretary reports the bill for first reading, which

    consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed by its referral to the appropriate Committee for study and recommendation. On second reading, the bill shall be read in full with the amendments proposed by the committee, unless copies therof are distributed and such reading is dispensed with. Then, the bill will be subject to debates, pertinent

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  • motions, and amendments. After the amendments, the bill will be voted on second reading. A bill approved on the second reading shall be included in the calendar of bills for third reading. On third reading, the bill as approved on second reading will be submitted for final vote.

    APPROPRIATIONS AND REVENUE BILLSRead Article 6, sec. 24, 25 of the constitution.

    AUTHENTICATION OF BILLSBefore an approved bill is sent to the president, the bill

    is authenticated by the signing of the Speaker and the Senate President of the printed copy of the approved bill.

    UNIMPEACHABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE JOURNALSThe journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to

    matters that are required by the constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.

    ENROLLED BILLUnder the enrolled bill doctrine, the text of the act as

    passed and approved is deemed importing absolute veracity and is binding on the courts. It is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.

    If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and approved by the chief executive, the remedy is by amendment by enacting a curative legislation, not by judicial decree (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez)

    Where there is discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled bill, the latter as a rule prevails over the former, particularly with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered in the journal.

    WITHDRAWAL OF AUTHENTICATION, EFFECT OFThe Speaker and the Senate President may withdraw

    their signatures from the signed bill where there is serious and substantial discrepancy between the text of the bill as deliberated and shown by the journal and that of the enrolled

    bill. It thus, renders the bill without attestation and nullifies its status as an enrolled bill. The court can declare that the bill has not been duly enacted and did not accordingly become a law (Astorga v. Villegas).

    C. PARTS OF STATUTESTITLE OF STATUTE

    One subject, one bill provision is mandatory, violation thereof is unconstitutional.

    PURPOSES OF REQUIREMENTIt is to prohibit duplicity in legislation, the title of which completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its provisions (Inchong v. Hernandez)

    1. to prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation2. to prevent surprise of fraud upon the legislature3. to fairly apprise the people 4. title of the statute may be used as a guide in

    ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly express its purpose

    HOW REQUIREMENT CONSTRUEDThe constitutional requirement as to title of a bill should

    be liberally construed (People v. Buenviaje). It should not be given a technical interpretation. Nor should it be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation (Tobias v. Abalos). Where there is doubt, the question should be resolved against the doubt an in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.

    WHEN THERE IS COMPLIANCE WITH REQUIREMENT1. if the title is comprehensive enough to reasonably

    include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary of convenient for accomplishing the object

    2. if all parts are related and germane to the subject matter

    3. if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scope and consequences of the law and its operations.

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  • The title need not be a catalogue or index of the bill (People v. Ferrer). These principles apply to titles of amendatory acts. A title which states that it is an act to amend a specific statutes is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement; it need not states the precise nature of the amendatory act (Manila Trading & Supply Co, v. Reyes).

    Note: and for other purposes amounts to nothing

    WHEN REQUIREMENT NOT APPLICABLEIt does not apply to laws in force existing at the time the

    1935 Constitution took effect (People v. Valensoy), nor to municipal or city ordinances.

    EFFECT OF INSUFFICIENCY OF TITLEIf the subject is not related in any manner to the title it

    is null and void, but if the subject matter is not sufficiently expressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is not expressed therein is void, leaving the rest in force, unless the invalid provisions are inseparable from the others.

    ENACTING CLAUSEThe enacting clause is that part of a statute written

    immediately after the title thereof which states the authority by which the act is enacted.

    PREAMBLEA preamble is a prefatory statement or explanation or a

    finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason or occasion for making the law to which it is prefixed. It is usually found in presidential decrees and executive orders.

    PURVIEW OF STATUTEThe purview of body of a statute is that part which tells

    what the law is all about. A complex and comprehensive piece of legislation usually contains, in this sequence, a short title, a policy section, definition section, administrative section, sections prescribing standards of conduct, section imposing sanctions for violations or its provisions, transitory provision, separability clause, repealing clause and effectivity clause.

    The constitutional requirement that a bill should have only one subject matter which should be expressed in its title is

    complied with where the provisions thereof, no matter how diverse they may be, are allied and germane to the subject, or negatively stated, where the provisions are not inconsistent with, but in furtherance of, the single subject matter (People v. Carlos).

    SEPARABILITY CLAUSEA Separability clause is that part of a statute which

    states that if any provision of the act is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby. Such a clause is not controlling and the courts, in spite of it, may invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part, is not complete and workable.

    D. PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE, RULES AND ORDINANCESPRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES

    These are those which the president issues in the exercise of his ordinance power. They have the force and effect of law.

    1. Executive order acts of president providing for rules of a general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers

    2. Administrative order acts of president which relate to particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head.

    3. Proclamations acts president fixing a date or declaring a statute or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend

    4. Memorandum orders acts of president on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the government

    5. Memorandum circulars acts of president on matters relating to internal administration which the president desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the government for information or compliance

    6. General/Specific orders acts and commands of president in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the AFP

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  • SUPREME COUR CIRCULARS; RULES AND REGULATIONSRead Sec. 5 (5), Article VIII of the constitutionIn case of discrepancy or conflict between the basic law

    and the regulations issued to implement it, the former prevails over the latter (Wise & Co. v. Meer). For it is elementary principle in statutory construction that a statute is superior to an administrative regulation and the former cannot be repealed or amended by the latter (China Banking Corp. v. C.A.).

    ADMINISTRATIVE RULE AND INTERPRETATION DISTINGUISHED

    When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulation, it makes a new law with the force and effect of a valid law and is binding to the courts, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a preexisting law, it is merely advisory and not binding to the courts.

    BARANGAY ORDINANCEThe sangguniang barangay may pass a barangay

    ordinance by majority vote of all its members, it is subject to review by the sangguniang bayan or sangguniang panlungsod, as the case may be, which shall take action on it within 30 days from submission. Inaction is equivalent to approval.

