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Expeditionary Operations in the 21st Century
Jim Strock Director, Seabasing Integration Division
Capabilities Development DirectorateMarine Corps Combat Development
CommandQuantico, Virginia 22134
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B.L.U.F.
We are in a Long War with an adaptive enemy We are continuously evolving with changing
character of war: Meeting guidance from QDR—shifting focus to both IW and
maintaining conventional competencies Learning from ongoing operations Anticipating who, where and how we will fight in the future
Future naval capabilities will provide CoCom’s with flexible capabilities via innovative concepts Exploiting operational maneuver from global commons Phase 0: Contributing to maritime security and cooperation Phases 3 and 4: Decisive Ops and SASO
Industry input vital to bring these capabilities to fruition ASAP and at reasonable costs
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Understanding the Future
• How to keep our Naval forces relevant and able to Threaten an asymmetrical enemy While maintaining dominance for the conventional fight
• Phase 0 requirements CONPLAN GWOT demands Naval emphasis in area denial and anti access environments Temporal nature of the battlespace
• World-wide deployment support structure is on the decline Forward Staging Bases: 38 to 12 Strat Airlift: declining fleet numbers: 160 fewer than 1989; projected
down to 250 by 2010
• Flexible, adaptable, self-sufficient, DO capable, seabased forces a must
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Strategic Guidance
Naval forces need to establish steady state capability: Active Partnering and Tailored Shaping
Must contribute to Long War & transnational/ regional deterrence
Build Partner Capacity
Deter or Prevail in Conventional Campaigns
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“Working closely with our Navy and Coast Guard partners, we will advance the amphibious and expeditionary capabilities the Combatant Commanders rely upon to meet their emerging challenges.”
CMC Planning Guidance
CMC Planning Guidance
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• Naval in character
• “Packaged” command, ground combat, aviation, CSS capabilities in any size (not just ARG/MEUs)
• Commander designation is mission dependent
• Joint, Coalition, Interagency friendly in composition
• Comfortable and adaptable on non-traditional platforms
• Motherships can lighten the maneuver element– Add or subtract “specialists” based on the mission
– Aviation and Combat Service Support lily-pad as far forward as required on all ships/crafts afloat
Traditional Naval EthosWell Tailored for Non-Traditional Missions
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Security Challenges …
Irregular Non-state and state actors employing
“unconventional” methods to counter stronger state opponents—terrorism, insurgency, etc. (erode our power)
(e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and emerging concepts like “unrestricted warfare”)
Disruptive Competitors employing technology or
methods that might counter or cancel our current military advantages. (capsize our power)
(e.g., technological – bio, cyber, or space war, ultra miniaturization, directed-energy, other – diplomatic blackmail, cultural or economic war)
Traditional States employing military forces in well-
known forms of military competition and conflict. (challenge our power)
(e.g., conventional air, sea, and land forces, and nuclear forces of established nuclear powers)
Catastrophic Terrorist or rogue state employment of
WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against American interests. (paralyze our power)
(e.g., attack on homeland, global markets, or key ally that would generate a state of shock and preclude normal behavior)
LIKELIHOOD
VU
LN
ER
AB
ILIT
Y
Lower Higher
Higher
Lower
Security Challenges …
Irregular Non-state and state actors employing
“unconventional” methods to counter stronger state opponents—terrorism, insurgency, etc. (erode our power)
(e.g., terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and emerging concepts like “unrestricted warfare”)
Disruptive Competitors employing technology or
methods that might counter or cancel our current military advantages. (capsize our power)
(e.g., technological – bio, cyber, or space war, ultra miniaturization, directed-energy, other – diplomatic blackmail, cultural or economic war)
Traditional States employing military forces in well-
known forms of military competition and conflict. (challenge our power)
(e.g., conventional air, sea, and land forces, and nuclear forces of established nuclear powers)
Catastrophic Terrorist or rogue state employment of
WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against American interests. (paralyze our power)
