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Ukraine: Minsk II, elections and opportunities that should not be missed For the attention of the European Union and its member states Author: Viking Bohman student at the Swedish Defence University and trainee at the EU Delegation to the Council of Europe not writing on the behalf of any institution on 26 August 2015

Ukraine: Minsk II, elections and opportunities that should not be missed

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Ukraine: Minsk II, elections and opportunities that should not be

missed For the attention of the European Union

and its member states

Author:Viking Bohman

student at the Swedish Defence University

and trainee at the EU Delegation to the Council of Europe

not writing on the behalf of any institution on 26 August 2015

2015/08/26

Summary Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatists today find themselves in a negotiation deadlock as both sides continue blaming each other for violating Minsk II. This most notably concerns the points in the agreement on constitutional reform, decentralisation and "special status" for certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. What seems to have allowed for this blame-game is the loose wording in Minsk II that has left key issues open for interpretation. It appears that there was not enough consensus to agree on details at the time of signing.

Accordingly, for Minsk II to be successful in its current form, one side would have to fully subscribe to the other’s interpretations; a scenario highly unlikely as domestic pressure is preventing both sides from any considerable concessions. Therefore, as Julia Embody has suggested, until the details of the agreement can be worked out, it seems futile for the EU to continue calling for Minsk II’s full and strict implementation. Instead it makes sense to see the agreement as a piece of work in progress; a document that could be reconsidered and changed in order to open up for new ways leading to resolution. This less absolute way of understanding Minsk II would allow the EU to look beyond the strict order of things as set out in the agreement and focus on specific issues that have real chances of leading to progress.

Evidence suggest that the elections in eastern Ukraine constitute a crucial opportunity to ease parts of the negotiation deadlock and avoid military escalation. In addition, it appears that finding consensus on this issue is not unimaginable. Therefore, the EU should direct its focus towards the elections at this point and assume a more proactive role.

In light of this, a number of alternatives are explored with special attention given to the question of who could organise the elections. Four different election-organisers are considered; (1) the separatists, (2) the OSCE, (3) the UN, (4) and the Council of Europe.

Seeing what appears to be a spike in support for Russia, the review of Minsk II at the end of 2015 and the need for the EU to legitimise its actions, it appears that proposing new initiatives, such as the ones set forth, in relevant fora can only be to the benefit of the EU.

———————————————————————————————————

Keywords: EU, EEAS, Ukraine, elections, Luhansk, Donetsk, Russia, Minsk agreements

Word count: 4218 (pages 2-11)

Viking Bohman

2015/08/26

The author extends his many thanks to Oksana Pasheniuk, Senior political advisor to the Special advisor of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe for Ukraine; to the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR); and to the EU delegations in New York and Vienna for their guidance on factual matters.

The author apologises in advance for possible errors and will be grateful for any corrections and feedback sent to [email protected].

1 Background 2 .......................................................................2 Minsk II 4 .............................................................................

2.1 Moscow: intentions and restraints 4 ..............................................

2.2 Kiev: intentions and restraints 5 ....................................................

2.3 Conclusion and suggestions 5 ........................................................

3 Elections in eastern Ukraine 6 .............................................3.1 Complications and recent developments 7 ....................................

3.2 New ways forward 9 ......................................................................

3.3 Conclusion and suggestions 11 ......................................................

4 References 12.......................................................................

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1 Background

With its death toll reaching beyond 6500, the Ukraine crisis has been described by some as the biggest geopolitical crisis in Europe since the fall of the Soviet Union. Since the outset of the conflict, Russia has annexed the Crimean peninsula and to this day it continues to indirectly control separatist-held territories in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions in eastern Ukraine. The conflict will soon have dragged on for a year and a half.

Throughout this period of time, hoping to find compromise and bring an end to the crisis, a number of meetings have been convened. This has been done mainly in the format of what has been dubbed the Trilateral Contact Group. This group originally includes Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Over time however, it has come to include also the separatist leaders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Since the outbreak of the crisis, the group has managed to reach two major agreements; Minsk I and Minsk II.

Minsk I was drafted some time after the failure of a 15-point peace plan put forth by Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko. The document, signed on 5 September 2014, introduces a number of measures to be taken in order to establish a viable ceasefire and a settlement to the conflict. Among other things it envisages OSCE monitoring missions in the Donbas territory, decentralisation of power in Ukraine, the release of hostages, amnesty for offenders in areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the withdrawal of weaponry, and the holding of early local elections.

