BARBEDOS VENTURES LTD v. ZAMFARASTATE GOVT & ANOR

CITATION: (2017) LPELR-42499(CA)

In the Court of AppealIn the Sokoto Judicial Division

Holden at Sokoto

ON THURSDAY, 8TH JUNE, 2017Suit No: CA/S/62/2013

Before Their Lordships:

HUSSEIN MUKHTAR Justice, Court of AppealMUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU Justice, Court of AppealFREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO Justice, Court of Appeal

BetweenBARBEDOS VENTURES LTD - Appellant(s)

And1. ZAMFARA STATE GOVT.2. FIRST BANK PLC - Respondent(s)

RATIO DECIDENDI1. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: Effect of order absolute in garnishee proceedings

"I wish to add that Garnishee proceedings commences with an exparte application for an order nisi and terminates with an order absoluteafter all the necessary parties were put on notice. Once an order absolute is granted, the Court becomes functus officio in respect of thatmatter and thus lacks jurisdiction to review, reopen or reverse its decision." Per SHUAIBU, J.C.A. (P. 35, Paras. D-F) - read in context

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2. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: Status of a judgment debtor in a garnishee proceeding"The first huddle that needs to be scaled here is the question of whether, it can be said in the real sense of the word that the JudgmentDebtor is indeed a nominal party in a Garnishee proceedings as claimed by learned Appellant's Counsel, and that if at all, at what stagecan a Judgment Debtor be referred to as a nominal party? This Court in the case of FIDELITY BANK PLC v. OKWUOWULU (2012)LPELR-8497 (CA) per OGUNWUMIJU, JCA had this to say on the issue;"A garnishee proceeding can be described in two stages; the first stage is the process of getting an order nisi. The order nisi directs thegarnishee to appear in Court on a specified date to show cause why an order should not be made upon him for payment to the judgmentcreditor the amount of the debt owed to the judgment debtor. This is usually done ex parte and limited to the judgment creditor and theCourt.The second stage is where on the return date, the garnishee does not attend, or does not dispute the debt claimed to be due from him tothe judgment debtor, the Court may subject to certain restrictions, make the garnishee order absolute under which the garnishee isordered to pay to the judgment creditor the amount of debt due from him to the judgment debtor, or so much of it as is sufficient tosatisfy the judgment debt together with the cost of the proceedings and cost of garnishee. This later proceeding is tripartite between thejudgment debtor, judgment creditor and the garnishee. This is because on the return date, all parties must have been served and given anopportunity to dispute liability or pray that the order nisi be discharged for one cause or the other."This Court also in an earlier case in N.A.O.C. v. OGINI (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1230) 131 AT 152-153, per OGUNWUMIJU, JCA had this to say onthe subject;"If the judgment creditor knows that the judgment debtor has an amount of money with any Bank or institution, he will as Garnishor filefor an ex parte application to be supported by an affidavit in Form 23 of the Judgment Enforcement Rules (JER) for an order that theGarnishee (in this case U.B.A. Plc.) shall show cause why he should not pay the amount due to the judgment debtor to him. Theseproceedings are strictly ex parte between the Garnishor (judgment creditor) and the Garnishee (the Bank or institution). Where the Courtgrants the order nisi on the garnishee, the Registrar through the Sheriff of the Court must serve on the garnishee, the judgment creditorand the judgment debtor the Order nisi on Form 26 of JER. The Registrar must then fix a date not less than 14 days after the service of theorder nisi on the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor and the garnishee for hearing. This subsequent hearing envisages a tripartiteproceeding, in which all interests are represented. That is when the judgment debtor has the opportunity to convince the Court todischarge the order nisi by filing affidavits to that effect. After that hearing on notice, the Court may discharge the order nisi or make it anorder absolute.Thus, the judgment enforcement rules envisage two proceedings, one ex parte and the other one on notice. I agree with the learnedRespondent's Counsel and my learned brother that there can be no appeal against the order nisi made ex parte. See Section 14(1) of theCourt of Appeal Act, Cap. C36, Laws of the Federation, 2004. On the other hand, the garnishee order absolute being proceedings in whichall parties have been heard and the interest of the judgment debtor in the money in custody of the Garnishee determined is one in whichan appeal can lie to this Court."In a more recent decision of this Court on the issue, in the case of C.B.N. v. AUTO IMPORT EXPORT (2013) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1337) 80 AT 127PARAS F-G per SAULAWA, JCA this was what this Court had to say on the issue;"...both the Garnishor and the garnishee as well as the judgment debtor constitute the parties to the proceedings."See also the case of SOKOTO STATE GOVT. v. KAMDEX (NIG.) LTD (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) 345 AT 380, where this Court per CHUKWUMA-ENEH, JCA (as he then was) had this to say;"The proceeding envisages three parties to it namely, the judgment creditor (garnishor), the judgment debtor and the garnishee in theinstant case - the Standard Trust Bank Ltd. - 3rd appellant."What seem most of the time to be lacking in the determination of who the proper parties are in Garnishee proceedings, is the failure todistinguish between the proceedings leading to the grant of the Garnishee nisi and the proceedings leading to the grant of the Garnisheeabsolute. The position remains that in the Garnishee order nisi proceedings, due to the nature of the application brought, which is by exparte it can safely be said that the proceedings involving only the judgment creditor and the garnishee, is at that stage a different thingaltogether, as it is at that stage the Judgment Debtor could rightly be said to be a nominal party as he is not expected to play any rolesthen. But where the proceeding goes beyond the level of the order nisi and when the proceedings leading to the grant of the Garnisheeorder absolute commences, three (3) parties are envisaged at this point. These are;a. The judgment creditor,b. The judgment debtor; andc. The Garnishee.It is important to note that at the stage of the Garnishee order absolute proceedings, the law envisages a more active participation of theJudgment Debtor due to a number reasons; First, by the wordings of Section 83(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, the JudgmentDebtor is expected before or after the rendering of the order nisi, to be examined orally or otherwise before the making of the orderabsolute. This position is further reinforced by the provisions of Section 83(2), which mandates the service of the order nisi on theJudgment Debtor at least fourteen (14) days before the hearing of the Garnishee proceedings leading to the grant of an order absolute. Itis important to note that the fact that Section 83(2) makes it mandatory to serve the order nisi on the Judgment Debtor clearly pre-supposes that the Judgment Debtor is not a nominal, but a necessary party to Garnishee proceedings at the stage of the proceedingsleading to the grant of a decree absolute.After the service of the order nisi on the Judgment Debtor, he may at that stage be expected to convince the Court by the filing into Courtof an application to have the order nisi discharged where there are cogent reasons for doing so. But where the Court refuses to dischargethe order nisi and goes ahead to make the order nisi absolute, the Judgment Debtor, being a necessary party and not a nominal party, canappeal as of right since the order absolute is regarded as a final decision of the Court. See the case of UBN PLC v. BONEY MARCUS IND.LTD & ORS (2005) LPELR-3394 (SC) where the Supreme Court per AKINTAN, JSC had this to say;"It is therefore an order made, at that stage that the sum covered by the Application be paid into Court or to the Judgment Creditor withina stated time unless there is some sufficient reason why the party on whom the order is directed is given why the payment ordered shouldnot be made. If no sufficient reason appears, the Garnishee order is then made absolute and that ends the matter in that the party againstwhom the order absolute is made is liable to pay the amount specified in the order to the judgment creditor. The Court thereafterbecomes functus officio as far as that matter is concerned in that the judge who decided the matter is precluded from again consideringthe matter even if new evidence or arguments are presented to him."By virtue of the decisions of Court cited here above and by virtue of the provisions of Sections 83(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act,on the one hand and, which requires that the Judgment Debtor has to be examined orally or otherwise before the making of the orderabsolute; and Section 83(2) on the other hand, which mandates the service of the order nisi on the Judgment Debtor at least fourteen (14)days before the hearing wherein the order nisi will be made absolute; this Court hereby finds and do hold that;1. The judgment Debtor becomes a necessary party after the grant of the Garnishee order nisi and rather than being referred to as anominal party as he is expected henceforth, and upon the grant of the decree nisi to play the role of a necessary party in the rest of theproceedings either leading to the setting aside of the decree nisi or the grant of the decree absolute.2. That the grant of the Garnishee Order absolute by the Court ultimately, signifies the final decision of the Court in respect of theGarnishee proceedings by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UBN PLC v. BONEY MARCUS (Supra)." Per OHO, J.C.A.(Pp. 21-28, Paras. A-E) - read in context

