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BOOK REVIEWS BY Agha Humayun Amin 1999-2008

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BOOK

REVIEWS BY

Agha

Humayun

Amin

1999-2008

A HISTORYOF THEPAKISTAN ARMY-BRIAN CLOUGHLEY (REVIEWED BY MAJOR A.H AMIN-RETIRED) MARCH 1999 Brian Cloughley’s book on the Pakistan Army is a welcome addition to the extremely limited number of books on the Pakistan Army.The fact that such a book was not written by a Pakistani soldier or a civilian scholar does not paint a very bright picture about the state of history writing,or to be more specific military history writing in Pakistan. Brian Cloughley has the singular advantage of having served for a relatively long period in Pakistan as a UN Official and as a military attache.In addition he is also a soldier and thus his perception of military affairs is different from a scholar who is a civilian and thus suffers from certain limitations which can only be overcome by extraordinary analytical ability and painstaking hard research.Brian Cloughley has made an honest attempt to present things as they are or as he percieved them to be with whatever facts he could lay hands to and the result is a relatively significant work on Pakistani military history with reference to on ground military performance of the Pakistan Army in three Indo Pak wars.On the whole Cloughley’s account is fairly balanced and the layman reader can form a fairly continuous picture of the progress of the Pakistan Army from 1947 to date.The initial history

of the Pakistan Army however is given a broad brush treatment and the British Indian Colonial social and military legacy is totally ignored.This leaves the reader with an impression that the Pakistan Army was an entity created in 1947 and all that it did from 1947 onwards had little connection with the pre 1947 British Colonial policy and the military experience of the Indian Army in the two world wars.The 1947-48 Kashmir War where the Pakistan Army got its baptism of fire as the independent army of a sovereign country is hardly discussed.Thus important military controversies like the Operation Venus Controversy etc are not discussed at all.The conduct of Kashmir War by the Pakistani civilian leadership and and its resultant impact on the army’s perception of the civilian leadership is not discussed.The British recruitment policy and their irrational advocacy of the "Martial Races Theory" is not discussed at all.The impact of the conservative British military heritage on the intellectual development of the post 1947 Pakistani military leadership is totally ignored.The Ayub period has been given a relatively more detailed treatment and the conduct of 1965 war is reasonably detailed and the analysis of military operations is objective,critical and thought provoking.No serious effort is however made to explain why the Pakistan Army failed to achieve any decisive breakthrough despite having technically superior equipment as well as numerical superiority in tanks. The 1971 war which was more of a one sided show and a war in which Indian victory in the Eastern Theatre in words of Field Marshal Mankekshaw was a "foregone conclusion" keeping in view the overwhelming Indian numerical superiority1 ,has been discussed in much greater detail than 1965 war.This is a serious draw back since 1965

deserved more space because it had more lessons keeping in view the fact that both sides employed their strategic reserves.The post 1971 history of the army has been given a better treatment and enables the layman reader to understand many aspects of the present state of confrontation in the Sub Continent. There are many factual and analytical errors in the book which were entirely avoidable and were not beyond the author or the publishers control.The publisher shares a major responsibility in ensuring accuracy of facts while analytical errors or analytical drawbacks are more within an authors sphere of responsibility.15 Lancers was not raised in 1948-50 but in 19552.Iskandar Mirza was not from the ICS (Indian Civil Service) but the Indian Political Service3.The author has asserted that Ayub Khan was "gallant in combat" 4but there is no record of it in terms of gallantry awards or mention in despatches.On the contrary Ayub was accused of tactical timidity in Burma5. Akhnur has been mentioned as the only road link to Kashmir6 whereas Akhnur ,as a matter of fact was the only road link to Poonch Valley only.The Indian 50 Para Brigade was not moved on 7th September to relieve the 54 Brigade as asserted on page-87 but made its appearance in the 15 Division area only on 10th September and that too in the Hudiara Drain area7.On page-96 the author states that 13 Dogra in 4 Indian Mountain Division area captured Bedian but was driven out by 7 Punjab’s counter attack the next day.In reality 13 Dogra never attacked Bedian ,nor was Bedian defended by 7 Punjab. Bedian was defended by 7 Baluch and attacked by 17 Rajput.Further Bedian was not attacked by a unit from the

4 Mountain Division but by a unit of 7 Indian Division which failed to capture it in the first place8.Jassar was not defended by a Pakistani Tank Troop as written on page-110 but by the whole 33 Tank Delivery Unit9.The Jassar operation did not result in release of a whole Indian tank regiment but release of two infantry battalions and a squadron minus10.4 FF was not part of 6 Armoured Division as stated on page-117. The whole "Order of Battle" of the Pakistan Army on the Western Front as given on page-225 is incorrect.Formations of the I Corps have thus been shown as formations of 11 Corps and vice versa.8 Armoured Brigade which was a part of 1 Corps has been shown as part of 4 Corps.Rahimuddin Khan has been promoted to Zia’s son in law on page-275 whereas Ejaz ul Haq was Rahim’s son in law. Aziz Ahmad the famous civil servant has been described as Aziz Ali9a.The order of battle of the Pakistan Army on page-284 has also some factual errors;eg Pakistan Army does not have any mechanised infantry divisions whereas the author has shown two divisions as mechanised divisions.One tank unit allotted to Pakistan in 1947 ie the 19 Lancers has not been listed at all in the list of armoured units allotted to Pakistan10. The author rightly wonders why some military commanders guilty of timidity in Khem Karan were not immediately sacked!But he fails to mention that one of them was promoted to the rank of major general few years after the war.His analysis of the Khem Karan operations is considerably thought provoking.But the major reason for failure of the Khem Karan offensive ie

poor initial planning which led to traffic congestion and poor engineers effort and delayed the concentration of the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division has not been discussed at all. The author however rightly points out that failure to carry out thorough reconnaissance was one of the major reasons of failure of the Pakistani armoured thrusts failure in Khem Karan.However his assertion that the Indians had considerable reserves to contain Pakistan Army even if it had achieved a breakthrough is not based on material facts.India did have its 23 Mountain Division,but this formation was nowhere near Khem Karan when the Pakistani offensive was launched.In any case a Mountain Infantry division could have been of little value against the Pakistani 1 Armoured Division.The analysis of the tank battles in Sialkot is not comprehensive and lacks depth. The authors assertion on page-120 that the ad hoc force under direct command of the I Pakistani Corps forced the Indians back to the border is not correct11.The 24 Brigade which did so was a part of the 15 Division and 25 Cavalry the tank unit which in the words of Indians stopped them acted on orders of its commanding officer alone and 1 Corps Headquarter had little idea of what 25 Cavalry did in stopping the Indians till the evening of 8th September. The author has not mentioned 25 Cavalry at all which in words of the Indian Armoured Corps’s historian; was the unit whose " performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the Indian 1st Armoured Division and its objective,the MRL Canal 11a" and stopped the 1st Indian Armoured Division on 8th September,all by

itself.The authors reproduction of the Indian writer Verghese’s views that the Indian 1st Armoured Division dashed forward rashly is not based on facts.The Indian advance was fairly balanced and it was halted on 8th September not because the Indians had completely committed their armour but because the Commander 1st Armoured Brigade lost his nerve because of false and unsubstantiated reports of his flanks being under counter attack at a time when both the advancing Indian tank regiments had committed a total of only three squadrons with three squadrons uncommitted and the Indian 1st Armoured Division had a third tank regiment totally fresh and in a position to easily outflank the Pakistani armour in Gadgor area12. The author has also not discussed at all the Indian armours total lack of activity on 9th and 10th September.This inactivity at a time when there was just one tank regiment to oppose five Indian tank regiments was the main reason for the Indian main attack’s failure in Sialkot Sector.The treatment of the 1971 war is far more detailed than 1965 war.All the emphasis is however on the Eastern Theatre where the Indian victory in words of the Indian Chief was a foregone conclusion.The author has highlighted actions of bravery at small unit level and has shown that the Pakistan Army put up a good show in East Pakistan as far as the junior leadership was concerned.The battles on the Western Theatre have however been largely ignored and the battle of Chhamb which was described by the Indians as "the most serious reverse suffered in the 1971 war 13" has not been discussed in much detail.

Major General Eftikhar was the finest commander at the operational level as far as the Pakistan Army is conerned and any history of Pakistan Army is incomplete without discussing Eftikhar’s brilliant opearational leadership in Chhamb.Eftikhar was one of the only two Pakistani senior commanders praised by the Indian military historians.One Indian military historian described him as one who "showed skill and determination in carrying out his mission" .14The analysis of the Bhutto period is quite comprehensive and the personality of Mr Bhutto and his attitude towards the army has been described quite correctly.The sycophantic persoanlity of Zia has however been given a generous treatment and many of Zia’s well known antics to please Mr Bhutto like orders to all officers of Multan Garrison to line up their wives to greet Mr Bhutto’s cavalcade passing through the Fort Colony have not been discussed at all. No Mard i Momin except one solitary EME officer Major Kausar had the moral courage to disobey this illegal order and Zia immediately got him dismissed from the army.

The intelligence and operational failure in Siachen on part of the ISI and the formation responsible for the defence of Siachen as a result of which the Indians were able to infiltrate 35 miles inside Pakistani

territory have not been discussed at all. On the contary General Pirdad who was the formation commander during the Siachen debacle has been praised as an admirable officer15.The authors assertion that English language was neglected during the Zia era is not based on facts.I was a cadet in Zia’s tenure at the Pakistan Military Academy.Any cadet who failed in English was not promoted to the next term and English teaching and examination standards were very tough.The crux of the problem was the overall deteriorating English standards in Pakistan following Bhuttos nationalisation of educational institutuins and the relatively poor material joining the army in the post 1971 era. The post Zia era has been covered in a very incisive manner.The authors assertion that the "Director infantry" was a post that any infantry officerw ould welcome is incorrect.Mahor General Zahir Ul Islam Abbasi was posted as Director Infantry following a diasastorous Charge of the light Brigade type attack in Siachen which he had ordered without prior approval of his next senior operational headquarter. in which one of the Pakistani units suffered unnecesarily high casualties including the death of a brigade commander.The authors criticism of the ISI is forthright,accurate and thought provoking.In this regard he has shown courage in criticising a top heavy agency whose much trumpeted reputaion is not matched by actual on ground performance and which suffers from a tendency to embark on private wars.Brian Cloughley has

done a remarkable job in writing a fairly critical history of the Pakistan Army.Most of the factual errors were avoidable but something which should have been taken care of by the publishers who knew that the author was a foreigner and did not have the time to cross check or recheck all the facts because of not permanently residing in Pakistan. The author appears to be too much of a gentleman to critically analyse many of the Quixotic blunders of Indo Pak military history. Nevertheless Brian Cloughley’s book has filled a void in Indo Pak military history by at least constructing a continuous and fairly comprehensive picture of one of third worlds important armies.Regardless of the fact whether any one may agree or disagree with Cloghley’s analysios.the book by and large retains the position of a book which is compulsory for any layman or foreigner doing research on the Pakistan Army.