The Minsk I protocol has not been successful. Most notably, the ceasefire, that was to come into force on 15 February, never held. It was continuously violated, especially by the separatists, until completely broken down by January 2015.

Later in February, new efforts were being made to draw up a more successful agreement: Minsk II. At that point in time however, the situation in Ukraine had changed quite drastically. The January offensive, that followed the collapse of Minsk I, had moved the Russian separatists’ position forward to the Mariupol port city and claimed the strategically important position of Debaltseve in the process. Minsk II bears many similarities to Minsk I but is more specific and contains wording that more officially grants control over the Russian border to the separatists. By this time however, due to economic hardship and the pressure from Russian military, Poroshenko did not have much choice but to embrace Minsk II and the $17.5 billion aid package that came with it as the international community hoped for the agreement’s success. However, the ceasefire envisioned in Minsk II has, just like its predecessor, been continually violated. 1

Embody, Julia, "Here’s How to Save the Minsk II Agreement" in The National Interest, [nationalinterest.org], 1

2015.

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Although the Minsk II agreement was signed by the Trilateral Contact Group, it was negotiated lengthily in "Normandy format"; a group including not only Ukraine and Russia, but also Germany and France. Ever since the document’s signing, both the EU and the US has seen it as key to resolve the conflict. 2

An essential point in the agreement is decentralisation through constitutional reform. This paragraph in Minsk II calls for broad decentralisation and for the new constitution to mention specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Many experts agree, and 3

have done so ever since the 90’s, that too much power is concentrated in Kiev and that decentralising reform is necessary to create a more efficient state. 4

The agreement ambitiously spells out that after constitutional reform has been carried out in consultation with the separatists, local elections will be held both in government and separatist-controlled areas. It states that the elections should be held in accordance with Ukrainian law and OSCE standards, and be monitored by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). The document however contains no detail on how the elections will be carried out and only states that the procedures should be agreed upon with separatist representatives. 5

A few months ago, Poroshenko initiated decentralising constitutional reform. The president has underlined that the reform marks the first time in Ukraine’s history that a head of state voluntarily has conceded this kind of authority. The Venice Commission, a Council of Europe (CoE) entity with extensive experience and expertise in judicial reform, was consulted by Kiev in this endeavour. This is likely to have brought legitimacy to the process since Russia is a member of the CoE and largely recognises the competence of the Commission. 6

On 12 May however, the separatist representatives presented their own proposals for changing Ukraine’s constitution. Under these proposals, the Donetsk and Luhansk entities would have the right to impose checks on the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament). They also demanded that "Ukraine does not join military blocs or alliances, maintains neutrality, [and] refrains from participating in military activities beyond its territory.” in other words, Ukraine’s full non-alignment and neutrality. 7

Embody, Julia, 2015.2

Minsk II, point 11.3

Pifer, Steven, "War By Other Means" at The Power Vertical, [rferl.org], 2015.4

Minsk II, point 9.5

Russia has on several occasions made reference to the Venice Commission in such a way in the CoE 6

Committee of Ministers (the author’s own observations).

Socor, Vladimir, "Donetsk, Luhansk Propose Amendments to Ukraine’s Constitution" in Eurasia Daily 7

Monitor, 12(93), [jamestown.org], 2015.

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The constitutional amendments put forth by Poroshenko include no clause on neutrality or non-alignment and apart from a reference to legislation on interim specificities for separatist areas, the decentralisation touches upon Ukraine as a whole, making no difference between the different oblasts (regions). 8

2 Minsk II

Six months after signature, it is clear that very few points of the second Minsk agreement have been implemented. Most of the key issues remain unresolved; there is no consensus on constitutional reform or proceedings for the upcoming elections, nor is there an effective ceasefire.

As Julia Embody has pointed out, the problem lies in the details of the agreement. 9

Ambiguous language has allowed for wide interpretation of key points. At the core of the 10

problem is constitutional reform, decentralisation and "special status" for the separatist entities. Paragraph 11 of Minsk II reads:

"Constitutional reform in Ukraine, with the new Constitution to come into effect by the end of 2015, the key element of which is decentralization (taking into account peculiarities of particular districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, agreed with representatives of these districts), and also approval of permanent legislation on special status of particular districts of Donetsk and Lugansk regions in accordance with the measures spelt out in the footnotes, by the end of 2015." 11

The agreement leaves completely unanswered the question of what the decentralisation will entail and how and with whom Kiev will co-ordinate when drawing up the constitutional amendments. It also leaves unclear what "special status" would mean in concrete terms. This suggests that, at the time of signature, there was no consensus on these issues; the wording has been left open-ended because there was simply no way to find common ground. 12

So why could no consensus be found on these issues?

