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HSI Lessons Learned Status Report

FORCEnet HSI Working GroupGeorge Edw. Seymour, Ph.D. *

LCDR Sally Van Horn * *

* * Naval Network Warfare Command

* Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, San Diego

San Diego, California: April 7, 2004

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Fn Human Systems Integration Lessons Learned Update Agenda

The value of HSI….leader comments….at the deck platesRecent HSI timelineHSI focus deficit in OIF LLHSI Lessons Learned info designHSI LL status report Preliminary findings and recommendations

Interview process findingsValue and next steps

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The Value of HSI

“In short, only by embracing a human-centered and HSI-focused philosophy that transcends virtually every element of the Navy will we be able to win the "war for people" and also ensure our future warships and other platforms can go in harm's way and emerge victorious.” — CNO (2002)

Source:

http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/vision/vis02/vpp02-ch3a.html

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HSI at the Deckplates

“It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, who's face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again,

because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.”

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Traditional HSI

Wartime Rqmts

DeploymentConsiderations

Force Structure

Operating Strength

Manning Concepts

Rate / Rating

Officer and EnlistedWorkload

Training Concepts& Strategy

Task AnalysisMethods

Media / Equipment

Simulation

OP Tempo

Training SystemEvaluation

Training Development Plan

Quality of Life

Quality of Work

Environment Limitsand Controls

Personnel Services

Physical & Mental Capabilities &

Limitations

Anthropometrics &Biomedical Criteria

Man-MachineInterface

Mission, Function& Human

Rqmts Analyses

Skill, Knowledge& Abilities

PerformanceAssessments

PersonnelClassification &

Selection

Demographics

Accession & AttritionRates

Retention Rates

Career Progression

Training Flow

System Safety / HealthHazards Plan

Human ErrorAnalyses

System ReliabilityAnalysis

Lessons Learned

EnvironmentalConsiderations

Protective Equipment

Anti-Fratricide

Personnel Protection

Perform Effects ofEnsembles

Damage Control

Human Systems IntegrationHuman Systems IntegrationHumanHumanFactorsFactors

EngineeringEngineering

HumanHumanFactorsFactors

EngineeringEngineering ManpowerManpowerManpowerManpower PersonnelPersonnelPersonnelPersonnel TrainingTrainingTrainingTrainingSafetySafetyAndAnd

HealthHealth

SafetySafetyAndAnd

HealthHealthHabitabilityHabitabilityHabitabilityHabitability PersonnelPersonnel

SurvivabilitySurvivability

PersonnelPersonnelSurvivabilitySurvivability

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Tactical Technology Comment

“Over the past decade, the exponential growth of e-mail and the Internet in command and control of joint, combined, and Fleet operations has made network reliability and redundancy perhaps our most "mission critical" concern for the warfighter.”

Admiral Natter, Commander, Fleet Forces Command, 2002

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Information Overload Comment

“The Global Hawk was awesome and the amount of data that it collects is incredible. The thing that we've learned from our lessons learned is that the Global Hawk will collect all of this great data, dump it down to the people and we got so much data that we were overwhelmed. So we had the Global Hawk go off into a holding pattern and we told it, 'Don't send us any more stuff.'”

Brig. Gen. Gregory H. Power, Vice Commander, Headquarters 8th Air Force, February 2004

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Information Deficit Comment

“Tactical intelligence was impeded by our speed of movement," Conway said. "We just didn't have enough time to get the reconnaissance out and mature the picture as to what was in front of the division and the regiment on a day-to-day basis. I don't think we can say we had too much" intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.”

Marine Lt. Gen. James Conway, Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, February 2004

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Recent HSI Timeline

10/01: Task Force EXCEL: 13 Learning Centers 7/02: CNO Stands Up NETWARCOM 4/03: SPAWAR Stands Up HSI Department 5/03: FORCEnet Conference: NAB Little Creek 5/03: Paul Wolfowitz USD (AT&L) signs the 5000.1 Defense Acquisition Directive 6/03: CNO addresses HSI Symposium 7/03: NETWARCOM FORCEnet OAG 8/03: First HSI-focused OIF L.L. Initiative 9/03: Human Performance Center Established

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HSI Focus Deficit in OIF LL

Example: Dienhart, Roos, & Howard (2003) collected USMC Lessons Learned at two locations in Iraq. Despite their focus of communication technology, a USMC Major who also holds a Ph.D. and works in the human factors area examined the list of 115 items. His analysis concluded that 18 items or 15.7 percent were definitely HSI related, although not directly stated as such. Another 60 of them definitely were not HSI items, and the remaining 37 could have some component of HSI, but more information was required to make that determination.