BEHIND THE SCENES Major General Joginder Singh (Retired) Lancer International -New Delhi-1993 273 Pages-Fifteen Sketch Maps. ISBN-1-897829-20-5

Price-Hardbound-380/- Indian Rupees- (Not including postage) Reviewed by A.H Amin August 2000 When I saw this books short description on LANCER BOOKS promotional leaflet I immediately ordered one through Bharat Verma's London UK office.I was very excited and thought very seriously that this book would be a really fine magnum bonum type of an effort on the Indian Army.At that time I was writing my book Pakistan Army till 1965 and hoped that this book would be a tremendous help.Following are my personal observations written in late 1999.“Behind the Scenes”, setting aside other factors discussed in the succeeding paragraphs still is a welcome addition to the limited number of books available on the Indo Pak wars. Major General Joginder Singh possesses the distinction of being an insider in the higher Indian command and staff echelons in the period 1958-65 and his analysis carries the weight of authority of a man who saw how various operational and higher command decisions were taken from close quarters. Major General Joginder Singh the author was commissioned in the 5th Battalion 14th Punjab Regiment more popularly known as “ Ali Baba’s (its commanding officers designation) Forty Thieves” British Indian Army in 1937 after having joined the army through the “Y Cadet Scheme”. Joginder saw military action in the British operations against the Frontier tribes in the late 1930s. He attended the 1945 Army Staff Course at Quetta, served in

various command and staff appointments including a stint at the Indian Ministry of Defence, command of an Infantry Battalion (7 Punjab), Commander 80 Brigade-Nowshera Sector), Deputy Commandant Infantry School, Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps during the Sino-Indian War, GOC 5 Infantry Division and Chief of Staff of the Western Command under three successive GOC in chiefs. The last assignment included 1965 War after which Joginder finally retired in 1967.The book is divided into five parts and covers the entire modern post-1947 Indian military history with maximum space devoted to the 1965 conflict while smaller tracts are devoted to the 1971 War, Interwar years followed by a small section dealing with the more recent developments. The first part dealing with “National Strategy” feels that strategic insight is sadly lacking in India’s higher decision making echelons. He feels that politicians leading India are short-sighted and self- centred and feels that Indian higher leadership lacks the qualities necessary to attain India’s position of natural leadership in Asia.Joginder discusses in considerable detail his experiences as 80 Infantry Brigade Commander where he first advanced the possibility that Akhnur bridge by virtue of being the sole link to Poonch Valley and the fact that it was defended by the weak 191 Infantry Brigade defending Chamb Sector represented a serious imbalance in Indian defensive posture in South Kashmir and that it was most likely that Pakistan Army in case of war may capture it with ease using a force of an armoured brigade infantry division. Joginder states that a divisional exercise was held based on this scenario in April-May 1956 but the only outcome was that “GOC 26 Division was asked to proceed on pension” (Page-28) while no

other changes were made in operational plans or organisational structure till 1965. The layman readers may note that shortly before the September 1965 War the Indian High Command did agree to upgrade the Chamb Brigade to a Divison in August 1965 but at the time of Grand Slam Chamb was defended only by an infantry brigade and a squadron of light tanks. Joginder devotes a small chapter to his experiences as Brigadier General Staff 15 Corps responsible for Indian Occupied Kashmir and discusses his recommendations which included creation of an infantry division to defend Chamb, construction of a bridge on Chenab at Riasi as an alternative to Akhnur bridge stationing of an independent armoured brigade in Jammu area and stationing of an infantry division size force as 15 Corps Reserve. None of the recommendations were followed by Joginders bosses ! The author’s discussion of Sino-Indian War is not much different from the other much known discussions in various well circulated books, so it is pointless to burden the readers with repetition of much discussed issues.The most valuable albeit controversial part of the book is the one dealing with the authors experiences as Chief of Staff of the Western Command before and during 1965 war. The author had a high opinion of his first GOC Western Command who died in a helicopter crash in 1963 along with four general officers and an airforce air vice marshal. Joginder also had a very high opinion about his second GOC Manekshaw. It was during this period as the author discusses that the Western Command carried out a detailed appreciation dealing with a future Indo-Pak conflict and recommended an offensive posture with attack aimed at isolating Lahore (going for Balloki

Headwork’s) and Sialkot (from Jammu-Samba area) and against the Mangla Dam-Mirpur area were planned. It was during this period that the Western Command’s proposals for opening a second front across the international border Joginder states that the Army Chief Chaudhry accepted the idea of opening a second front in case of war across the international border. Joginder, however, noted that by 1964 Nehru incapable of taking any decisions due to bad health and indifferent mental state while defence held a very low priority with Nehru’s successor Shaastri. Thus the 1964 memorandum prepared by the Western Command was simply filed away. Joginder felt that General Chaudhri was not assertive in presenting the Indian political leadership with the true defence requirements.The controversial part of the book begins once Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh enters the scene as the third boss of the author as GOC Western Command in November 1964. It appears that there was a personality clash between Joginder and Harbaksh while Harbaksh’s book “War Despatches” published before Joginder’s book indicates that Harbaksh did not have a very high opinion about Joginder.Joginder states that Harbaksh wanted to base India’s main defence on River Bias while abandoning the entire territory from the international border till Beas. While it is impossible to confirm or deny this assertion it seems highly improbable that Harbaksh could hold such an opinion whether one takes Harbaksh as an Indian or a Sikh.Joginder states that at a conference held in May 1965

the GOC of 1st Indian Armoured Division advanced the thesis that the most likely axis of Pakistani main attack was Patti-Harike -Beas Bridge. It was this conference that the Indian Chief as per the author agreed to deploy an armoured brigade in Khem Karan area to meet the Pakistani armoured threat emanating from Kasur area. Harbaksh Singh as per the author thought otherwise giving a higher priority to a Pakistani frontal threat in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Harbaksh Singh on the other hand states in his book that he had appreciated before the war that a Pakistani armour threat from Kasur towards the Beas bridge was most likely. There is no way in which Joginder’s assertions can be proved or disproved.Joginder’s approach towards Harbaksh Singh while discussing almost all aspects of the 1965 war is hostile to the point of being irrational. Thus he defends Major General Nirinjan Prasad who was sacked for exhibiting timidity and cowardice by Harbaksh Singh. Joginder thinks that Niranjan was sacked not because he was irresolute but because he was a difficult subordinate. Again it is not possible to agree or disagree with Joginder about this assertion. However, Niranjan’s sacking was even justified by very neutral and dispassionate Indian military historians like Major Praval. There is one fact which stands out in 15 Division’s conduct on 6th, 7th and 8th September, i.e its conduct keeping in view its numerical superiority in infantry and the degree of surprise that it had achieved on 6th of September was not commensurate with the overwhelming advantages that it enjoyed. As a matter of fact many Pakistani defenders of Lahore who were interviewed by this scribe were surprised at the

lack of initiative exhibited by the 15 Division in its operations on the 6th of September 1965. No one can deny the fact that two infantry brigades of this division bolted away in face of Pakistani counterattacks and that this led to a serious operational crisis on the 8/9 September once the 96 Brigade was brought forward to check the conditions of near rout. I am not implying that the Indians were non- Martial as many Pakistanis earnestly believe since it is a fact that a Pakistani unit from the Punjab Regiment opposite Barki also bolted away. What I am merely trying to point out is the fact that there was something seriously wrong with 15 Indian Division at divisional as well as brigade level. However, Joginder denies it and sees Niranjan as an angel of a man since Harbaksh sacked him.Niranjan was also called Dhoti Parshad in Indian Army. Joginder asserts that he gave a suggestion that the BRB should be crossed at Barki , after the main Indian attacks against Lahore had failed on 6-9th September , but does not explain how it could have been successfully done, keeping in view the net performance of all Indian brigades of 7 and 15 Division tasked to contact the BRB, was pathetic by all definitions. He asserts that he also suggested that the 26 Indian Division should bypass Sialkot and capture Sambrial west of Sialkot but does not explain how an infantry division would do so when an armoured division supported by two infantry divisions had failed to capture even Chawinda which was hardly 11 miles from the border. The author asserts that Harbaksh Singh took no interest in the main Indian attack i.e the 1 Corps operations opposite

Chawinda but does not explain why it was so. Was it due to some inter arm rivalry or because Harbaksh was not interested that India should win the war?The author’s conclusion that there was no worthwhile higher direction in 1965 war as far as the Indian Army is concerned stands out as one of the most credible conclusions of the book. His assertion that the 1965 War was a show of some “20 Lieutenant Colonel and their units and about seven regiments of the armoured corps....” is valid for both the armies conduct in 1965.Joginder flatly denies that General Chaudhri ever asked Harbaksh Singh to withdraw to the Beas River. General Kaul whose book was published many years before Harbaksh Singh’s “War Despatches” had also made a similar accusation (i.e that such a withdrawal was suggested by Chaudhri). I came across a similar assertion in another book by an Indian Colonel H.C Karr’s book. It appears that Chaudhri did discuss something with Harbaksh about re-adjusting his position but since there is nothing on record, therefore, only a Prophet or a Jinn may ever know about what exactly happened. The possibility that Joginder dismisses this incident since Harbaksh Singh had written that it occurred cannot be denied since “opposition for opposition’s sake” is one of the cardinal attributes of the Sub Continental psyche. The author agrees that the main failure at Chawinda occurred in the handling of 1st Indian Armoured Brigade on the 8th September 1965 but has spent far more energy in painting Harbaksh Singh as the main reason for the Indian failure all over the book. In this regard it appears that the book had the support of the Indian military

establishment who were outraged by Harbaksh very frank and forthright remarks about the mishandling of Indian Army at various levels in the 1965 War. In this regard the book stands out as more of a “Rejoinder” to Harbaksh’s “War Despatches” than a study carried out in a detached manner with the aim of correctly analysing the 1965 War. The author gives no explanation why the Indians wasted two complete days doing nothing following their failure at Gadgor on the 8th of September. This was the most critical phase of war for the Pakistanis when they were off balance and it was possible for the Indian armour to regain its freedom of manoeuvre by outflanking the Pakistani force opposite them. The situation after 10/11 September when the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division started reinforcing the 6th Armoured Division was totally transformed. The major Indian failure occurred on 8th 9th and 10th September and was entirely because of indecisiveness and lack of resolution in pressing forward on behalf of the Indian 1 Corps/1 Armoured Division/1st Armoured Brigade Commander.The author has also discussed 1971 War in brief but here his criticism is very mild about the higher direction in the war. Indian Western Command Chief Candeth has acknowledged in his book that had the Pakistanis attacked in late October 1971 all Indian plans to attack East Pakistan would have been blown into winds. This proves that the plans to invade East Pakistan were not as sound as they appeared and that the Indian plan was only carried out successfully since Yahya was irresolute enough not to launch a counteroffensive in the Western Front as had been planned before 1971 War.

