Mamiya and the Digital Revolution

Christian Sandström holds a PhD from Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden. He writes and

speaks about disruptive innovation and technological change.

Along with Hasselblad,

Pentax, Contax, Bronica and some other companies,

Mamiya used to be a dominant player

in the medium format segment of

the camera industry.

The medium format segment is comprised of those cameras which use 6*6, 6*4,5 and 6*7 cm film. The segment

has always been very small in relation to the camera industry, only about 1-3

percent of all cameras sold have been medium format cameras. It has always been a niche market for professional

photographer.

On September 1, 2006, the Mamiya camera business was

sold to Cosmo Digital and formed a new company, Mamiya Digital Imaging.

The shift to digital imaging

had created a

lot of problems

for the company.

Let’s go back in time and take a look at what

happened to Mamiya.

Mamiya emerged after the second world war as a low cost alternative to Rollei. The

Mamiya camera was not as small or smooth, but it was reasonably cheap and unlike Rollei had interchangeable lenses.

Over the years, Mamiya kept improving

their products and emerged as a formidable competitor to Hasselblad, for instance in the segment for wedding photography.

Over the years, thousands of wedding memories have been captured by Mamiya cameras.

It was actually in Mamiya’s

segment that digital imaging

started to prosper in the early 1990s.

Some of the first digital

imaging technology came from

Leaf Systems.

Leaf produced digital backs, which could be attached to Hasselblad

cameras instead of film.

It looked like this.

Yes, big and bulky.

But the business utility was great. Many film photos were digitized

sooner or later anyway. With a digital back, one

step in the production of photos could be removed.

The first digital backs were expensive and had a moderate

performance. The first one by Leaf had 4 Megapixels and Kodak launched one with 6 Mpixels.

But the performance was good enough for some applications.

Press and Studio photographers loved it and NASA was very

interested in the Kodak sensor.

Digital imaging had

other attributes

which made it attractive.

An infinite amount of

photos could be taken and

then be replicated,

manipulated and sent, at a very low cost.

So the business utility

of a digital back which cost maybe

30 000 dollars was still big.

And the image quality was

Good Enough, as long as the photos were not enlarged.

Despite the fact that digital imaging actually had a high

business utility in these early days, none of the established

medium format firms succeeded in developing their

own digital backs.

Instead, many companies were created around the idea to develop digital backs for

established medium format players.

Leaf…

Imacon…

http://www.imacon.dk/

Sinar…

Kodak also developed

some digital backs…

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9e/Digitalback_dcs420_02.jpg

Phase One…

During the 1990s, these companies kept selling digital

backs which could be attached to medium format

cameras.

The analogue medium format was still healthy, though the segment kept shrinking due to the improved performance

of smaller cameras.

The next big thing in this segment was autofocus.

Mamiya, Hasselblad, Contax and the others sought to

develop this new feature in the late 1990s.

Mamiya introduced autofocus in the

645 AF 4.5×6 SLR in 1999.

Having done so before Hasselblad, the company

obtained an increased market share on this shrinking market.

Together with back manufacturers, Mamiya was able to deliver a digital system at an early point. However, this did by

no means guarantee the long term survival of the company.

The Nikon D1 launched 1999 was the first true alternative for most

photographers who wanted digital cameras. It was mortal to many of

the old camera firms…

The digital SLR cameras from Canon and Nikon were cheaper,

lighter and good enough.

These companies invested massively in R&D and generated

cheaper and more advanced models at a furious pace.

Within a few years, Hasselblad and Mamiya lost the entire wedding photography segment to Canon.

Thus, the medium format segment shrank even further

with the shift to digital imaging and this put Mamiya in

some great trouble.

Collaborating with Leaf and providing great but very expensive products was

simply not enough.

However, Mamiya went further in this direction – in 2004 the

company announced the Mamiya ZD and the

Mamiya ZD digital back.

These products were severely delayed. It is very hard for a

small company with shrinking revenues to develop new

products, especially in such a competitive market.

The Mamiya ZD was not launched until early 2006 and by then, the SLR models from Canon and Nikon had reached

a performance level which implied that few customers demanded an expensive, fantastic but big camera.

Thus, the efforts which were put into these products did

not result in improved financial results.

The situation became desperate and Mamiya

announced in early 2006 that the camera division

was for sale.

Mamiya had up until this point been regarded as a survivor

since competitors like Bronica and Contax had already

left the industry.

Things change rapidly in an industry which has become

digital…

Mamiya was bought by Cosmo digital imaging, an IT company.

The idea was to combine software skills with Mamiyas skills in imaging and thereby

regain lost ground.

New lenses were launched in 2006 and Mamiya initiated a close collaboration with the

Danish digital back manufacturer Phase One.

The previous collaboration with Leaf resulted in the launch of

the DL28 in late 2008.

Priced at 15 000 USD, the camera offered improved

autofocus and a better integration with the

digital back of 28 Megapixels.

This sounds promising, given that the price of medium format

cameras has been a critical issue before, this camera may

help Mamiya to recover.

The collaboration with Phase One resulted in the

Mamiya 645, which was also launched under the Phase One brand.

Just recently, in March 2009, Phase One announced that the company will invest in Mamiya.

“We are committed to providing open, upgradable medium format camera systems,

so that pro photographers can enjoy the maximum flexibility and versatility at an

attractive cost of ownership”

// Henrik O. Håkonsson, President, Phase One.

“Furthering our relationship with Mamiya Digital Imaging that we initiated in 2006, we continue to design a broad

range of new cameras, digital backs and lenses that will offer the world’s

leading photographers greater choice and satisfaction.”

Together, Phase One and Mamiya Digital Imaging own all competencies required

for developing superior, innovative medium format camera systems. Our

combined expertise comprises digitalization, camera fine mechanics,

optics design and production and broad ranges of software and firmware

capabilities.”

// Toshio Midorikawa, President of Mamiya Digital Imaging.

“This investment by Phase One enables us to better optimize our

complementary capabilities to the benefit of our customers. And as a

result of our close collaboration, new products are just around the corner. We plan to introduce both new leaf

shutter lenses and even more super lightweight focal plane shutter lenses in 2009. We aim to offer the world’s

widest range of medium format lenses for Mamiya and Phase One.”

Whether this will help Mamiya out of their trouble remains to be

seen. For sure, this is a step in the right direction. However, the SLR cameras from Canon and Nikon are getting better each year and the medium format

market keeps shrinking…

This story is a bit puzzling – there was a financial logic in developing digital backs long before the real shift to

digital imaging, yet still Mamiya never captured this market but instead left it to companies like Leaf, Imacon, Phase

One and Jenoptik.

Why?

The main reason is probably that Mamiya had a competence base which was related to precise mechanics and

optics, not electronics. Therefore, the company did not have and failed to develop the capabilities needed to launch digital backs themselves.

By looking inside a product you get an idea what the company and its knowledge are really all about.

With the shift to digital imaging, much of Mamiya’s competence base lost its

value and thus, the company encountered great problems.

Sources

The online photographer The British Journal of Photography Digital Photography Review

Image attributions

Find out more:

www.christiansandstrom.org