NETWARCOM initiated an HSI-focused lessons learned research initiative

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OIF Tech Lessons Learned:Federal Computer Week, March 29, 2004

“What didn't work:Bandwidth allocation. DOD officials admit they need a better way to get bandwidth to the troops who need it. Data analysis on the fly. Battlefield commanders said they often received raw data and images that they were expected to interpret. Military and civilian defense leaders have called for reducing reaction time by providing more machine-to-machine information and data analysis. Soldier intercom radios. Soldiers have no confidence in the intercom radios, according to Army officials. Soldiers bought handsets and longer antennas to increase the radios' range. Ruggedized laptop computers. According to Army officials, the systems had a 30 percent failure rate in the desert. Apparently, they weren't rugged enough.

Communications interoperability. Communication among U.S. military services was relatively reliable, but talking to allied or coalition troops proved to be more difficult.”

Directly relates to FORCEnet and HSI

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HSI LL Research Initiative

OIF Platforms: Two of each kind (CV to SS)Inclusive vs. narrow HSI focus “Deckplate” focus (O-5 – E-3) versus unit commandersTactical & Non-tactical network experience Scientifically based: Sampling error goal 5 % Two formats (pilot tested twice) Interview Self-administered form

Minimize impact on both commands & platform personnelResource limited (i.e., researchers and funding)Kick-off message: COMNAVNETWARCOM/081748ZAUG2003//

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HSI LL Initiative: 16 Command Visits

As of 8 March 2004, visited 9 commands on east coast / 7 on the west coast Carrier Air Wing Three Carrier Group Two USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) USS Kearsarge (LHD-3) USS Donald Cook (DDG-75) USS Montpelier (SSN 765) USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7) USS Mitscher (DDG-57) USS Boise (SSN-764)

Conducted 60 OIF HSI-focused interviews which provided 484 comments Side 1 of survey form Opportunity to choose from 19 categories for discussion

Collected nearly 1,400 HSI-focused forms (as of 1 April 2004) Side 1 – rate, paygrade, OIF and current tasks, SW/HW used Side 2 – nine areas to provide comments, plus six-point satisfaction score

USS Shiloh (CG-67) VAW 116 USS Tarawa (LHA-1) VFA-137 USS Nimitz (CVN-68) USS Milius (DDG-69) USS Pearl Harbor (LSD-52)

Note: Form data from commands listed in blue have been entered into analysis database

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HSI Categories

Survey form Habitability Health Hazards Human Factors Engineering Information & Knowledge

Management Internet Manpower, Personnel & Training Medical Factors Personnel Survivability Safety Factors

Interview – All categories from survey form plus: Education Battlespace Awareness Command & Control Decision Speed & Superiority Collaboration Data and Information Distribution

(included Internet) Knowledge and Wisdom ISR Joint, Coalition & NGO Operations Focused Logistics Miscellaneous

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OIF HSI-focused Interviews

All 60 interviews were conducted with OIF-experienced personnel, having either tactical or non-tactical (or both) network experience. Interviews lasted about 40 minutes each, and provided a total of 484 anonymous comments in 19 categories