(e.g., attack on homeland, global markets, or key ally that would generate a state of shock and preclude normal behavior)
LIKELIHOOD
VU
LN
ER
AB
ILIT
Y
Lower Higher
Higher
Lower
Adjusting Our Aim
RebalancedCapabilities Irregular &
Traditional
Phase 0 Naval emphasis
Temporal nature
Requires self-sufficiency early on
RebalancedCapabilities Irregular &
Traditional
Phase 0 Naval emphasis
Temporal nature
Requires self-sufficiency early on
“ …our national strategy calls for more widely dispersed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation, and global response to crises…”
The Naval Operations Concept, 2006
Disruptive
CatastrophicIrregularIrregular
TraditionalTraditional
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The Naval Security EnvironmentAcross the Entire Range of National Security Strategy
“Arc of Instability”
“IslamicCaliphate”“IslamicCaliphate”
Naval Operations 1982-1989 (15X)Naval Operations 1982-1989 (15X)
Naval Operations 1990-1999 (40X)Naval Operations 1990-1999 (40X)Naval Operations 2000-2005 (21X)Naval Operations 2000-2005 (21X)
7676 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years Amphibious Operations in 23 Years
• 21 Forcible Entry Operations• 10 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations• 6 Amphibious Assaults• 3 Amphibious Raids• 2 Peace Operations
• 21 Forcible Entry Operations• 10 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations• 6 Amphibious Assaults• 3 Amphibious Raids• 2 Peace Operations
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Crises and Conflicts
SunniInsurgency
Micro-nationalistInsurgencies
ShiaInsurgency
#3
#2
#1
Piracy#X
Stability and Support Operations Small Wars and Counterinsurgency Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Nation Building Peace Operations Combating Terrorism Counter-Proliferation Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
Stability and Support Operations Small Wars and Counterinsurgency Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Nation Building Peace Operations Combating Terrorism Counter-Proliferation Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
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Contributors To Crises
>20% PopulationUndernourished
>35% PopulationUndernourished
<50% Population HaveAccess to Clean Water
High Earthquake Risk
5
6
8
7
43 2
1
9
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10 Top Ten Proven Oil Reserves 2004
?
?
? Known Reserves
Significant Drug Regions
?
?
NuclearArmed States
Crises Are CertainCrises Are Certain
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.
Date Unit Location Mission
Dec 01 15th & 26th MEUs Afghanistan Operation Enduring Freedom
Fall 04 22nd MEU Afghanistan COIN ops
Dec 04/Jan 05 15th MEU Sri Lanka/ Indonesia
Tsunami relief
June 05 24th MEU New Orleans, LA Hurricane Katrina relief
July 06 24th MEU Beirut, Lebanon NEO
Recent Examples
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Naval Response Patterns
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1970s 1980s 1990s
CV
SC
ARG
Nu
mb
er o
f R
esp
on
ses
Source: CNA Study, US Naval Response to Situations 1970-2000, Dec. 2000
(By platform type and by decade)
If anything, this demand signal for versatile, expeditionary
response has been extended even greater since 2001
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Increasing Forward PresenceWell Beyond Today’s ESGs and MEUs
SPMAGTFSPMAGTF
ESG Distributed
Ops ESG Distributed
Ops
SPMAGTF
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What Do We Need to Do?GWOT Operational Tasks
Conduct Expeditionary Ops Conduct NEO Conduct Information Ops Conduct ISR Conduct Maritime Interdiction Conduct Maritime Security Ops Conduct Strike/Power Projection Conduct Special Ops Conduct Command And Control Maintain SLOCs Provide Consequence Management Provide Force Protection Provide Log/CSS/Facilities Maint
Provide Operational Air and Missile Defense Conduct Civil Affairs Provide Law Enforcement and prisoner
handling Provide staging for joint and combined forces Conduct coalition, interagency and NGO
coordination and support Provide Humanitarian Aid Conduct Maritime Domain Awareness Share intelligence information Provide support for Homeland Security Support Proliferation Security Initiative
“21st Century UNITAS”
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The Anti-Access Challenge… OIF I Turkey: Access Not Granted, Even with $26B Offer
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Enhancing Phase 0-1 CapabilitiesVia Expanded Naval Missions
Sized, shaped, and globally postured for:• Forward Naval Presence• Security Cooperation• Counterinsurgency (COIN)• Counterterrorism• Civil-Military Operations• Counter-proliferation• Maritime Security Operations• Crisis Response• Deterrence• Sea Control• Air and Missile Defense• Expeditionary Power Projection
Global Fleet StationDistributed
Globally NetworkedAdaptive force packaging