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3. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - GARNISHEE PROCEEDINGS: Effect of order absolute in garnishee proceedings"The question that should therefore be addressed at this stage is; whether the learned Court below, after having accomplished itsfunctions in the Garnishee proceedings brought before it by the grant subsequently of the Garnishee order absolute, was in any position toreview, reverse, rehear or revisit the issue of the Garnishee proceedings afresh, which was brought before it for adjudication by theAppellant/Judgment Creditor following the application of the 1st Respondent to that effect who was Judgment Debtor at the Court below?The settled position of the law is that a Court is said to be functus officio in respect of a matter if the Court has accomplished its functionsin respect of that matter and it lacks the jurisdiction to review, reopen, reverse or revisit the matter. See FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v.TSA INDUSTRIES LIMITED (2010) LPELR- 1283 (SC). In an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of JOHN ANDY SONS & CO.LTD v. NATIONAL CEREAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1997) LPELR-1691 (SC) on the issue, the Court per WALI, JSC had this to say on thesubject;"Once an issue or issues have been raised and determined by the between the litigating parties, the Court becomes functus officio toeither direct or allow the parties to re-open the same issues before it for re-litigation. See NNAJIOFOR v. UKONU (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 686AT 688."Also in the case of SANUSI v. AYOOLA (1992) LPELR-3009 (SC), the Supreme Court per KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC had this to say;"There is the well settled elementary and fundamental principle of law that a Court on disposing of a cause before it renders itself functusofficio. It ceases to have jurisdiction in respect of such case; see EKERELE v. EKE (1925) 6 NLR 118; AKINYEDE v. THE APPRAISER (1971) 1ALL NLR, 162; it cannot assume the status of an Appellate Court over its own decision, except there is statutory power to do so- See FRITZv. HOBSON (1880) 14 Ch. D. 542."However, nothing prevents the trial Court where a judgment is in need of clarification or correction in respect of clerical slips or omissionsfrom going ahead to effect necessary clarifications or corrections as the case may be as there is power under the law for the same Courtthat delivered the judgment to correct clerical slips or accidental omissions. See the cases of ASIYANBI & ORS v. ADENIYI (1967) 1 ALL NLR82; ANYASINTI UMUNNA & 5 ORS v. ANIMUDA OKWURAIWE & 3 ORS (1978) 6-7 SC 1 and BERLIET v. KACHALLA (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420)478 AT 493-494, where the Supreme Court held that even where the judge of the High Court who delivered the judgment for any reason isnot available, any other judge in exercise of the general powers under Section 6 (6)(a) and 236 (1) of the 1979 Constitution, should be inas good a position as the judge who delivered the judgment to correct any palpable slips or errors in the judgment. In UMUNNA & 5 ORS v.OKWURAIWE & 3 ORS (supra), the Supreme Court went ahead and affirmed the power of the trial High Court to amend or correct itsjudgment when its attention was drawn to the error while the judgment was being delivered. See also the case of FEDERAL PUBLICTRUSTEE v. MRS. C. A. SOBAMOWO (1967) NMLR 350 where the exercise of the power to correct accidental slips or omissions in thejudgment and orders of Court was allowed.Where however, there had been an error or omission by a Court on matters, which are not accidental slips or clerical mistakes but of law,the Court would not have the jurisdiction to correct such errors or omissions even though apparent on the face of the judgment or order.See the case of RACE AUTO SUPPLY CO. LTD v. AKIB (supra). See also the cases of BRIGHT v. SELLER (1904) I. K.B. 6 and RE: GIST (1904)1 CH. 408 cited with approval in UMUNNA & 5 ORS v. OKWURAIWE & 3 ORS (Supra). In other words, the extent and scope of the exerciseof power of Court to correct clerical errors, accidental slips or omissions should not be used as an excuse to review, reverse or rehear thecase afresh. It is important to note that the nature of the application of the 1st Respondent in the instant Appeal filed at the Court belowand by which the 1st Respondent has sought to have the Court hear arguments with regards to questions involving the consent of theAttorney General on the one hand and on the other hand, questions by which the 1st Respondent has sought to be joined as a party to theGarnishee proceedings, would no doubt entail the rehearing, the revisiting or the reviewing of issues which have previously been settledone way or the other by the Court below and the Court below has no powers to do so, whether inherent or statutory. See MINISTRY OFLAGOS AFFAIRS, MINES AND POWERS v. AKIN-OLUGBADE (1974) 9 NSCC 489. See also the case of ALAO v. A.C.B. (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672)264 where the Supreme Court per, KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC had this to say on the subject;"The following three principles appear to be enshrined in the provision of this Rule. First, the Court shall not review any judgment oncedelivered. See ADEFULU v. OKULAJA (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 435. The exception to this prohibition where it is intended to correct anyclerical mistakes or some error arising from accidental slip or omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to give effect its meaning orintention. This is known as the "slip rule". Secondly, there is a total prohibition from review of a judgment which correctly represents whatthe Court decided. Such a judgment shall not be varied. Thirdly, the operative and substantive judgment shall not be varied and adifferent form substituted.This Court, in all seriousness wonders exactly what the 1st Respondent's application before the Court below is all about. Here at theninety-ninth hour, the 1st Respondent now seeks to be joined as a party to the Garnishee proceedings, which has since been concluded onits merits and under which the Court below had become functus officio." Per OHO, J.C.A. (Pp. 28-33, Paras. E-F) - read in context