    MUNICIPAL ORDINANCEThe sangguniang bayan may bass a bill by a vote of a

    majority of the members present, there being a quorum, subject to review by the municipal mayor acting on it within 10 days. Inaction is approval, if vetoed may be passed by two-thirds vote of all members.

    CITY ORDINANCEThe sangguniang panglungsod passed a bill in the same

    manner as the sangguniang bayan. But if its a component city, the bill is subject to review by the sangguniang panglungsod, acting on it within 30 days where inaction is equivalent to approval.

    PROVINCIAL ORDINANCE

    The sangguniang panlalawaigan may pass a bill by a majority vote of the members present, subject to review by the governor, who shall act within 15 days from receipt. Inaction is approval, if vetoed, may be repassed by two-thirds vote of all members

    E. VALIDITYPRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

    Every statute is presumed valid. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of law. To doubt is to sustain. The final authority to declare a law unconstitutional is the SC en banc by the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations. Trial courts have jurisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases.

    REQUISITES FOR EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER1. the existence of an appropriate case2. an interest personal and substantial by the party raising

    the constitutional question3. the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest

    opportunity4. the necessity that the constitutional question be passed

    upon in order to decide a case.

    APPROPRIATE CASEOne in which it raises a justiciable controversy, the

    resolution of which the court will have to choose between the constitution and the challenged statute

    STANDING TO SUELegal Standing is a personal and substantial interest in

    the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.

    Citizens legal standing:o He has suffered some actual or threatened injury

    as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of government

    o Injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action.

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  • o Injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action

    Tax payers legal standing:1. When it is established that public funds have

    been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the constitution, or in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation2. He will sustain a direct injury as a result of the

    enforcement of the questioned statute.The SC may take cognizance of a suit which does not

    satisfy the requirements of legal standing; the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people; paramount importance to the public.

    WHEN TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONALITYConstitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible

    time. If the question is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial, it will not be considered in appeal.

    Exceptions: a. the question may raised in a motion for

    reconsideration or new trial in the lower court, where the statute sought to be invalidated was not in existence when the complaint was filed or during the trial

    b. the question of validity may also be raised in criminal cases at any stage of the proceedings.

    c. In civil cases where it appears clearly that a determination of the question is necessary to a decision and incases where it involved the jurisdiction of the court below.

    TEST OF CONSTITUTIONALITYA statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is

    vague. It is vague when it lacks comprehensive standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. The change of circumstances or conditions may affect the validity of some

    statues, specially those so-called emergency laws designed specifically to meet certain contingencies.

    With respect to ordinances, the test of validity are:Must not contravene the constitution or any statuteMust not be unfair or oppressiveMust not be partial or discriminatoryMust not prohibit but may regulate tradeMust be general and consistent with public policyMust not be unreasonable

    EFFECTS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITYThe general rule is that an unconstitutional act is not a

    law, confers no rights. Regard should be had to what has been done while the statute was in operation and presumed to be valid. Hence, its operative fact before a declaration of nullity must be recognized.

    There are two view on the effects of a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute:

    Orthodox View. An unconstitutional law confers no right, is not a law, imposes no duties, affords no protection; in legal contemplation, it is inoperative, as if it had not been passed.

    Modern View. The court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it is unconstitutional, it simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if the statute had no existence. It does not repeal, supersede, revoke or annul the statute. The parties to the suit are concluded by the judgment, but no one else is bound.

    INVALIDITY DUE TO CHANGE OF CONDITIONSThe general rule as to the effects of unconstitutionality

    of a statute is not applicable to a statute that is declared invalid because of the change of circumstances affecting its validity. It becomes invalid only because the change of conditions makes its continued operation violative of the Constitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should affect only the parties involved in the case, and its effects applied

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  • prospectively. A statute of this type belongs to the class of emergency laws

    PARTIAL INVALIDITYThe general rule is that where part of a statute is void as

    repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced; except when the parts are so mutually dependent and connected. The presence of separability clause creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of the statute.

    F. EFFECT AND OPERATIONWHEN LAWS TAKE EFFECT

    Art 2 of the Civil Code provides that Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.

    All laws or statutes, including those of local application and private law shall be published as a condition for their effectivity (Taada v. Tuvera), otherwise it would violate the due process clause of the constitution.

    The general rule is that where the law is silent as to its effectivity, or where it provides that it shall take effect immediately or upon its approval, such law shall take effect after 15 days from its publication in the Official Gazette. The completion of publication, from which date the period of publication will be counted, refers to the date of release of the O.G. or newspaper for circulation and not to its date, unless the two dates coincide.

    WHEN PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS TAKE EFFECT

    The requirement of publication as a condition for the effectivity of statues applies to Presidential Issuances, except those which are merely interpretative or internal in nature not concerning the public.

    Rules and regulations of administrative and executive officers are of two types:

    1. Whose purpose is to implement or enforce existing law pursuant to a valid delegation or to

    fill in the details of a statute; whether they are penal or non-penal; this requires publication.

    2. Which are merely interpretative in nature or merely internal in character not concerning the public, does not need publication.

    In addition, the 1987 Administrative Code provides that:1. Every agency shall file with the U.P. Law center three

    copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within 3 months from that date shall not be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

    2. Each rule shall become effective 15 days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare.

    Publication and filing requirements are indispensable to the effectivity of rules and regulations, except when the law authorizing its issuance dispenses the filing requirements.

    WHEN LOCAL ORDINANCE TAKE EFFECT1. Unless otherwise stated, Local ordinance shall take

    effect after 10 days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two other conspicuous places in the local government unit.

    2. the secretary to the sanggunian shall cause the posting of the ordinance within 5 days after its approval at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal or barangay hall in at least 2 conspicuous places

    3. The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation, within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs, in the absence of such newspapers, postings shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the saggunian of origin is situated.

    4. For highly urbanized city and independent component cities, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of gen. circulation within the city, in the

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  • absence of which, it shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.

    STATUTES CONTINUE IN FORCE UNTIL REPEALEDUnless a statute is by its provisions for a limited period

    only, it continues in force until changed or repealed by the legislature. Law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed by change of sovereignty nor of a change in constitution, until the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.