2.1 Moscow: intentions and restraints As many scholars have pointed out, Russia is not interested in the territory of the Donbas per se. Just as in the conflict in Moldova around its region Transnistria in the 90’s, the main goal

Socor, Vladimir, 2015.8

Julia Embody is a program associate at the Center for the National Interest9

Embody, Julia, 201510

Minsk II, point 1111

Embody, Julia, 201512

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has been to influence Ukraine’s foreign policy; in other words, preventing a rapprochement to the West, entailing EU and Nato membership. 13

This becomes clear when you look at the separatists’ proposals of 12 May. They demand the non-alignment and neutrality of Ukraine and also ask for ways to impose checks on the Rada in Kiev. In practice this would rule out membership in Nato and might do the same for 14

EU membership as the recent solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty can be understood as invoking non-neutrality. Realising these proposals would satisfy Russia’s security concern 15

about its neighbouring areas.

In a way this is Russia’s red line. Putin could not go back to Moscow saying he let Ukraine go. This would be perceived as a complete surrender and the Russian people would not likely accept such a presidential failure after the suffering that the western sanctions have caused them. 16

2.2 Kiev: intentions and restraints At the same time, Poroshenko finds himself in a similar position. The president is under great pressure from internal forces to discard (at least parts of) Minsk II. The special status and decentralisation is viewed by many as granting unprecedented authority to enemies of the state. Adherents of this position are not only extremist forces such as the Right Sector, but also big parts of the main political establishment. This naturally makes it extremely hard to pass legislation on these matters through the Rada. 17

Meanwhile, the West is pushing for Poroshenko to embrace Minsk II and take steps towards a compromise. Poroshenko probably realises this is the best shot at peace and would not mind implementing Minsk II. However, he is currently not capable of doing so due to domestic pressure and his inability to suppress hardline opinion. 18

2.3 Conclusion and suggestions Taken together, Russia sees Ukraine as a crucial security interest and at the moment Putin is unlikely to settle for anything less than ensuring that the country stays away from Nato (and EU) membership. At the same time, Poroshenko is under strong pressure from domestic political forces preventing him from making any considerable concessions on points that

Embody, Julia, 2015 & Pifer, Steven, 2015 & Mearsheimer, John J., "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s 13

Fault" in Foreign Affairs September/October issue, [foreignaffairs.com], 2014

Socor, Vladimir, 2015 14

Articles 42 & 222 in the Treaty of Lisbon15

Embody, Julia, 201516

Ishchenko, Rostislav, "Poroshenko Too Weak to Implement Minsk", [russia-insider.com], 201517

Motyl, Alexander, "War By Other Means" at The Power Vertical, [rferl.org], 2015 & Ishchenko, Rostislav, 18

2015

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Russia values. With this in mind, it is understandable that negotiations today are at an impasse.

In this context, seeing the ambiguity in Minsk II, for the agreement to be successful in its current form, one side would have to fully subscribe to the other’s interpretations of key points. This seems highly unlikely since both sides are hindered to make such concessions due to domestic pressure. It therefore appears unwise for the EU to continue calling for the full and strict implementation of Minsk II.

Instead of insisting on this, Embody has suggested that western leaders use the agreement as a framework to complete further negotiations. She argues that Minsk II is a step on the way to settlement, rather than a final act. Until details that could ease the deadlock can be 19

worked out, it makes sense to see Minsk II as a document that could be reconsidered and changed in order to open up for new ways leading to resolution.

This less absolute way of understanding Minsk II would allow the EU to look beyond the strict order of things as set out in the agreement and focus more on the issues that have real chances of leading to progress. As a make-it-or-brake-it point for Minsk II approaches with the upcoming elections, such a mindset will be necessary.

3 Elections in eastern Ukraine

President Poroshenko has scheduled elections for 25 October 2015; the separatists have in turn announced they will hold their own on 18 October. This situation looks a lot like the period after the first Minsk agreement had been signed; in November 2014, the separatists decided to hold their own elections despite the fact that Kiev had planned elections for the next month. After this, Minsk I failed completely as disputes grew and the ceasefire collapsed when a big separatist offensive followed in January. If the upcoming elections in October play out the same way, what follows is likely to be an offensive even more difficult to contain than that of January.