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FREDERICK OZIAKPONO OHO, J.C.A. (Delivering the

Leading Judgment): This Appeal is against the Ruling of

the High Court of Zamfara State sitting at Gusau and

delivered on the 28-1-2013. The Courts Ruling had

followed an objection raised by the Appellant/Judgment-

Creditor against the 1st Respondents motion to be heard,

on the ground that under the Garnishee proceedings the

Judgment Debtor is a nominal party who ordinarily should

not be heard and that the Court below had earlier on ruled

on the issue. The Court below, in delivering its Ruling on

the objection, ruled thus;

"My attitude to application brought by Counsel is to

hear such application and there for rule. This

objection raised by Judgment Creditor Counsel in the

hearing of this application will be dealt with as a

preliminary objection to the application to be dealt

with in a consolidated Ruling after hearing the

Judgment debtor application, judgment debtor

granted permission to move the application."

The Appellant as Judgment Creditor being dissatisfied with

this Ruling, has appealed to this Court vide his Notice of

Appeal filed on the 29-1-2013. There are four

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(4) Grounds of Appeal which are reproduced here without

their particulars as follows;

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

1. The learned trial Judge erred in law when he

allowed the judgment debtor respondents motion for

joinder in the pending Garnishee proceedings to be

set aside for hearing.

2. The learned trial judge erred in law which

amounted to abuse of Court process when he held

that the 1st Respondent/judgment Debtors

Application for joinder and prayer to set aside the

Garnishee Order Absolute should be heard when he

has made a valid and subsisting ruling on the

8-1-2013 on the same subject matter, which has not

been overturned nor Appealed, that the 1st

Respondent/judgment debtor is a nominal party.

3. The Court erred in law by setting the 1st

Respondent/Judgment Debtors motion for hearing as

the Application amounts to rehearing of issues

determined by the Court on the 8-1-2013.

4. The ruling of the Court is against the weight of

evidence.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The Appellant nominated a total of three (3) issues for the

Courts determination thus;

1. Whether the judgment debtor who

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participated in the garnishee proceeding can be allowed to

set aside the order absolute on the ground that the

judgment debtor's Attorney General consent is required

when the Court had earlier ruled on same.

2. Whether the Court can consolidate two motions to be

heard at the same time when one is seeking to be joined as

a party to the garnishee proceeding and the other is

seeking to terminate the Garnishee proceeding.

3. Whether the rehearing of judgment debtor on the same

subject matter will not amount to abuse of Court process

after the Order absolute has been granted.

On the part of the Respondent, the entire three (3) issues

nominated by the Appellant were adopted and it is in

respect of these issues that learned Counsel addressed

Court extensively and cited a plethora of decided cases for

the Courts consideration in the resolution of the issues

nominated. The Appellants Brief of argument dated the

20-5-2013 was settled by PRINCESS CHI O. IGWE, and

filed on the 21-5-2013 while the 1st Respondents Brief of

argument dated the 3-11-2016 and filed on the 4-11-2016,

but deemed properly filed and served on the 13-3-2017

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was settled by SIRAJO ABDULLAHI, ESQ.,. At the hearing

of the Appeal on the 3-4-2017, learned Counsel adopted

their respective Briefs of argument on behalf of the parties

and each urged this Court to resolve this Appeal in favour

of their sides.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL

APPELLANT

ISSUE ONE

Whether the judgment debtor who participated in

Garnishee proceeding can be allowed to set aside

order absolute on the ground that the judgment

debtor's Attorney General consent is required when

the Court had earlier ruled on same.

The contention of learned Counsel on this issue is that an

application for garnishee proceedings is usually made to

the Court by the judgment Creditor and that the orders of

Court also come in two steps. According to Counsel, the

first is a Garnishee Order Nisi, which is an order made at

that stage that the sum covered by the application be paid

into Court or to the Judgment Creditor within a stated time

unless there is sufficient reason why the payment ordered

should not be made. Counsel argued that if no sufficient

reason is proffered, the Garnishee order is then made

absolute and that ends the matter. He

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cited in support, the following cases of U.B.N. PLC v.

BONEY MARCUS IND. LTD (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt.

104) 1; CHOICE INVESTMENT LTD v. JEROMINON

(MIDLAND BANK LTD, GARNISHEE) (1981)/ALL ER

225.

Learned Counsel also contended that in the instant Appeal,

the Judgment Debtor/Respondent participated in the

Garnishee proceeding, i.e. in the two steps stated above

before the Court pronounced the order absolute and in the

process not only ruled that the Judgment Debtor is a

nominal party to the proceeding but also that the consent

of the Attorney General is not required for money held by

the Bank on behalf of the State. It was therefore submitted

by Counsel that the trial Court should not have entertained

a situation where the Judgment Debtor is subsequently

allowed to bring applications to be joined as a party to the

Garnishee proceeding after it has pronounced the order

absolute. Counsel further argued that even in a situation in

which the Court has not pronounced an order absolute, the

Judgment Debtor remains a nominal party to the Garnishee

proceeding. He referred Court to Section 83 Sheriffs &

Civil Process Act.