    MANNER OF COMPUTING TIMEWhere the word week is used as a measure of time

    and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week from which it begins (PNB v. C.A).

    Where a statute requires the doing of an act within a specified number of days, such as ten days, from notice, it means 10 calendar days and not working days.

    The exclude- the first and include the last day rule governs the computation of a period. If the last day falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the act can still be done the following day. The principle does not apply to the computation of the period of prescription of a crime, in which the rule is that if the last days in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the next working day, as the offense has been by then already prescribed.

    CHAPTER 2: CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

    A. NATURE AND PURPOSECONSTRUCTION DEFINED

    It is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided in the law

    CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION DISTINGUISHED

    Interpretation is the art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of word, while construction is the process of drawing warranted conclusions not always included in direct expression or determining the application of words to faces in litigation. But they are used interchangeably in practice.

    RULES OF CONSTRUCTION, GENERALLYThe legislature is presumed to know the rules of

    statutory construction, it enacts a law with the end in view that it will, in case of doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation. Where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute, courts employ canons of statutory construction to ascertain and give effect to its true intent and meaning.

    The legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory construction as part of the provisions of a statute. The legislature also defines, in certain complicated statutes, the word and phrases used therein. Except as they may have been embodied as part of a statute, rules of construction have no binding effect on the courts. Nor are they controlling in the interpretation of laws, they may only be used to clarify, not to defeat, legislative intent. Even those rules of construction which are in the form of statutory provisions may be ignored if their employment may defeat, rather than effectuate, legislative intent.

    PURPOSE OR OBJECT OF CONSTRUCTIONAll rules of construction of interpretation have for their

    sole object the ascertainment of the true intent of the legislature. The object of all judicial interpretation of a statute is to determine legislative intent, what intention is conveyed, either expressly or impliedly, by the language used, so far as it is necessary for ascertaining whether the particular case or state of facts presented to the court comes within it.

    LEGISLATIVE INTENT, GENERALLYCourts will not follow the letter of the statute when it

    leads away from the true intent of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act (Torres v. Limjap). Hence, where the statute is susceptible of more than one construction, that construction should be

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  • adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the legislature (U.S. v. Toribio).

    LEGISLATIVE PURPOSEIt is the reason why a particular statute was enacted by

    the legislature. A legislation is an active instrument of the government which, for purposes of interpretation, means that law have ends to be achieved and statutes should be so construed so as not defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Litex Employees Assn v. Eduvala).

    LEGISLATIVE MEANINGIt is what the law, by its language, means. It may be

    synonymous to legislative intent. If there is ambiguity in the language, its purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and lead to what the legislative intent is.

    MATTERS INQUIRED INTO IN CONSTRUING A STATUTEIt is not enough to ascertain the intention of meaning of

    the statute; it is also necessary to see whether the intention or meaning of the statute has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect and validity. The legal act is made up of two elements an internal and an external one; it originates in intention and is perfected by expression. Failure of the latter may defeat the former.

    WHERE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS ASCERTAINEDThe primary source of the intent is the statute itself and

    has to be discovered from the four corners of the law (Manila Lodge No. 761 v. C. A). It has to be extracted from the statute as a whole and not from an isolated part of particular provision thereof. Where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed (Veroy v. Layague). The court may also look to the purpose of the statute to be subserved, the reason or cause which induced the enactment of the law, the mischief to be suppressed, and the policy which dictated its passage (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad).

    B. POWER TO CONSTRUECONSTRUCTION IS A JUDICIAL FUNCTION

    It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is and it has the final word as to what the law means. The court does not interpret the law in a vacuum. It does not give legal opinion on hypothetical cases or in cases which have become moot or academic

    LEGISLATURE CANNOT OVERRULE JUDICIAL DECISIONSThe legislature has no power to overrule the

    interpretation or construction of a statute of the Constitution by the Supreme court and while it may indicate its construction of a statute in a resolution or declaratory act, it cannot preclude the courts from giving the statute a different interpretation.

    WHEN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION MAY BE SET ASIDEThe Supreme Court may change or overrule its previous

    construction. Constitutional amendments may modify or nullify a judicial interpretation of a provision thereof. The rule that the Supreme Court has the final word in the interpretation of a statute merely means that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul the judicial construction without modifying or repealing the very statute which has been the subject of construction, but when it enacts a repeal, the previous judicial construction of the statute is modified or set aside.

    WHEN COURT MAY CONSTRUE STATUTEA condition sine qua non, before the court may construe

    or interpret, is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language. Only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction (Daong v. Municipal Judge). A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of more than one interpretation.

    COURTS MAY NOT CONSTRUE WHERE STATUTE IS CLEARConstruction comes only after it has been demonstrated

    that the application is impossible or inadequate without it. It is the very last function which the court should exercise, for it there is more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the law (Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico). It has been repeatedly declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for

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  • interpretation and there is only room for application (Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Municipality of Naga).

    For nothing is better settled than that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law as they find it, not as they like it to be. Fidelity to such a task precludes construction unless application is impossible or inadequate without it (Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General).

    Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed (Luzon Surety Co. v. De Garcia).

    Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may not introduce exceptions where none is provided from considerations of convenience, public welfare, or for any laudable purpose, nor may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated (Ramos v. C.A), nor construe provisions by taking into account questions of expediency, good faith, practical utility and other similar reasons so as to relax non compliance therewith.

    Administrative agencies tasked to implement a stature may not construe it by expanding its meaning where provisions are clear and unambiguous.

    RULINGS OF SUPREME COURT PART OF LEGAL SYSTEMLegis interpretato legis vim obtinet, the authoritative

    interpretation of the Supreme Court of a statute acquires the force of law by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its enactment, since the courts interpretation merely establishes the contemporatneous legislative intent that the statute thus construed intends to effectuate (Senovila v. Hermosisimo).

    Stare decisis et non quieta movere, when the Supreme Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the same. This assures certainty and stability in the legal system.

    As part of the legal system and until reversed by the Supreme Court itself, rulings of the highest tribunal are binding upon inferior courts.

    JUDICIAL RULINGS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT

    Lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The interpretation of a statute by the Supreme Court remains to be part of the legal system until the latter overrules it and the new doctrine overruling the old is applied prospectively in favor of persons who have relied thereon in good faith.

