2. Kida v. Senate 2011

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/2-kida-v-senate-2011 1/36

EN BANC

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA,

in his personal capacity, and inrepresentation of MAGUINDANAO

FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS

IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION,

INC., HADJI MUHMINA J.

USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM,

JAMILON T. ODIN, ASRIN

TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M.

KALANG, ALIH AL-SAIDI J. SAPI-

E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and

BASSAM ALUH SAUPI,

Petitioners,

- versus -

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

represented by its President JUAN

PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES, thru

SPEAKER FELICIANO

BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, thru its Chairman,

SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR.,

PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Office of

the President Executive Secretary,

FLORENCIO ABAD, JR., Secretary

of Budget, and ROBERTO TAN,

Treasurer of the Philippines,

Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

BASARI D. MAPUPUNO, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 196271 Present:

CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION, PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 18, 2011

G.R. No. 196305

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


- versus -

SIXTO BRILLANTES, in his

capacity as Chairman of the

Commission on Elections,

FLORENCIO ABAD, JR. in his

capacity as Secretary of the

Department of Budget and

Management, PACQUITO OCHOA,

JR., in his capacity as Executive

Secretary, JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

in his capacity as Senate President,

and FELICIANO BELMONTE, inhis capacity as Speaker of the House

of Representatives,

Respondents. x----------------------------------------------x

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN,

Petitioner,

- versus -

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his

capacity as the Executive Secretary,

and the COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU

CASAN CONDING CANA, and

PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO

PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN

(PDP-LABAN), Petitioners,

G.R. No. 197221

G.R. No. 197280

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


- versus -

THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,

SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON.

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his

capacity as Executive Secretary,

HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR.,

in his capacity as Secretary of the

Department of Budget and

Management, and HON. ROBERTO

B. TAN, in his capacity as Treasurerof the Philippines,

Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

ATTY. ROMULO B.

MACALINTAL,

Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

and THE OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, through EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY PAQUITO N.

OCHOA, JR.,

Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

LUIS “BAROK” BIRAOGO,

Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 197282

G.R. No. 197392

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY PAQUITO N.

OCHOA, JR., Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------x

JACINTO V. PARAS,

Petitioner,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and the

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------x

MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM,

PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-Intervenor.

G.R. No. 197454

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:

On June 30, 2011, Republic Act ( RA) No. 10153, entitled “ An Act Providing

for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of

August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) yearsthereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs)

for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and theMembers of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions

pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013

elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”

Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 alreadyspawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No.

2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multipliedafter RA No. 10153 was passed.

Factual Antecedents

The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,

mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao andthe Cordilleras. Section 15 states:

Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and

in the Cordillerasconsisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographicalareas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic

and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of

this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the

Republic of the Philippines.

Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact anorganic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the grantedautonomy.

Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous regionwith the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission

composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees

from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of

government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislativeassembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent

political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with

personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved

by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting

favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987

Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled “ An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao.” A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section

18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous Regionof Muslim Mindanao ( ARMM ). The initially assenting provinces were Lanao del

Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days

nor later than 90 days after its ratification.

RA No. 9054 (entitled “ An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act

for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in

Muslim Mindanao, as Amended ”) was the next legislative act passed. This law

provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in theoriginal organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regionalofficials to the second Monday of September 2001.

Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140[1] - on June22, 2001. This law reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA

No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.

RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.

The province of Basilanand Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.

RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMMregional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3

years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was notratified in a plebiscite.

Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have

been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these

elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regionaloffices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resettingthe ARMM elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local

elections of the country.

RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill

( HB) No. 4146, seeking the postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/196271.htm#_ftn1






7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB

No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.

After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate

Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators votedfavorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred

with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No.10153 into law.

As mentioned, the early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition

filed with this Court – G.R. No. 196271[3]

- assailing the constitutionality of both

HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity of RA No. 9333 aswell for non-compliance with the constitutional plebiscite requirement. Thereafter,

petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305filed another petition[4] also

assailing the validity of RA No. 9333.

With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its

preparations for the ARMM elections. The law gave rise as well to the filing of the

following petitions against its constitutionality:

a) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[5] filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a

member of the House of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in hiscapacity as the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R.

No. 197221;

b) Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6] filed by Atty. Romulo Macalintal

as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197282;

c) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, Injunction and Preliminary

Injunction[7] filed by Louis “Barok” Biraogo against the COMELEC and

Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed as G.R. No. 197392;and

d) Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus[8] filed by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa,

Jr. and the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197454.

Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and Datu Casan Conding Cana as

registered voters from the ARMM, with the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakasng Bayan (a political party with candidates in the ARMM regional elections




















7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


scheduled for August 8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and

Mandamus[9] against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 197280, to assail theconstitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153.

Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights ForumPhilippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their own Motion for

Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and Comment-in-Interventiondated July 18, 2011. On July 26, 2011, the Court granted the motion. In the same

Resolution, the Court ordered the consolidation of all the petitions relating to theconstitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA No. 10153.

Oral arguments were held on August 9, 2011 and August 16,2011. Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their respective memoranda

within twenty (20) days.

On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent

elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should these

cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30, 2011.

The Arguments

The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153

assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply with the

supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3,Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.

The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is

unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of

Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged

violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure toadhere to the “elective and representative” character of the executive and

legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant

to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of theelective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular

elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they also argue that the power of

appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, incomplete violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.

The Issues





7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were recognized and

argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:

I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of

elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2),Article VI of the 1987 Constitution

III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajorityvote and plebiscite

A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular electionsconstitute an amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?

B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Section 1

and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and

the corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?

C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the

creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?

IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the

ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution

VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.

OUR RULING

We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the

constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in toto .

I. Synchr onization as a recognized constitutional mandate

The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the

Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this position, cites

Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution,which provides:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitutionshall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.

The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President,

which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It

shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in theMetropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local

officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,

1992.

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining thehighest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three

years.

xxx

Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President

elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.

The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution

shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.

We agree with this position.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to

synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by

deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought toattain synchronization of elections.[11]

The objective behind setting a common termination date for all electiveofficials, done among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve

winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the holding of all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years.[12] This

intention finds full support in the discussions during the ConstitutionalCommission deliberations.[13]

These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the

Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of theconstitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting

the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.

This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of thenational and local elections as a constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission

on Elections,[14] we explained:

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that

the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the

local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to

end on the same hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.

It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections

that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding

simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenureon the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize

future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).

That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representativesand the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronizedwith the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is

likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional

Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]

Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be includedamong the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the

wording and structure of the Constitution.

A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should beunderstood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary





















7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the

significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] “[a]s the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, its language

should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be

given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.”

Understood in its ordinary sense, the word “local” refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or

minor political subdivision.[17]Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall

within this classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve

within the limited region of ARMM.

From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered

one of the forms of local governments, as evident from Article X of theConstitution entitled “Local Government.” Autonomous regions are establishedand discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted

to Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local

government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of

the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Thereshall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and theCordilleras as

hereinafter provided.

Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated by the

Constitution does not include the regional elections of the ARMM – unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions

below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed inthis case and must be recalled time and again for its complete resolution.

II. The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153

The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No.10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the

Constitution[18] which provides that before bills passed by either the House or theSenate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days.















7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


The exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s

immediate enactment.

The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of

the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of

printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except

when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in

Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can becomea law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been

printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.

xxx

That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of

three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensedwith is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill

defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with theSenate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third

readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after

the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker

of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediateenactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local

elections.

[20]

Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separatereadings requirement.

On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate

enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or emergency that hadto be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas

corpus or declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a

national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to thePresident under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basicrights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential

certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural

requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of

Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.[Emphasis

supplied.]









7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of their

legislative discretion – gave full recognition to the President’s certification and

promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing short of graveabuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our

intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]

The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justificationfor this course of action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are

not bound by the acceptance of the President's certification by both the House of

Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the

Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]

In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold purpose thatunderlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of every bill must

always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties interested in pending

bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect toMembers of Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote

on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment

process.[23]

We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both

advocates and the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunitiesto present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No. 10153 on the

cited ground.

III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054

The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged

because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054in amending this law. These provisions require:

Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Actmay be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the

Senate voting separately.

Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall becomeeffective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called













7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than

ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

We find no merit in this contention.

In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular

elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333

and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent laws – RA No. 9333

and RA No. 10153 – cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they

did not change or revise any provision in the latter law ; they merely filled in agap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the

subsequent regular elections.

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the

date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds support in

ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled theARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the

date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of the firstARMM elections,[24] leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.

Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25] RA No. 8176,[26] RA No. 8746,[27] RA No.8753,[28] and RA No. 9012[29]

were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the

ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or provisionof RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there

was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second Monday of

September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 [30] to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the

plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new

date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the

provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054 . Thereafter,Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31] which further reset the date of the ARMM

regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.