Counsel in this regard, referred

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Court to the case of LAWANI v. YAKUBU DAWODU

(1972) 8-9 SC 83 and argued that a trial Court cannot

over rule itself in the same course of proceeding. Counsel

submitted that the judge after making an order or giving a

judgment becomes functus officio and has no powers to

review such order or judgment except in cases of

correcting mistakes or accidental Slips. He cited the case of

NICON v. PIE CO. LTD (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 129);

ASIYANBI v. ADENIYI (1961) 1 ALL NLR 82.

By so doing, Counsel contended that the trial Court allowed

the judgment debtor to participate in the Garnishee

proceedings, who thereafter raised the issue of Attorney-

Generals consent on the money held under the control of

the Garnishee (the Bank). He said that the trial Court in its

earlier Ruling has said that the consent of the Attorney

General is not required because the money garnisheed is

under the control of the Garnishee and not the Judgment

Debtor and that the Judgment Debtor is a nominal party.

See page 69-74 of the Record of Appeal.

Counsel also argued that by Section 83 of the Sheriffs &

Civil Process Act, Cap S.6 LFN 2004, the Judgment Debtor

is a nominal

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party and cannot actively participate in the Garnishee

proceedings, as the only parties are the Judgment Creditor

and the Garnishee. Counsel urged this Court to so hold.

ISSUE TWO

Whether the Court can consolidate two motions to be

heard at the same time when one is seeking to be

joined as a party to the garnishee proceeding and the

other is seeking to terminate the Garnishee

proceeding.

Learned Counsel contended that in law two applications

cannot be consolidated and heard at the same time

particularly when one is by a party seeking to be joined as a

party to the Garnishee proceedings and the other motion is

one seeking to terminate the Garnishee proceedings.

Counsel argued that the Garnishee proceedings is a

process of enforcing a money judgment by the seizure or

attachment of the debts due or accruing to the Judgment

Debtor, which forms part of his property in the hands of a

third party for attachment. By this process, Counsel said

that the Court is competent to order the third-party in

whose hands the property of the Judgment Debtor resides

to pay directly to the Judgment Creditor as much of it as

may be sufficient to satisfy the

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judgment debt and the cost of the Garnishee proceeding. In

this regard, Counsel cited the case of CITIZEN INT.

BANK v. SCOA (NIG) LTD (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1011).

It was the contention of Counsel that where there are two

motions for hearing, there are orders of precedence for

hearing of motions placed before a Court. What Counsel

argued was that it was appropriate for the Court to have

first determined whether the judgment debtor can be given

leave to be joined as a party in the Garnishee proceeding

before allowing the application to set aside the order

absolute to be heard. He further argued that it is rather

novel to seek to hear the two applications together on the

part of the trial Court. Against this background, Counsel

argued that where there are two motions pending before

Court, one capable of terminating the proceedings and the

other seeking to regularize the same process, it has always

been the practice to give priority to the motion seeking to

regularize the process. Counsel cited the cases of

EDWARD BATISAN & OR v. CHIEF TITUS OKUNNIGA

(2005) ALL FWLR 809 AT 812; MOBIL PRODUCING

(NIG) UNLIMITED v. MONOKPO (2003) 18 NWLR

(PT. 852) 356.

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It was also argued that the proper order the trial Court

ought to have made is one determining whether the

Respondent can be joined in the Garnishee proceeding or

not, instead of consolidating it with a motion seeking to set

aside the order absolute. Counsel submitted that it is not

appropriate to consolidate the two motions to be heard

together and urged this Court to so hold, and to resolve

same in favour of the Appellant.

ISSUE THREE

Whether the rehearing of judgment debtor on the

same subject matter will not amount to abuse of ourt

process after the Order absolute has been granted.

This Court is informed that the trial Court in its Ruling of

the 8-1-2013 held that the Judgment Debtor/Respondent is

a nominal party and cannot be heard; that in a Garnishee

proceedings the Debtor clearly has no roles to play; that

the only legal option open to the Debtor in such

circumstance when served with the Order Nisi was to

Appeal the Judgment and apply for a stay, but certainly not

to appear and file processes in the Garnishee proceedings.

Learned Counsel further told this Court that the Judgment

Debtors grounds of

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objection was that the Accountant-General of the State was

not made a party to the proceedings and that the consent of

the Attorney-General of Zamfara State was not obtained

before the proceedings was instituted. Against this

backdrop, Counsel argued that the records of proceedings

particularly the ruling of the Court of the 8-1-2013 at pages

70-73 dealt extensively with the objection of the Judgment

Debtor and the ruling by the Court on the objection. It was

therefore submitted that the subsequent motions are an

a b u s e o f C o u r t p r o c e s s f o r t h e J u d g m e n t

Debtor/Respondent who was a Party to the Garnishee

Proceeding and who was heard on the merit before the

Courts ruling to bring another application seeking to

reverse the ruling of the Court before the same trial Court.

Counsel also submitted that if the trial Court is allowed to

hear the two applications before it, it would amount to

sitting on appeal over its own Judgment since it already

held that the Judgment Debtor cannot be heard and went

ahead and ruled on the objection. It was also contended by

Counsel that in a Garnishee proceeding, during the period

between when the order nisi and the

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order absolute is made, the matter would still be pending

before the Court. In other words, the proceeding would still

be at the interlocutory stage, but that when once the order

absolute is made, there would be nothing left before the

Court in the matter. According to Counsel, the Court has, at

that stage, completely determined the matter between the

parties as far as the proceedings are concerned; that the

Court would thereafter become functus officio and there

would then be nothing left to be determined by the Court.

Counsel cited the case of U.B.N. v. BONEY MARCUS

IND. LTD (2005) ALL FWLR 1041. Counsel urged this

Court to rule in favour of the Appellant.

1st RESPONDENT

ISSUE ONE

Whether the Judgment Debtor who participated in

Garnishee proceedings can be allowed to set aside

order absolute on the ground that the Judgment

Debtor's Attorney General Consent is required when

the Court had earlier ruled on same.