    COURTS MAY ISSUE GUIDELINE IN CONSTRUING STATUTEIn construing a statute, the enforcement of which may

    tread on sensitive areas of constitutional rights, the court may issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what the law requires. This is not judicial legislation but an act to define what the law is.

    C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUECOURTS MAY NOT ENLARGE OR RESTRICT STATUTES

    1. While statutory constructions involves choice, the court should resist the temptation to roam at will and rely on its predilection as to what policy should prevail.

    2. They may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by lawmakers.

    3. They are not authorize to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.

    4. They should not revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law

    5. Nor may they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe

    6. Neither should courts construe statutes which are perfectly vague, or cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.

    COURTS NOT TO BE INFLUENCED BY QUESTIONS OF WISDOMSince the legislature is primarily the judge of the

    necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and expediency of any law, courts may not take any of these matters into account in construing or interpreting the law. As long as laws do not violate the Constitution, the courts merely interpret and

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  • apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary.

    CHAPTER 3: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

    A. IN GENERALGENERALLY

    Aid to construction are those found in the printed page of the statute itself, known as intrinsic aids, and those extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page, called extrinsic aids.

    TITLEThe title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or

    restrict the scope of the law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the legislative intent as disclosed in its title. The rule that the title may serve as a guide carries more weight in this jurisdiction because of the constitutional requirement that every bill shall have one subject as expressed in the title thereof.

    WHEN RESORT TO TITLE NOT AUTHORIZEDWhen the text is clear it is improper to resort to its title

    to make it obscure. The title may be resorted in order to remove, but not to create doubt or uncertainty

    PREAMBLEIt is that part of the stature written immediately after its

    title which states the purpose, reason or justification for the enactment of the law and usually expressed in the form of whereas clauses. Though it is not, strictly speaking, a part of a statute, it is the key to the statute for its sets out the intention of the legislature. It may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law, or require, in the commission of a crime, an element not clearly expressed in its text. It may express the legislative intent to make the law apply retroactively, in which case the law has to be given retroactive effect, so as to carry out such intent (PNB v. Office of the President).

    CONTEXT OF WHOLE TEXT

    Legislative intent should accordingly be ascertained from a consideration of the whole context of the stature and not from an isolated part of particular provision (Aboitiz Shipping Corp. v. City of Cebu). The context may circumscribe the meaning of a statute, it may give to a word or phrase a meaning different from its usual or ordinary signification. In such a case, the meaning dictated by the context prevails.

    Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. The intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is taken into view (Commissioner of Internal Reveneu v. TMX Sales).

    PUNCTUATION MARKSA semi-colon is used to indicate a separation in the

    relation of the thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma; and what follows a semi-colon must have a relation to the same matter which precedes it. The comma and the semi-colon are both used for the same purpose to divide sentences and parts of sentences, the only difference is that semi-colon makes the division a little more pronounced. They are not used to introduce a new idea.

    Punctuation marks are aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written word. The reason is that punctuation marks are not part of a stature; nor are they part of the English language (Feliciano v. Aquino).

    Capitalization of Letters

    Like punctuation marks, capitalization is an aid of low degree in the construction of statute. Example: in a statute which provides that a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which , in force at a time when the Philippines was still a territory of the US, the fact that the words state and country are not capitalized does not mean that the United States is excluded form the phrase another state or country.

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  • Headnotes or epigraphsHeadnotes, headings, or epigraphs of sections of a

    statute are convenient index to the contents of its provisions. However they are not entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn therefrom are of little value and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clause, for they are not part of the law. Secondary aids, such as headnotes or epigraphs, may be consulted to remove, but not to create nor to limit or control the plain language of the law.

    Lingual textPhilippine laws are officially promulgated either in

    English, Spanish or Filipino, or either in two such languages. The rule is that, unless otherwise provided, where a statute is officially promulgated in English and Spanish, the English text shall govern, but in case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the Spanish may be consulted to explain the English text.

    Intent or spirit of the lawThe intent or spirit of the law is the law itself. For this

    reason, legislative intent or spirit is the controlling factor, the leading star and guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute. A thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.

    Policy of lawThe policy of the law once ascertained should be given

    effect by the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy. The construction which would carry into effect the evident policy of the law should be adopted in favor of that interpretation which would defeat it. Example: homestead act

    Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed The court much look to the object to be accomplished,

    the evils to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effectuate its purpose.

    DictionariesWhile definition s given by lexicographers are not

    binding, courts have adopted, in proper cases, such definitions to support their conclusion as to the meaning of the particular words or terms used in a statute, esp where no strong reason exists why their dictionary meaning should not be adopted in the construction of the statute. Consequences of various constructions

    In construing a statute, the objective should always be to arrive at a reasonable and sensible interpretation that is in full accord with the legislative intent. As a general rule, a construction of a statute should be rejected that will cause injustice or hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislative intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislative purpose or object, render certain words or phrases a surplusage, nullify the statute or make any of its provisions nugatory.

    PresumptionsInclude: presumptions in favor of the constitutionality of

    a statute, of its completeness, of its prospective operation, of right and justice, of its effective, sensible, beneficial and reasonable operation as a whole, as well as those against the inconsistency and implied repeal, unnecessary changes in law, impossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardship, inconvenience, and ineffectiveness.

    B. Legislative History

    Generally It is a well settled rule of statutory construction that

    where a statue is susceptible of several interpretations or where there is ambiguity in its language, there is no better means of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the statute.

    What constitutes legislative history

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  • If the statute is based on, or is a revision of, a prior statute, the latters practical application and judicial construction, the various amendments it underwent, and the contemporary events at the time of its enactment form part of its legislative history. If the statute is borrowed from, or modeled upon, Anglo-American precedents or other foreign sources, its history includes the history of such precedents, and for a proper construction of the statue sought to be construed, it is oftentimes essential to review such legislative history and find authoritative guide for its interpretation from such precedents, their practical application , and the decisions of the courts construing and applying such precedents in the country of origin.