Joginder does not explain how establishment of the Bangladesh strategically helped India in the long run since Bangladesh is militarily stronger than the old East Pakistan and is not an Indian satellite as Indians had envisaged. Even Indian thinkers are divided about the strategic success of the 1971 War! Was it fought to add another feather to the Durga Devis cap or to liberate the Bengalis ! Indira’s conduct after the 1971 War does not paint a very bright picture about her motivation to start the 1971 War. Even if the aim was to help the Bengalis it failed since major killings by the Pakistan Army whatever their quantum took place in April-June 1971 and by November 1971 the situation was far different from that of June 1971. Genocide was committed but the Indians came not with a missionary’s motive to help the oppressed but for other reasons. Wars are not fought for missionary purposes alone and 1971’s only enduring legacies are “a more aggressive and militarily viable Pakistan eager to vindicate its honour” and the creation of a smaller ethnic state which proves that after a decade or two all provinces of present day Indo Pak are tomorrow’s full time members of the UNO! In this regard the 1971 war as far as India was concerned was a strategic failure and only a symbolic success! It would have been a success only if India had the resolution to overrun West Pakistan or to at least recapture Pakistan held Kashmir.Joginder has not discussed anywhere the relative failure of the Indian command system especially with reference to the Western Command. A dispassionate glance at the conduct of 1965 and 1971 wars proves that the Indian command system is too unwieldy and keeping in view the frontage, location of formations and their

number it is very difficult for any man whether it is Harbaksh or Manekshaw to effectively command anything like the Western Command as it is and as it was in 1965 and 1971 wars. Joginder’s hero Manekshaw had nothing to do with actual operational command of any corps division or command in any of the three Indo Pak wars. The Indian failure at Chamb in 1971 which was criticised by Joginder definitely had a connection with the confusion in the Indian GHQ as the narratives of Candeth and Gurcharan Singh prove. Joginder does not explain why Chamb, which was adequately defended in 1971, lost to Pakistan in 1971. It was a command failure and had a deeper connection with the divisional commanders personality and handling of armour than with anything at brigade or unit level where the Indian 191 Brigade was brilliantly led and managed to hold three infantry brigades supported by three tank regiments for more than two days. An interesting revelation of the book is the fact that Ayub Khan commanded the Chamar Regiment and was under fire in WW Two and seen as not fit to command a battalion of his parent regiment Punjab Regiment.How should we analyse the Indian Army’s failure in 1965 or how should I put it as a Pakistani?

Lieutenant General Harbaksh Singh Joginder sees the hand of Harbaksh Singh in all Indian failures in 1965! This, however, is too simplistic an approach. There were deeper reasons for the Indian (as well as the Pakistani) failure to function as dynamic entities beyond unit level in 1965. The Indian Army of 1965 was like the Austrian Army of 1809. It consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders but was severely handicapped since rapid expansion since the Sino-Indian war of 1962, despite being impressive on paper had not made the Indian military machine really effective because of poor

training at divisional and brigade level. It was numerically strong but organisationally ineffective having dashing young leaders but tactically and operationally inept brigade divisional and corps commanders from the older pre- 1947 commissioned generation whom were initially supposed not to go beyond company level, had the transfer of power not taken place in 1947. The strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1 Corps which was shortly created before the 1965 war was a newly raised formation whose corps commander and armoured divisional commanders were about to retire in 1965 when war broke out. The Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the case with Pakistan Army, consisted of men who had experience of infantry biased operations in WW Two and did not understand the real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding that led to the failures in achieving a decisive armour breakthrough in both sides. It was a failure of command as well as staff system where even the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather than miles. Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North African experience where the Japanese and Germans frequently appeared in their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having been trained in the slavish colonial orders oriented British Indian Army was the cardinal script of their life. It was this British system in which every senior commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior to him that led to

the lack of dash and initiative at brigade and battalion level. They were trained that way and there behaviour as far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken in this context. How could one man, an army commander responsible for three corps is made responsible for failures that occurred at battalion brigade and divisional level!Once I heard about Joginder’s book in 1998, I had very high expectations and was convinced that a man who has been the Chief of Staff of the Western Command will be the best judge of 1965 War. In this regard the book was a big disappointment since instead of analysing Indian military history it is more of a proof that Joginder Singh was a very fine staff officer and that Harbaksh Singh was a horrible man! Joginder’s book is a welcome addition to the limited number of first hand/direct participant accounts on 1965 War. The fact that the writer has made some controversial assertions and has made an effort to write a rejoinder to Harbaksh Singh’s more famous “War Despatches”, however, does not diminish the historical value of the book, at least for the Pakistani readers of military history. I still maintain that the book thus retains the status of “must be read and indispensable books” on the list of all keen students of Indo Pak military history. However, his anti-Harbaksh bias should be taken with a pinch of salt. In addition his discussion of what could have been done must be viewed in relation to the relatively pathetic performance of both the armies in all three wars. The under employment of Pakistan and Indian Armies in all

three wars have a deep connection with the conservative British colonial legacy. Harbaksh and various other actors were a product of that system and were relatively better or perceived to be better than their contemporaries and thus elevated to the higher command ranks. It was the outmoded system that proved to be a failure in all three wars. Individuals were just the tip of the iceberg.

History of The Baloch Regiment 1820-1939-The Colonial Period-

Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad (Retired) - Published by Baloch Regiment Centre, Abbottabad; Printed by Central Army Press Rawalpindi (First Edition, 1998.) Reviewed by A.H AMIN October 2001 The two volumes on the history of the Baloch Regiment are a welcome edition to the extremely short list of books on Pakistani Military History. The first volume covers the period from 1820 to 1939 while the second volume covers the period from 1939 to 1956. Major General Rafiuddin Ahmed took to military writing at an early stage in his military career and came to be regarded as an accomplished military writer by the time he reached colonel rank in the mid early 1970s. This scribe read a bunch of one of his excellent writeups on German Airborne Warfare in 1975-76 at Quetta. These were presented to my father by then Lieutenant Colonel Rafi and as far as I recollect the general was then an instructor at the command and staff college Quetta. The writers father in laws family were active members of Aligarh Old Boys Association Rawalpindi .The readers may note that the most active members of this association included a prominent Baluchi Brigadier Gulzar Ahmad, and most

meetings of the association were held at this scribes grandfathers residence in Rawalpindi , which now houses the Darya Abad Girls School. A major qualification of General Rafi is that in essence he is not a member of the “Typical Prototype Generals Trade Union” having been promoted to general rank a little late ! Before we proceed further it is important to caution the layman reader about the immense odds that a military writer confronts once he writes a regimental history ! Writing a regimental history of an infantry regiment consisting of many battalions which participated in many wars including two world wars spread over an 180 years period is a gigantic undertaking ! It is but natural that any such enterprise cannot be perfect or free of factual as well as analytical errors ! In addition it must be remembered that Indo Pak and this includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka is not a “History Friendly” Region and “Intellectual Honesty” is the rarest commodity in all official quarters whether civil or military in this entire region of intellectual darkness. Organisations as well as political parties are run on the basis of personal interest rather than national interest and at least two Indo Pak Wars were triggered by individuals who were motivated by egoistic and personal rather than nationalistic motivations disguised in high sounding slogans! The readers must also note that General Rafi’s history is one which although not an official history was “officially sponsored” in terms of financial support and thus the general, as happens with all official or officially supported intellectual ventures, even in far more advanced western countries, was allowed to proceed in a certain officially prescribed course which did not allow him to be too critical in conduct of operations of the post 1947 period involving “Sacred Cows” of the Pakistani military establishment. In the first volume however the general has

been more critical since those who called the shots then are now patronless skeletons, little more than footnotes of history and their conduct can be criticised. The general has however made an effort to do some critical analysis “in between the lines” which is reasonable! At places he has been uncritical but the first volume is certainly better since history is easier to be written when the actors have long been dead and are in no position to cause any mental or physical discomfiture to the historian in question!The military history of various battalions of the regiment has been covered in an excellent manner linking the unit’s role with the overall military situation. The narrative is most interesting since the author has included various incidents from unit histories involving details of battle actions in which gallantry awards were won or accounts dealing with military personalities. The author does not hesitate from giving his opinion on various historical aspects and this makes the narrative more interesting. The battle accounts are supported by excellent maps although credits for most have not been mentioned in the acknowledgement section. The photographs and paintings are of excellent quality and make the book very interesting to read. The author has taken pains to highlight the role of the Baluchis in various remote campaigns in East Africa in the late 1890s. Many in Pakistan were not aware of these campaigns. The acounts dealing with the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 and the First World War are extremely well done . The analysis integrates the pure military history aspect with the Indo Pak and particularly Indo Muslim point of view. It is a difficult exercise since the Indian Army was a mercenary army and employed to fight against the freedom fighters! The writer has managed to highlight the performance of the Baluch Regiment and has also been symapthetic to the Freedom Fighters. For some reason he

did not have any sympathy with the Sindhi Hurs, but this shall be discussed in the next review of volume two.The strangest part of the work is absence of an introduction or a foreword by any retired or serving Baluchi officer! This perhaps is an indication of the lack of importance that we attach to anything connected with intellectual activity! The emphasis remains on self projection, personal advancement and personal fortune building ! We have a large number of so called illustrious retired officers! One visit to ’Pindi, Islamabad or Lahore is enough to prove their existence in terms of material progress! But what is their intellectual contribution to posterity in terms of transferring conceptual and intellectual experiences! Nil! All did exceedingly well on paper but have nothing to pen down! Ayub the longest serving chief wrote a book but that book had little to do with military history! Yahya was held in detention till he died and wrote little or we know little about what he wrote! The breed of Attique, A.I Akram etc is extinct! The lack of three or four pages written by any senior officer, serving or retired, and the Baluch Regiment did produce many generals(!) as opening remarks in General Rafi’s history is without doubt an irrefutable proof of our intellectual bankruptcy!The first volume contains factual errors which were entirely avoidable had the writer relied simply on three or four standard books on Indian Military history. The Safavids were overthrown not by Nadir Shah (Page-8) but by the Ghilzai Pathans from Afghanistan, who were previously Persian subjects and who in turn were overthrown by Nadir Shah in 1726. The Marhattas reached the outskirts of Delhi not in 1738 (Page-9) but in 1737 (Refers-Page-436-Oxford History of India-Percival Spear-1937 and Page-294-Later Mughals-Volume Two-William Irvine-Calcutta-1921-22). The assertion that “An Afghan power arose in Kabul”

(Page-Nine and Ten) is also incorrect. Ahmad Shah Abdali was crowned as the first king of Afghanistan at Kandahar in 1748 at the age of 23 and captured Kabul later but kept his capital at Kandahar till his death and is buried in Kandahar. Ahmad Shah did not begin his career as a Mughal adversary (Page-Nine) but as a soldier in Nadir Shah’s army and later made his entry into real power politics once he plundered Nadir Shah’s treasure in the chaotic situation after Nadir’s assasination by his Qizilbash generals. Ahmad Shah Abdali annexed Punjab not in 1754 (Page-10) but in 1751-52 (Refers-Page-434-The Cambridge History of India-Volume Four-The Mughal Period-Edited by Wolsely Haig and Richard Burn). The assertion that Ahmad Shah Abdali won the gratitude of Muslims and Hindus alike for defeating Marathas is also debatable. The target of both the Afghans and the Marathas were the rich and in this regard they did not give anyone a waiver simply because he was a Muslim or a Hindu! As a matter of fact Abdali proclaimed by Iqbal as a great hero mercilessly subjected Muslim Delhi and Muslim Punjab to merciless slaughter, rapine and plunder and his deeds are a frequent subject of even poetical works of Muslim poets like Waris Shah and Mir Taqi Mir! The layman reader may note that the loot that this so called soldier of Islam gathered in 1757 alone from Muslim Delhi was carried from Delhi to Afghanistan by 28,000 transport animals ! (Refers-The Pursuit of Urdu Literature-Ralph Russell-Zed Books-London -1997-Distributed by Vanguard Books-Lahore). Delhi was captured by Lake not in 1805 (Page-11) but September 1803. The writer has supported 1st Punjab’s claim (Page-30) of being the 3rd Battalion of Coastal Sepoys which in reality was the result of Lord Roberts decision to replace Madrasis with Punjabi manpower in the period 1885-1893. It is an indisputable fact that the post 1885 Punjabi