Table 1: Interviewee Rank

Enlisted N   Officer N

E-4 2   W-2 1

E-5 6   W-3 2

E-6 10   O-1 2

E-7 10   O-2 7

E-8 2   O-3 9

    O-4 7

      O-5 2

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HSI Form Respondents

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-90

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

W-2 W-3 O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5

Fre

quen

cy

Enlisted Pay Grade Officer Pay Grade

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HSI Interview Responses

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Not HSI

Misc

System Safety

Health Hazards

Decision Speed & Superiority

Personnel Survivability

ISR

Joint, Coalition & NGO Ops

Medical Factors

Habitability

Know ledge & Wisdom

Manpow er

Personnel

Battlespace Aw areness

C2

Focused Logistics

Data and Info Distro

HFE

Collaboration

Education & Training

Cat

ego

ry

Number of Comments

Based on 60 Interviews from 15

Commands

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HSI Form Responses

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

Per

sonn

elS

urvi

vabi

lity

Saf

ety

Med

ical

Info

rmat

ion

&K

now

ledg

eM

gmt

Hea

lthH

azar

ds

Hum

anF

acto

rsE

ngin

eerin

g

Man

pow

er,

Per

sonn

el &

Tra

inin

g

Inte

rnet

Hab

itabi

lity

HSI Category

Nu

mb

er o

f Co

mm

ents

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

6

Ave

rag

e R

atin

g

Number of Comments Received (Enlisted)

Average Rating (Scale 1 – 6)Number of Comments Received (Officers)

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Preliminary Interview Findings

OIF HSI LL Outcome Themes: Training: The number one issue in the Fleet Collaboration: The modern (21st Century) issue

is second Other important themes

Information and Knowledge Management Personal and Personnel Readiness Technology Usability Issues Habitability and Morale

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HSI Capability Issue 1 - Chat

Findings: Chat has emerged as one of the primary means of operational

communication and tasking Chat was used by all platforms tactically and non-tactically

Evidence: 56 interview comments from 15 different units regarding chat

usage (all units interviewed) 19 form comments from 9 different units regarding monitoring

chat and maintaining connectivity for chat

“We lived and died via chat and e-mail.”

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Capability Issue 1 (Continued)

Preliminary Analysis: Chat has become an integral

element of both tactical and non-tactical warfighting operations

Why? Facilitates coordination and

collaboration Facilitates timely information

exchange Wide availability User friendly Can be used as person to

person or to broadcast messages

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Capability Issue 1 (Continued)

Preliminary analysis (cont.) Current shortfalls of chat becoming increasingly

visible No standard for chat software applications

Multiple applications results in potential interoperability problems and increased costs due to multiple licenses and duplication of training effort

Limited TTP, protocols and policy (varied between chat rooms and theaters)

Notable limited central management of chat rooms Requires constant connectivity to participate in chat rooms No user-specific feedback that all recipients have received and

understand the communication Unreliable “logging” capability due to lack of official timestamp

and backup capability

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Capability Issue 1 (Continued)

Recommendations: Investigate establishing chat as an official method to

disseminate tasking (CFFC / NETWARCOM / NWDC) Conduct chat requirements analysis (timestamp, security,

number of users, joint/allied interoperability, etc.) (NETWARCOM / SSC-SD)

Research available chat software applications and establish/field the standard (JFCOM / SPAWAR)

Develop, and test via Trident Warrior and other appropriate experimentation venues, chat TTP, protocols and policy for usage of chat (including investigating the most efficient means of monitoring chat on each platform) (C2F / C3F)

Develop contingencies for when chat is unavailable (C2F / C3F)

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HSI Capability Issue 2 – Info Mgmt

Findings: Double-edged sword: There is too much

information from too many different sources AND required information is not easily found

Problem will only get worse as the Navy moves forward digitally

No consistent way to verify accuracy or reliability of data once found

Evidence: 56 interview comments from 15 different units

(all units interviewed) 81 form comments from 13 different units (all

units in database)

“Defending America, in today's rapidly changing world, is contingent upon the ability to process data and information quickly. Now, more than ever, knowledge superiority and integrated IT capabilities are essential to not only winning the war against terrorism, but defending our Nation as well.”

“There’s too much information out there – we need information management.”

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Capability Issue 2 (Continued)

Preliminary analysis: Personnel are being flooded with too much information Difficult to compile/reconcile data from multiple sources Difficult to determine which sources are authoritative Unsure of where to find needed data Personnel don’t have ready access to the data needed to

perform their jobs because Access (bandwidth, internet, time) Unsure of appropriate source

Moreover, “114.5 million or 39 percent of Americans used a search engine during January 2004.” *

* 114.5 million unique users represent “76 percent of the active online U.S. population.”