    Presidents message to legislatureThe presidents message indicates his thinking on the

    proposed legislation which , when enacted into law, follows his line of thinking on the matter.

    Explanatory NoteWhere there is ambiguity in a statue or where a statute

    is susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of the statute. The statue may then be so construed as to give effect to the purpose or intent as disclosed in its explanatory note.

    Legislative Debates, views and deliberationsCourts may resort to the legislative deliberations in the

    legislature on a bill which eventually was enacted into law to ascertain the meaning of its provisions. Thus, where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, that meaning which was put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted.

    However the views expressed by the legislators during the deliberation of a bill as to the bills purpose, meaning, or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law.

    The opinions expressed by legislators in the course of debates concerning the application of existing laws are not also given decisive weight, especially where the legislator was not a member of the assembly that enacted said laws.

    Reports of commissionsIn the codification of laws, commissions are usually

    formed to compile and collate all laws on particular subject and to prepare the draft of the proposed code

    Prior law from which statute is basedIn ascertaining the intention of the lawmaker, courts are

    permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents of the statute involved. Change in phraseology by amendments

    The change in phraseology by amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it originally had. In construing the amended provision, courts may investigate the history of the provision to ascertain legislative intent as to the meaning or scope of the amended law.

    Amendment by deletionAs a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words

    or phrases in a statute indicate that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislature would not have made the deletion had the intention been not to effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.

    Exceptions to the ruleThe rule that an amendment of a statute indicates a

    change in meaning from that which the statute originally had applies only when the deleted words or phrases are not surplusage or when the intention is clear to change the previous meaning of the old law. The rule does not apply where the intent, as shown by history of the enactment, is clear that the amendment is precisely to plainly express that construction of the act prior to its amendment because its language is not sufficiently expressive of such construction.

    Adopted statute

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  • The general rule is that where local statutes are patterned after or copied from those of another country, the decisions of the courts in such country construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of such local statutes. The reason is that the legislature, in adopting from another country a statute which has previously received judicial construction in that country, is deemed to have adopted the statute with such construction and practical application in the country of origin.

    The adopted statutes are thus generally construed in accordance with the construction given similar statutes in the US, unless special reasons, local customs, and practice require otherwise.

    Limitations to the ruleThe general rule that a statute which has been adopted

    from that of a foreign country should be construed in accordance with the construction given it in the country of origin is not without limitations.

    Principles of common law While common law as known in Anglo-American

    jurisprudence is not in force in this country, save only insofar as it is founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions and is not in conflict with existing laws, nevertheless many of the principles of the common law have been imported into this jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and establishment of institutions similar those of the United States. Courts may thus properly resort to common law principles in construing doubtful provisions of a statute, particularly where such statute is modeled upon Anglo-American precedents. However there is a conflict between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter prevails.

    Conditions at time of enactmentIn enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to

    have taken into account the existing conditions of things at the time of its enactment. For this reason, it is proper, in the interpretation of a statute to consider the physical conditions of the country and the circumstances then obtaining which must

    of necessity affect its operation in order to reach an understanding as to the intent of the legislature, or as to the meaning of the statute.

    History of timesThe court may look to the history of the times, examine

    the state of things existing when the statue was enacted, and interpret it in the light of the conditions obtaining. Generally, it may be said that in determining the meaning, intent and purpose of a law or constitutional provision, the history of the times out of which it grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good to be accomplished are proper subjects of inquiry.

    C. Contemporaneous Construction

    GenerallyContemporary or practical constructions are the

    constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as those who, because of their involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill sponsors.Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege--- the contemporary construction is strongest in law.

    Executive construction, generally; kinds of

    What is commonly known as contemporaneous construction is the construction placed upon the statute by an executive or administrative officer called upon to execute or administer such statute. Accordingly, executive and the administrative officers are generally the very first officials to interpret the law, preparatory to its enforcement. Three type of executive interpretations: (1) construction by an executive or administrative officer directly called to implement the law, expressed or implied, expressed such as circular, directive, or regulation; (2) by the Secretary of Justice in his capacity as the chief legal adviser of the government, in the form of opinions issued upon the request of the executive (3) interpretation

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  • handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.

    Weight accorded to contemporaneous constructionGenerally speaking, where there is doubt as to the

    proper interpretation of a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the executive or administrative officer charged with its enforcement will be adopted, if necessary to resolve the doubt. In the absence of error or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of the legislative enactment creating or charging a governmental agency, the action of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts. As aptly said in a case: the principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no authorities need be cited to support it.

    Weight accorded to usage and practice- acquiesced in by all the parties concerned and has

    extended over a long period of time-Optimus interpres rerum usus- the best interpreter of

    the law is usage

    Construction of rules and regulationsAn administrative agency has the power to interpret its

    own rules and such interpretation becomes part of the rules.

    Reasons why contemporaneous construction is given much weight

    Contemporaneous construction is entitled to great weight: because (1)it comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus construed. (2) executive officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. (3) there are frequently the drafters of the law they interpret. In short,

    due to their competence, expertness, experience, and informed judgment. And there is a need for certainty and predictability in the law.

    When contemporaneous construction disregardedIt is neither controlling nor binding upon the court. The

    court may disregard the law CC, where there is no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has previously given the statue a different interpretation. If it is erroneous then should be declared null and void.

    Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude correction nor create rights; exceptions

    The error may be corrected when the true construction is ascertained. As a rule, an erroneous CC creates no vested right on the part of those who relied upon, and followed such construction. A vested right may not arise from a wrong interpretation of a law by an administrative or executive officer whose primary duty is to enforce, and not to construe, the law. And the government is never estopped by the mistake or error on the part of its agents.

    The rule is not absolute, but admits exceptions in the interest of justice and fair play. (true in tax cases)

    Legislative interpretationThe fact that the interpretation of a statue is primarily a

    judicial function does not preclude the legislature form indicating its construction of a statute it enacts into law. It may thus provide in the statute itself an interpretative or declaratory clause prescribing rules of construction or indicating how its provisions should be construed. It may also define the terms used in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a previous law or pass a resolution indicating its sense or intention as to given statute. However the legislature cannot limit or restrict the power granted to the courts to interpret the law. While their interpretation is not controlling, the courts may resort to it to clarify ambiguity in the language thereof. It is entitled of respectful consideration.