Aggregate, disaggregate & re-aggregateCulturally aware
Task focusedBuild partner capacity
Cross Fleet Standardization
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Enhancing Phase 0-2 CapabilitiesVia Distributed Ops Capable SPMAGTFs
ESG/MEU(SOC)
Employed from platforms like LCS, riverine craft, destroyers…
…While supported by Amphib motherships
Counter-terrorism
Counter-proliferation
Security Cooperation
Civil – Military Operations
Deterrence
Air & Missile Defense
Crisis Response
MaritimeSecurity
COIN
Security Cooperation at Sea
Forward Presence
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Enhancing Phase 2-3 CapabilitiesBy Re-aggregating Naval Forces
PowerProjection
SeaControl
Forward Postured
CONUS Based
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Marine Corps Amphib & MPF(F)Shipbuilding Requirements
Shipbuilding RequirementsAmphibious Warfare Ships• 2.0 MEB AE per Strategic Planning Guidance; 15 Ao Ships per MEB AE• Total 30 operationally available ships
– 10 LHD/LHA(R)– 10 LPD-17– 10 LSD-41/49 (or equivalent replacement)– Average availability is 85% (for planning purposes)– Minimum 11/11/11 ships to meet 30 Ao requirement
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)• One squadron (per May 2005 Acting SecNav/CNO/CMC decision)
Legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons• Retain two squadrons to maintain afloat prepositioned war reserve capacity
CapabilitiesAmphibious Warfare Ships • Inherent survivability, self-defense, and Navy crewing• Maritime forcible entry operations• Forward presence, deterrence
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))• Capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces• Selective offload of equipment sets to meet Seabasing
mission requirements• Supports forward engagement and forcible entry• MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping;
therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable
Notional 15-Ship ATF
Five LHD-1 (Wasp Class)Five LPD-17 (San Antonio Class)
Five LSD-41 (Whidbey Island Class)
2 LHA(R)
1 LHD
3 T-AKR
3 T-AKE
3 MLP
2 Legacy
T-AK
MPF(F) Squadron Composition
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Marine Corps JHSVShipbuilding Requirements
JHSV Quantity and Basing• 8 JHSVs funded (5 Army, 3 Navy)• Quantity funded does not equal quantity required • Acquisition objective TBD by MS B (Mar ’08)
– PACOM, AoA, MCCDC studies suggest 16 JHSVs needed across DOD• 7 JHSV equivalents meet USMC requirements
– Based on MARFOR TSCP, GWOT, intra-theater lift requirements– Requirement quantified in “vessel days per year” v. specific # of JHSVs– Assumes 180 days operational availability (Ao) per year per JHSV– Does not explore overlap between USN, USMC requirements
• Notional basing scheme (JHSVs swing between theaters as needed)– PACOM = 3 (Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa)– CENTCOM = 2 (Bahrain)– EUCOM = 1 (Rota)– CONUS = 1 (Norfolk)
JHSV Capabilities & Characteristics• Shallow draft (< 15’), high speed (> 35 kts loaded)
– Ability to enter small, austere/degraded ports unassisted• Self-deploying between theaters• 600-700 ST payload, 1200 NM range, 35 kts, Sea State 3
– Smaller payloads = greater range, larger payloads = less range• Seating for 312 Marines (Co (rein)); berthing for 104 Marines• 20-22,000 sqft mission deck/cargo bay (M1A2, MTVR compatible)• Slewing ramp (astern to 40 degrees forward)• Level I, Class 2 flight deck for H-60s, H-46s, UH-/AH-1 helicopters
– Fuel only, no services• 20 ST crane for TEU movement, small boat launch & recovery• Net Ready C4 system (plug and play) • JHSV is not a combatant, operates in a permissive environment
– MSC standard for ATFP capabilities
Possible JHSV Candidates USMC JHSV CONOPS (The “Intra-Theater Connector”)
TSCP
COBRA GOLDBALIKITAN
Seabasing
Support
Sea Base
Self-deployAdv Base
FIE
ESG
MPF
HA/DR
NSE
Austal 126
TSL - 140
Austal 105
INCAT 112
MDV-300
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At-Sea Arrival, Assembly, Employment, Sustainment
Seabasing Research and Development
Skin-to-Skin Transfer
Stabilized Cranes
Mobile Landing PlatformInterface
High Capacity UNREP Selective Offload
Automated Cargo HandlingJoint ModularIntermodal Container (JMIC)
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Other Research and Development Opportunities
Cultural Awareness and Tactical Language Training
Responsive Naval and Joint Fires suitable for Restricted ROE
C4ISR Interoperability and Intel Fusion Support Technology
Key Equipment Characteristics Weight
Mobility
Armor
Power
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Conclusions
Evolving security environment expands challenges we face
Blurring character of war generates premium for agile forces with adaptive ethos
Security context calls for greater maritime cooperation and interoperability International and interagency