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Capability Issue 2 (Continued)

Recommendations: Develop / field intelligent agents for SIPRNET (“Ask Jeeves”

type of capability) (SPAWAR) Develop and implement information management plans during

Trident Warrior and other appropriate experimentation venues (NETWARCOM / SPAWAR / C2F / C3F)

Identify Navy POC for developing IM / KM DOTMLPF (DoN CIO)

Buy / develop information management processes and tools (SYSCOMs)

Ensure HSI is integral in individual C4I system design/updates and across systems (NAVSEA)

Install more computers / LAN drops throughout the ship to improve access (OPNAV / SPAWAR)

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HSI Capability Issue 3 - Skills

Findings: Skills acquisition and performance support

tools have become increasingly critical given optimum manning and increased optempo

Junior personnel arrive at their command with inadequate skills to perform required tasks

Senior personnel are seldom adequately trained to address technology upgrades

Evidence: 68 interview comments from 15 different units

(all units interviewed) 242 form comments from 13 different units

(all units in database)

“Proficiency level on ships does not match requirements.”

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Capability Issue 3 (Continued)

Preliminary analysis: Personnel arrive at their command

with inadequate skills to perform required tasks

Results in under-utilization of untrained personnel

Results in over-tasking of the trained ship’s crew, who have to provide the needed training when they can

Tasks take longer when personnel don’t receive adequate training

Sailors require more access to computers to take advantage of computer based training

“With each advance in technology, the human has become the increasingly weak link in systems," says Harold P. Van Cott, author of the foreword. To be competitive in today's economy, corporations spend billions of dollars each year to train their employees. Yet only a tiny portion of this expense is invested in research and development to make training more effective.” (2000)

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Capability Issue 3 (Continued)

Recommendations: Sailors should arrive at commands with more hands-on expertise and

troubleshooting skills (NETC) Each rate should have a standardized skills continuum tailored to platform

(i.e., ship class) (Task Force Warrior) Develop performance support tools (Human Performance Center) Officers and enlisted need basic skills on computer applications and web

sites they routinely use (MS Office, Turboprep, NAVFIT, NKO, etc.) (NETC)

Ensure adequate connectivity for training systems at sea (NETWARCOM) Install more computers / LAN drops throughout the ship to support

education and training (OPNAV / SPAWAR) Incorporate innovative / web-enabled training events during Trident

Warrior events (NETWARCOM / SPAWAR / C2F / C3F)

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Identified Technology Issue: NALCOMIS

“We use both NALCOMIS and IETMS but they do not work together. They are two stovepipes by two different contractors, and we have to retype the information (it is double work). They are used for downloading discrepancies from jets, and then creating the work order. They should be integrated to work together.”

“I use three computer systems and they do not work together (NMCI, NALCOMIS and IETMS). The whole thing frustrates me. None of them talk to each other. I can’t download what I need, and NALCOMIS is a DOS (command line) system. It has not changed in 10 years or so.”

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Interview Process Findings

OIF HSI LL Process Themes: Categories (e.g. Personnel & Education) sometimes convey

different meanings to interviewees Current focused-interview process is insufficient

Interview format should focus on specific tools and work processes Should require interviewees sit at their workstations Ideal time for interviews is during transit from theater to CONUS

Need more efficient way of collecting / analyzing data

Recommendations: Phase 2 of HSI LL should include small warfighter teams at

pre-selected workstations Data collection process needs to be more automated

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Link Between HSI LL Initiative and TW04

TW04 Initiative FORCEnet Systems Issue examples identified from HSI Research Initiative Addressed in TW04

Sea Warrior

Integrated Learning Env, 5-Vector Model, Threaded Discussion, Distance Spt

Centralized web-enabled foundational and system specific training for several

C2 and network systems

Web-Enabled Warrior

Chat, Email, NMCP, NITES, TMIP

Standardized chat policy

Information Mgmt / Knowledge Mgmt

IM Plan Standardized policy for sharing / finding information (info rules of the road)

Networks

ADNS, EHF TIP, INMARSAT, VIASAT

Means of providing better situational awareness of the network environment

(BW status, constraints)

ISR-Fires

SACC-A, NFCS, TBMCS, GCCS-M

Improved situational awareness and C2 processes (information exchange and

collaboration)

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Connection between FORCEnet and HSI LL Initiative