It was submitted on behalf of the 1st Respondent by

learned Counsel that there was nothing wrong with the 1st

Respondent/Judgment Debtor to have applied before the

lower Court, to have the order absolute made by the Court

below set

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aside upon the failure of the Appellant to have first sought

and obtained the consent of the Attorney-General in line

with the provisions of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil

Process Act. Counsel also argued that the law is that a

Court has no authority or legal competence to reverse itself

or correct itself or set aside its previous Judgment or order.

But that where, however, the Judgment or order is affected

and inflicted with a fundamental vice, the party affected is

entitled ex debitor justiciae to have it set aside; that the

Court indeed has an inherent jurisdiction to do so as it was

held in the case of ELEBUTE v. FALEKE (1995) 2 NWLR

(Pt. 375) 88.

It was also submitted on behalf of the 1st Respondent that

the trial lower Court was not wrong to have heard and

determined the 1st Respondents Application dealing with

the need to obtain the consent of the Attorney General of

Zamfara State. This, according to Counsel is because the

consent of the Attorney General is mandatory; besides, he

said that the account sought to be garnisheed by the trial

Court is the FAAC of the 1st Respondent. By the provision

of Section 84(1) of the

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Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Counsel also argued that

the consent of the Attorney General is sine qua non to the

hearing of Garnishee proceedings. He urged this Court to

so hold. Counsel referred Court to the following cases;

GOVERNMENT OF AKWA-IBOM v. POWER COM

(2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 246) 1356; PURIFICATION

TECHNIQUE v. A.G. LAGOS STATE (2005) 3; ONYEJU

v. M.C.I.K.S. (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 227); SKY BANK v.

UNITY BANK (Unreported) Court of Appeal Sokoto

CA/S/59/2015 delivered on 12/05/2016 and JAIZ BANK

v. UNITY BANK (Unreported) Court of Appeal Sokoto,

CA/S/58/2015 delivered on 01/07/2016.

On the strength of these, Counsel urged this Court to

resolve this issue in favour of the 1st Respondent and

against the Appellant.

ISSUES TWO and THREE

Whether the Court can consolidate two motions to be

heard at the same time when one is seeking to be

joined as a party to the garnishee proceeding and the

other is seeking to terminate the Garnishee

proceeding.

Whether the rehearing of judgment debtor on the

same subject matter will not amount to abuse of

Court process after the Order absolute has been

granted.

Under these issues,

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Counsel contended that the procedure for the enforcement

of judgment by Garnishee is statutory and are well laid out

in Sections 83, 84, 87 and 88 of the Sheriffs and Civil

Process Act Cap., S6 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. It

was submitted by Counsel that the application of the clear

words contained in the above Sections of the Act, will bring

out the spirit and intendment of the law makers who

intentionally couched the said provisions in such clear

terms or languages to bring out the justice of each case to

all parties concerned namely; the Judgment Debtor, the

Judgment Creditor and the Garnishee. To make assurance

doubly sure on the provisions of the law, Counsel

reproduced Section 84 (1) thus;

"Where money liable to be attached by garnishee

proceedings is in the custody under the control of a

public officer in his official capacity or in custodia

legis, the order nisi shall not be made under the

provisions of the last preceding section unless

consent to such attachment is first obtained from the

appropriate officer..."

(Underline, that of Counsel.)

According to Counsel, it is a fundamental principle of law

that all parties who

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will be affected one way or the other in litigation must be

made parties as they are entitled to be heard and must be

heard before a judgment of Court is handed down. Counsel

said that if it were not to be so, it would have been against

all known principles of fair hearing for a party to be

condemned in a judgment in which he is not given an

opportunity to lead evidence either in support or in defense

of his right: Counsel cited the case of ONABANJO v.

EWETUGA (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt. 288) 445.

Against the backdrop of this position, it was also submitted

by Counsel that the trial Court was right to have heard and

determined the 1st Respondent's Application by

consolidating the two Applications together on the

ground that rights/reliefs sought by the Appellant against

the 1st Respondent arose out of the same transaction and

that same can conveniently be disposed of in the same

proceedings. It was further submitted that the issue of

consolidation of causes is totally at the discretion of a

judge; that consolidation of suits is usually granted if a

Court is satisfied that the issues in the suits sought to be

consolidated can be resolved in one

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joint proceeding rather than in separate proceedings; that

the Supreme Court has made it clear as to the conditions

for the grant or refusal on an application for consolidation,

before the Court could exercise its discretion on the

matter which includes:

a) The case/suits to be consolidated must be pending in the

same Court.

b) There is/are some common question(s) of law or fact

bearing sufficient importance in proportion to the rest of

the subject matter(s) of the actions to render it desirable

that all the suits/cases sought to be consolidated be

disposed of at the same time.

c) The same common question(s) of law or fact in each of

the actions could conveniently be disposed of in the same

proceeding.

d) The right to relief claimed in each action arises out of

the same transaction or series of transaction, and/or

e) For any other reasons it is desirable to order

consolidation.

On account of these, Counsel cited the cases of: NGERE v.

OKURUKET 'XIV' (2015) EJSC VOL. 23, 85 @ 88;

OKWJAGBALA v. IKWUEME (2010) 19 NWLR (Pt.

1226) 54. He further argued that by the ruling of the

lower Court, the aforementioned conditions could be

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said to have been satisfied and he urged this Court to so

hold.

Learned Counsel also contended that the obligation of the

judge is to reach a decision which coheres best with the

total body of authoritative legal standard he is bound to

apply and that the paradigm of a rational decision is one

which is reached according to the rules, principles and

standards. He further contended that the law of evidence

imposes upon the judge the duty to reject irrelevant

matters and stick with the consideration of relevant

matters. Counsel cited the case of ILOABACHIE v.

ILOABACHIE (2000) NWLR (Pt. 656) 178 AT 223.

It was also argued by Counsel that adherence to the Rules

of Court is sine qua non to a competent adjudication by

parties since Rules of Court have been held to be

sacrosanct. Counsel cited the Supreme Court in: F.B.N.