Furthermore, the separatists’ elections held in November 2014 are not considered to have been free and fair. Understandably, Ukrainians do not see the leaders elected in this process as fit to represent the populations of these areas in negotiations. They are rather – and rightly so – seen as rebels who took power with military force. This is one of the reasons making it very hard for Kiev to make concessions; striking a deal with non-elected criminals does not ring well in the ears of any population. However, Kiev has indicated it would be willing to hold a genuine dialogue with whoever gets elected in a fair electoral process.

Embody, Julia, 201519

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Taken together, this shows that elections in these areas constitute a crucial opportunity to ease parts of the negotiation deadlock and at the same time avoid military escalation.

Furthermore, there seems to be better chances of making progress on the election question than on other points of Minsk II, such as decentralisation. This can be concluded from the fact that elections have never been an issue of disagreement in itself; none of the sides (at least openly) oppose democratic elections. Rather, it has only been used as a means of protest by the separatists to voice discontent. So in theory, it is not unlikely that some consensus could be found on this issue.

The order of things as spelled out in Minsk II makes sense. It is always preferable to have a ceasefire and weapons completely withdrawn before planning elections. However, the elections are scheduled very soon and ceasefire violations are abundant with no foreseeable end. Coupling this with the knowledge that the upcoming elections will be a decisive moment, and that finding consensus on this issue is not unimaginable, it would appear wise for the EU to direct its focus towards the elections at this point and assume a more proactive role.

3.1 Complications and recent developments Although there are some reasons to be hopeful about upcoming elections, the political situation still remains tense and problematic.

On 2 July, one day after Poroshenko presented the draft amendments on decentralisation, separatist leader Zakarchenko accused Kiev of violating Minsk II by its insufficient reforms and – knowing very well Kiev planned elections for 25 October – announced the separatists would hold their own local elections on 18 October. President Putin’s spokesperson Peskov joined the accusing voices by saying that in not consulting with the separatists, Kiev can hardly be seen as fulfilling the Minsk agreements. President Poroshenko has rightly pointed out that Minsk II says the elections have to be carried out in accordance with Ukrainian law, which says only Kiev can organise elections. As of today, there is still no common understanding between Kiev and the separatists on the elections as both parties continue to blame the other for violations of Minsk II.

Minsk II speaks of two types of elections. Firstly, the "regular" local elections in Ukraine, which means the elections on the government controlled areas. Secondly, "the comprehensive political settlement"; meaning the elections on the separatist controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The agreement leaves it up to the two parts to agree on specific procedures on how these elections will be carried out. So Minsk II does not state elections 20

in government and separatist controlled areas have to take place at the same time. Still France has underlined the importance of a single date for local elections in all of Ukraine.

Minsk II, point 920

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The Rada has scheduled the upcoming elections for 25 October, but has said the elections will not be held on the separatist-controlled territories because Kiev is not able to ensure OSCE standards in these areas. The specifics of which areas will be excluded in the elections is under consideration.

In the meantime, Kiev-backed governors of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions have expressed serious concern about the upcoming elections and in turn proposed that elections be postponed until 2017 in the two regions. There seems to be some support for this proposal in the Rada. 21

The OSCE is currently monitoring the ceasefire in Ukraine with a force of about 500 people. This has largely been considered insufficient to monitor the approximately 360 long front line. OSCE monitors have also continually been hindered to carry out their mission 22

and at several occasion been taken captive. Opinions have been voiced saying the OSCE monitoring mission lack efficiency and is loosing trust. As recently as 9 August, the OSCE reported a direct attack as several of their vehicles had been set on fire.

The Minsk agreement sets out that elections will be monitored by the OSCE’s section ODIHR which has extensive expertise on election monitoring. ODIHR has been under a lot of pressure to monitor the elections in eastern Ukraine and it now looks as if they will indeed monitor elections in both government and separatist-controlled Ukraine. However, because of the high number of elections throughout Europe recently, ODIHR is short of funds. They have thus asked the 57 member strong organisation for funding. Russia has however been reticent to grant more resources to monitor elections in eastern Ukraine. And considering the OSCE can only make decisions in consensus, prospects for success here are unclear. It appears the EU and its member states will continue pushing for the granting of this funding as a decision will have to be taken by the end of August at the very latest.