    Legislative approval

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  • The legislature may by action or inaction, approve or ratify such contemporaneous construction. It may be manifested in many ways: as when it reenacts a statute previously given a CC, uses words similar in their import to the language of an earlier law which has received a practical application or amend a prior statute without, in the amending act, providing anything which would restrict, change or nullify the precious CC placed upon the prior law. It may be also shown by the legislature appropriating money for the officer designated to perform a task pursuant to an interpretation of a statute. Where the legislature has notice or knowledge of a construction placed upon a statue by an executive officer charged with its implementation, without repudiating it, its silence is acquiescence equivalent to consent to continue practice. There is an implied approval by its failure to change a longstanding administrative construction.

    Ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur- legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate

    ReenactmentThe most common act of legislative approval of CC of a

    state is by reenactment. The principle is the reenactment of a statute, previously given CC, is a persuasive indication of the adoption by the legislature of the prior construction. It must be reenacted and not merely amended and the CC thereof must be in the form of regulation to implement the law and duly published and not merely administrative ruling embodied in a letter to a specified individual and not published. It is accorded with greater weight and respect than the CC of the statute before its ratification. The reason for such is: there is an agreement between two departments the legislative and executive to the meaning of the law, and it devolves upon the judiciary to give it deferential treatment.

    Stare decisisThe decision of the SC applying or interpreting a statute

    is controlling with respect to the interpretation of that statute and is of greater weight than that of an executive or administrative officer in the construction of other statutes of similar import. The reason: the SCs interpretation forms part of the statue itself and of the legal system and comes form that

    branch of government entrusted with the duty to construe or interpret the law.

    Stare decisis et non quieta movere- one should follow past precedents and should not be disturbed what has been settled. The rule rests on the desirability of having stability in the law. Interest republicae ut sit finis litiumthe interest of the state demands that there be an end to litigation.

    For a ruling of SC be under the doctrine of stare decisis, it must be a direct ruling and not through sub silencio and obiter dictum.

    The facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied should be the same for stare decisis to be applied.

    The rule of stare decisis is not absolute. The principle does not blind adherence to precedents. If it is found contrary to law, must be abandoned. The principle should not apply when there is conflict between the precedent and the law. However only the SC itself can change or abandon a precedent enunciated by it, neither by inferior court, nor by legislature unless they repeal or amend the law itself. If the inferior courts feel that the precedent is against their way of reasoning, they may state their personal opinion but still they are bound to follow it.

    CHAPTER IV : ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE

    A. LITERAL INTERPRETATIONLiteral Meaning or plain-meaning rule

    - As a general rule, the intent of legislature to be ascertained and thereafter given effect is the intent expressed in the language of the statute.

    - Plain meaning rule: verba legis- Index animi sermo: speech is the index of intention.- Verba Legis non est recedendum: from the words of a

    statute there should be no departure.- What is not clearly provided in the law cannot be

    extended to those matters outside its scope.

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  • - Where what is not clearly provided in the law is read into law by construction because it is more logical and wise, it would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law, which is judicial legislation.

    - To depart from the meaning expressed by words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not to interpret.

    - Maledicta est expositioquae corrumpit textum: or it is dangerous construction which is against the text.

    Dura Lex Sed Lex- Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent: When the

    language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.

    - When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied regardless who may be affected, even if it may be harsh or onerous.

    - Dura lex sed lex: The law may be harsh, but it is still the law.

    - Hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est, or it is exceedingly hard but so the law is written.

    - The court should apply the law even if it would be harsh or unwise.

    - The duty of court in interpreting a statute which is ambiguous is not to dispute its wisdom; the duty of the court is limited to inquiring into the legislative intent and, once this is determined, to making said intent effective.

    - When the law is clear, appeal to justice and equity as justification to construe it differently are unavailing. Equity I described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it cannot supplant although it may supplement the law.

    - Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis: Equity never acts in contravention of the law.

    B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL MEANINGStatute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperative.

    - Court must use every authorized means to ascertain the intent of the statute and give it an intelligible meaning. If effort is impossible to solve the doubt and dispel the obscurity of a statute, if no judicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply nor to make one.

    - If statute fails to express a meaning, judicial modesty forbids court from assuming and from supplying a meaning thereto.

    - Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeatquam pereat: that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is to be adopted. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.

    What is within the spirit is within the law.- The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself.- As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or

    intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and what is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the letter but not within the spirit of the statute is not within the statute.

    - The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent.

    - A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law.

    - The court may consider the spirit and reason of statute where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.

    Literal import must yield to intent.- The intention controls the literal interpretation of a

    particular language of statute.- Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire: words

    ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.

    - If theres two conflicting theories, courts choose which best accords with the spirit or intent of the law.

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  • - Conscience and equity should always be considered in the construction of a statute.

    - The spirit and intendment of the law must prevail over its letter.

    - A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.

    Limitation of rule- What is within the spirit of a statute even if not within

    the letter is applicable only if there is ambiguity in the language of the law.

    Construction to accomplish purpose- Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to

    be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.

    - Courts should not follow the letter of a statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the purpose of the act.

    - As between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail. why? The general purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down. (Holmes).

    - A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results.

    When reason of law ceases, the law itself ceases.- cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex- raton legis est anima: the reason of the law is its soul.- The reason behind the law is the heart of the law.

    Reason of the law plays a decisive role in its construction.

    - A statute may render a prior law devoid of reason. - Where a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a

    prior statute on the same subject, the latter has lost all meaning and function and has ceased to exist.

    - This may happen when the purpose of the statute sought to be achieved by it is accomplished, or the mischief sought to be repressed is prevented, by an act or event independent of the statute itself.

    Supplying legislative omission- Where a literal import of the language of a statute

    shows that words have been omitted that should have been in the statute in order to carry out its intent and spirit, clearly ascertainable from the context, the court may supply the omission to make the statute conform to the obvious intent of the legislature or to prevent the act from being absurd.

    - Rule is corollary with the rule that what is within the spirit of the law is within the law.