PLC v. TSA IND. LTD (2010) 38 WRN 1 AT 51-52 lines

45-50 per ADEKEYE, JSC where the noble Lord had this

to say:

"Rules of Court are to regulate matters in Court and

help parties in the presentation of their case with a

procedure made for the purpose of a fair and quick

dispensation of justice in the trial. Strict compliance

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with the rules makes for quicker administration of

justice. They are made to attain justice with ease and

certainty and as such, they are made with that

fundamental principles ... rules of Court must be

complied with, observed and obeyed; non-compliance

often attracts the sanction of incompetency and

ultimately striking out or dismissal as the case may

be."

(Underline, that of Counsel for emphasis)

In view of the foregoing, and by the nature of the facts in

dispute, it was submitted by Counsel that there is nothing

wrong in joining the 1st Respondent in the Garnishee

proceedings and consolidating the two Applications the way

the trial Judge did as same amounted to the compliance

with the rules of fair hearing and not an abuse of processes

as contended by the Appellant. Counsel urged this Court to

so hold and to resolve these issues two (2) and three (3) in

favour of the 1st Respondent and against the Appellant and

dismiss the Appeal.

RESOLUTION OF APPEAL

The events giving rise to this Appeal arose from a contract

awarded by the Government of Zamfara State of Nigeria

who is the Judgment Debtor, herein on the 26-6-2008 for

the

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supplies of 12,500 metric tons of fertilizers for the 2008

cropping season. The failure of the Judgment Debtor to pay

the contract sum resulted into disputes between the

parties, which was subsequently referred to Arbitration;

and on the 20-12-2011, both consent and trial Awards were

published. The Award was later recognized by the Zamfara

State High Court of Justice on the 8-10-2012 and no Appeal

has been lodged against the Award/Judgment till date.

In order, therefore to enforce the Judgment, the Appellant

filed an ex parte application in order to bring a Garnishee

proceeding against the Judgment Debtor's Account with the

First Bank of Nigeria Plc and the Court granted the order

nisi on the 29-11-2012, which was served on all the parties,

i.e., the Appellant as Judgment Creditor, the Judgment

Debtor and the Garnishee. Notwithstanding the fact that

the Judgment Debtor participated in the Garnishee

proceedings and moved its application to set aside the

Garnishee Order nisi, the learned trial Court ruled on the

8-1-2013 that the Judgment Debtor is a nominal party to

the Garnishee proceedings and that the Attorneys-General

consent is not required

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for money in the possession of the Bank and the Court

proceeded from there to grant the order absolute.

It was after the grant of the order absolute that the

Judgment Debtor filed two motions; the one seeking to have

the Judgment Debtor formally joined as a party to the

Garnishee proceedings (which has been concluded by the

Judgment of the 8-1-2013) and the other, asking for an

order to set aside the order absolute on the ground that

there was an absence of the consent of the Attorney-

General Zamfara State prior to the commencement of the

Garnishee proceedings. When the motions came up to be

heard, the Appellant raised a preliminary objection towards

the hearing of the two motions on the ground that the

Court had by that date become functus officio after the

grant of the Garnishee order absolute and that the

Judgment Debtor is a nominal party in the Garnishee

proceeding as earlier held by the trial Court. While

delivering a Bench Ruling on account of the preliminary

objection raised, the Court held that the Respondent's two

motions (the one for joinder and the other seeking to set

aside the order absolute) should be consolidated and

heard

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together, hence the need for this Appeal by the

Appellant/Judgment Creditor.

The first huddle that needs to be scaled here is the question

of whether, it can be said in the real sense of the word that

the Judgment Debtor is indeed a nominal party in a

Garnishee proceedings as claimed by learned Appellants

Counsel, and that if at all, at what stage can a Judgment

Debtor be referred to as a nominal party? This Court in the

case of FIDELITY BANK PLC v. OKWUOWULU (2012)

LPELR-8497 (CA) per OGUNWUMIJU, JCA had this to

say on the issue;

A garnishee proceeding can be described in two

stages; the first stage is the process of getting an

order nisi. The order nisi directs the garnishee to

appear in Court on a specified date to show cause why

an order should not be made upon him for payment to

the judgment creditor the amount of the debt owed to

the judgment debtor. This is usually done ex parte

and limited to the judgment creditor and the Court.

The second stage is where on the return date, the

garnishee does not attend, or does not dispute the

debt claimed to be due from him to the judgment

debtor, the Court may subject to certain

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restrictions, make the garnishee order absolute under

which the garnishee is ordered to pay to the judgment

creditor the amount of debt due from him to the

judgment debtor, or so much of it as is sufficient to

satisfy the judgment debt together with the cost of

the proceedings and cost of garnishee. This later

proceeding is tripartite between the judgment debtor,

judgment creditor and the garnishee. This is because

on the return date, all parties must have been served

and given an opportunity to dispute liability or pray

that the order nisi be discharged for one cause or the

other.

This Court also in an earlier case in N.A.O.C. v. OGINI

(2011) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1230) 131 AT 152-153, per

OGUNWUMIJU, JCA had this to say on the subject;

If the judgment creditor knows that the judgment

debtor has an amount of money with any Bank or

institution, he will as Garnishor file for an ex parte

application to be supported by an affidavit in Form 23

of the Judgment Enforcement Rules (JER) for an

order that the Garnishee (in this case U.B.A. Plc.)

shall show cause why he should not pay the amount

due to the judgment debtor to him. These

proceedings are

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strictly ex parte between the Garnishor (judgment

creditor) and the Garnishee (the Bank or institution).

Where the Court grants the order nisi on the

garnishee, the Registrar through the Sheriff of the

Court must serve on the garnishee, the judgment

creditor and the judgment debtor the Order nisi on

Form 26 of JER. The Registrar must then fix a date

not less than 14 days after the service of the order

nisi on the judgment creditor, the judgment debtor

and the garnishee for hearing. This subsequent

hearing envisages a tripartite proceeding, in which all

interests are represented. That is when the judgment

debtor has the opportunity to convince the Court to

discharge the order nisi by filing affidavits to that

effect. After that hearing on notice, the Court may

discharge the order nisi or make it an order absolute.