manpower had nothing to do with the pre 1885 battlehonours of the 2nd, 6th,16th, 22nd and 24th Madras Native Infantry which to date they claim as their own. The men of 3rd Battalion of Coastal Sepoys were not the ancestors of the post 1885 manpower of 1st Punjab. Technically the First Punjabi claim is right but historically and ethnically no one can deny the fact that some two third of the manpower of the Madras Infantry of pre 1885 was South Indian Hindu. The 1st Punjabis should thank Lord Roberts for getting the pre 1885 Battle Honours won by a regiment which consisted of some two third Madrasi Hindus and one third Muslims of mixed ancestry. Lord Hastings tenure lasted not from 1814-23 (Page-38) but from 1813-1823 having begun from 13th October 1813 (Refers-Page-238-A Popular History of British India-W. Cooke Taylor-1854-Reprinted Mittal Publications-Delhi-1987). The assertion that the “British Government in India tried to salvage its position through swift retaliation “(Page-41) i.e teaching Afghans a lesson is incorrect. The actual happenings were as following. The British Governor General Ellenborough was irresolute and simply wanted to withdraw the Bengal and Bombay Armies from Kandahar and Jalalabad. His generals i.e Nott and Pollock were more resolute and knew well by their experience of having Jallalabad and Kandahar successfully that the predominantly Hindu sepoys of the Bengal and Madras Armies and a smaller nucleus of British regiments could still teach the Afghans some parting lesson by once again capturing Kabul. It was resolution on part of both these indomitable generals that the British recaptured Kabul once again in Seprember 1842 and then withdrew the Bengal and Bombay Armies via the longer route i.e Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul-Jalalabad-Khaibar. (Refers-Pages-269 and 270- A History of the British Army-Volume XII-

1839-1852-Hon J.W Fortescue-Macmillan and Co Limited-London-1927 and Refers-Page-407-Cooke Taylor-Op Cit). The Governor General had initially given simple orders to withdraw from Afghanistan in May 1842. It was under military pressure that he agreed to a withdrawal after recapturing Kabul ! The statement that “In January 1843 Amir Dost Mohammad returned to Kabul” (Page-41) is misleading and implies that this “Amir” was fighting some kind of war of liberation. As a matter of fact this Amir had surrendered to the East India Company’s troops on 3rd November 1840 and living a comfortable life as a state prisoner with a large number of wives at Ludhiana . He was released not because of the myth in Afghanistan that he was exchanged for British prisoners (who had a matter of fact been released in 1842 by a British punitive column) but simply because Ellenborough had decided to follow a policy of good will as the Afghans had not harmed the British non combatant hostages. The British losses at Battle of Miani are described as heavy (Page-50) although they were not relatively heavy (about 62 Killed and 194 wounded) once compared to British Indian Battles of that time like Assaye, Chillianwalla etc. The writer states that there were very few all Muslim battalions in Indian Army except the three Baluch Battalions (Page-61). The Bengal Army had six All Muslim infantry Battalions in 1893 i.e the 5th, 12th, 17th, 18th, 33rd and 40th.I was unable to find footnote one in the main text of chapter six. This probably was a printing error. The spellings of Fortescue are not “Fortesque”. Delhi was garrisoned not by six infantry regiments on 11th May 1857 (Page-80) but by three i.e the 38th, 54th, and 74th Bengal Native Infantry. There were no British detachments in Delhi (Page 80) but few British ordnance personnel serving as technical staff in the magazine. Detachment in strict military terminology

means a subunit in between an infantry section or platoon. The writer states that there were Bengal Army units in Sindh (Page-81). This is incorrect since there were no Bengal Army units in Sindh in 1857. The two native units i.e 14 and 21 Native Infantry were Bombay Army units. The two Bengal Army units bearing numbers 14 and 21 Bengal Native Infantry were at Peshawar and Jhelum respectively. 14 NI rebelled and was destroyed while 21 NI remained loyal, survived the rebellion and still survives as a unit of the Indian Army.Both the Bombay Army units in Sindh in 1857 however had a large number of Hindustanis and one of them i.e the 21 Native Infantry did rebel .Bengal Army was withdrawn from Sindh after 1850 and the area was a part of Bombay Presidency. Nicholson was not a captain from the British Army (Page-86) but from the private Bengal Army of the English East India Company. The term “Maratha Army” ( Page-95,104 etc) is misleading.The Gwalior Contingent led by Tantia Topi consisted of Hindustani (Refers -The Revolt in Central India-1857-59-Intelligence Branch-Army Headquarters- Simla-1908.) troops serving in Gwalior state and hardly had any Marathas. The only other troops that Tantia led consisted of Hindustani regiments of Bengal Army stationed in Central India or the Doab. The Sepoy Rebellion had some Maratha leaders but very few Maratha soldiers since the largely Maratha Bombay Army never rebelled.It is incorrect that the caste basis was abolished and enrolment of Brahmins was discouraged (Page-112) in the post 1857 reorganisation . As a matter of fact there were no class basis in the companies of the pre 1857 Bengal Army and all classes were mixed in each company . On the other hand companies were recruited strictly on “One Class” or “One Caste” basis in the reorganised post 1857 Bengal Army. After 1857 more loyal than the king

loyalists like Sayyid Ahmad Khan became self styled consultants on the policy of divide and rule and suggested to their British masters that the rebellion of 1857 had started because “ Government certainly did put the two antagonistic races into the same regiment, but constant intercourse had done its work and the two races in a regiment had almost become one. It is but natural and to be expected, that a feeling of friendship and brotherhood must spring up between the men of a regiment, constantly brought together as they are. They consider themselves as one body and thus it was that the difference which exists between Hindoos and Mahomeddans had, in these regiments, been almost entirely smoothed away. “( Refers- Page-66-Causes of the Indian Revolt-1858-Sayyid Ahmad Khan- Written after 1857 rebellion and presented to Lord Canning the Governor General) As late as 1885 there were “caste companies” as well as companies based on “ethnic classes” or “ethnic class cum religion”.Thus there were at least 25 “Hindustani Hindu Brahman Infantry Companies” in the Bengal Army out of total 352 regular infantry companies (Refers-Pages-406 & 407-A Sketch of the Services of the Bengal Army up to year 1895-Lieut F.G Cardew-Office of the Superintendent Government Printing Press-Calcutta-1903).The assertion that the first contingent consisting of Indian troops west of Suez consisting of 126 Baluchistan Infantry in 1878 (Page-129) is also incorrect.The first Indian troops were employed west of Suez Canal was in 1801 (when the Suez Canal had not been excavated) (Refers-Pages 74 & 75-Lieut F.G Cardew-Op Cit). These consisted of troops of Bengal and Bombay Armies. There is no doubt that the first Indian VC was won by the Baluch Regiment. However the writer should have mentioned that Indians became eligible for this award only from 1911. Lettow Vorbeck complimented

11 Baluch but the odds that Lettow Vorbeck faced were a hundred time greater than any Indian British or South African troops.The readers may note that Lettow Vorbeck with just maximum 3,500 white troops and maximum 12,000 native troops kept at bay some 300,000 British South African Colonial and Indian troops inflicting 15,000 battle casualties on the allies , some 700,000 disaeses casualties , one camp followers are included and a financial loss of 350 Million US Dollars finally withdrawing into Portueguese East Africa .(Refers-Pages-183 & 184-Concise History of WW ONE-Brig Vincent.J.Esposito-Pall Mall Press-London-1965) .Lettow did not surrender till the end and did so only once he heard that Germany had concluded an armistice with the allies!The assertion that Afghanistan took advantage of the British involvement in the Great War(Page-217) and attacked British India is also incorrect.The Afghans missed the golden period in WW One once India was defended by a total of just 15,000 British troops (Refers -Page-479-Cambridge History of India-Volume Six ) .Once they attacked the British the war was already over and the British had reinforced India. The most serious drawback of the book is the fact that exact class composition of each battalion in WW One and in the period 1919-39 has not been given.The readers must note that errors are a natural part of any historical work.The resource starved and intellectually barren Pakistani society is not “Research friendly”.Pakistani scholars cannot hire research associates like Churchill could.It is a one man show and once one man does it , it is but natural that more errors will be committed. Nevertheless the writer did a commendable job.His achievements have to be viewed in the relative dimension. What is the contribution of our senior retired officers to military writing? Nominal ! In this regard General Rafi’s history is a positive

contribution ! At least he has made a significant attempt to add something to the limited amount of analytical and factual data of Pakistani military history. I remember a letter I received from General Tirmizi in reply to a tactical paper that I had sent him.Tirmizi wrote “ I have not studied the concept but I do commend your effort for taking so much pain and coming up with something thought providing”. General Rafi’s work is thought provoking provided it is read. What he states may not be totally convincing but it will hopefully cause some ripples and perhaps will spur some lazier minds to make another intellectual endeavour ! A vain hope , but one which we must entertain ! The printing is excellent and the quality of paper excellent. General Rafi has made a landmark effort in military history writing. His work has filled a serious void in Pakistani military history. We wish him best of luck with the third volume and hope he will be more forthright in dealing with Pakistani military history which has been promiscuously mixed with myths and fantasies.

History of The Baloch Regiment 1939-1956 Major General Rafiuddin Ahmad (Retired) - Published by Baloch Regiment Centre, Abbottabad; Printed by Central Army Press Rawalpindi (First Edition, 2000) Columnist Maj Gen (Retd) RAFIUDDIN AHMED’s book is reviewed by AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN. The second volume of Baloch Regiment history is a welcome addition to the extremely limited number of books on Indo-Pak military history. Maximum part of the volume deals with the Second World War. The author has laid greater stress on the general military history of the Second World War than on Baloch Regiments’ role in it. This appears to have been done since limited material was available on the regimental histories of the Baloch units which participated in the war and the fact that the Baloch Regiment was relatively a much smaller regiment than the Punjab or the FF Groups. The first chapter contains a good description about the organisation of the Baloch Regiment. The details pertaining to units raised during World War Two are sketchy. A casual remark states that “new classes and areas were included” but no specific figures have been given. The portions dealing with events of Second World War are excellent for the layman readers. The author has also dealt

with the political aspects of Indian perceptions about the Second World War, with special stress on the difference between Muslim League and Congress Party positions. The descriptions about circumstances in which various gallantry awards were won in WW Two are very well written. Yahya Khan’s escape is described in a very interesting manner, however, the author has not discussed the Axis Camp Commandant’s warning to Yahya about having him shot once he was caught escaping before his final successful escape. This incident has been mentioned in one of Shaukat Riza’s books (The 1965 War). The author made a passing reference to General Messervy’s getting captured by the Germans in North Africa while giving his designation but not name. Had he mentioned his name the narrative may have been more interesting since Pakistan Army’s first C in C was a German prisoner for some time as a general officer before he escaped (the Germans not knowing that they had captured the British general officer commanding a British armoured division). The author’s treatment of 1947-48 War could have been more extensive. He has once again quoted Fazal Muqeem’s criticism of Liaquat about calling off Operation Venus but has not given detailed reasons as to how it may have succeeded when the Indian Army in December was well poised to meet it. Even the Pakistani official account of 1970 written many years later refutes Fazal Muqeem’s criticisms. Rafi should have been more critical and should have given a dispassionate and concrete analysis rather than repeating Muqeem’s criticism. It should not have been difficult for the author to analyse the detailed pros and cons of the projected operation Venus. This discussion would certainly have added meat to the bones i.e.

reproduced judgement of Fazal Muqeem Khan. It is fifty two years now from 1948. One wonders whether the 1948 war would ever be properly analysed or not! The volume contains some minor factual errors. The German Blitzkrieg struck across Western Europe not in June 1940 (Page-16) but in May 1940. Rajauri was not captured by a brigade group (Page-206) but by a tank squadron of Central India Horse by a surprise attack through a nala. The infantry brigade later joined the tank squadron after Rajauri had been captured. The book contains extremely elaborate and detailed appendices dealing with various aspects of Baloch regiment history. The research scholars, very rare in Pakistan, will find these particularly useful. The second volume on the whole is a fine contribution to Pakistani military history. We hope that the book will cover many blanks in Pakistani military history. We hope that General Rafi will be more forthright, critical and blunt in his third volume which covers the 1965, and 1971 wars.