    Correcting Clerical errors- The court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the

    legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected would render the statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated.

    - It is the duty of the court to arrive at the legislative intent.

    - The court is not indulging judicial legislation, it is merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error.

    Qualification of rule- What the courts may correct to reflect intention of

    legislature are those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, misprints.

    - To correct a clear statute would be rewriting the law and do judicial legislation in the disguise of interpretation.

    Construction to avoid absurdity- General terms of a statute should be so limited in their

    application as not to lead to absurdities. It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid absurd consequences.

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  • - Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum: Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.

    - Where literal adherence to the language would result to absurdity, the court has the power to supply or omit the words from a statute in order to prevent an absurd result.

    - Courts test the law by its result. There are laws which are generally valid but may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstance. Courts are not bound to apply them in slavish obedience to their language.

    - A law should not be interpreted so as not to cause injustice.

    - Where a term is defined in a statute, the court may not construe it to exclude what is included therein as to restrict its scope.

    Construction to avoid injustice- The presumption is that the legislature in enacting a

    law, did not intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another.

    - Ea est accipienda interpretatio quae vitio caret: that interpretation is to be adopted which is free from evil or injustice.

    Construction to avoid danger to public interest- It is a well established rule of statutory construction that

    where great inconvenience will result, or great public interest will be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, from a particular construction of a statute, such construction is to be avoided.

    - Courts should presume that such construction was not intended by the legislature.

    Construction in favor of right and justice- Any doubt in the construction of a statute should be

    resolved in favor of right and justice.

    - The fact that a statute is silent, obscure or insufficient with respect to a question before the court will not justify the latter from declining to render judgment thereon.

    - Jure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem, which was restated with ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dao de otro. Courts invoke these principles when the statutes are silent or obscure in order to arrive at a solution that would respond to the vehement (passionate) urge of conscience.

    - In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle.

    Surplusage and superfluity disregarded- surplusagium non noceat: surplusage does not vitiate a

    statute.- Utile per inutile non vitiatur: the useful is not vitiated

    by the non-useful.- Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of

    meaning in relation to the context or intent of the statute or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase, or clause may be rejected as a surplusage and entirely ignored.

    Redundant words may be rejected- General rule is that every effort should be made to give

    some meaning to every part of a statute. This rule does not impose upon the courts an imperative obligation to give every redundant word or phrase a special significance, contrary to the manifest intention of the legislature.

    - A possible interpretation which would defeat the whole purpose of the law is to be rejected.

    - When the use of word is merely to reiterate or repeat, it carries out the intention of the legislature.

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  • Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude construction

    - Court should not and cannot always be bound by the phraseology or literal meaning of a statute.

    - That some words may be missing due to clerical errors or false description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise clear.

    - Falsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat: False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute.

    Exemption from rigid application of law- Every rule is not without exception- Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haec exception, si

    non aliquid sit contras jus basque, which means that where anything is granted generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right.

    - Equity and other compelling reasons may justify an exception to a rule even when the rule does not provide any.

    - If the application of law will prevent a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of a case, justice demands that the general rule should yield to occasional exceptions.

    - Summum jus, summa injuria: the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice.

    - Where rigid and strict application of law would work injustice, an exemption therefrom to prevent such result on humanitarian and equitable grounds is warranted, although the literal import of the law suggests no such exemption.

    Law does not require the impossible- The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility,

    expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossibile. In other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligation est.

    - Statutes should not be construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes, which is impossible;

    but in such a way that substantial compliance with what the law requires is sufficient.

    Number and gender of words- it is a maxim of statutory construction that when the

    context if a statute so indicates in plural include the singular, and vice versa.

    - A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular person or thing, just as a singular word may embrace two or more persons or things.

    - It is also a rule of statutory construction that in construing a statute, the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless the context in which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise.

    C. IMPLICATIONSDoctrine of necessary implication

    - What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for future events, thereby creating gaps in the law. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.

    - Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.

    - Every statute is understood by implication to contain all such provisions that are needed to effectuate its purpose.

    - Ex necessitate legis or from the necessity of the law.- Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is

    deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is because in eo quod plus sit, semper inest et minus.

    - necessary implication: it is one which under the circumstances, is compelled by a reasonable view of the statute, and the contrary of which would be improbable and absurd.

    - Necessity: defines what may properly and logically be inferred from and read into the statute.

    - This doctrine may not be used to justify the inclusion in a statute of what to the court appears to be wise and

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  • just, unless it is at the same time necessarily and logically within its terms.

    - What may be necessarily implied from a statute should, in any event, be consistent with, and not contrary to, the constitution or to existing laws. An implication which is violative of the law is unjustified or unwarranted.

    Remedy applied from a right- Where there is a right, there is a remedy. Ubi jus, ibi

    remedium- The fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does

    not preclude him from vindicating his right, for such remedy is implied from such right.

    - Such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislation must take their bearings.

    - wrong means deprivation or violation of a right, and is not equivalent to error.

    Grant of jurisdiction- Settled is the rule that jurisdiction to hear and decide

    cases is conferred only by the Constitution or by the Statute.

    - Jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to that effect.

    What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction- to employ all writs, processes and other means essential

    to make its jurisdiction effective.- Power to do all things which are reasonably necessary

    for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even though the court may be called to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as original caused of action.

    - It can grant reliefs incidental to the main cause of action.

    Grant of power includes incidental power

    - As a rule, where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred. The incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.

    - Power conferred by law upon an administrative officer to issue rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute he is called upon to execute includes the authority to delegate to a subordinate officer the performance of a particular function, absent any express or implied provision to the contrary.

    Grant of power excludes greater power- the principle that the grant of power includes all

    incidental powers necessary to make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those which are greater than that conferred.

    What is implied should not be against the law.- The statutory grant of power does not include such

    incidental power which cannot be exercised without violating the Constitution, the statute conferring the power, or other laws on the same subject.

    Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied

    - Unless a statute expressly so authorizes, no claim against public funds may be allowed. Accordingly, a statute may not be so construed as to authorize, by implication, a charge against public funds.