Thus, the judgment enforcement rules envisage two

proceedings, one ex parte and the other one on

notice. I agree with the learned Respondents Counsel

and my learned brother that there can be no appeal

against the order nisi made ex parte. See Section

14(1) of the Court of Appeal Act, Cap. C36, Laws of

the Federation, 2004. On the other

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hand, the garnishee order absolute being proceedings

in which all parties have been heard and the interest

of the judgment debtor in the money in custody of the

Garnishee determined is one in which an appeal can

lie to this Court.

In a more recent decision of this Court on the issue, in the

case of C.B.N. v. AUTO IMPORT EXPORT (2013) 2

NWLR (Pt. 1337) 80 AT 127 PARAS F-G per

SAULAWA, JCA this was what this Court had to say on the

issue;

both the Garnishor and the garnishee as well as

the judgment debtor constitute the parties to the

proceedings.

See also the case of SOKOTO STATE GOVT. v. KAMDEX

(NIG.) LTD (2004) 9 NWLR (Pt. 878) 345 AT 380,

where this Court per CHUKWUMA-ENEH, JCA (as he then

was) had this to say;

The proceeding envisages three parties to it namely,

the judgment creditor (garnishor), the judgment

debtor and the garnishee in the instant case - the

Standard Trust Bank Ltd. 3rd appellant.

What seem most of the time to be lacking in the

determination of who the proper parties are in Garnishee

proceedings, is the failure to distinguish between the

proceedings leading to

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the grant of the Garnishee nisi and the proceedings leading

to the grant of the Garnishee absolute. The position

remains that in the Garnishee order nisi proceedings, due

to the nature of the application brought, which is by ex

parte it can safely be said that the proceedings involving

only the judgment creditor and the garnishee, is at that

stage a different thing altogether, as it is at that stage the

Judgment Debtor could rightly be said to be a nominal

party as he is not expected to play any roles then. But

where the proceeding goes beyond the level of the order

nisi and when the proceedings leading to the grant of the

Garnishee order absolute commences, three (3) parties are

envisaged at this point. These are;

a. The judgment creditor,

b. The judgment debtor; and

c. The Garnishee.

It is important to note that at the stage of the Garnishee

order absolute proceedings, the law envisages a more

active participation of the Judgment Debtor due to a

number reasons; First, by the wordings of Section 83(1) of

the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, the Judgment Debtor is

expected before or after the rendering of the order nisi, to

be examined

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orally or otherwise before the making of the order absolute.

This position is further reinforced by the provisions of

Section 83(2), which mandates the service of the order nisi

on the Judgment Debtor at least fourteen (14) days before

the hearing of the Garnishee proceedings leading to the

grant of an order absolute. It is important to note that the

fact that Section 83(2) makes it mandatory to serve the

order nisi on the Judgment Debtor clearly pre-supposes

that the Judgment Debtor is not a nominal, but a necessary

party to Garnishee proceedings at the stage of the

proceedings leading to the grant of a decree absolute.

After the service of the order nisi on the Judgment Debtor,

he may at that stage be expected to convince the Court by

the filing into Court of an application to have the order nisi

discharged where there are cogent reasons for doing so.

But where the Court refuses to discharge the order nisi and

goes ahead to make the order nisi absolute, the Judgment

Debtor, being a necessary party and not a nominal party,

can appeal as of right since the order absolute is regarded

as a final decision of the Court. See the case of UBN PLC v.

BONEY

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MARCUS IND. LTD & ORS (2005) LPELR-3394 (SC)

where the Supreme Court per AKINTAN, JSC had this to

say;

It is therefore an order made, at that stage that the

sum covered by the Application be paid into Court or

to the Judgment Creditor within a stated time unless

there is some sufficient reason why the party on

whom the order is directed is given why the payment

ordered should not be made. If no sufficient reason

appears, the Garnishee order is then made absolute

and that ends the matter in that the party against

whom the order absolute is made is liable to pay the

amount specified in the order to the judgment

creditor. The Court thereafter becomes functus

officio as far as that matter is concerned in that the

judge who decided the matter is precluded from again

considering the matter even if new evidence or

arguments are presented to him.

By virtue of the decisions of Court cited here above and by

virtue of the provisions of Sections 83(1) of the Sheriffs and

Civil Process Act, on the one hand and, which requires that

the Judgment Debtor has to be examined orally or

otherwise before the making of the order absolute; and

Section

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83(2) on the other hand, which mandates the service of the

order nisi on the Judgment Debtor at least fourteen (14)

days before the hearing wherein the order nisi will be made

absolute; this Court hereby finds and do hold that;

1. The judgment Debtor becomes a necessary party after

the grant of the Garnishee order nisi and rather than being

referred to as a nominal party as he is expected henceforth,

and upon the grant of the decree nisi to play the role of a

necessary party in the rest of the proceedings either

leading to the setting aside of the decree nisi or the grant

of the decree absolute.

2. That the grant of the Garnishee Order absolute by the

Court ultimately, signifies the final decision of the Court in

respect of the Garnishee proceedings by virtue of the

decision of the Supreme Court in the case of UBN PLC v.

BONEY MARCUS (Supra).

The question that should therefore be addressed at this

stage is; whether the learned Court below, after having

accomplished its functions in the Garnishee proceedings

brought before it by the grant subsequently of the

Garnishee order absolute, was in any position to review,

reverse, rehear or revisit

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the issue of the Garnishee proceedings afresh, which was

b r o u g h t b e f o r e i t f o r a d j u d i c a t i o n b y t h e

Appellant/Judgment Creditor following the application of

the 1st Respondent to that effect who was Judgment Debtor

at the Court below?

The settled position of the law is that a Court is said to be

functus officio in respect of a matter if the Court has

accomplished its functions in respect of that matter and it

lacks the jurisdiction to review, reopen, reverse or revisit

the matter. See FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. TSA

INDUSTRIES LIMITED (2010) LPELR- 1283 (SC). In

an earlier judgment of the Supreme Court, in the case of

JOHN ANDY SONS & CO. LTD v. NATIONAL CEREAL

RESEARCH INSTITUTE (1997) LPELR-1691 (SC) on

the issue, the Court per WALI, JSC had this to say on the

subject;

Once an issue or issues have been raised and

determined by the between the litigating parties, the

Court becomes functus officio to either direct or allow

the parties to re-open the same issues before it for re-

litigation. See NNAJIOFOR v. UKONU (1985) 2 NWLR

(Pt. 9) 686 AT 688."