7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat

the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate anddistinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this intent

when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the amendment

prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.

III. B. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No.

9054 the character of an irrepealable law

Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1,

Article XVII of RA No. 9054[32]has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the

character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitutiondemands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of

each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.” In other words, as long asmajority of the members of the House of Representatives or the Senate are present,

these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business and holdsession. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws

or approve acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no

less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly,this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the

passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend,

revise or repeal the laws it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS [33] on this subject best explains the basis and reason for the

unconstitutionality:

Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a

legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body,

considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as theydo the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes

desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future

amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of

omniscience.

xxx






7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether

pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce

new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by thefederal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its

successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every

legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original actwas passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This

legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It

cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of

subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34]

(Emphasis ours.)

Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is alimitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is

constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the future legislators’

room for action and flexibility. III. C. Section 3, Article XVI I of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite

requir ement found in Section 18, Arti cle X of the Constitu tion

The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarrantedsupermajority, but enlarged as well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its

Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority requirement,

we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18,Article X of the Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a

violation of the Constitution.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required

only for the creation of autonomous regions and for determining which provinces,cities and geographic areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the

settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the

plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35]questions on the extent of

the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably arise because of the seeminglygeneral terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would result if a

plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.

Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that “The creation of

the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the

votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose.” Withthese wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only

amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to thecreation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the








7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require

ratification through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are thosethat relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the region’s

judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property law

jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative powers constitutionallyconceded to the regional government under Section 20, Article X of the

Constitution.[36]

The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the matters thatthe Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the Organic Act.

Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes and the plebiscite

requirements are valid, any change in the date of elections cannot be construed as asubstantial amendment of the Organic Act that would require compliance with

these requirements.

IV. The synchronization issue

As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local elections is a

constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronizationmust include the ARMM elections. On this point, an existing law in fact already

exists – RA No. 7166 – as the forerunner of the current RA No. 10153. RA No.7166 already provides for the synchronization of local elections with the national

and congressional elections. Thus, what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter

for local governments (with the exceptionof barangay and Sanggunian Kabataan elections where the terms are notconstitutionally provided) and is technically a reiteration of what is already

reflected in the law, given that regional elections are in reality local elections byexpress constitutional recognition.[37]

To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the

schedule of the ARMM’s regular elections (which should have been held inAugust 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and

local elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).

During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to

Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1) to allow the

elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the

synchronized elections assume office;[38] (2) to hold special elections in theARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the













7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint

OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in thesynchronized elections assume office.

As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below, Congress, in choosingto grant the President the power to appoint OICs, chose the correct option and

passed RA No. 10153 as a completely valid law.

V. The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153

A. Basic Underlying Premises

To fully appreciate the available options, certain underlying material

premises must be fully understood. The first is the extent of the powers of

Congress to legislate; the second is the constitutional mandate for thesynchronization of elections; and the third is on the concept of autonomy asrecognized and established under the 1987 Constitution.

The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general andcomprehensive.[39] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of

civil government.[40] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is

necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged itelsewhere.[41] Except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly,

legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to all matters of general

concern or common interest.[42]

The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in some provisions of the

Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of

Rights (Article 3). Other constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and

referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. The implied limitations are found

“in the evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and historical

events which led to the enactment of the particular provision as a part of organiclaw.”[43]

The constitutional provisions on autonomy – specifically, Sections 15 to 21of Article X of the Constitution – constitute express limitations on legislative

power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters, thus limiting




















7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to legislate on the governance

of the autonomous region.

Of particular relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations

posed by the prescribed basic structure of government – i.e., that the governmentmust have an executive department and a legislative assembly, both of which must

be elective and representative of the constituent political units; nationalgovernment, too, must not encroach on the legislative powers granted under

Section 20, Article X. Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17, ArticleX, “all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution or by law to the

autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.”

The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should likewise serve as a

standard that Congress must observe in dealing with legislation touching on the

affairs of the autonomous regions. The terms of these sections leave no doubt onwhat the Constitution intends – the idea of self-rule or self-government, in particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social, economic and

administrative matters. But equally clear under these provisions are the

permeating principles of national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic, as expressed in the above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44] In

other words, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,

reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45]

in the relationship between the nationaland the regional governments.

In relation with synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are recognized and established constitutional mandates,

with one being as compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all,the difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the

whole country, while regional autonomy – as the term suggests – directly carries a

narrower regional effect although its national effect cannot be discounted.