Expeditionary, multi - tiered

sensor and weapon information

Distributed, collaborative command & control

Adaptive / automated decision aids

Human-centricIntegration Information

Effects

Dynamic, multi -path and survivable networks

FORCEnet

6.4%

36.3%

31.8%

14.5%

0.6%

10.3%

Preliminary (Incomplete) Alignment Analysis

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Value and Next Steps

Value of HSI Lessons Learned Effort Seldom, if ever, has the HSI perspective been given this empirical

visibility and this depth of analysis HSI Lessons Learned effort needs to be continued during these

times of rapid technology and system changes

Recommended Next Steps Phase 1 Platform Visits Completed

Enter the remaining survey form data. Requires support! Analysis and report generation

Derive requirements from findings and forward as appropriate Design and Initiate Phase 2

Develop plan and methodology Expand to USMC

Develop website Conduct onsite briefs / train crew prior to data collection

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HSI Lessons Learned Summary

Although the Navy moves smartly into the 21st Century, there are substantial HSI issues in the Fleet.Heretofore, there has been no mechanism for addressing the wide scope of traditional and newer IT HSI topics collectively. Important Fleet HSI LL and HSI process methodology LL have been identified in this preliminary report. The final report is expected before the end of FY04.

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ResourcesCarl, C. (2003). "Bloggers and Their Blogs: A Depiction of the Users and Usage of Weblogs on the World Wide Web." M.A. thesis in Communication, Culture and Technology at Georgetown University: <link>Clark, V. (2003). CNO’s Talk at HSI Symposium, June: <link> <Covenant leadership>Dienhart, P., Roos, S. & Howard, M. (2003). Field Report Marine Corps Systems Command Liaison Team Central Iraq 20 April to 25 April.FORCEnet HSI webpage (2003) (I.E. only): <link>FORCEnet: Turning Information into Power: <link>Greenspan, R. (2003). "Blogging By The Numbers," CyberAtlas <link>Human Systems Integration: <link> Lyman, P. & Varian, H. (2003). How Much Information? Regents of the University of California, October 27: <link>Naval Network Warfare Command: <link>NETWARCOM Stands Up: <link>President Roosevelt: <link> Sea Power 21: <link> SC-OAG Seeks Deckplate's Input to Shape Future Navy: <link>

POC: George Edw. Seymour (DSN or 619) 553-8008

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Contact Information

Points of Contacts: George Edw. Seymour, Ph.D., Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Center, San Diego, CA DSN or (619) 553-8008 E-mail: seymour@spawar.navy.mil http://www.2-SIR.com/TwinFalls/

LCDR Sally Van Horn, NETWARCOM FORCEnet Architecture Team, Norfolk, VA (757) 417-6752 x6 DSN: 537-6752 x6, E-mail: sally.vanhorn@navy.mil

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Addenda: Backup Slides

Identified Technology Issues:

SPINS

TAMPS

SAMS

Capability Issues Quotes:

CHAT

Information / Knowledge Management

Training / Skills Management

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HSI Technology Issue: SPINS

“Had one guy on the ship creating SPINS. He was very talented. It was on 8.5 x 11" paper. Should be pictures in the cockpit. These are mission critical and go along with the ATOs. They are Joint, but standardization is a big issue. All military aircraft use them. There needs to be a better way - automated.”

Recommend: This issue be investigated.

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Identified Technology Issue: TAMPS

“TAMPS machine constantly down---the rep on board was working it constantly. It is a mission computer, a single point of failure. We have to put a brick in JRT. MIDS uses it and HARM uses it.”

“WEPS 1.1 is terrible.During OIF used ATACS and it was just as bad. Now we are expecting WASP (why did it take so long) and use TAMPS (but it is UNIX based; that is not good). We have a $60 million jet that is useless without the proper tools.”

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Identified Technology Issue: Medical SAMS

“We are using legacy systems in Medical SAMS (SNAP Automated Medical System), but it was designed for smaller ships (about 500 people), and then expanded for CVs. But it is archaic. Tried to make it fit Windows, but did not work. It’s terrible. Need user-friendly system that communicates with database (e.g., personnel) because people have to maintain. At NPGS they had a web-based system where all sailors logged on to check their medical readiness. Tracking immunizations and health protection topics are important.”