As of today, the conflict has seen a recent spike in ceasefire violations and many fear the situation might escalate. The Trilateral Contact Group has in turn held talks on the withdrawal of weaponry. However, the group’s meeting on 5 August was concluded without reaching an agreement on a final document on withdrawing weapons smaller than 100 mm in calibre from the contact line.

Democracy Reporting International, "Briefing paper 55", [democracy-reporting.org], 2015 & EEAS reporting21

Gressel, Gustav, "How to freeze the Russian-Ukrainian war? Part 3", [intersectionproject.eu], 201522

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3.2 New ways forward Taken together, the situation on local elections is problematic and unsure. It is still not clear how and when elections in the separatist territories will be held, nor whether ODIHR will be given sufficient funds to monitor them. In this context, the EU should continue its efforts to bring clarity into these things, but at the same time, if it is serious about taking on a more proactive role on the issue, it should explore new options to help the elections.

Much attention has been given to the issue of election monitoring, but it appears that the question of who will organise the elections remains largely unaddressed. Ukrainian legislation indeed says that only Kiev can organise elections, but seeing the Rada has stated it will not hold elections in the eastern parts, it makes sense to consider other alternatives.

The following section will briefly explore a selection of alternatives the EU has, seeking to help free and fair elections in eastern Ukraine and reach a resolution to the conflict.

Letting the separatists organise their own elections

Because Kiev will not organise elections in the eastern parts and the separatists have announced they will, the first option to consider is simply letting them hold the elections, and thus also legitimising the endeavour. This should not be given without conditionality. In return for Kiev legitimising the elections, the separatists would have to live with a strong presence of monitors; most likely OSCE monitors, but even EU monitors could be suggested. Seeing the recent attacks on monitors and the spike in violence, the monitors’ safety would have to be ensured in some way; a peacekeeping force of some sort could be suggested.

However, this would be extremely hard, if not impossible, to pass through the Rada in Kiev. As mentioned, the separatists are considered criminals by most and are consequently not trusted in Kiev. But if the separatists agreed to a strong monitoring and peacekeeping force, legitimising separatist elections might be something that the Rada could consider.

However, letting the separatists organise the elections would still leave room for electoral fraud. A better option to ensure the elections’ fairness would be having a third party organise the elections.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE has been the main player in both negotiations and monitoring throughout the conflict. It would therefore be logical to look at what could also be done in this framework to help the elections. As mentioned, there are already talks of OSCE monitoring the elections. The EU and its member states should continue pushing for that. But the option of the OSCE as an election organiser also deserves some attention.

The OSCE has organised elections in Bosnia in the past, so in principle it would be possible also in this case. This would most likely ensure free and fair elections. However, the

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separatists and Russia would have to be willing to agree to this, which at this point seems quite unlikely. In addition, the OSCE monitoring mission has recently been described by some as ineffective and as loosing trust. So it might be reasonable to look in other directions as well.

The United Nations

The issue of a UN peacekeeping mission in Ukraine was raised in Kiev in February 2015. The issue has been debated and some fear that it could be used by Russia to operate on Ukrainian territory legally under UN flag. However, just like in other UN missions, limitations to who could participate would be imposed. It would make sense to exclude all states that have been considerably involved in the crisis, this meaning all Nato and EU member states, and Russia.

Still there is no guarantee that a UN peacekeeping mission would establish total peace. One should remember that UN peacekeepers in Bosnia had extensive problems trying to carry out their mission. However, the UN has made considerable progress on its peacekeeping since the Yugoslav wars and should be able to contribute to the de-escalation and improve conditions for holding elections considerably.

As of election monitoring and organising, the UN would probably be even more fit to undertake this endeavour than the OSCE. The organisation has extensive experience in both organising and monitoring. A recent example is that of East Timor, where the UN was fully in charge of organising the election of 2001.

As always, concerning both a peacekeeping force and the organising of elections, the funding and mandate the UN gets has to pass through the Security Council, which would most likely mean a Russian veto at this point.

The Council of Europe (CoE)

The CoE has 47 member states including Russia. Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia no longer participates in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. However, it still engages is substantial dialogue in the Committee of Ministers. This indicates that Russia still accredits the Council with some legitimacy. The CoE already has activity in Ukraine through its Action Plan for Ukraine.