    Illegality of act implied from prohibition- Where a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act

    done in violation thereof is by implication null and void.- The prohibited act cannot serve as a foundation of a

    cause of action for relief.- Ex dolo malo non oritur: no man can be allowed to

    found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or inequity

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  • - Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria: no man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.

    - It is popularly known by the maxim: In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis

    Exceptions to the rule- the principle of pari delicto recognizes certain

    exceptions.- It will not apply when its enforcement or application will

    violate an avowed fundamental policy or public interest.- Another exemption is that when the transaction is not

    illegal per se but merely prohibited and the prohibition by law is designed for the protection of one party, the court may grant relief in favor of the latter.

    What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly- Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibeturet per

    obliquum- What the law prohibits cannot, in some other way, be

    legally accomplished.There should be no penalty for compliance of law.For simple logic, fairness and reason cannot countenance an exaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done in compliance with the law

    CHAPTER 5: INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

    Generally- A word or phrase used in a statute may have an

    ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trade meaning.

    - Which meaning should be given depends upon what the legislature intended. As a general rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the intendment of law, ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not of an isolated part or a

    particular provision alone, must be made to determine the real intent of the law.

    Statutory Definition- The legislative definition controls the meaning of a

    statutory word, irrespective of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense.

    - For the legislature, in adopting a specific definition is deemed to have restricted the meaning of the word within the terms of the definition.

    - When the legislature defines a word, it does not usurp the courts function to interpret the laws but it merely legislates what should form part of the law itself.

    - While the definition of terms in a statute must be given all the weight due to them in the construction of the provision in which they are used, the terms or phrases being part and parcel of the whole statute must be given effect in their entirety as a harmonious, coordinated and integrated unit, not as a mass of heterogeneous and unrelated if not incongruous terms, clauses and sentences.

    Qualification of rule- The statutory definition of a word or term as used in

    this Act is controlling only in so far as said act is concerned.

    - The general rule that the statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words does not apply where its application creates obvious incongruities in the language of the statute, destroys one of its major purposes, or becomes illogical as a result of a change in its factual basis.

    - However, in a subsequent case, it was held that of a statute remains unchanged, it must be interpreted according to its clear, original mandate until the legislature amends it.

    Words construed in their ordinary sense- In construing words and phrases, the general rule is that

    in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they

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  • should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.

    - For words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their ordinary and common use and acceptation.

    - The grammatical and ordinary reading of a statute must be presumed to yield its correct sense.

    - Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus

    General Words construed generally- Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is

    generally spoken shall be generally understood or general words shall be understood in a general sense.

    - Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is understood in a general sense.

    - Where a word used in a statute has both a restricted and general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the subject matter or the context in which it is employed clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended.

    - A general word should not be given a restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated.

    Generic term includes things that arise thereafter- progressive interpretation: extends by construction the

    application of a statute to all subjects or conditions within its general purpose or scope that come into existence subsequent to its passage and thus keeps legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory unless there is a legislative intent to the contrary.

    - It is a rule of statutory construction that legislative enactments in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all persons, subjects and business within their general purview and scope coming into existence subsequent to their passage.

    Words with commercial or trade meaning- Words and Phrases, which are in common use among

    merchants and traders, acquire trade or commercial

    meanings which are generally accepted in the community in which they have been in common use.

    - Settled is the rule that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, trade or commercial terms, when used in a statute are presumed to have been used in their trade or commercial sense.

    Words with technical or legal meaning- As a general rule, words that have or have been used in,

    a technical sense or those that have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they have been previously used, although the sense may vary from the strict or literal meaning of the words.

    - The technical or legal, not the ordinary or general meaning of a word used in a statute should be adopted in the construction of the statute, in the absence of nay qualification or intention to the contrary.

    How identical terms in same statute construed- The general rule is that a word or phrase repeatedly

    used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute.

    - The same word or substantially the same phrase appearing in different parts of a statute will be accorded a generally accepted and consistent meaning, unless a different intention appears or is clearly expressed.

    - The reason for the rule is that a word used in a statute in a given sense is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout the law.

    - It is particularly applicable where in the statute the words appear so near each other physically and particularly where the word has a technical meaning and that meaning has been defined in the statute.

    Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute- The meaning of a words or phrase used in a statute may

    be qualified by the purpose which induced the legislature to enact the statute.

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  • - In construing a word or phrase, the court should adopt that interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its object.

    - It is generally recognized that if a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning of the word or phrase used therein may be rejected if the result of adopting such meaning will be to defeat the purpose which the legislature had in mind.

    Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions- The general rule is that a word, phrase or provision

    should not be construed in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the law. This rule is a variation of the rule that a statute should be construed as a whole, and each of its provisions must be given effect.

    - A word or provision should not be construed in isolation from, but should be interpreted in relation to, the other provisions of a statute or other statutes dealing on the same subject.

    - The word or provision should not be given a meaning that will restrict or defeat, but should instead be construed to effectuate, what has been intended in an enacting law.

    Meaning of term dictated by context- While ordinarily a word or term used in a statute will be

    given its usual and commonly understood meaning, the context in which the word or term is employed may dictate a different sense.

    - The context in which the word is used oftentimes determines its meaning.

    - A word is understood in the context in which it is used. Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam

    - The context may likewise give a broad sense to a word of otherwise ordinarily limited meaning.

    - The context may also limit the meaning of what otherwise is a word of broad signification.

    Where the law does not distinguish

    - Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.

    - The rule founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance

    - The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law.

    - A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, court may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.

    - Ubi lex non distinguit, nec non distinguere debemus, applies not only in the construction of general words and expressions used in a statute but also in the interpretation of a rule laid down therein.

    - This principle assumes that the legislature made no qualification in the use of a general word or expression.

    - The courts may distinguish when there are facts or circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification, for in such a case, the courts merely give effect to the legislative intent.

    Disjunctive and conjunctive words- The word or is a disjunctive term signifying

    disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated. It should be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.

    - The use of the disjunctive word or between two phrases connotes that either phrase serves as qualifying phrase.

    - The term or has sometimes been held to mean and, when the spirit or context of the law so warrants.

    - The word or may also be used as the equivalent of that is to say giving that w