These underlying basic concepts characterize the powers and limitations of

Congress when it acted on RA No. 10153. To succinctly describe the legal

situation that faced Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regionalelections with the national, congressional and all other local elections (save

for barangay and sangguniang kabataan elections) left it with the problem of how

to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening per iod between theexpiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office

– twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronizedelections on May 13, 2013.








7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


The problem, in other words, was for in ter im measures for this period,consistent with the terms of the Constitution and its established supporting

jurisprudence, and with the respect due to the concept of autonomy. Interim

measures, to be sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legallandscape. The Constitution’s Transitory Provisions themselves collectively

provide measures for transition from the old constitution to the new[46] and for theintroduction of new concepts.[47] As previously mentioned, the adjustment of

elective terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first transpiredunder the Transitory Provisions. The adjustments, however, failed to look far

enough or deeply enough, particularly into the problems that synchronizing

regional autonomous elections would entail; thus, the present problem is with ustoday.

The creation of local government units also represents instances wheninterim measures are required. In the creation of Quezon del Sur [48] and DinagatIslands,[49] the creating statutes authorized the President to appoint an interim

governor, vice-governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan althoughthese positions are essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to

serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been elected andqualified.[50] A similar authority to appoint is provided in the transition of a local

government from a sub-province to a province.[51]

In all these, the need for interim measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-

the-way arrangements and approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust tothe goal or objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the

Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms. Under these limitations, the choiceof measures was a question of wisdom left to congressional discretion.

To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the

guideposts and markers in our discussion of the options available to Congress toaddress the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM

elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding of the options as interim measures assume

prime materiality as i t is under these terms that the passage of RA No. 10153

should be measur ed, i.e ., given the consti tutional objective of synchr onization

that cannot legall y be faul ted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate

the Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant

problems that the adjustment of elections necessari ly brought wi th i t?
























7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional

We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in

executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term – as

an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8,Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangayofficials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such

official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and

bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannotextend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmeña v.

COMELEC :[52]

It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified

where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term

and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin,there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even

though the successors fail to qualify within the time.

In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:

“It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by

an act postponing the election to fill an office the term of which

is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the

incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution .”

[Emphasis ours.]

Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the

supreme law of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a

determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or mandated

should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repealthrough the applicable constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of

the three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional mandateexcept only as the Constitution itself may allow.[53] If at all, Congress may only

pass legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command

or to implement it by legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other









7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is appropriate and called

for .[54]

In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly

and unequivocally, allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respectto the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an interpretation from

this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3)

years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover byCongress.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term

mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to

appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the

elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectlywhat it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the

term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can bedone indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.[55] Congress cannot also create a

new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term.This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional

intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President.[56] Hence,holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that

Congress could not have undertaken.

Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where thequestion of holdover was brought before, and given the imprimatur of approval by,

this Court. The present case though differs significantly from past cases withcontrary rulings, particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC ,[57] Adap v.

Comelec,[58] and Montesclaros v. Comelec ,[59] where the Court ruled that theelective officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

All these past cases refer to elective barangay or sangguniang

kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly provided for

in the Constitution; the present case, on the other hand, refers to local electiveofficials – the ARMM Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the three-year term

limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an extension beyond the

term for which they were originally elected.

























7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had

been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60] we have to remember that the rule of holdover can only apply as an

available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary

exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.[61]

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the

intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 bycompletely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly

within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of

legislation,[62] except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

C. The COMELEC has no authori ty to order special elections

Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this

Court to compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant toSection 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, asevident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the Constitution:

Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of theSenators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the

second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]

Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President

and Vice-President, states: xxxx

Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for

President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.[Emphasis ours]

while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:













7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which

shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,

salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]

These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on

any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congressand local officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon

orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power .[63]

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the

scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local

elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a poli cy decision in the exercise

of its legislative wisdom that it shal l not cal l special elections as an adjustmentmeasure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act

to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the

COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without therebysupplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the

Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse of

discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narr ow ground and i s merely to annul

a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor

to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its

legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges,

we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special elections.

Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of theCOMELEC, in contrast with the power of Congress to call for, and to set the date

of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations

relative to the conduct of an election.[65]Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to

call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutorygrant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP 881, COMELEC with

the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to,and can only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided

for in the law. We quote:

Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause suchas violence, terrorism,loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or












7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the

holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any

political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition byany interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested

parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election

therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the electionnot held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later thanthirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of

the election or failure to elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force

majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in

any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been

suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after thevoting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in

the custody or canvass thereof,such election results in a failure to elect , and in

any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any

interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or

continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to

elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation

of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

[Emphasis ours]

A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address

instances whereelections have already been scheduled to take place but have tobe postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of

election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogouscauses of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election

should become impossible in any political subdivision. Under the principleof ejusdem generis, the term “analogous causes” will be restricted to

those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduledelections. These “analogous causes” are further defined by the phrase “of such

nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become

impossible.”

Similarly, Section 6 of BP 881 applies only to those situations where

elections have already been scheduled but do not take place because of (a) force

majeure, (b) violence, (c) terrorism, (d) fraud, or (e) other analogous

causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date

fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the

7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the

election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a

failure to elect. As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where

the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because

of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances.

In the present case, the postponement of the ARMM elections is by law – i.e., by congressional policy – and is pursuant to the constitutional mandate of

synchronization of national and local elections. By no stretch of the imaginationcan these reasons be given the same character as the circumstances contemplated

by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881, which all pertain to extralegal causes that

obstruct the holding of elections. Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of astatute under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not provided nor

intended by the lawmakers.[66] Clearly, neither Section 5 nor Section 6 of BP 881

can apply to the present case and this Court has absolutely no legal basis to compelthe COMELEC to hold special elections.

D. The Cour t has no power to shor ten the terms of elective off icials

Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the

COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal basis likewise exists to rule that thenewly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials

elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.

In the first place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of electiveofficials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective

officials, which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] isspecifically given to Congress. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as

shown when the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the

least votes,[68] and extended the terms of the President and the Vice-President[69] in

order to synchronize elections; Congress was not granted this same power. Thesettled rule is that terms fixed by the Constitution cannot be changed by mere

statute.[70] More particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has

the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM for less , or more, than the consti tutionall y mandated three years

[71] as this tinkering would

directly contravene Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as we ruled in Osmena.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be

extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an

expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
























7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a callfor special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, theresult is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to beelected in the ARMM elections instead of acting on their term (where the “term”

means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right andfixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another,

while the “tenure” represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds

the office).[72] As with the fixing of the elective term, neither Congress nor theCourt has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.

They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if

they do so.

E. The President’s Power to Appoi nt OICs

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM

during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should

be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the

limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictlyconstrued; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to berecognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the

Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the

Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces

from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments

are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of

the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,

and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,

in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.[emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President canappoint. These are:









7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


First , the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other publicministers and consuls; officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the

rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested

in the President in this Constitution;

Second , all other officers of the government whose appointments are nototherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by lawvest in the President alone.[74]

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed

law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to

appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the

Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative officials to be“elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement

indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the

appointment of OICs constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153

were to be mistakenl y read as a law that changes the elective and representative

character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way

amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to“appoint

officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice

Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall performthe functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the

May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far

different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term endingon the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.





7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


As we have already established in our discussion of the supermajority and

plebiscite requirements, the legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA

No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections

and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhi le prevail . And this is

how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on itsunambiguous facial terms.[75] Aside fr om its order for synchronization, it i s purely

and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that the

synchronization requir es.

Thus, the appropriate question to ask is whether the interim measure is an

unreasonable move for Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the

synchronization unavoidably brought with it. In more concrete terms and based onthe above considerations, given the plain unconstitutionali ty of providing for a

holdover and the unavail abil ity of constitutional possibi li ties for lengthening or

shortening the term of the elected ARMM off icials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a f ixed and specif ic per iod as an interim

measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Ar ticle VI I of the Constitu tion – an

unconsti tutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?

Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other

situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the adjustment

period for synchronization would be to foster a government that is not “democraticand republican.” For then, the people’s right to choose the leaders to govern them

may be said to be systemically withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic

regime. This is the grant that would frontally breach the “elective andrepresentative” governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the

Constitution.

But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited circumstances

contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly,

the terms of governance – both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution andRA No. 9054 – will not systemically be touched nor affected at all. To repeat what

has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern unchanged and continuously,

with full effect in accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim andtemporary measures that synchronization of elections requires.

Viewed from another perspective, synchronization will temporarily disruptthe election process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s

choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of necessity and as aninterim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adopted and used





7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


in the creation of local government units[76] and the adjustments of sub-provinces

to the status of provinces.[77] These measures, too, are used in light of the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections (considered vis-à-vis the

regional interests involved). The adoption of these measures, in other words, is no

different from the exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State,where one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure taken

in light of the given circumstances.