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Capability Issue 1 – Chat Quotes Representative Quotes from the Fleet concerning chat’s effectiveness:

“Tomahawk lived and died by chat…” “Often got advance notification of launch involvement via chat.” “Decision making information came via chat and e-mail.”

Representative Quotes from the Fleet regarding their concerns: “We need chat and NetMeeting on the same system. As of today, half the ships

say they do not have the bandwidth, tools or the space that the CVs have.” “Daily Intentions Message – received via official message traffic, but by the time

the message was received, it was outdated, since it had been revised continually via chat.”

“Used chat continuously.  Two problems with chat – no timestamp associated with entries (so it was difficult to get a sense of the timing involved); if unit submerges or if connectivity is lost, there is no record of what transpired on the chat when you re-establish contact.”

“Do we need a chat phone talker? Some ships did. Had 1 guy who did only type and read. Another only on GCCS and back-up chat. The Launch Area Coordinator needs to think….Sound power phones a good analogy because Fireman Tim was not paid to think but to relay information.”

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Chat and e-mail are tips of the digital iceberg, and the Navy must explore other IP technologies: “America Online’s AOL Instant Messenging Service (AIM) "estimates 1.6

billion AOL and AIM IMs are sent every day" (Edwards, 2003). Similarly, the Kaiser Family Foundation found that 74 percent of online teens use instant messaging (Henry J. Kaiser Foundation, 2002).”

“84 percent of Internet users say they have contacted or joined online groups (Pew Internet and Family Life, 2001).”

“Blogcount (http://dijest.com/bc), a Web site dedicated to finding how many blogs and bloggers are out there, suggest there are 2.4–2.9 million active weblogs ("active" means they have been updated in the last eight weeks) as of June 2003 (Greenspan, 2003).”

The Navy should take the initiative to create a Naval Semantic Web.

Capability Issue 1 – Chat Quotes

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“So here's my prediction: Blogs will soon become a staple in the information diet of every serious businessperson, not because it's cool to read them, but because those who don't read them will fail. In short, blogs offer an accelerated and efficient approach to acquiring and understanding the kind of information all of us need to make business decisions...Until recently, blogs have proven to be an incredibly lousy source of information for most businesspeople. Finding and keeping up with the relevant ones is far too time-consuming. But I've recently started using a newsreader, and after spending hours setting the damn thing up, my business life has changed forever.” —John Battelle, 2004

Visiting Professor, UC Berkeley and one of the co-founders of Wired magazine.

Capability Issue 1 – Chat Quotes

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Capability Issue 2 – Info Mgmt Quotes

Representative Quotes from the Fleet: “How do we determine the wheat from the chaff?  Need a better

way of searching.  Google is good.  When we search on SIPRNet, we get garbage.”

“Search Engine on SIPR doesn’t work.” “Lessons learned are distributed on ships.  Using message

traffic.  Need a database or a website.” “Too many sources – message traffic, GCCS-M, GBS,

SIPRNET, CNN, e-mail – need to get things from a single source.”

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Capability Issue 3 - Skills Quotes

Representative Quotes from the Fleet: “Need to train sailors better before coming to the Fleet (they are book-

smart, but have difficulty troubleshooting equipment).” “Proficiency level on ships does not match requirements.” “Too much work is being dumped on the Fleet, especially in the area of

providing training.” “Training for many of new systems that are being fielded isn’t adequate.” “Command only uses experienced personnel at sea.” “Lack of manpower leading up to cruise.  Two check-ins needed training,

rapidly.  Training did not always result in necessary skills acquisition.” “Gained four new personnel just prior to cruise, useless, until end of

cruise.  They created more work.” “Need to standardize training and have set people give it.” “Need single source for OJT.”

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Tactical Training Comment

“I feel very strongly that we have lost our bearings when it comes to transformation because most of the talk is not backed up by solid intellectual analysis.”

Konetzni also blasted technology develop-ment and experimentation across the Navy, singling out four programs for criticism: the Joint Fires Network, Navy-Marine Corps Intranet, mine warfare efforts and the Battle Force Tactical Training (BFTT) system.”

Vice Adm. Albert Konetzni, deputy commander and chief of staff Atlantic Fleet, May, 2003