Initiatives by the CoE have lately seen a trend to depend more on voluntary contributions. This creates an opportunity for action to be taken despite the CoE regular budget being largely drained. In light of this, the EU and its member states could push for new initiatives to ensure that elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions will be free and fair (knowing of course that they would have to be the main contributors to the projects).

The CoE does have some experience with election observing. However, it would be difficult to imagine the CoE as an election organiser considering it has no previous

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experience in this field. It would be more reasonable to envisage more of a supportive role for the CoE in this context. Exploring what such a role could be would make sense since it could be a way to bypass deadlocks in other forums.

However, also here it comes down to political will as Russia would have to agree. Taking decisions without Russian consent would risk closing valuable lines of communication and escalate the situation on the ground.

3.3 Conclusion and suggestions Most of these initiatives are indeed quite unlikely to succeed because of the non-cooperation of Russia and the separatists. But in theory, if the proposals were to lead to action, it would bring about scenarios that would help the elections. Therefore, it would not be frowned upon if the EU or its member states decided to propose such things in international fora.

Over the last decade, Russia has bombarded Europe with diplomatic initiatives that it knew would not be accepted, with the aim to get the EU on the defensive and force it to refuse. If the EU or its member states proposed some of the above mentioned actions, Russia would either have to come up with a credible counter proposal which the EU and Kiev could consider, or it would stubbornly refuse.

But even if Russia refuses, this would not necessarily be a bad thing for the EU and its member states. When Russia refuses, it makes the country appear as the one trying to block the way to peace and the implementation of Minsk II. This is important for two reasons. Firstly, the European public would see this, which in turn would legitimise further action by the EU (sanctions, aid to Ukraine), thus granting the EU more flexibility in policy making. Secondly, the world would see that Russia is not genuinely trying to fulfil the agreement. This is important because when we hit 31 December 2015, the period of Minsk II will be over and there will be a review seeking to find who is to blame for the non-implementation of the agreement.

Considering recent visits by parliamentarians to Crimea and Putin visiting prominent states such as Japan, it appears Russia is not so isolated as one would like to think after the annexation of Crimea. This makes it even more urgent that we put pressure on Russia and show the world who is in fact disrupting the implementation of Minsk II.

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Taken together, the elections are truly an opportunity to change the dynamics of the dispute and get going on the way to resolution. Therefore, the EU and its member states should put more effort into finding ways forward in the relevant negotiations. If nothing else, the author hopes that this paper has served as some food for thought on the issue.

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4 References

Minsk II (en): "Full text of the Minsk agreement", [ft.com], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/21b8f98e-b2a5-11e4-b234-00144feab7de.html#axzz3iy6EWzeR]

Democracy Reporting International, "Briefing paper 55", [democracy-reporting.org], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [http://democracy-reporting.org/files/briefing_paper_update_on_legislative_initiatives_and_debates_en.pdf]

Embody, Julia, "Here’s How to Save the Minsk II Agreement", [nationalinterest.org], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [http://nationalinterest.org/feature/heres-how-save-the-minsk-ii-agreement-13299]

Gressel, Gustav, "How to freeze the Russian-Ukrainian war? Part 3", [intersectionproject.eu], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/how-freeze-russian-ukrainian-war-part-3]

Ishchenko, Rostislav, "Poroshenko Too Weak to Implement Minsk", [russia-insider.com], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [http://russia-insider.com/en/kiev-stalemante/ri8951]

Mearsheimer, John J., "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault" in Foreign Affairs September/October issue, [foreignaffairs.com], 2014, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/04/15, Available at: [http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-wests-fault]

Motyl, Alexander, "Podcast: War By Other Means" at The Power Vertical, [rferl.org], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [http://www.rferl.org/content/podcast-war-by-other-means/27163249.html]

Pifer, Steven, "Podcast: War By Other Means" at The Power Vertical, [rferl.org], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [http://www.rferl.org/content/podcast-war-by-other-means/27163249.html]

Socor, Vladimir, "Donetsk, Luhansk Propose Amendments to Ukraine’s Constitution" in Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12(93), [jamestown.org], 2015, [Electronic], Date of access: 2015/08/20, Available at: [h t tp : / /www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/s ingle /? tx_t tnews%5Btt_news%5D=43927&cHash=8662cb5150445829740407118af00284#.VdCyc1Ptmkq]

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