Furthermore, the “representative” character of the chosen leaders need notnecessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is really a

function of the appointment process; only the “elective” aspect shall be supplanted

by the appointment of OICs. In this regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks toaddress concerns arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4

and 5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner

and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.

Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No. 10153 – viewed in its

proper context – is a law that is not violative of the Constitution (specifically, its

autonomy provisions), and one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.

VI. Other Constitutional Concerns

Outside of the above concerns, it has been argued during the oral argumentsthat upholding the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous

precedent of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in thecountry, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with OICs.

This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board cancellationof elections is a matter for Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power

that falls within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers. Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can legislatively

undertake with respect to elections.

If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a

very specific and limited purpose – the synchronization of elections. It was atemporary means to a lasting end – the synchronization of elections. Thus, RA No.10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and

specific, and cannot be transferred or applied to any other cause for thecancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call for

special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by

Congress to the COMELEC, as above discussed.








7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act ina holdover capacity upon the expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot

compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now has to deal

with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.

To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgottenthat a period of 21 months – or close to 2 years – intervenes from the time that the

incumbent ARMM elective officials’ terms expired and the time the new ARMMelective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history

– past and current – teach us, many developments, some of them critical and

adverse, can transpire in the country’s Muslim areas in this span of time in the waythey transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the

presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully

functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with eventemporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the presentcircumstances is an absolute necessity.

Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs toundertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative

Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier

pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al .:[79]

It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the RevisedAdministrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary

appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may

occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive

positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local

Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent

reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly

applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is

the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the

President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the

members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problemruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under

the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation andgovernance in their own local government.

In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of









7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will

be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people

of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80]

(Emphasis ours.)

As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor,

and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic

services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional

government, and in responding to critical developments that may arise. Whenviewed in this context, allowing the President in the exercise of his

constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

B. Autonomy in the ARMM

It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally

mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that theConstitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume

that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates – synchronization and regional autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one

over the other.

We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle inconstitutional construction – ut magis valeat quam pereat : that the Constitution is

to be interpreted as a whole,[81] and one mandate should not be given importanceover the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear .[82] We refer

to the Court’s declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al. ,[83] thus:

A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from

the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, andapparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a

manner that may give to all of them full force and effect. [Emphasis supplied.]

Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional

autonomy. They are interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, inthe way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the measure to transit

to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that

must be respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or modify its

governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated bythe attendant circumstances.

















7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not besynchronized with the national and local elections in order to maintain the

autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the rough

and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far fromconvinced of its merits.

As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are

granted political autonomy, the framers of the Constitution never equatedautonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to

operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national

policies set by the national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous determination. As reflected during the

constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:

Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the

central government, but rather an efficient working relationship between theautonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective

partnership, not a separation.

Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of ascomplete independence.

Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the

larger political framework of the nation.[84]

[Emphasis supplied.]

This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted

Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be “within the framework of this

Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”

Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove

Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration

of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of theConstitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provisionin order to “mak e it clear, once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of

the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised

by the national government[.]”[85] Of note is the Court’s pronouncement

in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirr e[86] which we quote:












7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government

has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including

autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegatedto political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance

more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic,

political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country

to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be

integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-

setting for the entire country still lies in the President and

Congress. [Emphasis ours.]

In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to

defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not

just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is subject to it; the regional

autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from havingto act in accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than theConstitution.

Conclusion

Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national and local elections – when it enacted RA No.

10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this

task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the lawand, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]

Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should

address what is essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty of usurping the

exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to

compel COMELEC to hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so,

are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which isabhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic

government – the separation of powers.

The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with

grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is

such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to













7/29/2019 2. Kida v. Senate 2011


amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty

enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power isexercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and

hostility.[90]

We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its

constitutional mandate. Given an array of choices, it acted within dueconstitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary

adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accusedof any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find

no reason to accord merit to the petitioners’ claims of grave abuse of discretion.

On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only

reiterate the established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus,

has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and the partychallenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[92] Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be

resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[93] As this Court declared in Garcia v.

Executive Secretary:[94]

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and

to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a

clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This

presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon

each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. Thetheory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines,

a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the

fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95]

[Emphasis ours.]

Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of

constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm itsvalidity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated

petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,

and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporaryrestraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

























Documents

2. Kida v. Senate 2011