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Crossed Swords , Pakistan,Its Army,and the Wars Within-Shuja Nawaz , Oxford University Press,Pakistan , 2008700 pages; 13 black and white photographs, 6 maps; ISBN13: 978-0-19-547660-6ISBN10: 0-19-547660-3 Book Review A.H Amin Crossed Swords is the latest addition to the list of books dealing with Pakistan Army . Written with an eye on the Western audience by a Pakistani who has settled in USA the book is a welcome addition to books on Pakistan Army.It contains some new sources and some new information .Unfortunately most of the information is

anecdotal and the narrators are extolling their own performance. The author's viewpoint is somewhat subjective as he is a brother of one of the ex chiefs of Pakistan Army General Asif Nawaz. The book contains some factual errors , some possibly typing errors,expected from Oxford University Press Pakistan which has a reputation of doing this.Some errors are however historical and factual and were entirely avoidable.On page 8 3rd Light Cavalry of Meerut fame is written as 3rd Light Infantry and on page 9 becomes 3rd Light Cavalry.On page 22 Ayub Khan is placed in Assam regiment though Ayub's battalion officer Joginder Singh specifically stated that Ayub Khan was in Chamar Regiment in WW Two.On page 426 Naseerullah Khan Babar is promoted to lieutenant general and similar fate befalls Major General Sarfaraz Khan on page 223.13 Lancers becomes 13 Cavalry on page 305.On page 470 he changes the ethnicity of Sardar Balakh Sher Mazari a Baloch Seraiki by calling him a Punjabi , an honour that no Baloch would like to have. A far more serious error Shuja makes while discussing the ethnic composition of Pakistan Army on page 570.He states that Sindhis and Baluchis are 15 percent of Pakistan Army.This is a serious distortion of history.The term Muslim Sindhi and Baluchi abbreviated to MS & B was given to Ranghar/Kaimkhani/Khanzada Rajout recruitment in Pakistan Army in 1950s.The aim was to rationalise the recruitment of Ranghars in Pakistan Army.Later the usuper Zia in order to appease the Sindhis created the Sindh

Regiment but Sindhis as far as my resaech reveals are far less than Ranghars/Kaimkhanis/Khanzada Rajputs in the army.The Ranghars are a significant class in fightig arms being some at least 35 % of armour and distinct from Punjabis.The Baloch are hardly represented in the army.As a matter of fact the Pakistan Army has such a reputation in Balochistan that no Baloch would like to join it.All thanks to General Musharraf,Zia and ZA Bhuttos policies. These are expected errors and more so from Oxford University Press Pakistan known for changing authors photograph with those of their uncles on jackets of books as they did with Colonel M.Y Effendi in his book Punjab Cavalry published by Oxford University Press in 2007.The old prince narrated to me the sad story when I met him and was also quite cheesed off by the fact that the princess running the Oxford Pakistan is too arrogant to meet any author or to even discuss anything on telephone. It is significant to note that so disgusted did Effendi become with this Ameena Syed of Oxford that he withdrew his books rights from Oxford University Press Pakistan.Its possible that Effendis book was deliberately sabotaged by Ameena Syed as her brother brigadier Javed Hussian was with Effendi in the tank corps and both did not get along well. The above errors are insignificant.However Shuja has made some asertions which can be classified as serious errors or even distortion of history.On page 71 he asserts that calling off of Operational Venus by Pakistan's civilian government was one of the reasons why the 1947-48 war failed.I state this because the sub title of the chapter is " Why the War Failed".On the other hand he fails to point

out the major fatal decision when the Pakistani government refused to allow the armoured cars of 11 PAVO Cavalry to assist the tribesmen in breaking through to Srinagar.Those who are not familiar should know that the main reason why the tribals failed to take Srinagar was because Indian armour counterattacked them and destroyed them at Shalateng.This fact was discussed by Brig A.A.K Chaudhry also in his book.Operation Venus plan came much later.At that time the Indian Army was well established in Kashmir and well poised to meet any threat.Very few participants of the Kashmir War have left any written accounts of their war experiences. General Iqbal who participated in the war and later on rose to the rank of full general and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, long after the Kashmir War made one very thought provoking remark about the Kashmir War in an article in the Pakistan Army Green Book 1992. This particular publication was sub titled 'Year of the Senior Field Commanders'. Iqbal wrote; 'During 1948 Kashmir Operations I saw one senior officer sitting miles behind the frontline and counting availability of mules and rations. He had relegated the fighting to a senior battalion commander .In 1963 once Major General Fazal I Muqueem Khan in his book The Story of Pakistan Army .Fazal thus wrote; 'To the Army's horror, Pakistan during her greatest hour of triumph in Kashmir agreed to accept the ceasefire...it was difficult to understand why Pakistan let that opportunity pass. Was it assumed weakness; or as a result of pressing advice; or from misplaced chivalry towards an unfriendly neighbour in distress? Whatever the reason,Pakistan's reluctance to accept the risks of continuing the war,cost her Kashmir at that time. It was a risk worth taking."

The Pakistani attack force collected for Operation Venus consisted of about six infantry battalions and two armoured regiments. To oppose this the Indians had two infantry brigades (50 Para Brigade and 80 Infantry Brigade) .In addition there were two armoured regiments in the same area i.e. Central India Horse and the Deccan Horse . In addition the Indians also possessed more than 10 other armoured regiments which were not in Kashmir but in Punjab or Western UP and could move to Kashmir. We shall see in 1965 how Pakistani armour functioned and the reader can keep that as a yardstick in order to appreciate how Pakistani armour and infantry would have behaved in Operation Venus; had it been ever launched!Fazal does not explain how capture Of Beri Pattan bridge would have led to complete collapse of Indian hold over Kashmir,apart from temporary severing of the line of communication to Poonch.Greater part of the Central India Horse was at Nowshera close to Beri Pattan while Deccan Horse in Chamb-Akhnur area was also within striking range and the battle would have been a hotly contested affair!Shaukat Riza did not take the extreme viewpoint similar to Fazal's when he wrote his book on Pakistan Army.He merely said that 'On December 30 both sides saw the wisdom of cease-fire'. Lately in an article General K.M Arif adopted a more rational viewpoint, when he stated that the Kashmir War of 1948 was mismanaged simply because Pakistan was not in a position to fight it successfully summing it up by stating ; 'It is too hazardous a risk to fight a war on ad hoc basis'.There is no doubt that Pakistan was in a favourable position to win the Kashmir War at least till the first week of November. Mr Jinnah exhibited great Coup de Oeil when he ordered Gracey to employ two brigades and

advance with one brigade each towards Jammu and Srinagar. But Mr Jinnah was unlucky in possessing no one like Patel and his Prime Minister and his entire Cabinet proved to be an undoubted failure at least as a war cabinet! Mr Jinnah's decision not to have a Pakistani C in C although taken in the best interest of the country and the Army as Mr Jinnah saw it ensured that the British acting C in C procedurally blocked the execution of Mr Jinnah's orders in October to attack Kashmir. Pakistan was unlucky in having a man like Iskandar Mirza at the Ministry of Defence.Mirza did not advise Mr Jinnah correctly and the fact that he had hardly served in the Army and did not understand military affairs further ensured that Mr Jinnah and the Prime Minister remained as ignorant as they were about military affairs as they were when they were in high school. It is incorrect to criticise Liaqat for Operation Venus since in December 1948 the Indian position was much more secure than in 1947.Liaqat can be criticised for not ever visiting Kashmir while the war was on and for not standing by Mr Jinnah in pressurising Gracey in October 1947 to order the Army to attack Kashmir.Had a Pakistani C in C been appointed even in December or in March 1948 the Indians may not have held on to Poonch-Nowshera area at least. Had Major Masud been allowed with his armoured cars on Domel-Baramula Road despite Ghazanfar Ali and Sher Khan's objections;Srinagar may have been captured by the Tribesmen by first week of November 1947. The Indians were lucky in having comparatively more regular army officers who led from the front and is evident from higher officer casualties among Indian Army officers above the rank of captain vis a vis the Pakistan Army.

The treatment of 1857 is also very superficial.The author states that the Bengal Army which rebelled some 80 % were Purbias (page.7) , but fails to point out that the vast majority of cavalry which led the rebellion notably at Meerut i.e 3rd Light Cavalry which actually captured Delhi was Muslim and mostly Ranghar Muslim.His use of the term British for the pre 1858 period is also factually incorrect as India till 1858 was ruled by the English East India Company using mostly its private Bengal Army ,Madras Army,Bombay Army , its private European regiments and some regiments on rent from British Army to conquer ventire India. In discussion of Martial Races Theory the author totally ignores the fact that Punjab Loyalty in 1857 to the British was one of the main reasons why martial races theory was evolved.This is a simple point noted even by British writers like Philip Mason.The author also fails to note the politically important fact that the English East India Company's army was the knight in shining armour which saved the Muslims of Punjab and settled areas of present Pashtun NWFP from the Sikhs who were using Muslim Mosques as stables gunpowder magazines and plastering their walls with cowdung.Perhaps this fact did not suit the martial races ruled by a 10 % minority,the Sikhs in the Punjab and settled Pashtun areas for more than four decades in Punjab and some two decades in modern NWFP's settled districts. The author talks about martial races theory and thinks that martial races theory was all about Punjab and Frontier as it is now but perhaps does not know that one of martial races theory's most famous exponent Major General

Macmunn regarded the Khanzada Rajputs of Firozpur Jhirka as the finest fighting race in India. The author also fails to note that the Sikhs were in majority in the fighting arms till First World War and were reduced to a minority by being replaced with Punjabi Muslims after First World War because the Punjabi Muslims were regarded as phenomenally loyal , even against Muslims by the British.Thus the author conveniently ignores two important developments of WW One i.e the Singapore rebellion of 129th Light Infantry by Ranghar Muslims and the tribal Pashtun mutinies against British as a result of which tribal Pashtun recruitment was reduced to the gain of Punjabi Muslims. In discussion of Ayub Khan the author totally ignores allegations about Ayub's tacfical timidity in Burma.This incident was discussed by three writers of the time.Major General Joginder Singh of Indian Army who was Ayub's battalion mate , Sardar Shaukat Hayat who was an ex Indian Army officer and Major General Sher Ali Khan.In an article Brigadier Nur Hussain a reliable authority did state that Ayub Khan was close to General Gracey because they drank together. The authors discussion of old officers is also partial.On page 31 he notes that Brigadier Gul Mawaz got an MC , a medal which many earned but fails to note that Major General Akbar Khan won a DSO which is higher in scale than MC.On page 33 he states that " Akbar Khan who gained notoriety in Kashmir ....." .Akbar Khan was the pioneer of Kashmir war but Shuja thinks that he was notorious.A strange assertion.