Also in the case of SANUSI v. AYOOLA (1992)

LPELR-3009 (SC), the Supreme Court per

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KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC had this to say;

There is the well sett led elementary and

fundamental principle of law that a Court on

disposing of a cause before it renders itself functus

officio. It ceases to have jurisdiction in respect of

such case; see EKERELE v. EKE (1925) 6 NLR 118;

AKINYEDE v. THE APPRAISER (1971) 1 ALL NLR,

162; it cannot assume the status of an Appellate

Court over its own decision, except there is statutory

power to do so- See FRITZ v. HOBSON (1880) 14 Ch.

D. 542.

However, nothing prevents the trial Court where a

judgment is in need of clarification or correction in respect

of clerical slips or omissions from going ahead to effect

necessary clarifications or corrections as the case may be

as there is power under the law for the same Court that

delivered the judgment to correct clerical slips or

accidental omissions. See the cases of ASIYANBI & ORS

v. ADENIYI (1967) 1 ALL NLR 82; ANYASINTI

UMUNNA & 5 ORS v. ANIMUDA OKWURAIWE & 3

ORS (1978) 6-7 SC 1 and BERLIET v. KACHALLA

(1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 478 AT 493-494, where the

Supreme Court held that even where the judge of the High

Court who delivered the

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judgment for any reason is not available, any other judge in

exercise of the general powers under Section 6 (6)(a) and

236 (1) of the 1979 Constitution, should be in as good a

position as the judge who delivered the judgment to correct

any palpable slips or errors in the judgment. In UMUNNA

& 5 ORS v. OKWURAIWE & 3 ORS (supra), the

Supreme Court went ahead and affirmed the power of the

trial High Court to amend or correct its judgment when its

attention was drawn to the error while the judgment was

being delivered. See also the case of FEDERAL PUBLIC

TRUSTEE v. MRS. C. A. SOBAMOWO (1967) NMLR

350 where the exercise of the power to correct accidental

slips or omissions in the judgment and orders of Court was

allowed.

Where however, there had been an error or omission by a

Court on matters, which are not accidental slips or clerical

mistakes but of law, the Court would not have the

jurisdiction to correct such errors or omissions even though

apparent on the face of the judgment or order. See the case

of RACE AUTO SUPPLY CO. LTD v. AKIB (supra). See

also the cases of BRIGHT v. SELLER (1904) I. K.B. 6

and RE: GIST (1904) 1 CH. 408 cited with

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approval in UMUNNA & 5 ORS v. OKWURAIWE & 3

ORS (Supra). In other words, the extent and scope of the

exercise of power of Court to correct clerical errors,

accidental slips or omissions should not be used as an

excuse to review, reverse or rehear the case afresh. It is

important to note that the nature of the application of the

1st Respondent in the instant Appeal filed at the Court

below and by which the 1st Respondent has sought to have

the Court hear arguments with regards to questions

involving the consent of the Attorney General on the one

hand and on the other hand, questions by which the 1st

Respondent has sought to be joined as a party to the

Garnishee proceedings, would no doubt entail the

rehearing, the revisiting or the reviewing of issues which

have previously been settled one way or the other by the

Court below and the Court below has no powers to do so,

whether inherent or statutory. See MINISTRY OF LAGOS

AFFAIRS, MINES AND POWERS v. AKIN-OLUGBADE

(1974) 9 NSCC 489. See also the case of ALAO v. A.C.B.

(2000) 9 NWLR (Pt. 672) 264 where the Supreme Court

per, KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC had this to say on the subject;

The following three

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principles appear to be enshrined in the provision of

this Rule. First, the Court shall not review any

judgment once delivered. See ADEFULU v. OKULAJA

(1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 550) 435. The exception to this

prohibition where it is intended to correct any clerical

mistakes or some error arising from accidental slip or

omission, or to vary the judgment or order so as to

give effect its meaning or intention. This is known as

the slip rule. Secondly, there is a total prohibition

from review of a judgment which correctly represents

what the Court decided. Such a judgment shall not be

varied. Thirdly, the operative and substantive

judgment shall not be varied and a different form

substituted.

This Court, in all seriousness wonders exactly what the 1st

Respondents application before the Court below is all

about. Here at the ninety-ninth hour, the 1st Respondent

now seeks to be joined as a party to the Garnishee

proceedings, which has since been concluded on its merits

and under which the Court below had become functus

officio. When the 1st Respondent was mandatorily served

after the grant of the order nisi as Judgment Debtor, it had

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all the opportunity of making the objections it now

considers important to make, thrust upon it on a platter of

gold, courtesy of the provisions of Sections 83(1) and 83(2)

of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act. But unfortunately,

these opportunities to say the least were frittered away for

reasons best known to the 1st Respondent. Upon being

served in accordance with Section 83(2) of the Sheriffs and

Civil Process Act, the 1st Respondent became a necessary

party and was expected to play the role of a necessary in

the rest of the proceedings either leading to the setting

aside of the order nisi or the grant of the order absolute.

But this was not to be.

In the final analysis, this Appeal succeeds and the Ruling of

the Court below i.e. the High Court of Zamfara State sitting

at Gusau and delivered on the 28-1-2013 in suit number

ZMS/GS/M16/2013 is hereby set aside. Parties to bear their

respective costs.

HUSSEIN MUKHTAR, J.C.A.: I have had the privilege of

previewing the lead judgment of my learned brother,

Frederick O. Oho, JCA. I am in total agreement with the

eloquent reasoning therein and the conclusion that the

appeal

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is meritorious and deserves to be allowed. I adopt it as

mine and hereby allow the appeal.

I subscribe to the orders made in the judgment inclusive of

costs.

MUHAMMED LAWAL SHUAIBU, J.C.A.: I had the

opportunity of reading in draft the judgment just delivered

by my learned brother, Frederick O. Oho, JCA. I am in

complete agreement with his reasoning and conclusion. I

wish to add that Garnishee proceedings commences with

an exparte application for an order nisi and terminates with

an order absolute after all the necessary parties were put

on notice. Once an order absolute is granted, the Court

becomes functus officio in respect of that matter and thus

lacks jurisdiction to review, reopen or reverse its decision.

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