Mr Jinnah's historic decision of creating two infantry battalions of Bengalis is also not all discussed by the author.It may be noted that Ayub Khan refused to expand the East Bengal Regiment till 1966 as a result of which the Bengalis were further alienated for not being given the due share in the armed forces.this decision was reversed by Yahya Khan in 1966 but by then it was too little too late. The authors analysis of origin of officer corps is also superficial.He fails to note the 50 % ranker quota that the British kept for Indian rankers in the officers selected for IMA Dehra Dun in order to keep the Indian officer corps slavish and backward. The author does note the fact that Pakistani SSG captured Indian War Plan on Samba Kathua road before the war actually started but fails to note the fact that it was Pakistan's Military Intelligence led by Director Military Intelligence Brigadier Irshad who refused to give any serious thought to this discovery and dismissed it as an Indian ruse.This was revealed to this scribe in an interview by Major General Naseerullah Khan Babar in March 2001. The most serious distortion of history committed by Mr Shuja Nawaz is on page 226 when he gives the credit of 25 Cavalry's action of 8th September 1965 at Gadgor to Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik.The authority he quotes is Farouk Adam , then a very junior officer and not in 24 Brigade Headquarter. It must be clarified that a good military historian or analyst's prime motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write "what men did" rather than what "they ought ideally to have done" or what "someone later

with the benefit of hindsight tried to portray , what they had done". Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth from reality. History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has been continuously under civil or military dictators since 1958. I maintain as one great master of English prose said that "all history so far as it is not supported by contemporary evidence is romance"! Battle of Chawinda was thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was essentially "Romance"! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality!Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar, when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st Indian Brigade also did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were created! I repeat "Heroes were created" ! The hero had to be from the Salt Range however ! At least Shuja Nawaz wants it this way ! What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was "casualties" ! These were deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy links !How many were killed in the biggest military blunder "Operation Gibraltar"! This is Top Secret ! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no mention of any

figures! The real motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to "guard reputations" Now lets talk about the broad front deployment that Shuja Nawaz refers to .There is no doubt that the "broad front deployment" was done by Nisar and Nisar alone and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towards each other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of hindsight! Shuja Nawaz here in his 600 page book offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to "do something" as clearly stated by an authority no less than Pakistan Army's official historian Major General Shaukat Riza,apparently not from Jhelum or from North of Chenab by a twist of fate .There is no doubt that Nisar did something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! The "Do Something" order by Brig A.A Malik to Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry should not have been glorified to something higher by Shuja Nawaz simply on authority of an article written by a person who was a company 2IC in an infantry battalion of 24 Brigade and that too only in 1992.This is a serious historical failing.At least in a military historian but is the Oxford University Press Pakistan run by professionals.One may ask Colonel M.Y Effendi.

The same words of Brig A.A Malik " Do Something" were repeated by Nisar in his article published in Pakistan Army Journal in 1997. Perhaps Shuja Nawaz did not read all the accounts of direct participants.Perfectly excusable as he is based in USA.But not good military history certainly.The fact is that the 25 Cavalry on 8th September 1965 was functioning in a vacuum.Brig A.A Malik had no clue about armour warfare and Nisar had no higher armour headquarter to guide him.. 24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had been overrun and dispersed on 8th September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at Gadgor few miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured Division. This was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had he known what was in front of him he may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is speculation and some part of history always remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took place at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25 Cavalry versus two leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus the Indian Armoured Corps historian stated "The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons of Pattons and in the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the higher commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next move. This interval gave Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the

golden opportunity that fate had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost" (Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians acknowledged "This regiment's (25 Cavalry) performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured division and its objective, the MRL canal".(Refers-Page-395-Ibid). This is not the only source.Major Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on record that SJs were awarded to some officers for an attack in which not a single man was killed on both sides! Here he refers to Major Farouk Adam.This reminds me of an incident in armour school Nowshera in 1991.I was an instructor in Tactical Wing.The Senior Instructor incharge of the Young Officers Tactical course asked us , " Should we give an Alpha Grade" . My lone reply was that no Sir , since Armour School gives Alpha to sons of generals only .This was a norm then .The Infantry School where I did the junior tactical course but later on it started giving alphas after 1985 to oblige some sons of generals.But that is how Pakistan Army is. The historical fact remains that 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th and 10th September no fighting took place as Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to the crossroads. On 10th September, 6 Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8th September there was a vacuum and Nisar acted in a

sitaution which can be classified as one characterised by "absence of clear and precise orders"! Shaukat Riza's book is basically a compilation of existing facts. It has historical value since Riza was allowed access to official records.Shaukat had no axe to grind . Shuja Nawaz by his own confession is a close relative of A.A Malik. Shuja also forgets Brig A.A Malik's request to withdraw when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on 16th September and occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the much criticised Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M Arif), first more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I know suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably but was launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter published in Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area. Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it disastrously attacked Buttur Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault of 3 FF but because of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1 Corps suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej Corridor.

A.A Maliks poorly planned counterattacks leading to bloody casualties for Pakistan Army were also discussed by Major General Fazal i Muqeem in his book on 1971 war. On page 233 while discussing the main Pakistani offensive the author fails to point out that the Pakistanis had a 7 to 1 superiority in tanks and yet they failed.Further he fails to point out the fact that major failure of Paskistani 1st Armoured Division occured ion the 4th Brigade where its commander Brigadier Bashir ordered its tank regiments every night to return to leaguer at their start point every night thus abandoning all territory they had gained during the day. In the treatment of Chamb Operation of 1971 the most significant decision of Major General Eftikhar to switch from North to South is not discussed at all.This was one of the most landmark operational decisions in history of Pakistan Army.The author also fails to highlight the cowardly action of then Brigadier Rahimuddin Khan in not joining 111 Brigade on pretext of dealing with Shiekh Mujibs trial.This great warrior later rose to full general in Pakistan Army. Shuja also gives no thought in his worthy analysis to Pakistan Army's launching a pre-emptive attack on India in September 1971.This if done in the words of Indian Commander Western Command General Candeth would have thrown all Indian plans to attack East Pakistan to the winds . (Refers-The Western Front -Candeth). In the chapter dealing with Z.A Bhutto Shuja does not discuss the cadrisation plan proposed by ZA Bhutto and his tasking of Pakistan Army's Military Operations Directorate

to implement it.This plan if implemented would have reduced the standing army in size and enabled the Pakistani government to spend more money on training.This plan was scrapped by Zia in 1977. On page 477 he states that “ Abbasi was the man who had been removed from his command in the Kargil area of Kashmir…………after having undertaken an unauthorized

and costly foray into Indian held territory in 1990‿.Now this comes straight from a man who repeatedly claims nearly total access to all direct participants. Now the facts of the above situation. Poor General Abbasi had done nothing in Kargil. First the use of the word Kargil by Shuja Nawaz is unwarranted and irrelevant and above all totally out of context! Abbasi’s command was not just Kargil only but a much larger area i.e. the entire Northern Areas of Pakistan. Second the foray he Shuja refers to was not launched in 1990 but in 1992 when Shuja Nawaz’s very own brother was the army chief! Third the foray was not as unauthorized as claimed by Nawaz. Abbasi was commanding the FCNA, part of 10 Corps Rawalpindi and his corps commander Lieutenant General G.M Malik,a man of extreme ambition had a tacit understanding with Abbasi that in case he succeeds he was a part of the team and if Abbasi failed G.M did not knew about the attack ! A very typical and known phenomenon in all armies, organizations and bureaucracies all over the world.

Fourthly poor Abassi’s unauthorized foray was not in Kargil but in Siachen an area far away from Kargil. Lastly Abbasi had been packed off to the FCNA in late 1990 a time when snow made any foray in Kargil or Siachen impossible. This happened once Abbasi expressed disagreement with the then corps commander 4 Corps Lahore Alam Jan Mehsud.The incident was narrated by this scribe to then Brigadier Salahuddin Tirmizi (later lieutenant general).Alam Jan thought that Abbasi should be posted to FCNA where he could catharsize his spirit of Jihad on those snowy rocky icy pinnacles of Siachen Glacier.Catharsize he did, with disastrous and bloody results in 1992.Not 1990 as this privy to inside sources in the army claims. And that too when his brother was army chief.A sad reflection on how an operation was mounted by an overzealous divisional commander, with secret authorization of his direct superior corps commander, while keeping a so called professional army chief in absolute darkness ! A sad but logical end to the career of Abbasi who was a more upright and internally motivated general officer and shoulders above most of the general officers that I saw in my army service. Shuja Nawaz repeats the above assertion again on page.509 when he states that “among the many attempts to gain advantage at Kargil was a failed attempt in 1990

by……Major General Zaheer ul Islam Abbasi‿. On the same page again Shuja once again repeats the same totally incorrect assertion “without clearance from the army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg,Abbasi launched

an attack on the LOC‿ .Poor Beg the target practicing

range of Shuja Nawaz had no connection with Abbasi’s ill fated attack in 1992 ! Beg had retired in August 1991. Burhanuddin Rabbani promoted or demoted to Mullah Burhanuddin Rabbani by Shuja Nawaz on page.479 was the president of Afghanistan in 1992 and not

“subsequent‿ to 1994 as stated by Shuja. In footnote.2 on page.502 Shuja Nawaz has forcibly thrust the honour of being Chief of Staff 12 Corps on General Kakar, when he states that Kakar served as Chief of Staff of 12 Corps at Quetta under Rahimuddin (famous for not joining his command in Chamb in 1971 thus making his then commanding general Major General Eftikhar state that he would court martial this man after the war. To Rahimuddin’s good luck Eftikhar embraced martyrdom in the war and Rahimuddin survived).This is a factual error as 12 Corps at Quetta did not exist at that time. This corps was raised somewhere in 1985 when Rahimuddin was already the chairman joint chiefs. In the same footnote Shuja Nawaz states that Kakar was wounded at Chawinda in 1965 war .When the 1965 war started Kakar was at intelligence school in Murree.This assertion of Kakar being wounded while possible is questionable .Its possible that Kakar joined his unit in later part of the war. On page.508 Nawaz states that “one of the first actions in 1948 Kashmir war was the securing of Kargil heights by Pakistani forces.This is a serious factual error. The first major action of the 1947-48 Kashmir war was the attack on Muzaffarabad in October 1947 and the seizing of heights near Kargil happened much later in May 1948 by

the Eskimo Force of Gilgit Scouts under Captain Shah Khan (later an air force officer).As a matter of fact Kargil itself was captured by the Gilgit Scouts and they had then captured Zojila Pass and advanced across it. But all this happened much later after October 1947. Good in details, written from the relative calm and safety of USA, this book possibly written with good intentions, got lost in the woods of details and failed to present the broad picture. Many Bhagwans of military history reviewed it and failed to find any fault with it! On page 471 Shuja glorifies General Kakar for having no liking for politics.He ignores the fact that Kakar was not groomed for higher ranks and was promoted because of ethnic biases.Simply because a Pashtun president was comfortable with a harmless compatriot.He also fails to note that General Kakar acted against Nawaz Sharif not because Kakar was a democrat but simply because he feared Nawaz as a threat to his chair of army chief.General Musharraf has himself acknowledged in his book that General Kakar was parochial and was favouring Pashtun officers.No compliment to an army chief who is supposed to be a much bigger man.No wonder that Kakar had been packed off to a backwater in Quetta by General Baig.Becoming chief was something that a man of Kakar's mediocre intellect could never have imagined but this happened only because of party baazi in the army and the fact that Ghulam Ishaq Khan wanted a Pashtun brother.Fair enough in a backward and tribal medievaal society like Pakistan !

It is my conviction based on a deep study of that period,that if Kakar would have been the army chief in 1996 and 1997 General Musharraf or any non Pashtun officer would never have become the army chief ! Why ? Simply because Musharraf was not a Pashtun ! Here it must be noted that Jahangir Karamat ,Kakar's successor was miles above Kakar in intellect as well as professionalism.Though a Punjabi he was not from the more parochial tract of area between Chenab and Indus and thus a man with a broader outlook.Its a tragedy of the Pakistan Army that he became a victim of a conspiracy made successful by his own brother officers in ISI , that too because there was that parochial net during that time between the then prime minister and the boss of the prime inter service security agency. The author lauds caretaker premier Moin Qureshi's role in making the state bank independent but forgets Qureshi's most controversial release of advance to Bayinder Turkey for Islamabad Peshawar Motorway while also stating that this project was uneconomical.This gained nothing but total loss for Pakistan as Bayinder repatriated many million dollars without doing anything and later successfully sued Pakistan for huge damages in International Court of Justice at Hague. On page 480 Shuja extols Talibans wild west justice in hanging Afghan President Dr Najeeb but fails to note the allegation that Pakistani agencies were suspected to be behind the assasination of Mulla Borjan the most popular and independent leader of the Taliban. On page 481 Shuja quotes Benazir to prove that General Kakar was a brilliant strategist.What did Benazir know

about strategy and what strategy did Kakar ever successfully execute other than removing a Punjabi Kashmiri prime minister against decision of supreme court just to assist a fellow Pashtun president.What is Shuja trying to prove . In discussing tenure of General Jahagir Karamat Shuja ignores totally the Ukrainian tank deal commissions.Nawaz Sharif the then prime minister tasked ISI to launch an investigation.Major General Zulfiqar then in ISI was tasked to investigate.He went to Ukraine and Azerbaijan and compliled a thick volume on the whole transaction and commissions taken.This was used by Nawaz later and one of the reasons why Karamat quickly stepped down.The information was given by a staff officer from Corps of Engineers of major rank with DG ISI of that time and confirmed by an Intelligence Bureau officer.It is strange that Shuja Nawaz who seems to know everyone who matters fails to discuss this serious issue.Or perhaps he succumbed to the conspiracy of silence.Karamat was betrayed by his brother officers and that too just out of selfish motives to please the then prime minister.Not out of any national motives. As an officer who served from 1981 to 1988 how would I sum up the Pakistan Army. 1981 to 1983 a cheap emphasis on being good Muslim, growing a beard to get a good report from Zia.Further Zia used religion to get dollars.This was the basic motivation. Begs time saw for the first time a tradition of some criticism being accepted.An effort was made to introduce the culture of intellectual honesty in the army.

Asif Nawaz time saw emphasis on starch but no change in the army.We did not see any professional change in Asif Nawaz's Asif Nawaz's time other than introduction of peak cap in the uniform Kakars time saw parochialism par excellence with a chief at the head who used to count cherries in his garden and was upset when some guards ate some.( This first hand account was given to me in Okara in June 1993 when Kakar was the army chief and at the height of his power by a Lieutenant Colonel Feroz , an officer from FF Regiment , whose unit provided Kakars guard while he was a corps commander in Quetta) .A petty man elevated to the highest rank.No wonder he was non political because in the heart of his hearts he must have thanked his stars that he became a four star general.An authority no less than General Musharraf has stated in his book that KAKAR WAS PAROCHIAL . In this case Musharraf has hit the nail right on the head. Karamat I did not see in service and did not serve with so I cannot comment but is reported to be a mild man.Musharraf as I saw him as a major general was flashy,extrovert,egoistic but dynamic.The present army from what I learn from serving officers is again business as usual.Nothing much to write about.The agencies off course play the usual games for money and for their own naukri and Islam being misused for operational reasons.

The most serious criticism of Shuja's analysis is in treatment of Islamic fundamentalism in the army.Shuja on page 585 consoles the audience of his book that Islamic fundamentalism is still not a threat in Pakistan Army.Shuja ignores the more dangerous fact that the army has misused Islam as a slogan to mobilise the populace to achieve its narrow institutional agenda.This is more dangerous than being Islamist.Now this policy may go out of control.Right from Zia in 1977 the army generals used Islam as a slogan to fight a proxy war in Indian Kashmir and Afghanistan.Events may prove that this would be the undoing of Pakistan as it stands in its present form.Now Pakistan is perceived in the west as part of the problem and not the solution.Particularly its army and intelligence agencies are seen as the heart of the problem.India is continuously preparing for a war although a low intensity one and no solution has been achieved in Kashmir.Afghanistan is increasingly hostile and a strange but logical Indian-Russian-Iranian-NATO un declared strategic alliance has come into place in Afghanistan against Pakistan.All these are serious developments.The coming ten years may vindicate this assertion. The Pakistan Army and its generals may be remembered in history as one of the reasons for Balkanisation of Pakistan.Not a good omen for Pakistan.The army's involvement in Pakistan's politics and government is now a serious reason of imbalance for Pakistan's political system.No hope appears in sight as we hear rumours that the agencies are still active in destabilising Pakistan's own elected government. Shuja has burnt his midnight oil.He has compiled and collected all the facts in a nice way but his analysis has

been shallow.We expected something far more profound than this.600 pages written in vain.

Military Control in Pakistan-The Parallel State ,Mazhar Aziz Price: $150.00 , ISBN: 978-0-415-43743-1 ,Binding: Hardback Published by: Routledge ,Publication Date: 24th October 2007 ,Pages: 160 Mazhar Aziz's book on military and politics in Pakistan is a new addition to books dealing with civil military relations in Pakistan. Mazhar Aziz Mazhar Aziz (PhD, University of Nottingham, 2006) is a former Pakistani civil servant and an independent scholar with research interests in democracy and political representation, civil-military relations and foreign policy.

He is an outsider to the Pakistani military having observed it as a civil servant who at times are junior partners in the civil military nexus in Pakistan barring few exceptions like the old fox Ghulam Ishaq or the half military half civilian Iskandar Mirza. Aziz in words of a reviewer "introduces the concept of institutional path dependency. According to him, the institutional innovations of the formative years of Pakistan's history (1947-54) created a form of path dependency that has been responsible for thwarted democratisation, military intervention and post-military withdrawal crises." Aziz however fails to define this concept of " Institutional Path" precisely and also fails to connect it with the negative British colonial military legacy particulary the British Imperial policy in Punjab from 1849-1947. Under the British the Punjab the preferred British recruiting area for the army from 1857 till 1947 had a special status.It was a non regulation province where the deputy commissioner was far more powerful than in any British province and most of the initial deputy commissioners were ex army.It was a province where the feudals and the British had a special relationship.It was a province where the vast bulk of British intelligence resources were employed as its location was the most strategic in entire British India.It was a province which had the closest link and the largest contribution to the British

war effort as far as 1857 ,First World War and Second World War were concerned. While the Indian Army and notably the Punjabis , and most particularly the Punjabi Muslims were the closest collaborators of the British immediately after partition the Pakistani Army particularly its pro British generals were the most valuable political asset of the British.The Pakistani generals led by Ayub Khan soon out of personal ambition became the self styled guardians of Pakistans territorial and ideological boundaries.Ayub Khan with open support of civil servants like Ghulam Mohammad and the military cum civil servant Iskandar Mirza on his own started negotiating with USA and boasted that the US Director CIA was his best friend.At this point in time Ayub was propelled to do so by personal ambition and by the declared intention of safeguarding Pakistan and the army's institutional interests on the pretext of acquiring US weapons.In this case he was however not alone.The initial move for US aid was made by Mr Jinnah and later by Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad.From 1954 onwards however Ayub was picked out by USA as USA's best bet.India was too large to be manipulated and India's Congress too formidable a party to be messed with.In Pakistan however manipulation was simpler because of the pre partition feudal military civil service connection.Thus in case of Ayub the mafia was not military alone but civil military West Pakistani feudal with Punjabis in lead and all conspiring to reduce the Dravidian Bengalis politically.What followed was a joint conspiracy by the army with a linguistically Punjabi chief in league with Punjabi feudals and civil servants to snatch legitimate

political power from the Bengalis.Mazhar Aziz misses this point or has practiced selective distortion. The Yahya takeover of 1969 was the most credible intervention by the army done out of national interests.General Yahya did make an honest attempt to introduce direct franchise and provincial autonomy.Unfortunately he failed because all of pakistan's rulers starting from Jinnah had mishandled the Bengalis and the situation became unmanageable. Zia on the other hand acted out of personal motives because he feared that Bhutto wanted to sack him and the top army generals feared Bhutto who was a popular leader.Again a case of class interests rather than institutional interests. Aziz misses the point that the army or its top clique was used by the USA to achieve its geopolitical ends in Pakistan.Every military takeover in Pakistan had some link with USA or became a servile instrument to further US geopolitical objectives. Aziz also fails to note that initial military takeovers were more personality oriented while starting from Zia the army's generals very correctly called the trade union of

generals acted out of class interests.After 1977 it became the stated objective of the Pakistan Army's top generals and its intelligence agencies to destroy all independent political leadership in Pakistan.Thus every political party was penetrated and every effort made to destroy independent political leadership.The Punjab again was the centre of these efforts and the emergence of Nawaz Sharif in 1988 was the high point of these covert efforts. General Zia's successor General Beg did hold the elections of 1988 but failed to control the ISI pursuing a parallel policy or simply ignored what it was doing thus destabilisng and removing the first PPP government in 1990.In 1990 Mr Nawaz Sharif was the best choice of the army's ruling clique but he was removed in 1993.In this case again the matter was not entirely or even 50 % institutional but a collusion of a Pashtun president and a Pashtun army chief to remove a Punjabi PM who was becoming too assertive.Their natural choice was a Sindhi lady .This move again was unconstitutional and motivated by personal and ethnic motivation rather than institutional motivation. In 1999 the Musharraf coup was again motivated by personal considerations rather than any institutional considerations.Many generals supported Musharraf because they had been fired by Nawaz Sharif notably General Mahmud Corps Commander Rawalpindi.

After 2001 however Musharraf got a great opportunity to play the role of USA's best collaborator.Again a continuation of the Punjab loyalty to British of 1857 and Ayub loyalty to USA in the Cold War or Zia loyalty to USA in 1979-1988. It would be more correct to describe the army in Pakistan as a mixture of institutional and class loyalty with personal motivation and ambition of the army chief as the main catalyst.The army is divided into many classes and the real culprits are the top 150 or 200 generals around the chief.Their ambition distorts the whole scenario and their selfish actions cannot be called institutional interests. Unless their is total defeat as happened to the Russian Army in 1917 the hegemony of the army signified by these top 150-200 windbag generals would continue come what may ! Now how to bell the cat.Only defeat in war can reduce the army's role in Pakistan.The same happened in Russia in 1905 and 1917.In Turkey in 1918.In Japan in 1945,Alone the Pakistani politicians cannot do it.They are the test tube babies of many army intelligence agencies.

It appears that change is round the corner.The army is facing internal fractures.Its lower ranks for the first time in its history were involved in at least two major assassination attempts against the army chief and these included many soldiers from Musharraf's own SSG commandos.The army is being challenged by Islamists and its credibility is being reduced.Conventional war is out but the secret war at covert levels continues.India intelligence knows that the war never ended and so does the Pakistani intelligence.For the first time in West Pakistan's hopeless history the army is being challenged in NWFP and Balochistan and the threat has not been contained.This is an ethnic war as its a Punjabi Army with junior Pashtun auxillaries like the Yusufzais and Khattaks fighting the Baloch and tribals . The army is trying to sell itself to USA as its best bet but it appears that the USA has decided that some structural changes are needed in the Pakistan Army. The bottom line however is not the Pakistani generals but US policy , at least at the Defence Department,State Department,CIA and DIA level.They want the Pakistani generals.They do not trust the Pakistani politicians and that's the main reason why the Pakistani generals and only the top 20 are guarding their class interests .A small class by numbers but very influential and destructive. Only defeat in war or Balkanisation will reduce the role of Pakistani generals.Mazhar misses this point.

To conclude Aziz fails to present a comprehensive case for the Instutional path theory although he makes many repetitions in the core 100 pages of his book.

AHMED RASHID

Descent into Chaos , Ahmed Rashid, Allen Lane,2008.ISBN No .978-1-846-14175-1 Book Review A.H Amin

Ahmed Rashid acquired fame and became darling of the west when his book on Taliban was published in 2000 or so.Descent into Chaos is another bestseller as far as publishing statistics is concerned.It is a tragedy that the West,guardian of the present worlds intellectual property projects what suits its political and social interests and stifles what it finds “ politically unacceptable”.Seen in this background what Ahmed Rashid writes is acceptable to the west.Possibly because what he says fits hand in glove with western perceptions about how to shape the future. As normal the book has some factual errors.Some insignificant some not so insignificant and some which not have escaped the sagacity of a known Afghanistan hand like Ahmed Rashid. The Ghilzai revolt started not in 1701 as stated on page.7 but in 1709.The Durranis did not move the capital to Kabul in 1772 as stated on page.7 but in 1774 if we agree with Sayed Qasem Reshtia a great Afghan historian or 1775 if we believe Louis Dupree who is concerned the most reliable western historian.On page.8 Ahmed Rashid states that the British tried to conquer Afghanistan three times.This is not correct.It happened twice if we include the English East India Company and once if we include the Second Afghan War of 1878-80.In the Third Afghan War it were the Afghans who tried to attack India and miserably failed and the British launched some very local offensive actions at Spin Boldak and Khyber Agency to push back the Afghans.On page.9 Rashid promotes Major General

Naseerullah Babar to lieutenant general rank.On page.11 he states that for first time in 300 years the Afghan capital Kabul fell in non Pashtun hands once Ahmad Shah Masud captured it.This is quite incorrect.The first time Afghanistan’s capital fell in Non Pashtun hands was once the Persian Qazalbash Nadir Shah captured Kandahar the then capital of Ghiljai Pashtuns on 24 March 1738 some 224 years before 1992 and Kabul on 29 June 1738 again some 223 years and some 10 months before April 1992.In any case we must remember that Kabul was a Hindu province for a long time in twelfth century and a Mughal Indian province for some 200 plus years long before 1992.On page 17 Rashid states that the Pakistani FC managed Pakistani artillery and communications.This is factually incorrect.The FC hardly has any artillery and the Afghans did not require any training in communications.In any case the Afghans had a much larger number of ex Afghan Army gunners with Mujahideen quite capable of handling all types of artillery guns of Soviet vintage available in Afghanistan.Rashid seems to be very friendly with US officials who throughout his narrative keep on telling him so many things,like on page.18 US officials tell him that Al Qaeda was responsible for USS Cole.On page.34 Rashid states that “ the British conquest of Northwest India was aimed solely at providing security from marauding Afghan Baloch and Pashtun tribes” .This assertion is factually incorrect.The British company English East India Company’s conquest of North West India comprising modern Pakistan was done in response to invasion of Sikhs of British territory in 1845.At that time the Sikhs were controlling all major Pashtun cities like Peshawar,Bannu ,Kohat,D.I Khan etc so the question of the Pashtun, Afghan or Baloch simply does not arise.Musharraf was not commissioned in the field artillery

as stated on page.45 but in the “ Self Propelled Artillery”.On page.45 Rashid states that in 1971 Musharraf commanded an SSG Commando unit which went behind the enemy lines.In 2002 I interviewed Musharrafs Commanding Officer in 1971 Brigadier Iqbal Nazir Warraich who confirmed that Musharraf was a sub unit commander under him and Musharraf’s sub unit was not used behind enemy lines.On page.52 Rashid states that the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was the ISI’s investigative arm.This is also factually incorrect.The NAB was an independent public body which was not independent and not connected to ISI in any organizational sense.On page.73 Rashid calls Burhanuddin Rabbani a Panjsheri Tajik which is not correct.Rabbani was from Badakhshan province.On page.79 Rashid states that the ISI chief (Mahmood) was forced to resign.This is incorrect.Mahmood was simply removed and never resigned and to date draws his pension from the army to which an officer who resigns his commission is not entitled.On page 186 Rashid reduces the distance from Kabul to Kandahar to 190 miles which is not correct.On page 193 Rashid states that the Mazar Kabul line was financed by World Bank.This is not correct since this electric transmission line was a gift of Government of India to Afghanistan.Karachi port had not serviced transit trade for Afghanistan since 1950s as stated on page 192 but for a long time before that dating back to the Kalhora,Talpur and British times.There was a famous incident of a ship carrying armaments for Afghanistan by the British so that King Amanullah was militarily weakened against Afghan rebels in late 20s.On page.259 Rashid states that the ISI was meeting Taliban leaders in Command and Staff College Quetta.This is quite funny and ridiculous.Why should the ISI meet insurgents in an academic institution

with which it has no connection rather than in a safe house.Probably Rashid was trying to be humorous.On page.261 Rashid indicates that Afghan ministers gave up their foreign passports.My inquiries while permanently based in Kabul from June 2004 till todate indicate that this assertion is not correct.On page.274 Rashid places the Mahsud tribe in North Waziristan whereas Mahsuds main area is South Waziristan Agency.On page 275 Rashid states that a murdered man’s body was found in military handcuffs.This is a unique discovery .My inquiries reveal that there is no such object as military handcuffs.The military buys handcuffs from the open market.On page 331 Rashid states that the Afghan Tajikistan border is 750 miles whereas my inquiries reveal that it may be about a 100 mile less. Factual errors done with we move on to the more serious assertions of Rashid.On page.4 Rashid dismisses Mullah Omar as a itinerant preacher who could not claim the pedigree of Karzais.On page.13 Rashid again ridicules Mullah Omar for being born without social status or pedigree. I find this distinctly snobbish coming from the pen of a leftist Ahmed Rashid.Probably in his old age he has become class conscious.On page 6 Rashid states that easy to pass through the country has been impossible to conquer.Now this is a relative statement.For more than 200 years most parts of Afghanistan were provinces of Mughal and Saffavid Empires.The Mughals actually had a Hindu Rajput Governor in Kabul.

On page 19 Rashid passes sweeping judgment on Talibans when he says that Osama Bin Laden had a clear strategy in mind to isolate them from the world.A more balanced and scholarly approach may have been used.Rashid cites no supporting sources. Some of Rashids conclusions about Pakistan are quite accurate.Like Pakistan as a state being grappled with an acute sense of insecurity.The army’s monopolization of power in Pakistan in the name of national security.His analysis of the Pakistani military mindset is penetrating and brilliant.His exposure of of the military links of the likes of Maliha Lodhi and Shaukat Aziz is again a breath of fresh air.Rashids revelations about the Pakistani intelligence agency ISIs negative role in Pakistani politics is bold and accurate to the dot.One may not agree with how the USA downsized the Afghan intelligence.My inquiries reveal that some of the most brilliant officers of the indomitable Khad were removed just because the American advisors wanted to severely reduce Russian influence.Rashids analysis of US firm Louis Burger is incomplete and not wholly correct.Louis Burgers failures in delay in building of schools was because of unprofessional sub contracting procedures and because of the fallacious policy of hiring only Afghan NGOs to do the job instead of commercial firms.Most of these NGOs were owned by political appointees and haphazardly formed to siphon the fruits of US aid.I saw the whole process myself as the Vice President of an Afghan NGO which was building schools and clinics for Louis Burger in 2004 and 2005 in Helmand ,Ghazni and Kunduz.Rashid does not have his facts correct when he states that Louis Burger had just 9 schools and 2

clinics ready in end of 2005.The number was much larger than this.Even in this case some Afghan NGOs like CDU did extremely well. Rashids conclusion that the ISI was no longer in control of the monster of extremism that it created are valid but incomplete.What about the CIA and the Saudi intelligence the real fathers of extremism ? On page 223 Rashid states that Pakistani artillery gave covering fire to Taliban militants infiltrating Afghanistan.This is an illogical and implausible assertion.The Talibans do not need covering fire because a very large part of Afghanistan Pakistan border is unmanned.The most important stretch in Helmand and Nimroz has hardly any Afghan NATO or US presence at all. Rashid is harsh on the Americans,the Pakistanis as well as the Afghans.However he presents no tangible recommendations to remedy the situation. His analysis ignores some important ground realities.First that the USA came to Afghanistan to achieve certain strategic objectives.Its aim was not altruistic or missionary.Thus the low per capita aid figure to USA.The US objective at least till 2008 has been to maintain control

of about 15 plus military/air bases .The US troop strength is far below the minimum necessary to even ensure security in Afghanistan. The control of Afghanistan still lies with the pre 1992 bureaucracy trained by the Soviets.This includes the army,the civil services,the police which was a real bastion of the leftists and above all the foreign ministry and the intelligence .All despite various reductions and purges by the USA and NATO.The Northern Alliance cadres on whom the USA tried to rely dod not simply have enough trained and educated recruits.Thus the important division in all Afghan Government in between the Maslakis ( professionals) and the Wasta dars (those who came without sufficient qualifications). Rashid also ignores the fact that Pakistan’s Islamic extremism is not the result of a sudden flight but a logical result of misuse of religion by all major Muslim leaders since 1858. Rashids subject matter is vast and the complexities with which he is trying to deal are vast in magnitude and their dimensions.Rashid’s analysis is subtle and thought provoking but marred by his extreme bias against the Taliban.This leads him repeatedly to make pre conceived statements and sweeping judgements.

Nevertheless Rashids analsyis is thought provoking and can be immensely instrumental as a catalyst in inspiring more research on the subject.My fear is that Rashid’s present work is more a commercial venture with one eye on audience in the west.This is not the idealistic Rashid reporting from Kabul for the Far Eastern Economic Review.But as they say “ things do not change,we change”. One may not agree with Rashids assertion about Central Asia being the new bastion of Al Qaeda.With Russia fast moving in and re-asserting it may be more difficult for the Al Qaeda to gain ascendancy in Central Asia.The provisional centre of gravity of the Al Qaeda lies in non state actors in Pakistan and the Arabian Gulf.It is going to be a long bloody war for the USA to alter this particular strategic situation.